Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The petitioner, the estate of Fredrick O'Brian Elliott, deceased, by and through his personal representative, Sonya Windham ("the estate"), filed a petition for a writ of mandamus asking the Alabama Supreme Court to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its March 7, 2018, order insofar as it denied certain requests for production of documents made by the estate. The estate filed a wrongful-death action against Baptist Health System, Inc., d/b/a Princeton Baptist Medical Center ("PBMC"), and Courtney Johnston (collectively, "the defendants") and various fictitiously named defendants. Elliott was admitted to Princeton Baptist Medical Center complaining of nausea, vomiting, and gastritis; that, as part of his treatment, Elliott "was ordered to undergo full bowel rest by having Trans-Peritoneal Nutrition (TPN) administered through a Peripherally Inserted Central Catheter (PICC Line)." Johnston, Elliott's nurse, came into Elliot's room and discarded a partially full TPN bag, "following doctor's orders," which Elliott's family questioned since Elliott had not finished his entire nutritional dose. The complaint alleged that because Johnston misread the chart and prematurely discarded the TPN bag, it started an irreversible chain reaction: Elliott became febrile, his temperature spiked, he developed an infection such that it damaged his heart, leading to cardiac arrest. Nine days after the TPN incident, Elliot died. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in denying the estate's motion to compel certain information requested in interrogatories based solely on the assertions of defendants' counsel: they did not satisfy their burden of establishing that the information requested was privileged. As such, the Supreme Court granted mandamus relief and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Ex parte the Estate of Fredrick O'Brian Elliott, deceased, by and through his personal representative, Sonya Windham." on Justia Law

St. Luke’s Magic Valley Regional Medical Center appealed a jury verdict awarding Rodney and Joyce Herrett $3,775,864.21 in a medical malpractice action wherein St. Luke’s admitted liability. On appeal, St. Luke’s argued that the district court erred by denying its motion for mistrial, admitting certain expert testimony, and improperly instructing the jury as to recklessness. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Herrett v. St. Luke's Magic Valley RMC" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from plaintiff Lucia Serico’s motion for attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses pursuant to Rule 4:58 after a jury trial on medical malpractice claims against Robert Rothberg, M.D. At issue was whether Serico could collect attorney’s fees from Rothberg despite entering into a “high-low agreement” that limited the amount she could recover at trial to $1,000,000. Based on the expressed intent of the parties and the context of the agreement, the New Jersey Supreme Court found the agreement set $1,000,000 as the maximum recovery. Therefore, Serico could not seek additional litigation expenses allowed by Rule 4:58. View "Serico v. Rothberg" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a discovery dispute in a medical malpractice action involving a hospital’s and its staff’s care of a patient. The parties disagreed over the boundaries of privileged material under the Patient Safety Act (PSA), N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.23 to -12.25c, and plaintiff’s ability to receive responsive discovery in order to prepare her action. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the appellate panel’s order shielding the redacted document at issue from discovery because the PSA’s self-critical-analysis privilege prevents its disclosure. The Court also affirmed the determination that, when reviewing a discovery dispute such as this, a trial court should not be determining whether a reportable event under the PSA has occurred. The Court reversed the judgment to the extent it ended defendants’ discovery obligation with respect to this dispute, finding that defendants had an unmet discovery duty under Rule 4:17-4(d) that had to be addressed. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Brugaletta v. Garcia" on Justia Law

At issue before the South Carolina Supreme Court in this case was an appeal of a circuit court's decision to impose sanctions against Pee Dee Health Care, P.A., and its attorney for conduct that occurred before the circuit court entered summary judgment against it. The issue the Court addressed was whether a motion for sanctions filed nine days after remittitur from Pee Dee Health's unsuccessful appeal of the summary judgment order was untimely under the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act (FCPSA) and Rule 11 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court found the motion was untimely under the FCPSA, but the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding the motion timely under Rule 11. View "Pee Dee Health Care v. Estate of Hugh S. Thompson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kimberli Ransom, the relator and petitioner in this mandamus proceeding, filed a medical negligence action alleging that two radiologists employed by Radiology Specialists of the Northwest (defendant) were negligent in reading her imaging studies when they examined them in 2013. In 2016, during discovery in that underlying action, plaintiff took the depositions of the radiologists. The radiologists testified to the findings that they had made after examining plaintiff’s imaging studies, but, when plaintiff showed the radiologists the studies, they testified that they had no independent memory of reviewing them. When plaintiff then asked the radiologists to tell her what they could now see in those studies, defense counsel instructed the radiologists not to answer. Defense counsel took the position that those questions called for “expert testimony” that was not discoverable under ORCP 36 B. Defense counsel also argued that those questions impermissibly invaded the attorney client privilege set out in OEC 503. Plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery and sought an order allowing her to ask the radiologists about their current “knowledge and ability to read and interpret” the imaging studies. