Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued Defendants, alleging that he suffered from spinal injuries as a result of Defendants’ medical malpractice. During discovery, Plaintiff requested a recorded surveillance video that Defendants had created of him. Defendants refused to turn over the video, claiming that it was attorney work product that they intended to use only as impeachment evidence. The court of common pleas ordered Defendants to produce the tape. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s order, concluding that the discovery order was final and appealable. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that Defendants failed to establish that the trial court’s discovery order was a final, appealable order, and therefore, neither this Court nor the court of appeals had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the interlocutory order. View "Smith v. Chen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against medical malpractice action against multiple defendants, including FMC Hospital, Ltd., d/b/a Florida Medical Center, and FMC Medical, Inc., d/b/a Florida Medical Center. A proposed settlement offer was served upon Plaintiff, but Plaintiff did not accept the offer. A jury subsequently returned a verdict adverse to Plaintiff, and the trial court entered final judgment in favor of Defendants. Thereafter, Defendants filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs. Plaintiff opposed the motion, asserting that the entities were joint offerors and that the proposal was invalid because it failed to apportion the amount offered as required by Fla. Stat. 768.79 and Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that there was only a single offeror - Florida Medical Center - and therefore, apportionment of the amount offered was not required. The district court affirmed, concluding that because the offer was made on behalf of the single hospital entity allegedly responsible for Plaintiff’s injury, the settlement proposal complied with the statute and rule. The Supreme Court quashed the district court’s decision, holding that the offer constituted a joint proposal and, under a strict construction of section 768.79 and rule 1.442, apportionment of the settlement amount was required. View "Pratt v. Weiss" on Justia Law

Appellee Maria Brady had a lengthy history of foot problems. By 2007, both of her feet were in pain due to toe deformities. Appellee’s podiatrist, William Urbas, D.P.M., successfully treated toes on her left foot with surgery; he then turned his attention to her right foot. One of Appellee’s primary complaints on her right foot pertained to a hammer-toe condition of her second toe: this deformity caused the middle of Appellee’s second toe to rise above the plane of the foot, which in turn caused rubbing and pain when Appellee wore shoes. Dr. Urbas performed a total of four operations between March 2008 and January 2010. Before each surgery, he explained the risks and complications that could occur, and Appellee signed a consent form acknowledging her awareness of these possible outcomes. The first operation did not finally alleviate Appellee’s condition, and Dr. Urbas eventually performed three more surgeries, each involving, among other things, the removal of additional bone material with the expectation that the foot would, over time, generate soft tissue to fill the gap and provide flexibility. Nevertheless, Appellee’s pain persisted and, in the end, her toe was less stable and significantly shorter than it had been initially. In August 2010, Appellee consulted a different podiatrist, Dr. Harold Schoenhaus, who performed a bone-graft operation which returned the toe to approximately ninety percent of its original length. This procedure also had the effect of restoring some of the toe’s stability and substantially reducing the pain. Appellee testified that she was pleased with the outcome of Dr. Schoenhaus’ surgery and that she returned to all levels of activity. In December 2010, Appellee filed a complaint against Dr. Urbas, alleging that he negligently treated her toe in the three follow-up surgeries performed after March 2008. In this appeal by allowance involving alleged medical negligence, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether a doctor may introduce evidence that the patient was informed of and acknowledged various risks of surgery, although the complaint does not assert a cause of action based on a lack of informed consent. After unsuccessfully moving for a new trial on the basis that the trial court erred in admitting the consent evidence, Appellee appealed. The Superior Court vacated and remanded for a new trial. In concluding that the trial court had abused its discretion, the Superior Court court adopted the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Virginia regarding the relevancy of consent evidence in a medical malpractice case: assent to treatment does not amount to consent to negligence, regardless of the enumerated risks and complications of which the patient was made aware. In a trial on a malpractice complaint that only asserts negligence, and not lack of informed consent, evidence that a patient agreed to go forward with the operation in spite of the risks of which she was informed is irrelevant and should be excluded. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that evidence that a patient affirmatively consented to treatment after being informed of the risks of that treatment is generally irrelevant to a cause of action sounding in medical negligence. View "Brady v. Urbas" on Justia Law

This is a consolidated case of two medical malpractice suits. In each case, the trial judge gave the jury instruction on a physician's exercise of judgment, similar to 6 Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil105.08 (6th ed. 2012) (WPI) was given. Both juries found in favor of the defendants and both plaintiffs appealed. After review of both cases, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's use of the exercise of judgment jury instruction. Furthermore, the Court held that evidence of consciously ruling out other diagnoses is not required; a defendant need only produce sufficient evidence of use of clinical judgment in diagnosis or treatment to satisfy a trial judge that the instruction is appropriate. "We reaffirm that this instruction is supported in Washington law and has not been shown to be incorrect or harmful." View "Fergen v. Sestero" on Justia Law

David Garver and Katheryn Garver filed a medical malpractice action against several medical providers. The claims brought by David were referred to arbitration. The Garvers filed an appeal after the arbitration panel issued its decision but before the district court issued a judgment conforming to the arbitration award. The district court subsequently dismissed the Garvers’ claims. The Garvers filed a motion pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) arguing that the district court had been divested of jurisdiction by their premature notice of appeal, and therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment. The district court agreed and purported to reissue the judgment. The Garvers then filed another notice of appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction to issue its original judgment and erred in assuming it was divested of jurisdiction by the Garvers’ premature notice of appeal; and (2) because the Garvers failed to timely appeal the original judgment, the Court lacked jurisdiction to address any challenge to the merits. View "Garver v. Rosenberg" on Justia Law

