Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Quintez Talley, an incarcerated individual, sought in forma pauperis (IFP) status to appeal without prepaying filing fees. The appellees argued that the "three strikes" provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) barred Talley from proceeding IFP, claiming that three of his previous cases were dismissed on grounds that qualify as strikes under the PLRA. Talley contended that only one of these cases constituted a strike.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed Talley's federal claim for failure to state a claim and his medical malpractice claim for not complying with Pennsylvania procedural rules. The court did not dismiss the entire action on strike-qualifying grounds, so this case did not count as a strike. In another case, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed Talley's complaint for failure to state a claim but granted him leave to amend. Talley did not amend within the deadline, but the court did not formally close the case before Talley filed his notice of appeal, so this case also did not count as a strike. In a third case, the same court dismissed Talley's claims for failure to state a claim and noted his failure to file a certificate of merit for his medical malpractice claim. This dismissal was on strike-qualifying grounds, making it a strike.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and determined that only one of Talley's previous cases constituted a strike. The court held that the dismissal of the medical malpractice claim for procedural non-compliance did not qualify as a strike, and the case where Talley was given leave to amend but did not do so was not formally closed, thus not a strike. The court granted Talley's motion to proceed IFP, allowing him to appeal without prepaying filing fees. View "Talley v. Pillai" on Justia Law

The case involves a medical negligence claim brought by Janet Hild, the administrator of Scott Boldman's estate, against several medical professionals and entities, including Samaritan Health Partners and Good Samaritan Hospital. Boldman, who had multiple health issues, underwent an emergency appendectomy at Good Samaritan Hospital. Post-surgery, he became combative and removed his breathing tube, after which he soon died. Hild claimed that the anesthesia was improperly handled, causing Boldman's aggressive behavior and subsequent death. The hospital argued that Boldman self-extubated and suffered a cardiac arrest unrelated to the anesthesia.The case proceeded to a jury trial in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. The jury found that Sandra Ward, the Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist, was negligent in her care of Boldman. However, only the six jurors who found negligence were allowed to vote on whether Ward's negligence proximately caused Boldman's death. They concluded it did not. Hild filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that all jurors should have been allowed to vote on proximate cause. The trial court denied the motion.The Second District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision in part, holding that the trial court erred by not allowing all jurors to vote on proximate cause, and remanded the case for a new trial on specific issues. The hospital appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the same-juror rule applies in all negligence cases where the jury answers sequential interrogatories that separate the elements of negligence. This means the same three-fourths of jurors must concur on all elements for a valid verdict. The court reversed the Second District's decision to the extent it ordered a new trial and reinstated the jury's verdict in favor of the hospital. View "Hild v. Samaritan Health Partner" on Justia Law

In September 2017, Michael Wollan was admitted to Essentia Health and died two days later. Mary Wollan, on behalf of Michael's heirs, filed a medical malpractice and wrongful death lawsuit against Essentia, seeking economic and noneconomic damages. The jury found Essentia at fault and a proximate cause of Michael's death, but also found a non-party at fault, allocating 25% fault to Essentia and 75% to the non-party. The jury awarded $500,657 in total damages, which included $116,657 in past economic damages.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, held a jury trial and entered a judgment against Essentia, including costs and disbursements totaling $639,292.06. Essentia's motion for a new trial was denied by the district court.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found the jury's verdict inconsistent and irreconcilable, particularly the award of past economic damages, which exactly matched the amount requested by Wollan but did not align with the 25% fault allocation. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying Essentia's motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, noting that the jury's damage award was not supported by sufficient evidence and was contrary to the record.Additionally, the Supreme Court addressed other issues likely to arise on remand, including the admissibility of settlement evidence and the district court's exclusion of such evidence under N.D.R.Ev. 408. The court upheld the exclusion of settlement evidence, finding no abuse of discretion. The award of costs and disbursements was also reversed, consistent with the reversal of the judgment. View "Wollan v. Innovis Health" on Justia Law

