Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

On November 21, 2017, Richard Bush presented to Saint Bernard Parish Hospital for depression and suicidal ideations. At the hospital, Dr. Miguel Aguilera treated and discharged him. Bush attempted re-admittance with the same complaints, but was refused re-admittance. Thereafter, Bush attempted suicide in the hospital bathroom. He was found alive and transported to University Hospital in New Orleans for treatment; however, he succumbed to his injuries from the suicide attempt and died on November 30, 2017. In November 2018, his wife, Patricia Bush, on behalf of herself, her daughters, Madalyn and Ashley Bush, and on behalf of the decedent, Richard Bush, filed a formal pro se complaint with the Patient Compensation Fund (“PCF”) to convene a medical review panel (“MRP”), naming Saint Bernard Parish Hospital and Dr. Aguilera for malpractice relating to Richard Bush's death. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted this writ application in order to determine: (1) whether contra non valentem interrupted prescription; and (2) whether the court of appeal erred in relying on documents that were not entered as evidence and were not part of the record. The Court found that, while contra non valentem may interrupt prescription in a wrongful death claim in certain instances, it did not interrupt prescription in this case due to the fact that the court of appeal incorrectly considered documents that were not in evidence. The Court reversed the court of appeal’s ruling in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Medical Review Panel for the Claim of Richard Bush" on Justia Law

This litigation arose from a medical malpractice suit brought by plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of their minor daughter, against Dr. Daryl Elias, Jr. and his insurer. Plaintiffs alleged Dr. Elias committed malpractice during the child’s delivery, causing a separated right shoulder and a broken clavicle. Plaintiffs also alleged the child suffered permanent injury when the five nerve roots of her brachial plexus were completely and partially avulsed from the spinal cord, causing her to lose the use of her right arm. At the conclusion of trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants, finding the treatment provided by Dr. Elias to the child did not fall below the applicable standard of care for an obstetrician gynecologist. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case for the primary purpose of addressing two narrow issues: (1) whether any errors in the district court’s evidentiary rulings interdicted the jury’s fact-finding process; and (2) if so, whether the court of appeal erred in reviewing the record de novo. The court of appeal found the district court committed prejudicial legal error in excluding the child's treating orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Kozin’s testimony in part and permitting defendant's retained expert, Dr. Grimm, to testify. The Supreme Court found no error in the judgment of the court of appeal insofar as it reversed the district court’s ruling limiting Dr. Kozin from testifying as to the cause of the child’s injuries: "a review of Dr. Kozin’s excluded testimony reveals he did not render any opinions on whether Dr. Elias breached the standard of care or was otherwise negligent. Rather, he simply testified as to the cause of the child’s injury, explaining that based on his expertise, he was 'certain the force applied by the delivering physician led to this injury.'" The district court erred in restricting his testimony. However, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its great discretion in finding Dr. Grimm’s testimony was admissible under the standards set forth in La. Code Evid. art. 702 and Daubert/Foret. The court of appeal erred in reversing the district court’s evidentiary ruling. Furthermore, the Court held the court of appeal abused its discretion by undertaking a de novo review of the record rather than remanding the case for a new trial. In all other respects, the judgment of the court of appeal was vacated, and the case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "LaBauve, et al. v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Ins. Co., et al." on Justia Law

A surgeon and his clinic sought a writ from the Court of Appeal directing the trial court to vacate its order allowing the survivors of a patient who died from a surgical procedure to amend their complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages. The Court of Appeal determined the evidence of the misconduct of the surgeon and the employees of his clinic that the survivors submitted with their motion for leave to amend, if believed by the trier of fact, might well support an award of punitive damages. Nevertheless, because the survivors did not move to amend within the time mandated by statute, the Court granted the requested relief. View "Divino Plastic Surgery, Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Dr. Paulus was prosecuted for healthcare fraud. Government consultants reviewed 496 of Paulus’s procedures and concluded that 146 (about 30%) were unnecessary. King’s Daughters Medical Center (KDMC) consultants also reviewed a random selection of Paulus’ procedures. Three experts at trial concluded that Paulus overstated his patients’ arterial blockage and inserted medically unnecessary stents. A jury convicted Paulus. After remand, before sentencing, the government disclosed to Paulus for the first time the “Shields Letter,” stating that when KDMC faced previous legal trouble, it hired independent experts to review 1,049 of Paulus’s cases; they flagged about 7% of his procedures as unnecessary. The defense viewed this evidence as exculpatory and consistent with diagnostic differences of opinion. Before trial, the district court had held that the information was inadmissible and that the parties “[we]re not to disclose” any information about the KDMC Review to Paulus.The Sixth Circuit vacated Paulus’s convictions and remanded, finding that the Shields Letter was material to Paulus’s defense and that failure to disclose it violated Paulus’s “Brady” rights. On remand, the government subpoenaed KDMC for additional information regarding the study referenced in the Shields Letter. KDMC objected, citing the attorney-client, work-product, and settlement privileges. The government filed a motion to compel, which was granted. KDMC sought a writ of mandamus. The Sixth Circuit denied KDMC’s petition. KDMC’s disclosure of some information regarding its experts’ study waived its privilege over the related, undisclosed information now being sought. View "In re: King's Daughters Health System, Inc." on Justia Law

