Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

T.T., individually and on behalf of her three-year-old daughter, A.T., filed this medical malpractice action seeking damages from a hospital and several medical professionals for injuries caused during the child’s birth.1 The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants and dismissed the action with prejudice because plaintiff failed to serve a timely affidavit of merit. The Appellate Division affirmed, rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the circumstances should have supported entry of a dismissal without prejudice under Rule 4:37-1(b). After review, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment to defendants and remanded for further proceedings. The Court determined that a combination of circumstances (not the least of which was the failure to schedule a pretrial conference to address the affidavit of merit requirement as New Jersey case law directed), warranted allowing the untimely affidavit to be filed. "The equities militate in favor of permitting a facially meritorious action to proceed here, particularly because any prejudice to defendants may be addressed through costs imposed by the trial court. We decline to approve recourse to a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Rule 4:37-1(b) as an appropriate avenue for addressing failures to comply with the affidavit of merit requirement, including when a minor is involved. Rather, we will require modification of the Judiciary’s electronic filing and notification case management system to ensure that, going forward, necessary and expected conferences are scheduled to enhance parties’ compliance with requirements under the Affidavit of Merit Statute (AMS or the statute), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29, in furtherance of the statutory policy goals." View "A.T. v. Cohen" on Justia Law

Christopher Pollan filed a medical negligence action against Dr. Andrew Wartak, North Mississippi Medical Center-West Point; Angie Turnage, LPN; Chase Larmour, RN; and Ashley Thomas, LPN, claiming that the defendants’ medical negligence caused the death of his mother, Shirley Pollan. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, finding that Pollan’s survival claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Finding no error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Pollan v. Wartak" on Justia Law

Prusak filed medical malpractice complaint in 2011, against Dr. Jager, University Retina, and University of Chicago medical providers. Prusak claimed that from 2007-2009, she received treatment from Dr. Jager for “flashes, spots and floaters in her eyes.” In 2009, she underwent a brain biopsy that showed she had central nervous system lymphoma. She alleged that Dr. Jager was negligent in failing to order appropriate diagnostic testing. Prusak died in November 2013. Prusak’s daughter was allowed to substitute herself as plaintiff, as the executor of Prusak’s estate and, in April 2014, filed an amended complaint, citing the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/2), and the Survival Act (755 ILCS 5/27-6) and the same allegations of negligence as the original complaint. Defendants alleged that plaintiff’s wrongful death claim was barred by the four-year medical malpractice statute of repose because decedent had died more than four years after the last alleged act of negligent medical treatment. Plaintiff responded that the wrongful death claim related back to the original complaint under 735 ILCS 5/2-616(b). The circuit court dismissed the wrongful death claim. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The wrongful death action accrued upon decedent’s death, which occurred after the four-year repose period had expired. If plaintiff had filed an original wrongful death complaint at that time, it would have been barred by the statute of repose but a pending complaint can be amended to include a wrongful death claim that accrued after the statute of repose expired. View "Lawler v. University of Chicago Medical Center" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted mandamus relief to Relator, who sought to resign, revoke, or withdraw the circuit court’s medical authorization order authorizing the release of the decedent’s medical records, holding that the medical authorization order in this case was prohibited by this court’s precedent.Relator filed a wrongful death action against Defendants after his brother, the decedent, died allegedly from metastatic colon cancer. During discovery, Defendants sought an order from the circuit court authorizing the release of the decedent’s medical records. The circuit court signed an order authorizing the release of medical records. Relator then petitioned for this writ to prohibit the use of the decedent’s unlimited medical records. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition, holding that the medical authorization was prohibited because there was no case-by-case review of the medical authorization designed to tailor the requests to the pleadings. View "State ex rel. Fennewald v. Honorable Patricia S. Joyce" on Justia Law

Petitioner Sarah Cahn invoked the due process exception to the New Mexico Medical Malpractice Act (MMA), but did not file her late-accruing medical malpractice claim against Respondent John Berryman, M.D. within twelve months. Twenty-one months elapsed between the accrual date of Cahn’s claim against Dr. Berryman and the date she filed suit against him. Thus, her claim was barred by Section 41-5-13 of the Act. By this opinion, the New Mexico Supreme Court clarified the contours of the due process exception, and held that plaintiffs with late-accruing medical malpractice claims, i.e., claims accruing in the last twelve months of the three-year repose period, shall have twelve months from the time of accrual to commence suit. View "Cahn v. Berryman" on Justia Law

