Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed a district court's decision in a case involving a plaintiff, John Breuer, who sued the State of Montana for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The accident was caused by a student-employee of the University of Montana. Breuer claimed that the accident resulted in a shoulder injury that caused him significant pain and suffering, and loss of established course of life. The State admitted liability for the accident, but disputed that the accident was the sole cause of Breuer's claimed disabilities and pain. The district court excluded evidence of Breuer's pre-accident back injury and related disabilities as alternate cause evidence. The Supreme Court held that this was an error and that the district court's exclusion of this evidence materially prejudiced the State's right to a fair trial. The case was remanded for a new trial. View "Breuer v. State" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the petitioner, Jay Watson, filed a grievance against his employer, the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks (FWP or agency), claiming he was underpaid for six years due to an agency error in implementing a new pay system. The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, ruled in favor of Watson and reversed the Final Agency Decision issued by the Board of Personnel Appeals (BOPA or Board). The court also awarded attorney fees to Watson. FWP appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana.The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not err in reversing BOPA’s decision. The court found that BOPA incorrectly applied the Montana Wage Payment Act (MWPA) to Watson's grievance, which was pursued under the agency's grievance process. The court found that the MWPA provides a process independent from the agency grievance process and its restrictions and benefits do not apply to Watson's claim. As such, the MWPA's three-year limitation does not apply to Watson’s claim, and the court affirmed the District Court’s reinstatement of the Hearing Officer’s pay determination.However, the Supreme Court held that the District Court erred in awarding attorney fees to Watson. The court noted that Montana follows the “American Rule” regarding fee awards, which provides that “absent statutory or contractual authority, attorney’s fees will not be awarded to the prevailing party in a lawsuit.” There was no contractual or statutory authority providing for attorney fee awards for prevailing parties in this case, and the court found that this case was not frivolous litigation or litigated inappropriately by FWP. Therefore, an exception to the generally applicable American Rule was not established. The court reversed the attorney fee award and remanded for entry of an amended judgment. View "Watson v. FWP" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, a dispute arose over the distribution of a deceased person's estate, particularly a 1978 Ford pickup truck. The decedent was Ronald Glen Kemmer, who died intestate and was survived by his four adult children: Travis Kemmer, Becky Mastley, Collette Cole, and Ronda Gilge, referred to as the Heirs. Travis Kemmer served as the Personal Representative (PR) of the Estate. The Heirs could not agree on the disposition of the truck, and a conflict arose over whether a binding agreement had been reached and whether Travis Kemmer, as PR, had breached his fiduciary duties by not drafting a written agreement on the truck's distribution.The Court found that the PR was not obligated to draft a formal written agreement. The plain language of Montana's Uniform Probate Code (MUPC) requires a written contract executed by all successors to alter the amounts to which they are entitled under the laws of intestacy, and this requirement was not fulfilled in this case. The Court also held that the PR had no duty to piece together emails and texts to determine whether there was a meeting of the minds among successors or to take responsibility for putting any such agreement in writing.As such, the Court reversed the District Court's order that had concluded that the PR had a duty to draft a written agreement and remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Estate of Kemmer" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the plaintiff, Kevin Barber, appealed against his former employer, Bradford Aquatic Group, LLC, alleging wrongful termination. Bradford Aquatic Group, a North Carolina-based company, had employed Barber as a Regional Business Development Manager for its Rocky Mountain region, which includes Montana. The employment contract between Barber and the company included a choice-of-law and forum selection clause, specifying that any disputes arising from the agreement would be governed by North Carolina law and adjudicated in North Carolina courts.Barber, a resident of Montana, argued that Montana law should apply to his claims of wrongful discharge, breach of contract, and bad faith, and that the suit should be heard in Montana. The district court dismissed Barber's claims due to improper venue, based on the choice-of-law and forum selection clauses in the employment agreement.