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion, and she petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus requiring the trial court to grant her motion, or, in the alternative, show cause why it had not done so. The Supreme Court issued the writ; the trial court declined to change its ruling. The Supreme Court concluded the questions that plaintiff asked the radiologists about what they saw in plaintiff’s imaging studies in 2016 were relevant under ORCP 36 B; they were reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence about the radiologists’ treatment of plaintiff in 2013 and what they perceived and knew at that time. The Court also concluded those questions did not call for impermissible “expert testimony” and did not invade the attorney client privilege. View "Ransom v. Radiology Specialists of the Northwest" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that Rule 9(j) does not permit a plaintiff to amend a timely filed medical malpractice complaint to cure a defective Rule 9(j) certification after the statute of limitations has run when the expert review required by Rule 9(j) occurred before the filing of the original complaint, holding that the procedures Plaintiff followed in this case were consistent with the letter and spirit of the rule.Plaintiff filed this medical malpractice complaint, but Plaintiff’s Rule 9(j) certification inadvertently used the language of a prior version of Rule 9(j). Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss. In response, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint to cure her defective Rule 9(j) certification. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that where Plaintiff did not file the complaint with the proper Rule 9(j) certification before the running of the statute of limitation, the complaint could not have been deemed to have commenced within the statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff should be permitted to amend her medical malpractice complaint to correct a purely technical pleading error under the circumstances of this case. View "Vaughan v. Mashburn" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Ohio savings statute, Ohio Rev. Code 2305.19, does not apply to a federal or state court action commenced in another state that fails otherwise than upon the merits, and therefore, the attempted recommencement in an Ohio state court of the medical malpractice action in this case was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.Plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The federal court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. Less than one year later, Plaintiffs filed an identical action against the same defendants in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court. The trial court, relying on Howard v. Allen, 283 N.E.2d 167 (Ohio 1972), concluded that the action was untimely and granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the savings statute applied, and therefore, Plaintiffs were permitted to file the case within one year after the action failed otherwise than upon the merits, even if the applicable statute of limitations had expired. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the savings statute did not apply to this action. View "Portee v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court remanded the matter without reaching the merits of the appeal, holding that the discovery order challenged on appeal was now a nullity and did not govern future proceedings in this case and that no exception to the final judgment applied.Appellants appealed from an order of the superior court granting Appellee’s motion to compel them to produce in discovery certain patient medical records that the court found to relevant to Appellees' notice of claim asserting medical negligence. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) given the unusual procedural posture presented in this case, the discovery order was a nullity without legal force or effect and did not govern future proceedings in this case; and (2) no exception to the final judgment rule applied that would require the Court to reach the merits of the parties’ arguments below. View "McCain v. Vanadia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of Defendant following the grant of Defendant’s motion to strike, holding that an action authorized by the claims commissioner, limited to medical malpractice, may not survive a motion to strike where the plaintiff was not a patient of the defendant, as required by Jarmie v. Troncale, 50 A.3d 802 (2012).Plaintiff, administratrix of the estate of the decedent in this case, sought permission to bring an action against Defendant for medical malpractice based on mental health services and treatment given to Robert Rankin, who allegedly fatally stabbed the decedent. The claims commissioner granted Plaintiff permission to bring an action under Conn. Gen. Stat. 4-160(b), limited to medical malpractice. Plaintiff then brought this action. Defendant filed a motion to strike the complaint, arguing that Connecticut does not recognize medical malpractice claims brought by nonpatient third parties. The trial court granted the motion to strike and then rendered judgment for Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Jarmie prohibits an action, limited by the claims commissioner to medical malpractice, where the plaintiff was not a patient of the defendant; and (2) if Plaintiff’s action sounded in negligence, then the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. View "Levin v. State" on Justia Law