Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Flannery and Murray sued Southern California Gas Company (SCGC) for damages suffered in the 2008 Sesnon wildfire.They were jointly represented by Tepper until attorney Ardi substituted in as Murray’s counsel. Tepper represented Flannery until 2012, when attorney Daneshrad substituted in as Flannery’s counsel. Tepper filed a notice of lien. In 2013, a settlement b was approved by the court, requiring SCGC to pay confidential specific amounts to Flannery and Murray and their attorneys before March 19, 2013. Tepper sent an e-mail advising all that he was “entitled to know the amount” and asserting a 33 1/3% lien. Unable to obtain agreement from Tepper and Daneshrad, SCGC filed the Interpleader Action, identifying Tepper, Daneshrad, and Flannery as defendants, and deposited the settlement funds with the court. Once the deadline for SCGC to pay had expired, Flannery moved to enforce the settlement. SCGC moved for discharge from the interpleader action and attorney fees. Flannery filed a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP). The court granted the discharge and denied the Anti-SLAPP Motion. The court of appeal affirmed. SCGC met its burden of showing a probability it would prevail on the merits of its interpleader action.View "S. Cal. Gas Co. v. Flannery" on Justia Law

P&C filed suit on behalf of Penn, LLC against Prosper Corporation, Prosper’s owners, and their counsel, the Arnold Firm, alleging violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, fraud, conversion, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the management of Penn and Prosper’s joint venture, BIGresearch. There had been court and arbitration proceedings since 2004, but Penn never before named the Arnold Firm as a defendant. The Arnold Firm served P&C with a letter purporting to satisfy the obligations of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, threatening to seek sanctions if the matter was not dismissed, and claiming that the action was frivolous and had been filed for the “improper and abusive purpose” of disrupting the Arnold Firm’s attorney-client relationship with Prosper and its owners. The district court ultimately dismissed the Arnold Firm from the action, but denied a motion for Rule 11 sanctions against P&C. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on the alternative ground that the Arnold Firm’s failure to comply with Rule 11’s safe-harbor provision made sanctions unavailable. The Arnold Firm’s warning letter expressly reserved the firm’s right to assert additional grounds for sanctions in its actual motion.View "Penn, LLC v. Prosper Bus. Dev. Corp." on Justia Law

Karton filed suit against its former client for unpaid fees and costs and obtained a default judgment, including an award of attorney fees under the parties' retainer agreement. The court reversed the trial court's determination that Karton is the prevailing party for purposes of an award of attorney fees and concluded that the client is the party prevailing on the contract within the meaning of Civil Code section 1717; reversed the trial court's determination that Karton is the prevailing party for purposes of an award of costs and concluded that the client is the party prevailing within the meaning of section 1032; and concluded that Sears v. Baccaglio provided no basis to affirm the awards of attorney fees and costs to Karton.View "David S. Karton v. Dougherty" on Justia Law

Appellant, an attorney, appealed the district court's order finding that he committed ethical violations, and disqualifying him from representing plaintiff in a pending action against Gateway. Appellant's violations stemmed from his use of knowledge gained from questionably-obtained emails to prepare a public records request. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the ethical violations are intertwined with the disqualification order and the United States Supreme Court has held that disqualification is not subject to interlocutory appeal.View "Thurbon v. Gateway Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants alleging that defendants breached a contract for legal services, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. The district court granted defendants' motion to transfer the legal malpractice suit to the District of Nebraska. The district court subsequently denied plaintiffs' motion to retransfer and concluded that plaintiffs' claims were time-barred. Plaintiffs appealed. The court concluded that, because the malpractice occurred exclusively in the District of Nebraska, there was no error in concluding that the Southern District of Iowa was an improper venue. Further, this issue is governed by the Nebraska, the transferee forum, choice-of-law principles. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment applying Nebraska's legal malpractice statute of limitations in ruling that plaintiffs' claim was time-barred.View "Steen v. Murray" on Justia Law