The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a certified interlocutory order dismissing Defendant-respondent OSU Medical Trust, doing business as OSU Medical Center (OSUMC), from a medical malpractice lawsuit. The issue was whether Plaintiffs-appellants Miranda and Colby Crawford, Natural Parents and on Behalf of C.C.C., a Minor, and Miranda and Colby Crawford, Individually (collectively, the Crawfords) complied with the notice provisions of the Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA). The Supreme Court held that the Crawfords failed to present notice of their tort claim within one year of the date the loss occurred and, pursuant to 51 O.S.Supp.2012 section 156(B), their claims against OSUMC were forever barred. The Court thus affirmed the trial court's order dismissing OSUMC with prejudice. View "Crawford v. OSU Medical Trust" on Justia Law

Claiborne County Hospital (CCH) sought summary judgment against Julius Truitt on his medical-negligence claim. CCH claimed Truitt failed to designate a medical expert. Truitt responded to CCH’s motion that a genuine issue of material fact existed, and that he was exempt from producing sworn expert testimony under the layman’s exception allowing lay testimony despite the general rule requiring medical expert testimony in medical-negligence cases. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that as a matter of law, the trial court erred by denying CCH’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court found CCH met its summary-judgment burden by showing that Truitt failed to produce sworn expert testimony establishing a prima facie case of medical negligence. The trial court's judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Claiborne County Hospital v. Truitt" on Justia Law

St. Alexius Medical Center, d/b/a CHI St. Alexius Health Bismarck, requested a supervisory writ preventing enforcement of the district court’s order compelling disclosure of privileged information. Kevin McKibbage sued Daniel Dixon, Bone & Joint Center, and CHI for medical malpractice relating to a surgery Dixon performed in 2017. In response to McKibbage’s discovery requests, CHI produced some of the requested documents and asserted privileges on others. CHI provided a privilege log identifying undisclosed documents and the privileges claimed. McKibbage filed a motion to compel arguing CHI did not provide sufficient information in the privilege log. CHI responded that it identified all the information it could without violating the peer review law, but CHI agreed to produce an amended privilege log containing greater descriptions. The district court found the law permitted the disclosure of additional information and ordered the following to be disclosed: the dates the documents were created, the identity of the person who created each document and their position at the time of creation, and the identity of the person who received each document and their position for peer review. CHI argued to the North Dakota Supreme Court that the disclosures violated North Dakota’s statutory peer review privilege. The Supreme Court granted CHI's petition and directed the district court to vacate its November 8, 2021 discovery order. View "St. Alexius Medical Center v. Nesvig, et al." on Justia Law

Pappas sued Dr. Chang for malpractice. During mediation, they agreed that Chang would pay Pappas $100,000. Both parties and their counsel signed a settlement agreement, which provided that Pappas “will execute a release of all claims ... in a more comprehensive settlement agreement ... to include a provision for mutual confidentiality as to the facts ... the terms and amount of this agreement.” The parties unsuccessfully negotiated the “more comprehensive settlement agreement” and “provision for mutual confidentiality” for months. Pappas discharged her attorney and, representing herself, advised Chang’s attorney that she would only comply with a confidentiality provision if she received $525,000, then sued Chang for breach of contract.The trial court ruled against Pappas “because she has not signed a ‘more comprehensive settlement agreement’ and release which includes a provision for mutual confidentiality.” In consolidated appeals, the court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that a confidentiality provision would be against public policy and violate the Business and Professions Code. The court also rejected Chang’s appeal of the trial court’s denial of her attorney fees as costs of proof at trial (Code Civ. Proc., 2033.420) based on its finding that Pappas’s denial of two requests for admission was based on a good faith belief she would prevail at trial and that the requests went to the ultimate issue. View "Pappas v. Chang" on Justia Law

The University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC) appealed a county court judgment granting Genevieve Jensen’s motion for extension of time to serve process on the attorney general and its decision denying UMMC’s motion for summary judgment based on a statute of limitations defense. Since Jensen failed to articulate good cause for an extension of time to serve process, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined the county court abused its discretion by granting her motion for extension, it reversed the county court’s decision and dismissed Jensen’s case with prejudice. View "University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Jensen" on Justia Law

Relatives of Saldana, who died from COVID-19 at Glenhaven nursing home, sued Glenhaven in California state court, alleging state-law causes of action. Glenhaven removed the case to federal court. The Ninth Circuit affirmed a remand to state court,The district court lacked jurisdiction under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442, because Glenhaven did not act under a federal officer or agency’s directions when it complied with mandatory directives from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Department of Health and Human Services.The claims were not completely preempted by the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, which provides immunity from suit when the HHS Secretary determines that a threat to health constitutes a public health emergency, but provides an exception for an exclusive federal cause of action for willful misconduct. A March 2020 declaration under the Act provided "liability immunity for activities related to medical countermeasures against COVID-19.” The Act does not displace non-willful misconduct claims related to the public health emergency, nor did it provide substitute causes of action. The federal scheme was not so comprehensive that it entirely supplanted state law claims.The district court did not have jurisdiction under the embedded federal question doctrine, which applies if a federal issue is necessarily raised, actually disputed, substantial, and capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress. View "Saldana v. Glenhaven Healthcare LLC" on Justia Law