Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Steven Lake murdered his wife, Amy, and their two children before committing suicide. George Lake, Steven’s father, was appointed as the personal representative of Steven’s Estate (“the Estate”). Thereafter, Ralph Bagley, Amy’s father and a personal representative of Amy’s estate, filed a creditors’ claim against the Estate, anticipating a wrongful death action on behalf of Amy’s estate against the Estate. Bagley then filed a demand for bond seeking a bond in the amount of $150,000. Nearly two years later, Bagley filed a petition to remove George as the personal representative, alleging that he should be removed because he failed to obtain a bond despite the earlier petition. The court entered an order requiring George to submit a personal surety bond in the amount of $75,000 within thirty days and denied Bagley’s petition for removal. Bagley subsequently filed a motion for contempt against George for failing to timely obtain the bond. The probate court granted the petition, removed George from his position as representative of the Estate, and awarded attorney fees. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the probate court erred in proceeding on the motion for contempt because the motion did not satisfy the requirements of Me. R. Civ. P. 66. View "In re Estate of Steven L. Lake" on Justia Law

Mainers for Fair Bear Hunting (MFBH) is a Maine ballot question committee that was a proponent of November 2014 Ballot Question 1 concerning bear hunting and trapping. As early as September 2013, the Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife used agency resources to communicate with the public in opposition to Question 1. MFBH filed a complaint against the Department alleging that the Department’s campaign activities constituted an ultra vires expenditure of public funds. In November 2014, Maine voters defeated the ballot question. The Department subsequently filed a motion to dismiss MFBH’s complaint on the grounds of mootness and standing. In March 2015, the superior court dismissed the complaint as moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the case is moot and that no exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply. View "Mainers for Fair Bear Hunting v. Dep’t of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife" on Justia Law

In 2014, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to operating under the influence (OUI), elevated to a Class C felony by two prior convictions for operating under the influence. Defendant appealed, asserting that his 2013 OUI conviction - one of the two convictions that enhanced his 2014 charge - was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and therefore, the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike that conviction from the indictment. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to meet his burden on collateral attack of demonstrating that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. View "State v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Darling’s Auto Mall is a franchisee of General Motors LLC (GM) and and authorized dealer. Darling’s filed two small claims actions in district court alleging that it had been underpaid by GM for certain warranty repairs in violation of the Business Practices Between Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, Distributors and Dealers Act (Dealers Act). The district court ruled in favor of Darling’s on both small claims. GM appealed and requested a jury trial de novo. The superior court granted GM’s request. After a jury trial, the superior court entered a judgment in favor of GM. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court’s decision to grant a jury trial de novo was not an appealable determination; (2) the trial court did not err in denying Darling’s motion for judgment as a matter of law; and (3) the trial court properly rejected Darling’s proposed jury instructions. View "Darling's Auto Mall v. General Motors LLC" on Justia Law

Arthur Murdock, then a lieutenant with the Maine State Police, was injured when his cruiser was struck by another vehicle after Martin Thorne indicated that Murdock could turn in front of him into an intersection. Murdock filed a four-count complaint alleging negligence against Castigliola and Thorne and seeking uninsured motorist coverage from the Maine Department of Public Safety (DPS). The superior court granted the motions for summary judgment filed by both DPS and Thorne. Murdock appealed, and DPS cross-appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the superior court improvidently granted Murdock’s motion to enter final judgment on Murdock’s claims against Thorne and DPS pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1). View "Murdock v. Thorne" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court considered when a municipal agency’s decision constitutes a final action subject to immediate judicial review. The owner of the Camden Harbour Inn applied to the Town of Camden for authorization to increase the number of guest rooms and parking spaces for the Inn and to reduce the number of seats at the Inn’s restaurant. The Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) granted a special exception permit subject to conditions and allowed the Inn to proceed to the Planning Board for site plan review. Susan Bryant, an abutter, appealed the ZBA’s decision to the superior court before site plan review could occur. The superior court affirmed the ZBA’s decision. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded for dismissal of Bryant’s complaint, holding that, while the Town’s Zoning Ordinance expressly provided for Bryant’s appeal from the grant of the preliminary special permit, the ZBA’s decision was not a final action subject to appellate review in the courts because additional process was required by the Town’s Ordinance before a final decision on the Inn’s proposed changes is reached. View "Bryant v. Town of Camden" on Justia Law

Defendants defaulted on their mortgage, and U.S. Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure. Following the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Bank of America, N.A. v. Greenleaf, the Bank filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss the foreclosure action without prejudice, arguing that it could not proceed with the foreclosure because it did not have a mortgage assignment from the original lender and thus did not have standing to pursue the action. Defendants countered that the motion should be dismissed with prejudice so that they could be awarded attorney fees. The trial court granted the Bank’s motion but dismissed the case with prejudice. The court subsequently issued a correction of the record stating that the dismissal of the Bank’s action was without prejudice. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of dismissal with prejudice and subsequent judgment of dismissal without prejudice, holding that the trial court erred in dismissing the Bank’s action with prejudice and did not have authority under the circumstances to change that outcome to a dismissal without prejudice. Remanded for the entry of judgment of dismissal without prejudice. View "U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Curit" on Justia Law

John Dyer gave a promissory note and a mortgage on property securing the note to Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. The mortgage contained language naming Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as lender’s nominee. The Bank of New York later filed a complaint for foreclosure, asserting that Dyer had stopped making payments on the note and that he owed the Bank over $1 million. During the trial, the Bank filed a motion to dismiss its complaint without prejudice on the ground that it did not have the requisite standing to pursue its claim. Dyer filed an objection requesting that any dismissal be with prejudice and that he be awarded his attorney fees and costs. The district court granted the Bank’s motion to dismiss without prejudice and declined to award additional attorney fees or costs. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint without prejudice and in declining to award Dyer his full attorney fees and costs. View "Bank of New York v. Dyer" on Justia Law

Mother and Father met in Guatemala, and their child was born there. When the child was approximately fifteen months old, Father filed a complaint in Maine to establish parental rights and responsibilities. Mother was not served in Maine and did not consent to jurisdiction in Maine, and neither Mother nor the child ever resided in Maine. Mother moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that Maine lacked long-arm jurisdiction over her. The district court granted Mother's motion to dismiss, determine that Maine lacked jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly determined that the UCCJEA governed its determination of jurisdiction in this matter. View "Seekings v. Hamm" on Justia Law