Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2003, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court amended its Rules of Civil Procedure to require malpractice plaintiffs to file a certificate of merit (COM) within 60 days of bringing suit, under penalty of dismissal. Five years later, to dismissal of meritorious claims due to technical oversights, the Court amended the Rules again, setting conditions that had to be met before a defendant could seek dismissal. The Third Circuit previously held that the COM requirement is substantive state law that must be applied by a federal court sitting in diversity. Schmigel sued Dr. Uchal, who performed Schigel’s laparoscopic adjustable gastric band surgery in Pennsylvania before moving to Florida. Realizing that no COM had been filed, Uchal waited out the 60-day window, then filed a motion to dismiss. The next day, Schmigel’s counsel filed an “answer,” attaching the missing COM, and arguing that Uchal had not waited 30 days after giving notice of the deficiency to allow for cure before filing his motion to dismiss, The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that conditions precedent to dismissing an action for failure to comply with the COM requirement, including fair notice to a plaintiff, are substantive law that must be applied in federal court. View "Schmigel v. Uchal" on Justia Law

In 2007, plaintiff Lisa Tyra received a kidney transplant at defendant William Beaumont Hospital, with a kidney made available by defendant Organ Procurement Agency of Michigan. Plaintiff allegedly suffered complications because the kidney did not constitute a proper match, and she filed suit asserting defendants should have identified this fact before the surgery. When plaintiff filed her complaint, the 182-day notice period set forth in MCL 600.2912b(1) had not yet expired. Organ Procurement moved for summary disposition on the basis that plaintiff’s complaint was filed prematurely, and the period of limitations had since expired. The hospital and Dr. Steven Cohn, the transplant surgeon, joined the motion and the trial court later granted the motion. The trial court reasoned that, under "Burton v Reed City Hosp Corp," (691 NW2d 424 (2005)), the prematurely filed complaint failed to toll the running of the period of limitations and plaintiff could not cure the error by refiling the complaint. The legal issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the controlling caselaw authority governing this case, "Zwiers v Growney," (778 NW2d 81 (2009)), was overruled by the Michigan Supreme Court in "Driver v Naini," (802 NW2d 311 (2011)). The Court of Appeals held that Zwiers was not overruled in Driver. Because the Supreme Court concluded to the contrary, it reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part in both "Tyra v Organ Procurement Agency of Mich," (850 NW2d 667 (2013)), and "Furr v McLeod," (848 NW2d 465 (2014)). In "Tyra," the Court reinstated the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition, and in "Furr," the Court remanded the case back to the trial court for entry of an order granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition. View "Tyra v. Organ Procurement Agency of Michigan" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Georgia Supreme Court's review centered on a question about the qualification of expert witnesses under OCGA 24-7-702 (“Rule 702”). Specifically, the issue reduced to what sort of experience was required of a practicing surgeon who was offered as an expert witness in a medical malpractice case to opine that another surgeon breached the applicable standard of medical care in the course of performing a surgical procedure. In this case, the Court of Appeals held that a surgeon was not qualified as a matter of law under Rule 702 (c)(2)(A) to give expert testimony about negligence in connection with a laparoscopic procedure to repair an umbilical hernia because he had not performed more than one laparoscopic procedure to repair an umbilical hernia in the last five years, notwithstanding that the surgeon had performed many other abdominal laparoscopic procedures during that time. The Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals understood Rule 702 (c)(2)(A) correctly, and concluded that it did not. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Dubois v. Brantley" on Justia Law

In this health care liability case Plaintiff sent Defendants pre-suit notice of the claim via FedEx. Defendants moved for summary judgment, alleging that Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121(a)(3)(B) and (a)(4) by not using certified mail, return receipt requested, through the U.S. Postal Service. The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that strict compliance with the manner and proof of service requirements of sections 29-26-121(a)(3)(B) and (a)(4) was required. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the manner and proof of service prescribed by sections 29-26-121(a)(3)(B) and (a)(4) may be achieved through substantial compliance; (2) delivery of pre-suit notice by private commercial carrier and filing of proof with the complaint constitutes substantial compliance with sections 29-26-121(a)(3)(B) and (a)(4); and (3) because Defendants received notice and were not prejudiced by the manner of service, Plaintiff’s provision of pre-suit notice to Defendants through the use of FedEx and filing of proof with the complaint constituted substantial compliance with the manner and proof of service requirements of the pre-suit notice statute. Remanded. View "Arden v. Kozawa" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and as the administrator of the estate of his son, Jonathan Radzik, sued Francisco Sylvester, a board certified specialist in pediatrics, and related healthcare entities (collectively, Defendants), alleging that Sylvester had negligently prescribed Remicade for Jonathan, which led to Jonathan’s death. At issue here was the trial court’s grant of Plaintiff’s motion to compel electronic discovery of the hard drives of certain computers used by Sylvester. Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal of the discovery order. The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the discovery order did not constitute a final judgment. View "Radzick v. Conn. Children's Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

