Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In October 2010, Clara Dees filed a medical malpractice suit against Heritage House Nursing Home and its employees and against River Region Medical Center and its employees. River Region was owned by Vicksburg Healthcare, LLC. Dees also filed, with her complaint, a certificate of consultation. Dees filed an amended complaint in January 2011, also accompanied by a certificate. No summonses were issued until after February 16, 2011, the same date Dees moved the court for an enlargement of time (which was granted). Dees issued a number of summonses from February 22 to March 3, 2011. In May, an agreed order staying the proceedings and compelling binding arbitration was entered concerning defendants Heritage House Nursing Home and its employees. Vicksburg Healthcare moved to set aside the order allowing additional time to serve process. Vicksburg Healthcare also moved to dismiss and, alternatively, moved for summary judgment, while also asserting its affirmative defenses and answering the amended complaint. In February 2012, Heritage House Nursing Home filed its motion to confirm the arbitrator’s ruling. Dees failed to submit a response, and failed to request additional time in which to respond, and did not request a continuance of the scheduled hearing. The circuit court confirmed the decision of the arbitrator, dismissing with prejudice all claims against Heritage House Nursing Home and its employees. Subsequently, a notice of service of discovery requests was filed by Vicksburg Healthcare in September of 2012. In December, Vicksburg Healthcare filed a motion to compel discovery and for sanctions, and shortly thereafter filed a new a motion for summary judgment on the basis that Dees had failed to designate any expert witness and had failed to provide expert-witness testimony to establish a prima facie case in support of her claim. Dees then responded, requesting that the motion for summary judgment be denied, and designating her expert. No affidavit signed by the expert was attached. The motion for summary judgment was heard by the circuit court in January 2013, and was denied based on Dees’s designation. The circuit court granted Dees an additional sixty days in which to provide a sworn affidavit of the expert’s testimony. The circuit court provided that Vicksburg Healthcare could renew its motion for summary judgment once the expert opinion had been submitted. Vicksburg Healthcare petitioned the Supreme Court for interlocutory appeal, arguing (1) that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment; and (2) that the trial court erred in granting Dees additional time to submit her expert's affidavit establishing her claim. The Supreme Court concluded the record was clear that the trial court erred in not granting Vicksburg Healthcare’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.View "Vicksburg Healthcare, LLC v. Dees" on Justia Law

Christian Westby, James Westby, and Kristina Westby appealed the district court’s denial of their motion to reconsider the court’s protective order granted to Mercy Medical Center and Dr. Gregory Schaefer. This case arose from the Westbys’ claim that Dr. Schaefer’s and Mercy Medical’s negligence resulted in lifelong brain damage to Christian Westby. Near the end of discovery, the district court granted Mercy Medical and Dr. Schaefer’s protective order motion to prohibit the Westbys from deposing Mercy Medical and Dr. Schaefer’s expert witnesses. The district court later denied the Westbys’ motion to reconsider that protective order. The Westbys argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the district court abused its discretion by not requiring any showing of good cause or unreasonable delay and basing its decision on a mistaken belief that the Westbys were dilatory. The Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred, vacated the order and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Westby, et al v. Schaefer, M.D." on Justia Law

Joanne Anderson sued Jackson Hospital and Clinic, Inc., Dr. Stephen K. Kwan, and Dr. Kwan's practice group, Capital Cardio-Thoracic, P.C. asserting medical-malpractice claims against them. The trial court granted a motion to substitute bankruptcy trustee Daniel Hamm for Anderson as the real party in interest because Anderson had filed a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy after her medical malpractice claim had accrued. The Jackson Hospital defendants subsequently petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for permission to file an interlocutory appeal, arguing that Hamm's attempt to be substituted as the real party in interest was untimely. Anderson filed a separate Rule 5 petition for permission to appeal challenging the trial court's decision to remove her as the plaintiff in this case. The Supreme Court granted both petitions; however, treated the parties' petitions for permissive appeals as petitions for writs of mandamus, found that neither were entitle to mandamus relief, and denied the petitions.View "Anderson v. Jackson Hospital & Clinic" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice complaint in the Puerto Rico Court of the First Instance then voluntarily dismissed their suit and re-filed in federal court. In their federal complaint, Plaintiffs named as defendants Hospital Damas, Inc., various hospital employees, and several unnamed entities. Six weeks before the scheduled start of trial, Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint to include Fundacion Damas, Inc. as a defendant. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion because of Plaintiffs’ undue delay in moving to amend. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Plaintiffs failed to act with sufficient speed in seeking to add the new defendant.View "Perez v. Hosp. Damas, Inc." on Justia Law