Monty Clarence Petersen filed a complaint on January 27, 2020, alleging that Jennifer J. Simon, APRN, committed medical malpractice by prescribing Lovenox within 24 hours of his surgery on January 25, 2018, causing him injuries. A summons was issued on October 31, 2022, and served on Simon on January 9, 2023. Simon moved to dismiss the complaint because Petersen did not serve it within six months of filing, as required by Montana Code Annotated § 25-3-106.The Fourth Judicial District Court of Missoula County granted Simon's motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice, citing the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations under § 27-2-205, MCA. The court interpreted the statute to allow dismissal with prejudice if the defendant had made an appearance and other substantive law supported such dismissal.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that § 25-3-106, MCA, mandates dismissal without prejudice for untimely service unless the defendant has made an appearance, which only affects the need for service, not the nature of the dismissal. The court found that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice based solely on untimely service. The Supreme Court also noted that it could not issue an advisory opinion on whether a new complaint would be barred by the statute of limitations or statute of repose, as no new complaint had been filed.The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order dismissing the complaint with prejudice and remanded the case for entry of an order dismissing the complaint without prejudice. View "Petersen v. Simon" on Justia Law

The administrator of a deceased woman’s estate filed a complaint alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death against a doctor, the doctor’s employer, a hospital, and Medicare. The doctor and his employer included the affirmative defenses of insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process in their answer. Over two years later, they moved for summary judgment, arguing that the case had not commenced timely because the doctor had not been served with the complaint. The administrator opposed, claiming the doctor waived his defense by participating in the litigation. The trial court granted summary judgment, and the First District Court of Appeals affirmed.The administrator appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, urging it to overrule its decision in Gliozzo v. Univ. Urologists of Cleveland, Inc., which held that active participation in litigation does not waive the defense of insufficiency of service of process if properly raised and preserved. The Supreme Court of Ohio declined to overrule Gliozzo, reaffirming that the defense is not waived by participation in litigation if it is properly raised and preserved. The court emphasized that the burden of perfecting service lies with the plaintiff and that the rules of civil procedure govern the conduct of all parties equally.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that Dr. Ahmad properly preserved his insufficiency-of-service-of-process defense and that the administrator never perfected service of the complaint on him. Consequently, the trial court correctly dismissed the claims against Dr. Ahmad and his employer. The judgment of the First District Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Ackman v. Mercy Health W. Hosp., Inc." on Justia Law

Roberta Evans underwent a total hip replacement surgery performed by Dr. Mark B. Wright at St. Luke’s Magic Valley Regional Medical Center. Post-surgery, Evans experienced persistent pain and discomfort, which led her to seek a second opinion. Another doctor confirmed that her hip bone socket was abnormally anteverted, and subsequent revision surgery revealed a periprosthetic joint infection. Evans filed a lawsuit against Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s, alleging negligence in their follow-up care and treatment.The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of Idaho dismissed Evans’s case, ruling that her claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations under Idaho Code section 5-219(4). The court found that Evans’s surgical complications were objectively ascertainable by March 4, 2019, indicating that some damage was present. Her motion for reconsideration was denied.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Evans’s medical malpractice claim was time-barred, as the statute of limitations began when her symptoms indicated some damage, which was before April 6, 2019. The court also found that the district court did not err in dismissing Evans’s complaint and that her equitable estoppel argument was without merit. The court denied attorney fees to both parties but awarded costs to Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s as the prevailing parties. View "Evans v. Wright" on Justia Law

David Francisco, a retired endodontist, sought treatment from Dr. Kevin Art of Affiliated Urologists, Ltd. in 2018. Dr. Art performed a urological procedure and prescribed the antibiotic Ciproflaxin (Cipro) without discussing its use with Francisco. The FDA's black box warning for Cipro indicated serious risks, especially for elderly patients with a history of corticosteroid use, which applied to Francisco. After taking Cipro, Francisco experienced severe adverse reactions, including tendon ruptures and peripheral neuropathy.The Superior Court in Maricopa County dismissed the Franciscos' case for failing to provide a preliminary expert opinion affidavit as required by A.R.S. § 12-2603. The Franciscos argued that the FDA warning itself should establish the standard of care, negating the need for expert testimony. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal, holding that the FDA warning could be sufficient to establish the standard of care without expert testimony.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that FDA warnings cannot substitute for expert testimony to establish the standard of care in medical malpractice cases. The Court emphasized that medical judgment is required to determine the appropriate standard of care, which must be established by expert testimony. The Court also rejected the Franciscos' argument that the statutory requirements for expert testimony violated the anti-abrogation clause of the Arizona Constitution, finding that the statutes permissibly regulate medical negligence actions.The Arizona Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the Superior Court's dismissal of the case. View "FRANCISCO v AFFILIATED UROLOGISTS" on Justia Law

