Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Court of Criminal Appeals held David Dow, a post-trial capital defense attorney, in contempt for violating Court of Criminal Appeals Miscellaneous Rule 11-003 and suspended him from practicing before it for one year. Dow filed this original proceeding seeking mandamus and declaratory relief in the Supreme Court, contending that the Court of Criminal Appeals exceeded its authority in imposing the sanction. The Supreme Court dismissed Dow’s petition, holding (1) the Court does not have jurisdiction under the Constitution over Dow’s petition for mandamus relief; and (2) because the Court lacked mandamus jurisdiction, it also lacked jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief. View "In re Dow" on Justia Law

Gaymar ‘s patent is directed to a patient temperature control system, including a blanket that can conductively warm or cool the patient. In 2008, Gaymar sued CSZ, asserting that CSZ’s Blanketrol device infringed claims of the patent. The PTO granted CSZ’s inter partes reexamination request and issued a first Office Action rejecting all claims of the patent as anticipated or obvious over prior art cited in CSZ’s request. The district court denied Gaymar’s motion for a preliminary injunction and granted CSZ’s motion to stay the case pending the conclusion of the reexamination. The PTO reaffirmed its rejection of all claims of the patent. Gaymar filed an express abandonment of all claims in 2010, and the PTO concluded the reexamination, cancelling all of the claims. The district court lifted the stay. CSZ unsuccessfully sought attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. 285, alleging that Gaymar’s litigation position was frivolous and that Gaymar had engaged in litigation misconduct. Following the Supreme Court’s 2014, decision, Octane Fitness, CSZ unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. The Federal Circuit affirmed a finding of a lack of objective baselessness, but reversed the exceptional case finding insofar as it was based on CSZ’s purported misconduct. View "Gaymar Indus., Inc. v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero Prods., Inc." on Justia Law

SGI sued Yogi’s, alleging trademark infringement. Attorney Harris filed trademark applications for Yogi’s. SGI served Harris with a subpoena, for his deposition. The deposition did not take place. The court ordered Harris to be deposed at his office at noon on October 29. SGI sent Harris, who did not attend the hearing, a copy of the order by mail and facsimile on October 23. On October 29, SGI’s attorney, Park, arrived at the office. Harris was not there. The two spoke by phone. According to Park, Harris stated that he was aware of the order, but that it would take him at least an hour to arrive. Park told Harris that if he did not arrive by 1:00 p.m. it would be treated as a “no show.” The deposition did not occur. Harris faxed a letter stating his intention to comply and willingness to be deposed telephonically or by video. SGI did not respond or attempt to reschedule, but moved to hold Harris in contempt, seeking fees and expenses of $6,800. Harris filed an affidavit, explaining that during the week of October 22, he was in New York, and that he first became aware of the court order on October 29, when speaking with Park. On November 6, Harris sent Park a letter via email, facsimile, and certified mail, stating that he was available for deposition. On November 8, Harris called Park to reschedule. Park did not return the call; Harris sent another email. There was no response. On December 17, the court ordered SGA to take Harris’ deposition that same day. SGI complied. The court declared the motion for contempt and sanctions moot. SGI filed a renewed motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed its denial. View "Sik Gaek, Inc. v. Harris" on Justia Law

ASARCO hired the law firms to assist it in carrying out its duties as a Chapter 11 debtor in possession, 11 U.S.C. 327(a). When ASARCO emerged from bankruptcy, the law firms filed fee applications requesting fees under section 330(a)(1), which permits bankruptcy courts to “award . . . reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by” professionals. The Bankruptcy Court rejected ASARCO’s objections and awarded fees for time spent defending the applications. The district court held that the firms could be awarded fees for defending their fee applications. The Fifth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed. Section330(a)(1) does not permit bankruptcy courts to award fees to section 327(a) professionals for defending fee applications. The American Rule provides the basic point of reference for attorney’s fees: Each litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides otherwise. Congress did not depart from the American Rule in section 330(a)(1) for fee-defense litigation. The phrase “reasonable compensation for services rendered” necessarily implies “loyal and disinterested service in the interest of” a client, Time spent litigating a fee application against the bankruptcy estate’s administrator cannot be fairly described as “labor performed for”—let alone “disinterested service to”—that administrator. Requiring bankruptcy attorneys to bear the costs of their fee-defense litigation under section 330(a)(1) creates no disincentive to bankruptcy practice. View "Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC" on Justia Law