The attorneys filed suit on behalf of Carabello, who was injured in a collision while acting in the course of his employment. Old Republic, the workers’ compensation insurer, intervened to seek reimbursement. Casby, the other driver, raised a defense that limits the ability of an employer, or its insurer, to obtain reimbursement out of an injured worker’s recovery against a third party where the employer’s own negligence contributed to the injuries. The drivers settled for her $100,000 policy limits. The check was deposited in the attorneys’ account, with signatures of both parties required to withdraw any money” Old Republic sought apportionment, claiming the entire settlement, but later withdrew its motion and filed a notice of lien seeking $111,026.33. It is not clear that the attorneys were notified of the dismissal. The attorneys later dismissed the Carabello complaint with prejudice and took the position that by dismissing its pleading, Old Republic had forfeited any right to litigate employer negligence and to recover on its lien. The attorneys later moved, under the anti-SLAPP law (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16), to strike claims that they wrongfully withdrew the settlement. The trial court concluded that dismissal of all affirmative pleadings had deprived it of jurisdiction. The court of appeal affirmed. In determining whether a claim arises from conduct protected by the anti-SLAPP law, the focus is on the wrongful, injurious acts or omissions identified in the complaint and whether they fit the statute’s description of protected conduct. Because the withdrawal of funds was neither communicative nor related to an issue of public interest, the trial court properly denied the motion.View "Old Republic Constr. Program Grp. v. Boccardo Law Firm" on Justia Law

"[A]ll too often attorney fees become the tail that wags the dog in litigation." Nevada City Sugar Loaf Properties LLC challenged an award of $14,553.50 in attorney fees to Ellis Law Group LLP (ELG) as the prevailing party on a special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP motion). Sugar Loaf argued the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees for work on the anti-SLAPP motion performed by attorney Joseph Major because Major was a member of ELG on whose behalf the motion was filed. Relying on case law holding self-represented law firms may not be awarded attorney fees for an anti-SLAPP motion, Sugar Loaf argued the fee award must be reversed. ELG contended that Major acted as an independent contractor to the firm because he had no billable hour requirements, did not accrue vacation time, received no health care benefits, and was paid by the hour without deduction for taxes. The trial court agreed with ELG that Major's status as an independent contractor to ELG allowed the law firm to receive attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute. After its review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in awarding fees to ELG under the anti-SLAPP statute: Major was listed as a member of ELG in the caption of documents filed in support of ELG's anti-SLAPP motion; Major signed documents for ELG's anti-SLAPP motion as an attorney with ELG; Major did not file a notice of association or substitution to indicate he was acting as outside counsel to ELG; and when Major contacted opposing counsel regarding the filing of a document concerning the anti-SLAPP motion, he used an e-mail address and signature that identified him as a member of ELG. "The possibility that Major was paid in a manner different than a regular 'employee' of ELG may render him an independent contractor for taxation purposes, but does not make him separate counsel for ELG for purposes of attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute."View "Ellis Law Group v. Nevada City Sugar Loaf Prop." on Justia Law

After defendant Elem suffered injuries in a car accident, she and her attorney conspired to hide and disburse settlement funds from an employee welfare benefit plan she received after the accident. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment and the district court granted summary judgment for the employer, as well as awarded attorney's fees and costs to the employer. The court affirmed, concluding that the district court had the authority to sanction defendants for their bad faith. The court also concluded that defendant's claim that the district court misapplied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 70 was moot and dismissed the appeal.View "AirTran Airways, Inc. v. Elem, et al." on Justia Law

The government appealed the district court's award of attorneys' fees and costs in favor of plaintiff. The district court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) reinstating plaintiff's home health care benefits. The benefits were awarded to her based on her "prevailing party" status for purposes of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412(d). The court held that while the TRO caused plaintiff's coverage to be reinstated shortly after it had been terminated, the effect was simply a return to the status quo. Therefore, the issuance of the TRO is an insufficient basis on which to find that plaintiff was a prevailing party entitled to an award of fees and costs under the EAJA. Further, the TRO involved no determination on the merits of plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the order and judgment of the district court.View "Mastrio v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals concern the ongoing tobacco litigation that began as a class action in Florida courts more than two decades ago. At issue is the fate of 588 personal injury cases filed on behalf of purportedly living cigarette smokers who, as it turns out, were dead at the time of filing (predeceased plaintiffs), 160 loss of consortium cases filed on behalf of spouses and children of these predeceased plaintiffs, and two wrongful death cases filed more than two years after the decedent-smoker's death. Plaintiffs' counsel sought leave to amend the complaints, but the district court denied those requests and dismissed the cases. The root of the problem occurred back in 2008 when these cases were originally filed where the law firm that brought the cases did not have the time or resources required to fully investigate all the complaints. Consequently, problem after problem cropped up once the district court started going through the inventory of cases. The defects that led to these consolidated appeals stemmed from counsel's failure to obtain accurate information regarding whether or when certain smokers died. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of these cases where, among other reasons, the problems could have been avoided if counsel had properly investigated the claims, and even if that lack of diligence were somehow excusable, counsel failed to inform the court that so many complaints were defective.View "4432 Ind. Tobacco Plaintiffs v. Various Tobacco Companies, et al." on Justia Law