Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Lightspeed operates online pornography sites and sued a defendant, identified only Internet Protocol address, which was allegedly associated with unlawful viewing of Lightspeed’s content, using a “hacked” password. Lightspeed identified 6,600 others (by IP addresses only) as “co‐conspirators” in a scheme to steal passwords and content. Lightspeed, acting ex parte, served subpoenas on the ISPs (then non‐parties) for the personally identifiable information of each alleged coconspirator, none of whom had been joined as parties. The ISPs moved to quash and for a protective order. The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of the ISPs. Lightspeed amended its complaint to name as co‐conspirator parties the ISPs and unidentified “corporate representatives,” alleging negligence, violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030 and 1030(g), and deceptive practices. Lightspeed issued new subpoenas seeking the personally identifiable information. The ISPs removed the case to federal court. The district judge denied an emergency motion to obtain the identification information. After several “changes” with respect to Lightspeed’s lawyers, the court stated that they “demonstrated willingness to deceive … about their operations, relationships, and financial interests have varied from feigned ignorance to misstatements to outright lies … calculated so that the Court would grant early‐discovery requests, thereby allowing [them] to identify defendants and exact settlement proceeds.” After granting Lightspeed’s motion for voluntary dismissal, the court granted attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. 1927, stating that the litigation “smacked of bullying pretense.” Failing to pay, the lawyers were found to be in civil contempt and ordered to pay 10% of the original sanctions award to cover costs for the contempt litigation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Duffy v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant-respondent Stephen Lipworth won a judgment against Plaintiff-appellant Raj Singh, and successfully moved to amend the judgment to add certain aliases Singh used. The trial court then granted Lipworth's application for the sale of certain property that Singh transferred to his wife, who in turn transferred the property to Sunman Mehta. The trial court concluded that "Mehta" was another alias Singh adopted to avoid paying his creditors. The court set aside that series of transfers and ordered the property sold to satisfy the judgment. The order granting Lipworth's application for sale became final after various appeals were dismissed. In the case before the Court of Appeal, Singh, along with his wife Karen and "Mehta," sued Lipworth alleging he used "fraudulent representations" to persuade the trial court in the prior case that Singh was "hiding some properties from his creditors using different names such as Archana Singh and Suman Mehta." After several frivolous motions were decided against Singh, the trial court invited Lipworth to file a motion to require Singh to furnish security or have the case dismissed pursuant to the vexatious litigant statutes. Lipworth did so, and filed both a demurrer and a special motion to strike pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court found Singh to be a vexatious litigant with no reasonable probability of prevailing in the litigation because the lawsuit amounted to an impermissible collateral attack on a prior final judgment and post-judgment orders. The trial court ordered "Raj Singh aka Suman Mehta" to furnish security and dismissed the lawsuit as to plaintiff when no such security was furnished. The trial court then granted the anti-SLAPP motion as to Karen Singh, and awarded attorney fees and costs. Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeal, and Lipworth filed a motion for sanctions against plaintiffs and plaintiffs' counsel pursuant to section 907 and rule 8.276 for bringing a frivolous appeal. The Court of Appeals concluded sanctions were warranted in this case. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment and imposed sanctions against plaintiffs and their attorney. View "Singh v. Lipworth" on Justia Law

After the jury returned a verdict in favor of ING on its breach of contract claims, the jury awarded ING attorney's fees under Georgia law. UPS moved under Rule 59(e) to amend the judgment to set aside the award of attorney's fees or, alternatively, for a new trial on the issue of attorney's fees. The court held that the district court erred in setting the verdict aside in light of UPS's failure to move for relief under Rule 50(a) and the existence of evidentiary support in the record for the jury's verdict. The court also concluded that a new trial was not warranted. Accordingly, the court reversed the order granting UPS's motion and remanded with instructions to reinstate the verdict and resolve ING's motion to set attorney's fees. View "ING Global v. United Parcel Service Oasis Supply Corp." on Justia Law

The district court entered a Rule 60(a) clarifying order imposing sanctions on plaintiffs' attorney, Peter A.T. Sartin. Sartin hired the McNair Firm to represent him and to appeal the clarifying order, but the McNair Firm filed the notice of appeal two days late. The appeal was voluntarily abandoned. Sartin then filed a malpractice suit against the McNair Firm and the district court granted the Firm's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court's original intent was to impose sanctions on Sartin individually and, therefore, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving effect to that intent in its Rule 60(a) clarification order. Because the court concluded that the district court's earlier case properly employed Rule 60(a), the court affirmed the district court's conclusion in this case that the McNair Firm's failure to appeal the earlier Rule 60(a) clarification order caused Sartin no injury. The court disposed of Sartin's remaining arguments and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Sartin v. McNair Law Firm PA" on Justia Law