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the choice-of-law provision in the employment agreement was valid and that North Carolina law should apply to Barber's claims. The court also upheld the validity of the forum selection clause, concluding that it is enforceable under North Carolina law. Therefore, the court determined that the dispute should be adjudicated in North Carolina, not Montana. View "Barber v. Bradford Aquatic" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Appellant's complaint against eighteen defendants relating to the installation of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) units at a property owned by Yellowstone Lodging, LLC, holding that Appellant did not meet the constitutional or prudential requirements of standing.Yellowstone, which owned and operated a hotel in West Yellowstone, hired and entered into contracts with several HVAC contractors to upgrade the HVAC system at the motel. Appellant, the sole member of Yellowstone, brought this complaint alleging thirty-nine claims related to the HVAC system, as well as claims of legal malpractice against the law firm and attorney Appellant originally engaged to pursue these claims on behalf of Yellowstone. The district court concluded that Appellant lacked standing to sue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant may not, through an assignment, bring Yellowstone's claims on his own behalf and without counsel. View "Sagorin v. Sunrise Heating & Cooling, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court denying Plaintiffs' motions for default judgment and for summary judgment and granting the summary judgment of Defendants, holding that there was no error.In the midst of a dispute over real property, Plaintiffs filed an action to quiet title. The district court denied Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' quiet title claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not manifestly abuse its discretion by declining to enter a default judgment in favor of Plaintiffs after Defendants did not complete service of their answer until one day after the deadline of Mont. R. Civ. P. 12; and (2) did not err when it determined that Plaintiffs' claims were barred by the doctrine of laches. View "Carter v. Badrock Rural Fire District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court vacating its prior order to expunge Justin Dickey's misdemeanor records, holding that the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure apply to proceedings brought under the Misdemeanor Expungement Clarification Act and that the district court properly determined that venue was not proper under Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-1105.Dickey filed a petition for expungement of his misdemeanor criminal records, referred only to "misdemeanor criminal record(s)" generally. The district court granted the petition. On reconsideration, the district court vacated its prior expungement order and dismissed the matter, determining that venue was improper. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to a proceeding brought under the Expungement Act; and (2) the district court did not err in determining that Dickey's prior speeding violation in Kalispell was insufficient to establish proper venue in the Eleventh Judicial District for expungement of misdemeanors under section 46-18-1105. View "In re Dickey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that service is not required when the Montana Department of Labor and Industry, Employment Relations Division (DLI) files an application for enforcement of judgment when it seeks enforcement of a final agency decision in a wage claim action.DLI applied to the district court for enforcement of judgment against a Billings restaurant on behalf of Jordan Carillo for unpaid wages pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 39-3-212(1). DLI did not serve the restaurant under Mont. R. Civ. P. 4. The district court concluded that the filing of an application for enforcement of judgment initiates as lawsuit that that due process requires service of process. DLI petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of supervisory control. After considering DLI's petition as one of a declaratory judgment, the Supreme Court held (1) DLI need not follow Mont. R. Civ. P. 4 service of process requirements when applying for enforcement of judgment in Montana's district courts in wage claim matters pursuant to section 39-3-212(1); but (2) the statutes do not exempt DLI from compliance with Mont. R. Civ. P. 5. View "Montana Department of Labor & Industry v. Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted supervisory control over this matter and affirmed the district court's ruling denying Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that the district court did not err by holding that Montana had specific personal jurisdiction over Philadelphia under Montana's long arm statute and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.In the underlying action, Appellees were sued for failing to distribute to employees eighteen to twenty percent service charges (the Walter Class Action). Appellees submitted a claim to Philadelphia requesting defense and indemnity, but Philadelphia denied the claim. After Appellees settled the Walter Class Action and paid the judgment entered against them Appellees brought suit against Philadelphia arguing that Philadelphia had a duty to defend them in the Walter Class Action. Philadelphia filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the case qualifies for and merits review pursuant to the Court's constitutional power of supervisory control; and (2) a Montana court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Philadelphia regarding Plaintiffs' claims. View "Gateway Hospitality Group Inc. v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting Continental Resources, Inc.'s motion to dismiss for lack of specific personal jurisdiction Plaintiff's complaint alleging that Continental was liable for the death of Zachary Buckles, holding that Plaintiff raised sufficient facts to withstand a motion to dismiss.Buckles died at a North Dakota oil well site owned by Continental, allegedly from exposure to high levels of hydrocarbon vapors while manually gauging tanks. The district court concluded that Continental, an Oklahoma corporation authorized to do business in Montana, was not subject to specific personal jurisdiction because the events leading to Buckles' death did not satisfy Montana's long-arm statute and because exercising jurisdiction over Continental would violate the United States Constitution's Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Continental failed to present a compelling case that jurisdiction would be unreasonable should Plaintiff prove her claims. View "Buckles v. Continental Resources, Inc." on Justia Law