Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Source manufactures water reservoirs in which drinking water can be stored inside backpacks for use during outdoor activities and is the assignee of the 276 patent, which focuses on a reservoir with a hermetic seal to prevent leakage and a wide opening for easier cleaning and filling. Attorney Yonay prosecuted the 276 patent application. Yonay and his partner signed the complaints in an infringement action against Hydrapak, which also manufactures a flexible hydration reservoir, the Reversible Reservoir. Hydrapak served a sanctions motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which allows the party against whom the sanctions will be sought 21 days to withdraw the offending claim. Source declined to withdraw its amended complaint. The district court granted Hydrapak summary judgment and sanctions, stating that there was “nothing complicated or technical” about the claim limitation “slot being narrower than the diameter of the rod,” and that none of the words of this limitation “requires definition or interpretation beyond its plain and ordinary meaning.” The court determined that in Hydrapak’s products the slot is larger than the diameter of the rod, even under Source’s proposed construction. After the Federal Circuit affirmed and denied Hydrapak sanctions for a frivolous appeal, the district court imposed a sanction of $200,054.00. The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "Source Vagabond Sys., Ltd. v. Hydrapak, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendants violated the automatic-stay provision of 11 U.S.C. 362(a). The court held that an attorney preparing an order for a judge is not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. The court did not reach the question of whether such an action violated the automatic stay, or whether it was actionable under 11 U.S.C. 362(k). View "Burton v. Infinity Capital Management" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that New York City officers used excessive force when arresting her. On appeal, plaintiff primarily seeks a new trial on damages and challenges portions of the district court's order awarding attorney's fees and costs incurred prior to the date of defendants' Rule 68 Offer. The court concluded that the district court did not err in refusing to give a separate charge as to future damages and plaintiff failed to establish that any potentially improper conduct by defense counsel prejudiced the jury's award of punitive damages. The district court properly applied Rule 68 and did not abuse its discretion by reducing the reasonable hourly rate of plaintiff's lead counsel. The court held that Rule 68 offers need not, as a per se rule, expressly apportion damages among multiple defendants. With respect to apportionment, a Rule 68 offer is operative so long as it is capable of being compared to the prevailing plaintiff's ultimate recovery. Because the Offer meets this standard, the court affirmed the district court's decision. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that the district court erred in reducing the amount of her awardable attorney's fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and order of the district court. View "Stanczyk v. City of New York, et al." on Justia Law

This appeal is a companion to Baker v. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. The appeal concerns action the district court took while purporting to exercise jurisdiction over that dispute, namely, disqualifying plaintiffs' counsel (Zerger and Mauer). Greenwood sought Zerger and Mauer's disqualification due to a conflict of interest out of the attorneys' former representation of Greenwood and its current representation of plaintiffs. The district court entered the disqualification order based on its inherent need to manage its bar and uphold the rules of professional conduct. The record supported the district court's determination that the two matters were substantially related and there was a conflict of interest. Therefore, although the court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the merits case, the court concluded that the district court had authority to disqualify counsel and did not abuse its discretion in doing so. View "Zerger & Mauer v. City of Greenwood" on Justia Law

Davis Wright Tremaine LLP ("DWT") challenged a trial court order compelling production of certain materials that, in DWT’s view, were protected under the attorney-client privilege. The trial court issued the order in the context of a legal malpractice action against DWT by a former client. The materials that are the subject of the order are communications between DWT’s designated in-house counsel and the lawyers in the firm who had represented the former client, and concern how actual and potential conflicts between the lawyers and the former client should have been handled. The trial court concluded that all but three of the communications with the firm’s in-house counsel ordinarily would have been covered by the attorney-client privilege, but the court recognized a “fiduciary exception” to the attorney-client privilege, which arose out of the fact that the firm was attempting to shield its internal communications from a former client. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly determined that the attorney-client privilege as defined in OEC 503 applied to communications between lawyers in a firm and in-house counsel. However, the trial court erred in recognizing an exception to OEC 503 that the legislature did not adopt in the terms of that rule. Accordingly, the Supreme Court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to vacate its order compelling production of materials related to those communications that it determined were otherwise subject to the attorney-client privilege. View "Crimson Trace Corp. v. Davis Wright Tremaine LLP" on Justia Law