The City of Milwaukee is defending several lawsuits brought by scores of plaintiffs alleging that its police officers conducted unconstitutional stops and searches, including strip‐searches and body‐cavity searches. Judge Stadtmueller was assigned to preside over several cases. Milwaukee, asserting that some of the judge’s comments in opinions and conferences in the related cases raise questions about his impartiality, moved for recusal under 28 U.S.C. 455(a). The judge declined. Milwaukee sought a writ of mandamus. The Seventh Circuit denied the motion. The five challenged statements were made during the course of litigation; “opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep‐seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Judge Stadtmueller is presiding over several of these cases. It is not surprising that he might draw conclusions about the nature of the issue or problem. He is expected to look for and consider common threads and possible systemic problems to manage the cases effectively and decide them fairly. Even considering all the challenged statements together, nothing reasonably suggests deep-seated antagonism. View "City of Milwaukee v. Stadtmueller" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a pro se complaint on behalf of two estates, claiming that financial institutions fraudulently transferred real estate in Shelby County, Tennessee, and failed to follow proper procedures for selling properties encumbered by outstanding liens. The district court dismissed on the ground that a non-attorney cannot appear in court on behalf of an artificial entity such as an estate, even though plaintiffs claimed that they were the sole beneficiaries of their respective estates. Each signed the notice of appeal as the “Authorized Representative” of the estates. Federal law allows parties to “plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel,” 28 U.S.C. 1654. The Sixth Circuit denied a motion to dismiss the appeal, holding that the sole beneficiary of an estate without creditors may represent the estate pro se. The purpose of protecting third parties is not implicated when the only person affected by a nonattorney’s representation is the nonattorney herself. The tradition that “a corporation can only appear by attorney,” has not been extended to estates. View "Bass v. Leatherwood" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Fraser Trebilcock Davis & Dunlap, P.C. provided legal services to the defendants, a group of trusts, in connection with the financing and purchase of four hydroelectric dams. Dissatisfied with the representation they received, defendants refused to pay the full sum of fees billed by Fraser Trebilcock. To recover these unpaid fees, Fraser Trebilcock brought the underlying suit against defendants for breach of contract. Pursuant to MCR 2.403, the matter was submitted for a case evaluation, which resulted in an evaluation of $60,000 in favor of Fraser Trebilcock. Fraser Trebilcock accepted the evaluation, but defendants rejected it. The case proceeded to trial, resulting in a verdict for Fraser Trebilcock and a judgment totaling $73,501.90. Throughout the litigation of this breach-of-contract action, Fraser Trebilcock appeared through Michael Perry (a shareholder of the firm) and other lawyers affiliated with the firm. At no point did Fraser Trebilcock retain outside counsel, and there was no indication that the firm entered into a retainer agreement with its member lawyers or received or paid a bill for their services in connection with the litigation. After receiving the verdict, the parties filed posttrial motions: defendants moved for a new trial, and Fraser Trebilcock moved for case-evaluation sanctions under MCR 2.403(O), seeking to recover, inter alia, a “reasonable attorney fee” under MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b) for the legal services performed by its member lawyers. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion for a new trial, and granted Fraser Trebilcock’s motion for case-evaluation sanctions, ruling in particular that Fraser Trebilcock could recover an attorney fee as part of its sanctions. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the plaintiff law firm could recover, as case-evaluation sanctions under MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b), a “reasonable attorney fee” for the legal services performed by its own member lawyers in connection with its suit to recover unpaid fees from defendants. Contrary to the determinations of the trial court and the Court of Appeals majority, the Supreme Court concluded it could not. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals was reversed in part, the trial court's award of fees was vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Frazier Trebilcock Davis & Dunlap, P.C. v. Boyce Trust 2350" on Justia Law

Humphrey sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act on behalf of her daughter Teniscia, alleging that medical malpractice during Teniscia’s 2008 birth left her permanently disabled. Teniscia’s father, Lee, participated in the litigation, but did not ask to be joined as a party. Humphrey and Lee are not married; Teniscia lives with Humphrey, but both are Teniscia’s legal custodians. The case was settled for $13 million, used to buy an annuity to provide care over the course of Teniscia’s life. Porter, who represents Lee, demanded a share of the 25% contingent fee that had been negotiated between Humphrey and her lawyer, who opposed this request, arguing that Lee was not a party and that Porter had not performed any of the legal work that led to the settlement. After the settlement Lee moved to file an amended complaint naming himself as a plaintiff. The district court denied Lee’s motion, stating that Lee not only had approved the settlement but also had not filed an administrative claim, as the FTCA requires. Lee then moved to intervene. The court denied that motion as untimely. Porter unsuccessfully sought fees notwithstanding Lee’s non-party status. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court could not have allowed intervention even on a timely motion. View "Lee v. United States" on Justia Law

Leeman filed a private enforcement action under Health and Safety Code 25249.5 (Proposition 65), alleging that t Adams Extract & Spice failed to issue an adequate warning that its product contained a chemical identified on the Governor’s list “of those chemicals known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity .” A successful plaintiff in such an action is entitled to recover attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure 1021.5. The parties settled shortly before trial, including a stipulated award of $72,500.00 for attorney fees and costs, incurred by Leeman. In confirming the settlement, the court modified the attorney fee amount by reducing it to $35,839.67. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court had the right to reject the settlement agreement in its entirety, and refuse to “approve the settlement” if the court determined that $72,500.00 was unfair or unreasonable, but lacked authority to modify any of the terms of the settlement agreement unilaterally, thus requiring the parties to accept a settlement to which they have not agreed. View "Leeman v. Adams Extract & Spice, LLC" on Justia Law

McVey sued for injuries she sustained after a waitress dropped a tray on her foot. Memorial Hospital of Carbondale treated her. McVey settled the lawsuit for $7,500, then filed a petition to adjudicate liens. The hospital’s lien was $2,891.64. In addition to attorney fees, McVey allegedly incurred litigation costs of $846.66 in securing the settlement. The trial court entered an order recognizing that under the Health Care Services Lien Act (Act) (770 ILCS 23/10), no individual licensed category of health care professional or health care providers may receive more than one-third of the award or settlement, so that the hospital could recover no more than $2,500. The court acknowledged precedent holding, that in order to ensure that a plaintiff receives 30% of the judgment, the computation of the amount available to health care providers should not begin until costs associated with bringing the case and securing payment have been deducted, but refused to deduct attorney fees and costs before calculating the amount available to the hospital. The appellate court reversed and remanded. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that hospitals are not required to contribute to the costs of litigation. View "McVey v. M.L.K. Enters., LLC" on Justia Law