Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Howard allegedly rear-ended Gumby's vehicle, Gumby sued Howard and his employer, UPS. Contending that Gumby’s health might have contributed to the accident, UPS requested information including medical records and the identity of anyone with knowledge concerning this defense. Gumby provided the names of one physician and one hospital from which he had received pre-accident care. Gumby died a year later. Comstock, Gumby’s daughter and estate administrator, was substituted as plaintiff. A year after discovery began, Comstock produced documents revealing more medical providers, but did not produce all requested information. The court ordered Comstock to complete production by September 28. She failed to do so. In December 2012, Comstock provided UPS with over 3,000 pages of documents. Some were duplicates, but new documents showed that Gumby had vision problems; suffered dizziness, paranoia, and hallucinations while driving; had been instructed not to drive at night; and had been hospitalized hours before the accident. Comstock had called law enforcement that night, worried because Gumby, had left Pennsylvania to drive to Arkansas. UPS had already deposed Gumby and family members. The district court noted further misconduct concerning expert test results. The court found “extreme prejudice” and sanctioned Comstock under FRCP37(b)(2) by dismissal. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Comstock v. UPS Ground Freight, Inc." on Justia Law

Symetra appealed the district court's refusal to award attorneys' fees under the Texas and Washington State Structured Settlement Protection Acts (SSPAs). Rapid cross appealed the district court's award of attorneys' fees as damages for tortious interference and the district court's permanent injunction, arguing that the injunction relies on an erroneous interpretation of the SSPAs. The court concluded that the district court erroneously held that Symetra could not recover any fees under the SSPAs where specific transfers were challenged throughout this litigation and Symetra can recover some portion of its fees related to some of those transfers. Therefore, remand is appropriate, but Symetra bears the burden of segregating fees and the district court retains discretion to deny Symetra's attorneys' fees request for failure to segregate. The court also concluded that the district court's award of fees incurred in state court with respect to one annuitant as damages for tortious interference under Texas law was proper where the natural and proximate cause of Rapid's conduct toward the annuitant was to drag Symetra into Indiana state court litigation. The district court's requirement that state court transfer orders also list first-refusal rights contravenes the SSPAs. However, the court found no error in the district court's analysis of first refusal rights under the SSPAs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Symetra Life Ins. Co. v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd." on Justia Law

At trial, when Abbas Husain was sworn in, he raised his right hand and spoke the oath, but did not place his left hand directly on the Bible. Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Tomika Davis for $12,500. After the verdict was rendered and the jury was discharged, but before post-trial motions were argued and the judgment was entered, the trial judge had a conversation with the jurors, outside the presence of counsel, which was not recorded. During that discussion, one juror noted that she was surprised that Husain had not placed his hand on the Bible before he testified. The judge did not make a record of the juror's observation, but later informed counsel. Both parties subsequently filed post-trial motions. A certification by Husain, filed in support of his post-trial motion, included a brief reference to the juror's observation. At oral argument on the motion, the trial judge expressed surprise that information he had provided counsel in confidence ended up in a certification and as part of the trial record. Ultimately, the court denied Husain's motion, finding the amount allocated in the verdict fair in light of the evidence and giving no regard to the comment the juror made in reference to the fact that Husain did not touch the Bible. After the judgment was entered, Husain appealed, raising several arguments. Relevant to the limited issue presented in this appeal as of right, he argued that the trial judge erred by failing to declare a mistrial on the basis of the juror's comment about the fact that he did not touch the Bible. In an unpublished decision, a majority of the Appellate Division panel affirmed the verdict as to this issue, holding that no manifest injustice inhered in the juror's observation and comment. The dissenting judge maintained that the trial judge had violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and that the juror's observation was sufficient to warrant a new trial. Husain appealed to the Supreme Court as of right. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: post-verdict discussions between the court and discharged jurors are prohibited unless those discussions are part of a hearing ordered on good cause shown. View "Davis v. Husain" on Justia Law

Danko practiced law with the firm of O’Reilly & Collins, until, in 2009, Danko sued O’Reilly, as an individual, and O’Reilly & Collins, for unpaid wages. Before trial, O’Reilly, as an individual, obtained directed verdict. In 2012, judgment was entered in favor of Danko for more than $2,000,000. Danko filed moved to amend the judgment and the costs and fee order “to include Terry O’Reilly as a judgment debtor for all amounts owed to Michael Danko” on the ground that O’Reilly knew that the firm owed Danko more than $2 million, but drew out all the firm’s available funds without reserving any amounts to satisfy the debt he knew was owed to Danko, telling Danko “you will not be able to execute on any judgment.” The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s amendment of the judgment, citing Code Civ. Proc., 187. The court rejected arguments that the amendment was entered in violation of a stay in the bankruptcy of the firm; the amendment was precluded by the doctrine of res judicata; and the amendment was contrary to the principles governing collateral estoppel. View "Danko v. O'Reilly" on Justia Law