In 2012, petitioners Saint Francis Hospital, Inc., Neurological Surgery, Inc., and Douglas Koontz, M.D. performed decompressive laminectomies of respondent Johnson John’s spine at the C2-3, C3-4, C4-5, C5-6 and C6-7 regions. After the operation, respondent allegedly became partially paralyzed, suffered constant pain, was hospitalized for four months and submitted to additional medical treatment. Respondent filed suit against petitioners in 2016, alleging negligence, gross negligence, medical malpractice and sought punitive damages for petitioners’ failure to render reasonable medical care, breach of the duty of care owed and respondent’s resulting injuries. In commencing the action, respondent failed to attach an affidavit of merit to the Petition or otherwise comply with Okla. Stat. tit. 12, section 19.1. In lieu of answer, petitioners filed their respective motions to dismiss and asserted, among other things, respondent’s failure to include the statutorily required affidavit of merit or, in the alternative, obtain a statutorily recognized exception. Respondent averred that the statutory directive unconstitutionally restrained a litigant's right to access the courts and was an unconstitutional special law. The district court provided notice to the Attorney General's office concerning the challenged statute. As intervenor, the Attorney General essentially urged the district court to enforce the affidavit requirements. The district court ultimately overruled petitioners’ motions to dismiss, and rejected respondent’s special law challenge. The court determined that section 19.1 unconstitutionally imposed a substantial and impermissible impediment to access to the courts, and this barrier was unconstitutional regardless of the financial worth of a litigant and was not cured by exercising the indigent from this burden. The Oklahoma Supreme Court agreed with the district court’s ruling, and found section 19.1 was an impermissible barrier to court access and an unconstitutional special law. Section 19.1 was therefore stricken. View "John v. St. Francis Hospital" on Justia Law

At issue in this medical malpractice action was Ariz. R. Evid. 615 and the proper remedy for technical Rule 615 violations. Rule 615 generally provides that a trial court, at a party’s request, must order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear other witnesses’ testimony. The Supreme Court held that Rule 615, when invoked, prohibits a party from providing prospective trial witnesses with transcripts of prior witnesses’ trial testimony. The court further held (1) a violation of this prohibition is not presumptively prejudicial in a civil action, but even when no prejudice is shown, the trial court must take some corrective action by fashioning an appropriate remedy under the circumstances; and (2) although expert witnesses are not automatically exempt from the Rule, a trial court must permit a witness to hear (or read) a prior witness’s testimony if a party shows that such an exception is essential to that party’s claim or defense. View "Spring v. Bradford" on Justia Law

Pharmacist Joseph McNamara, Jr. appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Benchmark Insurance Company ("Benchmark") in Benchmark's indemnity action against McNamara. Benchmark commenced the indemnity action in an effort to recover funds expended to settle a medical-malpractice action brought against Southern Medical, Inc., Benchmark's insured and McNamara's employer. The medical-malpractice action was brought against Southern Medical by Ricky Avant and Kim Avant and was based, at least in part, on the alleged tortious acts and omissions of McNamara. Because the act complained of occurred in January 2010 and Benchmark sued McNamara in February 2014, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded Benchmark's indemnity action was time-barred under section 6-5-482, Ala. Code 1975. Thus, the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of Benchmark and in denying McNamara's motion for a summary judgment. View "McNamara v. Benchmark Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Dr. Eyston Hunte and his medical practice petitioned for mandamus relief. A former patient, Lisa Johnson, filed suit against Hunte, alleging Hunte sexually abused her during a health examination. Johnson served discovery requests on Hunte and his practice, which included a request to produce "each and every claim or complaint that has been made against [Hunte] by a patient for assault or inappropriate touching." Hunte objected to this request on the ground that this information was protected from discovery. Johnson filed a motion to compel Hunte to produce the requested documents. Hunte and EAH, in turn, filed a motion for a protective order. The trial court denied Hunte's motion for a protective order and ordered Hunte to respond to the discovery requests within 21 days. It was evident to the Alabama Supreme Court that a the 2001 complaint submitted to the Alabama Board of Medical Examiners by former patient and provided to Hunte as a part of the proceedings before the Board was the type of document declared privileged and confidential under section 34-24-60, Ala Code 1975. Furthermore, the Court noted that Johnson had not filed an answer and had not presented any facts or argument to the Supreme Court indicating that the 2001 complaint was not privileged or that it was otherwise subject to discovery. Thus, the Court concluded that Hunte has shown a clear right to an order protecting the 2001 complaint in Hunte and EAH's possession from discovery. The Court granted Hunte’s petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Dr. Eyston Hunte" on Justia Law

The Alaska professional licensing division brought an accusation of professional misconduct against doctor David Odom, M.D., alleging that he acted incompetently when he prescribed phentermine and thyroid hormone for one of his patients. The division sought disciplinary sanctions against the doctor. Following a hearing, an administrative law judge issued a proposed decision concluding that the division had failed to show that the doctor’s conduct fell below the standard of care in his field of practice and that no disciplinary sanctions were warranted. But the Medical Board instead adopted as its decision the proposal for action submitted by the division and revoked the doctor’s medical license. On appeal to the superior court, the case was remanded to the Board for consideration of the doctor’s own late-filed proposal for action. The Board reaffirmed its decision to revoke the doctor’s medical license, and the superior court affirmed that decision. The doctor appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court. Because the Medical Board’s decision to revoke the doctor’s medical license was not supported by substantial evidence, the Court reversed the superior court’s affirmance of that decision. View "Odom v. Alaska Div. of Corporations, Bus. & Prof. Licensing" on Justia Law