Montanez sued the City of Chicago and Officers Fico and Simon, alleging that Fico used excessive force while arresting him for drinking on a public way and Simon failed to intervene. He sustained minor injuries and sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state-law. The state-law claims were dismissed as time-barred. The city conceded its obligation to indemnify, so the section 1983 claims proceeded to trial. Fico was found liable, Simon was cleared, and the jury awarded $1,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000 in punitive damages. Montanez’s lawyers submitted a bill for more than $426,000 in attorneys’ fees and about $6,500 in costs and expenses. The judge scrutinized the bill line-by-line, discounted entries where more than one partner oversaw the same activities, or where the lawyers researched or drafted motions that were never filed, excluded hours spent on a full-day mock trial and entries related to matters that were essentially administrative matters, and reduced the hourly billing rates. After these and other reductions, the final award of costs was $3,051.94 and the court awarded $108,350.87 in fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, referring to the city’s “scorched-earth” defense strategy and the need for trial judges to exercise their broad discretion to adjust bloated bills for attorney’s fees after the fact and case-management authority during the litigation. View "Montanez v. Simon" on Justia Law

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, thousands of lawsuits were filed against the City, private contractors, and the WTC Captive. Following years of litigation and extensive negotiations, the parties agreed on a comprehensive settlement process. In these consolidated appeals, three of the district court's orders regarding the settlement process are at issue. The court vacated the order of the district court with respect to the Bonus Payment and remanded for further proceedings in this respect; reversed the order of the district court as to the Contingent Payment; affirmed the order of the district court denying a contingency attorneys' fees as to the Bonus Payment; and dismissed the appeal from the order denying a contingency attorneys' fee as to the First Contingent Payment. View "Cirino et al. v. City of New York et al." on Justia Law

Source manufactures water reservoirs in which drinking water can be stored inside backpacks for use during outdoor activities and is the assignee of the 276 patent, which focuses on a reservoir with a hermetic seal to prevent leakage and a wide opening for easier cleaning and filling. Attorney Yonay prosecuted the 276 patent application. Yonay and his partner signed the complaints in an infringement action against Hydrapak, which also manufactures a flexible hydration reservoir, the Reversible Reservoir. Hydrapak served a sanctions motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which allows the party against whom the sanctions will be sought 21 days to withdraw the offending claim. Source declined to withdraw its amended complaint. The district court granted Hydrapak summary judgment and sanctions, stating that there was “nothing complicated or technical” about the claim limitation “slot being narrower than the diameter of the rod,” and that none of the words of this limitation “requires definition or interpretation beyond its plain and ordinary meaning.” The court determined that in Hydrapak’s products the slot is larger than the diameter of the rod, even under Source’s proposed construction. After the Federal Circuit affirmed and denied Hydrapak sanctions for a frivolous appeal, the district court imposed a sanction of $200,054.00. The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "Source Vagabond Sys., Ltd. v. Hydrapak, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendants violated the automatic-stay provision of 11 U.S.C. 362(a). The court held that an attorney preparing an order for a judge is not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. The court did not reach the question of whether such an action violated the automatic stay, or whether it was actionable under 11 U.S.C. 362(k). View "Burton v. Infinity Capital Management" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that New York City officers used excessive force when arresting her. On appeal, plaintiff primarily seeks a new trial on damages and challenges portions of the district court's order awarding attorney's fees and costs incurred prior to the date of defendants' Rule 68 Offer. The court concluded that the district court did not err in refusing to give a separate charge as to future damages and plaintiff failed to establish that any potentially improper conduct by defense counsel prejudiced the jury's award of punitive damages. The district court properly applied Rule 68 and did not abuse its discretion by reducing the reasonable hourly rate of plaintiff's lead counsel. The court held that Rule 68 offers need not, as a per se rule, expressly apportion damages among multiple defendants. With respect to apportionment, a Rule 68 offer is operative so long as it is capable of being compared to the prevailing plaintiff's ultimate recovery. Because the Offer meets this standard, the court affirmed the district court's decision. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that the district court erred in reducing the amount of her awardable attorney's fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and order of the district court. View "Stanczyk v. City of New York, et al." on Justia Law

This appeal is a companion to Baker v. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. The appeal concerns action the district court took while purporting to exercise jurisdiction over that dispute, namely, disqualifying plaintiffs' counsel (Zerger and Mauer). Greenwood sought Zerger and Mauer's disqualification due to a conflict of interest out of the attorneys' former representation of Greenwood and its current representation of plaintiffs. The district court entered the disqualification order based on its inherent need to manage its bar and uphold the rules of professional conduct. The record supported the district court's determination that the two matters were substantially related and there was a conflict of interest. Therefore, although the court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the merits case, the court concluded that the district court had authority to disqualify counsel and did not abuse its discretion in doing so. View "Zerger & Mauer v. City of Greenwood" on Justia Law