Flannery and Murray sued Southern California Gas Company (SCGC) for damages suffered in the 2008 Sesnon wildfire.They were jointly represented by Tepper until attorney Ardi substituted in as Murray’s counsel. Tepper represented Flannery until 2012, when attorney Daneshrad substituted in as Flannery’s counsel. Tepper filed a notice of lien. In 2013, a settlement b was approved by the court, requiring SCGC to pay confidential specific amounts to Flannery and Murray and their attorneys before March 19, 2013. Tepper sent an e-mail advising all that he was “entitled to know the amount” and asserting a 33 1/3% lien. Unable to obtain agreement from Tepper and Daneshrad, SCGC filed the Interpleader Action, identifying Tepper, Daneshrad, and Flannery as defendants, and deposited the settlement funds with the court. Once the deadline for SCGC to pay had expired, Flannery moved to enforce the settlement. SCGC moved for discharge from the interpleader action and attorney fees. Flannery filed a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP). The court granted the discharge and denied the Anti-SLAPP Motion. The court of appeal affirmed. SCGC met its burden of showing a probability it would prevail on the merits of its interpleader action.View "S. Cal. Gas Co. v. Flannery" on Justia Law

P&C filed suit on behalf of Penn, LLC against Prosper Corporation, Prosper’s owners, and their counsel, the Arnold Firm, alleging violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, fraud, conversion, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the management of Penn and Prosper’s joint venture, BIGresearch. There had been court and arbitration proceedings since 2004, but Penn never before named the Arnold Firm as a defendant. The Arnold Firm served P&C with a letter purporting to satisfy the obligations of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, threatening to seek sanctions if the matter was not dismissed, and claiming that the action was frivolous and had been filed for the “improper and abusive purpose” of disrupting the Arnold Firm’s attorney-client relationship with Prosper and its owners. The district court ultimately dismissed the Arnold Firm from the action, but denied a motion for Rule 11 sanctions against P&C. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on the alternative ground that the Arnold Firm’s failure to comply with Rule 11’s safe-harbor provision made sanctions unavailable. The Arnold Firm’s warning letter expressly reserved the firm’s right to assert additional grounds for sanctions in its actual motion.View "Penn, LLC v. Prosper Bus. Dev. Corp." on Justia Law

Karton filed suit against its former client for unpaid fees and costs and obtained a default judgment, including an award of attorney fees under the parties' retainer agreement. The court reversed the trial court's determination that Karton is the prevailing party for purposes of an award of attorney fees and concluded that the client is the party prevailing on the contract within the meaning of Civil Code section 1717; reversed the trial court's determination that Karton is the prevailing party for purposes of an award of costs and concluded that the client is the party prevailing within the meaning of section 1032; and concluded that Sears v. Baccaglio provided no basis to affirm the awards of attorney fees and costs to Karton.View "David S. Karton v. Dougherty" on Justia Law

Appellant, an attorney, appealed the district court's order finding that he committed ethical violations, and disqualifying him from representing plaintiff in a pending action against Gateway. Appellant's violations stemmed from his use of knowledge gained from questionably-obtained emails to prepare a public records request. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the ethical violations are intertwined with the disqualification order and the United States Supreme Court has held that disqualification is not subject to interlocutory appeal.View "Thurbon v. Gateway Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants alleging that defendants breached a contract for legal services, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. The district court granted defendants' motion to transfer the legal malpractice suit to the District of Nebraska. The district court subsequently denied plaintiffs' motion to retransfer and concluded that plaintiffs' claims were time-barred. Plaintiffs appealed. The court concluded that, because the malpractice occurred exclusively in the District of Nebraska, there was no error in concluding that the Southern District of Iowa was an improper venue. Further, this issue is governed by the Nebraska, the transferee forum, choice-of-law principles. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment applying Nebraska's legal malpractice statute of limitations in ruling that plaintiffs' claim was time-barred.View "Steen v. Murray" on Justia Law

The attorneys filed suit on behalf of Carabello, who was injured in a collision while acting in the course of his employment. Old Republic, the workers’ compensation insurer, intervened to seek reimbursement. Casby, the other driver, raised a defense that limits the ability of an employer, or its insurer, to obtain reimbursement out of an injured worker’s recovery against a third party where the employer’s own negligence contributed to the injuries. The drivers settled for her $100,000 policy limits. The check was deposited in the attorneys’ account, with signatures of both parties required to withdraw any money” Old Republic sought apportionment, claiming the entire settlement, but later withdrew its motion and filed a notice of lien seeking $111,026.33. It is not clear that the attorneys were notified of the dismissal. The attorneys later dismissed the Carabello complaint with prejudice and took the position that by dismissing its pleading, Old Republic had forfeited any right to litigate employer negligence and to recover on its lien. The attorneys later moved, under the anti-SLAPP law (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16), to strike claims that they wrongfully withdrew the settlement. The trial court concluded that dismissal of all affirmative pleadings had deprived it of jurisdiction. The court of appeal affirmed. In determining whether a claim arises from conduct protected by the anti-SLAPP law, the focus is on the wrongful, injurious acts or omissions identified in the complaint and whether they fit the statute’s description of protected conduct. Because the withdrawal of funds was neither communicative nor related to an issue of public interest, the trial court properly denied the motion.View "Old Republic Constr. Program Grp. v. Boccardo Law Firm" on Justia Law