AF Holdings, represented by Prenda Law, filed suit in district court against 1,058 unnamed John Does who it alleged had illegally downloaded and shared the pornographic film "Popular Demand" using a file-sharing service known as BitTorrent. Prenda Law's general approach was to identify certain unknown persons whose IP addresses were used to download pornographic films, sue them in gigantic multi-defendant suits that minimized filing fees, discover the identities of the persons to whom these IP addresses were assigned by serving subpoenas on the Internet service providers to which the addresses pertained, and then negotiate settlements with the underlying subscriber. The providers refused to comply with the district court's issuance of subpoenas compelling them to turn over information about the underlying subscribers, arguing that the subpoenas are unduly burdensome because venue is improper, personal jurisdiction over these Doe defendants is lacking, and defendants could not properly be joined together in one action. The court agreed, concluding that AF Holdings clearly abused the discovery process by not seeking information because of its relevance to the issues that might actually be litigated here. AF Holdings could not possibly have had a good faith belief that it could successfully sue the overwhelming majority of the John Doe defendants in this district. Although AF Holdings might possibly seek discovery regarding individual defendants in the judicial districts in which they are likely located, what it certainly may not do is improperly use court processes by attempting to gain information about hundreds of IP addresses located all over the country in a single action, especially when many of those addresses fall outside of the court's jurisdiction. Given AF Holdings' decision to name and seek discovery regarding a vast number of defendants who downloaded the film weeks and even months apart - defendants who could not possibly be joined in this litigation - one can easily infer that its purpose was to attain information that was not, and could not be, relevant to this particular suit. Accordingly, the court vacated the order and remanded for further proceedings, including a determination of sanctions, if any, for AF Holdings' use of a possible forgery in support of its claim. View "AF Holdings, LLC v. Does 1-1058" on Justia Law

Reifer suffered a worker’s compensation injury at IU-20 where she provided special education. Her injuries prevented her from returning to work. She retained Attorney Russo. Russo carried legal malpractice insurance with Westport in compliance with the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct. When IU-20 initiated disciplinary proceedings against Reifer, Russo failed to appear at the hearing. When IU-20 terminated her, Russo failed to appeal. Russo filed suit alleging violation of Reifer’s employment rights, which he lost for failure to exhaust state remedies. When Reifer sought alternate employment, Russo advised her to answer an application question as to whether she had ever been terminated in the negative. Reifer was terminated and disciplined for the false answer. Reifer commenced a malpractice claim against Russo. Russo’s “claims-made” policy only covered losses claimed during the policy period or within 60 days of the policy’s expiration. Russo failed to inform Westport of the action until several months after the policy lapsed and he failed to secure a replacement policy. Westport refused to defend Russo. Russo admitted liability. A jury awarded Reifer $4,251,516. Russo assigned to Reifer his rights under the Westport policy. Reifer sought a declaratory judgment that Westport was required to show it was prejudiced by Russo’s failure to notify and, failing to do so, owed a duty to defend and indemnify. The federal district court, sua sponte declined to exercise jurisdiction and remanded to state court. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Reifer v. Westport Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed a qui tam action against various providers of home health-care services and their officers, including Nursing Personnel. Plaintiff and the United States settled the claim against Nursing Personnel and the action remains pending against other defendants. Plaintiff subsequently moved to dismiss two appeals of Nursing Personnel from an interlocutory order entered by the district court awarding plaintiff attorney's fees. The court concluded that the fee award did not have to be appealed until entry of an appealable judgment, and that the pending collateral order appeal in Case No. 13-1688, taken in the absence of an appealable judgment, has become moot upon the entry of a Rule 54(b) partial judgment. The court also concluded that the appeal in Case No. 14-251 from the Rule 54(b) partial judgment was timely. Therefore the court denied the collateral order appeal and dismissed that appeal as moot. The court denied the motion to dismiss and directed briefing of that appeal in the normal course. View "United States ex rel. Maurice v. Nursing Personnel Home Care" on Justia Law