Respondent-plaintiff Scott Simpson sought to obtain meeting minutes from two Cedar Springs Hospital quality management committees in his medical malpractice case. Cedar Springs refused to produce these documents, arguing they were protected by the quality management privilege in 25-3-109, C.R.S. (2014). Simpson argued at trial that Cedar Springs failed to show that the quality management program was "approved by" the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDHPE), and because Cedar Springs failed to adhere to the requirements of the CDHPE with regard to the program, the meeting minutes should have been produced. The trial court agreed with Simpson that simple licensure was insufficient to demonstrate that facilities "complied with what they are required to comply with" and no "authoritative" documentation was provided confirming the quality management plan was properly implemented. The Supreme Court reversed: "because a quality management program is required in order to be licensed by CDHPE, and because Cedar Springs was licensed by CDHPE during all relevant periods, its quality management program was necessarily "approved." Therefore the documents Simpson sought from Cedar Springs were privileged, and the trial court erred in ordering them produced.View "Simpson v. Cedar Springs Hosp., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice action against Defendant, and the claims brought by one of the plaintiffs were referred to arbitration. After an arbitration panel issued its decision but prior to the district court confirming that ruling and disposing of the remaining claims, Plaintiffs appealed. After the district court’s subsequent ruling, the Supreme Court dismissed as premature Plaintiffs’ appeal. More than sixty days after entry of the judgment, Plaintiffs filed a Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion seeking to reissue the judgment based on the presumption that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter its previous judgment because it had been divested of jurisdiction by Plaintiffs’ premature notice of appeal. The district court agreed and reissued the judgment, purporting to “amend” the judgment, without substantively altering the original decision. Plaintiffs then filed another notice of appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to issue the original judgment, and because Plaintiffs failed to timely appeal that judgment, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to address any challenge to the merits.View "Garver v. Rosenberg" on Justia Law

Robert E. Anderson, M.D. and Selma Doctors Clinic, PC, d/b/a Selma Doctors Clinic ("SDC") petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order granting plaintiff Barbara Craig's Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion, and to reinstate the final judgment entered in favor of Dr. Anderson and SDC. This matter stemmed from a medical-malpractice/wrongful-death action filed by Barbara G. Craig as the administrator of the estate of her husband William Craig. Dr. Anderson performed hernia surgery on Mr. Craig at Vaughan Regional Medical Center ("VRMC"), following which, he died. Mrs. Craig sued Dr. Anderson, SDC, and VRMC alleging that the defendants were negligent in their care and treatment of Mr. Craig and that their conduct proximately caused his death. The trial court found that Mrs. Craig failed to qualify her expert on the applicable standard of care, and accordingly, was unable to establish that Dr. Anderson violated the applicable standard of care. Mrs. Craig filed a Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to vacate the judgment or for a new trial. In the motion, Mrs. Craig contended that the trial court erred in excluding the expert's testimony. The trial court denied this motion, but granted her Rule 60(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., in which she argued that Dr. Anderson had committed perjury and had perpetrated a fraud upon the trial court by testifying that he had performed an ulcer surgery when, in fact, he had not done so. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court exceeded its discretion in granting Mrs. Craig's Rule 60(b)(3) motion. The Court therefore granted Dr. Anderson's request and issued the writ. View "Craig v. Anderson" on Justia Law

In August 2002, plaintiff William Vaughan went to the emergency room at St. Vincent Hospital complaining of symptoms that included abdominal pain. In this medical negligence case, Vaughan alleged that, as the result of a communication failure between a surgeon and a contract radiologist, St. Vincent failed to tell Vaughan about a cancer diagnosis. The district court granted summary judgment for St. Vincent because Vaughan did not specifically plead vicarious liability relating to the radiologist, St. Vincent's apparent agent, and failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact through expert testimony. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Vaughan's complaint adequately notified St. Vincent that one or more of its employees or agents was negligent and that genuine issues of material fact required resolution at a trial on the merits.View "Vaughan v. St. Vincent Hospital" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s decedent received medical care and treatment from Defendants and, thereafter, died in August 2007. Plaintiff extended the two-year statute of limitations contained in Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-555 until November 2009, at which point Plaintiff sent a summons and complaint to a marshal and requested that Defendants be served. Due to an error on the part of the marshal, the trial court dismissed the claims against Defendants in April 2011 for improper service. In December 2011, Plaintiff commenced the present wrongful death action. The trial court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss on the basis of the two-year statute of limitations, concluding that Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-592, the accidental failure of suit statute, did not operate to save Plaintiff’s action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court improperly determined that section 52-592 did not save the action. Remanded.View "Dorry v. Garden" on Justia Law

The patient in this case alleged that his physician negligently performed a surgical procedure and breached his duty to obtain informed consent. The patient also sued the supervising health services corporation based on vicarious liability and independent negligence. The jury found both the physician and the corporation negligent and apportioned liability between them. On appeal, the physician and corporation argued the trial court erred in several evidentiary rulings, incorrectly instructed the jury on proximate cause, and wrongly awarded pre- and post-judgment interest. In cross appeals, the physician and corporation sought review of the trial court’s decision to submit a supplemental question to the jury, as well as its failure to alter the damages award based on the jury’s response to that supplemental question. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in favor of the patient. The trial court should not have requested supplemental information from the jury after the verdict. Although the trial court decided not to modify the verdict, the jury’s response to the supplemental question arguably could have affected other proceedings between the physician and corporation. The case was remanded with instructions to the Superior Court to vacate the supplemental verdict. View "Shapria, M.D. et al. v. Christiana Care Health Services, Inc., et al." on Justia Law