After Chan’s mother died from internal hemorrhaging related to Coumadin use following heart surgery, Chan successfully sued Curran for medical malpractice. Chan challenged the trial court’s post-verdict reduction of the $1 million noneconomic damages award to $250,000, as required by the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA), Civ. Code 3333.2. Chan challenged the MICRA cap as violating equal protection, due process and the right to jury trial, based on her assertion she is entitled to seek noneconomic damages sufficient to cover attorney fees. The court of appeal rejected Chan’s claims, stating that the legitimate debate over the wisdom of MICRA’s noneconomic damages cap remains a matter for the Legislature and state electorate. View "Chan v. Curran" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Sharp Memorial Hospital (dba Sharp Rehabilitation Center) appealed the trial court's order granting plaintiff-respondent's Berthe Kabran's motion for new trial following a special verdict on a cause of action for medical malpractice in which the jury found Sharp was negligent in the care and treatment of plaintiff's predecessor, Dr. Eke Wokocha, but that the negligence was not a substantial factor in causing harm. Sharp argued on appeal that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by granting a new trial because the motion was untimely, rendering the order void. It further argued the court abused its discretion because the evidence proffered by plaintiff in support of the new trial motion was cumulative and consistent with defense expert trial testimony, and thus would not change the outcome of the trial. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that no jurisdictional defect appeared in the court's new trial order and, as a result, Sharp could not raise its appellate contentions as to the motion's timeliness for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the new evidence and ruling on the record that plaintiff should have been granted a new trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order. View "Kabran v. Sharp Memorial" on Justia Law

In 2007, Clyde Snider, Jr. was hospitalized for a suspected myocardial infarction. He would later get surgery and be given a pacemaker. Following up on an unrelated issue, Snider's treating doctors found infection at the site of the pacemaker. The doctor who recommended implantation of the pacemaker was found to have rushed the decision to give Snider the pacemaker. "Except for the relatively minor complication of a hematoma, and the surgical scar after pacemaker extraction," a medical review panel found no evidence of any long term, major injury to Snider. Snider sued the treating doctor and his liability insurer for damages arising out of the doctor's alleged negligence in the implantation of the pacemaker. A jury later found that the doctor did not breach the appropriate standard of care in Snider's medical negligence action, which Snider appealed. Finding that the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence and was not clearly wrong, the Supreme Court affirmed the verdict. View "Snider v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Kyle and Marla Moore timely filed a medical malpractice suit against St. Dominic Hospital, Jackson Neurosurgery Clinic, and several physicians, claiming that the physicians and hospital had been negligent in treating Kyle in May 2004. Kyle complained of lower back pain. Kyle was diagnosed with an epidural abscess. Kyle went to the emergency room at St. Dominic on the morning of May 23, 2004; within a 24-hour period, Kyle was seen by a series of doctors at the hospital before getting an operation on May 24. The Moores contended that surgery should have been done sooner and that the delay in treatment resulted in neurological injury to Kyle. In March 2011, the Moores added Dr. Howard Holaday as a defendant. Dr. Holaday moved for summary judgment, asserting that the two-year statute of limitations had expired. The trial court denied summary judgment, and Dr. Holaday petitioned the Supreme Court for an interlocutory appeal. The issue this appeal presented for the Court's review was whether the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations against Dr. Holaday. The Court held that whether the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations required a determination by the trier of fact (here, the jury) regarding the “date the alleged act, omission or neglect shall or with reasonable diligence might have been first discovered.” The trial court, therefore, properly denied summary judgment to Dr. Holaday. View "Holaday v. Moore" on Justia Law

John Krusac, as personal representative of the estate of Dorothy Krusac, brought a medical malpractice action against Covenant Medical Center, Inc., alleging that Dorothy Krusac died as a result of injuries she sustained when she rolled off an operating table following a cardiac catheterization procedure. During discovery, it became known that one of the medical staff present during the procedure had filled out an incident report shortly after the event and submitted it to her supervisor. Plaintiff filed a motion in limine on the eve of trial, asking the court to conduct an in camera inspection of the incident report and provide plaintiff with the facts contained in it. On plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, however, the court reviewed the report in camera and subsequently ordered defendant to provide plaintiff with a portion of the incident report that contained only objective facts in light of "Harrison v Munson Healthcare, Inc," (304 Mich App 1 (2014)), which held that the peer-review privilege did not apply to objective facts contained in an incident report. Defendant sought leave to appeal the order in the Court of Appeals and moved to stay the proceedings, both of which motions the Court of Appeals denied. After its review, the Supreme Court held that the applicable statutory authority that governed this case did not contain an exception to the peer review privilege for objective facts. As a result, that portion of "Harrison" was wrongly decided. Here, the trial court erred by relying on Harrison to order production of the objective-facts portion of the incident report. Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Krusac v. Covenant Medical Center, Inc." on Justia Law