In 1997, Dr. Michael Hayes and Dr. Michael Taillon were working as emergency room physicians at Providence Hospital, presumably as independent contractors. Arthur Sharpe came to the Providence Hospital emergency room complaining of chest pain. Dr. Hayes and Dr. Taillon evaluated Sharpe and diagnosed him as suffering from reflux. Sharpe was discharged. Sharpe had actually suffered a heart attack, which was determined a few days later when he sought further medical care elsewhere. Because of the misdiagnosis, in 1999, Sharpe and his wife filed a medical malpractice and loss of consortium action against Providence Hospital and Dr. Hayes. The Sharpes did not name Dr. Taillon as a defendant. Providence Hospital settled with the Sharpes in 2004. In 2007, Providence Hospital filed this equitable indemnification action against Dr. Taillon and his medical malpractice insurer, The South Carolina Medical Malpractice Liability Joint Underwriting Association (collectively Respondents). Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground that the medical malpractice statute of repose barred Providence Hospital's claim and the circuit court granted the motion on that basis. Providence Hospital appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the medical malpractice statute of repose applied to Providence Hospital's indemnity claim. The Court concluded that Providence Hospital's indemnity action was indeed barred by the statute of repose, and as such affirmed the trial court. View "Columbia/CSA-HS Greater Columbia Healthcare System v. So. Carolina Medical Malpractice Liability Joint Underwriting Association" on Justia Law

In 2010, Blevins had knee surgery at a surgical facility. The knee later became infected by bacteria, subsequently found on a sponge manufactured by Ruhof that had been used to clean surgical equipment before the surgery. The bacteria had apparently "survived the sterilization process." The surgical center paid Blevins $4,118.23 for medical expenses he incurred in treating the infection. Blevins did not sign an agreement releasing the center from liability; he was not represented by counsel and the center did not give him written notice of the statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action. More than 15 months after receiving the payment, Blevins filed suit. Ruhof settled for $100,000. The trial court, relying on Insurance Code section 11583, ruled that the one-year limitations period was tolled by the payment of medical expenses. The trial court reduced a jury’s award of damages against the surgical facility to $285,114. The court of appeal affirmed. Section 11583, which provides that the applicable statute of limitations is tolled when advance or partial payment is made to an injured and unrepresented person without notifying him of the applicable limitations period, applies to the one-year limitations period for medical malpractice actions. View "Coastal Surgical Inst. v. Blevins" on Justia Law

Tallahatchie General Hospital moved to dismiss a medical malpractice claim filed against it because the plaintiffs failed to provide it with proper presuit notice before the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the filing of the complaint tolled the statute of limitations, despite the plaintiffs’ failure to provide proper presuit notice. Finding no reversible error to the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Tallahatchie General Hospital v. Howe" on Justia Law

In October 2010, Clara Dees filed a medical malpractice suit against Heritage House Nursing Home and its employees and against River Region Medical Center and its employees. River Region was owned by Vicksburg Healthcare, LLC. Dees also filed, with her complaint, a certificate of consultation. Dees filed an amended complaint in January 2011, also accompanied by a certificate. No summonses were issued until after February 16, 2011, the same date Dees moved the court for an enlargement of time (which was granted). Dees issued a number of summonses from February 22 to March 3, 2011. In May, an agreed order staying the proceedings and compelling binding arbitration was entered concerning defendants Heritage House Nursing Home and its employees. Vicksburg Healthcare moved to set aside the order allowing additional time to serve process. Vicksburg Healthcare also moved to dismiss and, alternatively, moved for summary judgment, while also asserting its affirmative defenses and answering the amended complaint. In February 2012, Heritage House Nursing Home filed its motion to confirm the arbitrator’s ruling. Dees failed to submit a response, and failed to request additional time in which to respond, and did not request a continuance of the scheduled hearing. The circuit court confirmed the decision of the arbitrator, dismissing with prejudice all claims against Heritage House Nursing Home and its employees. Subsequently, a notice of service of discovery requests was filed by Vicksburg Healthcare in September of 2012. In December, Vicksburg Healthcare filed a motion to compel discovery and for sanctions, and shortly thereafter filed a new a motion for summary judgment on the basis that Dees had failed to designate any expert witness and had failed to provide expert-witness testimony to establish a prima facie case in support of her claim. Dees then responded, requesting that the motion for summary judgment be denied, and designating her expert. No affidavit signed by the expert was attached. The motion for summary judgment was heard by the circuit court in January 2013, and was denied based on Dees’s designation. The circuit court granted Dees an additional sixty days in which to provide a sworn affidavit of the expert’s testimony. The circuit court provided that Vicksburg Healthcare could renew its motion for summary judgment once the expert opinion had been submitted. Vicksburg Healthcare petitioned the Supreme Court for interlocutory appeal, arguing (1) that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment; and (2) that the trial court erred in granting Dees additional time to submit her expert's affidavit establishing her claim. The Supreme Court concluded the record was clear that the trial court erred in not granting Vicksburg Healthcare’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.View "Vicksburg Healthcare, LLC v. Dees" on Justia Law

Christian Westby, James Westby, and Kristina Westby appealed the district court’s denial of their motion to reconsider the court’s protective order granted to Mercy Medical Center and Dr. Gregory Schaefer. This case arose from the Westbys’ claim that Dr. Schaefer’s and Mercy Medical’s negligence resulted in lifelong brain damage to Christian Westby. Near the end of discovery, the district court granted Mercy Medical and Dr. Schaefer’s protective order motion to prohibit the Westbys from deposing Mercy Medical and Dr. Schaefer’s expert witnesses. The district court later denied the Westbys’ motion to reconsider that protective order. The Westbys argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the district court abused its discretion by not requiring any showing of good cause or unreasonable delay and basing its decision on a mistaken belief that the Westbys were dilatory. The Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred, vacated the order and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Westby, et al v. Schaefer, M.D." on Justia Law