Greg Phillips died on October 11, 2019, after receiving medical care from Dr. Anna Robbins at Logan Health. On April 22, 2021, Phillips' estate filed a medical malpractice claim with the Montana Medical Legal Panel (MMLP), which issued a decision on December 9, 2021. Subsequently, on January 5, 2022, Phillips filed a complaint in the District Court alleging wrongful death, negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, a survivor’s claim, and respondeat superior. However, the complaint was not served on Logan Health. On February 10, 2023, Phillips filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) adding claims of common law negligence and negligent misrepresentation, which was served on Logan Health on February 20, 2023.The Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court dismissed the FAC with prejudice on April 28, 2023, because Phillips failed to serve the original complaint within the six-month period required by § 25-3-106, MCA, and the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims under § 27-2-205, MCA, had expired. Phillips' motion to alter, amend, or set aside the dismissal was denied on June 13, 2023, as the court found that the statute of limitations resumed running after the six-month service deadline passed and that the FAC did not relate back to the original complaint.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's dismissal. The court held that the statute of limitations was not tolled during the six-month period for serving the complaint and that the FAC was filed outside the two-year limitations period. The court also determined that Logan Health's motion to dismiss did not constitute an appearance under § 25-3-106, MCA, and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Phillips' post-judgment motion. View "Phillips v. Robbins" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, representing their minor son, sued a hospital and a doctor for medical malpractice after their baby suffered birth injuries during delivery. They sought $6,000,000 in damages. Under Puerto Rico law, damages would be capped at $150,000 if the doctor was a faculty member at the hospital at the time of the birth. The defendants claimed the doctor was a faculty member, but could not produce a contract to prove it. The district court held a pretrial evidentiary hearing and concluded that the doctor was a faculty member, thus applying the statutory cap on damages.The U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico adopted a magistrate judge's Report & Recommendation, which stated that the applicability of the statutory cap was a matter of law. The district court found that the doctor was a faculty member based on testimony and letters from the medical school, despite the absence of a contract. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the applicability of the statutory cap was a factual question that should have been decided by a jury.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that whether the doctor was a faculty member at the time of the birth was a factual question requiring a jury's determination. The court found that the evidence was not one-sided enough to compel the district court's conclusion and that the district court improperly took the question from the jury. The First Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Perez-Perez v. Hospital Episcopal San Lucas Inc." on Justia Law

Anne G. McNair experienced a perforated esophagus and infection following cervical fusion surgery performed by Dr. Joshua D. Beck at North Lincoln County Hospital District, d/b/a Star Valley Health. Dr. Beck, employed by Orthopaedics of Jackson Hole, P.C., d/b/a Teton Orthopaedics, continued to treat her post-surgery. McNair filed a complaint against Dr. Beck, Teton, and Star Valley, alleging medical malpractice, negligence, and vicarious liability. The district court dismissed her complaint, citing the statute of limitations, and denied her motion to amend the complaint, deeming it futile.The District Court of Lincoln County granted the defendants' motions to dismiss, concluding that McNair's claims were filed beyond the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions. The court determined that the continuous treatment rule did not apply, as McNair's injury stemmed from a single act of negligence during the surgery on December 30, 2020. Consequently, the court found that the statute of limitations began on December 31, 2020, the date McNair was discharged from the hospital, making her April 2023 filings untimely. The court also denied McNair's motion to amend her complaint, asserting that any amendment would be futile.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its application of the continuous treatment rule. The Supreme Court held that the continuous treatment rule applies when a medical provider has provided ongoing care for the same or related complaints. The court noted that McNair's complaint alleged continuous treatment by Dr. Beck and Teton into early 2021, which could extend the statute of limitations. The court also found that the district court abused its discretion in denying McNair's motion to amend her complaint, as the proposed amendments did not show on their face that the claims were untimely. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "McNair v. Beck" on Justia Law