Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

For some period of time before March 2015, the Agricultural Labor Relations Board had delegated plenary authority to seek injunctive relief under Labor Code section 1160.4 to general counsel. In March 2015, the board decided to change that delegation by requiring general counsel to obtain case-specific approval from the board for every request for injunctive relief. In May 2015, general counsel asked the board to approve a proceeding for injunctive relief against Gerawan Farming, Inc. (Gerawan). The board gave its conditional approval to that proceeding. When Gerawan asked the board to disclose the communications between the board and general counsel regarding the matter under the California Public Records Act, the board refused, claiming privilege. Gerawan brought a writ proceeding in Sacramento County Superior Court seeking to force the board to disclose the requested communications, and the court ordered disclosure. The board brought the present writ proceeding to the Court of Appeals to challenge the superior court’s ruling. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded the superior court erred in ordering disclosure of the communications between the board and general counsel relating to the decision to seek injunctive relief against Gerawan because those communications were indeed protected by the attorney-client privilege. "[E]ven if due process concerns with respect to the pending administrative proceeding against Gerawan are raised by the communications at issue, those concerns do not preclude the attorney-client privilege from attaching to those communications, and because the communications are privileged, they are exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act." Accordingly, the Court directed that a writ of mandate issue ordering the superior court to vacate its order requiring disclosure of those communications and enter a new order denying Gerawan’s request for disclosure. View "Agricultural Labor etc. Bd. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Hermitage challenges the district court's denial of its motion to disqualify counsel for Prevezon. The underlying litigation arises out of a 2013 civil forfeiture action brought by the United States alleging that Prevezon received the proceeds of a complex, sweeping scheme that defrauded the Russian treasury of roughly $230 million. The government alleges Prevezon laundered portions of the fraud proceeds in New York by buying various real estate holdings in Manhattan. Hermitage, an investment advisory firm, is a victim of the Russian Treasury Fraud. The court concluded that this case presents the “extraordinary circumstances” necessary to grant a writ of mandamus, as Hermitage is without other viable avenues for relief and the district court misapplied well‐settled law. The court explained that it is rare that a nonparty, nonwitness will face the risk of prosecution by a foreign government based on the potential disclosure of confidential information obtained during a prior representation. That real risk, however, coupled with the misapplication of the law by the district court, outweighs the delay and inconvenience to Prevezon of obtaining new counsel. The court found the remaining arguments raised by the parties to be without merit. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus and instructed the district court to enter an order disqualifying Moscow and BakerHostetler from representing Prevezon in this litigation. Prevezon’s motion for clarification is denied as moot. View "United States v. Prevezon Holdings, Ltd." on Justia Law

Defendants Eric Schrier, Frank Frederick, and Angela Martinez had been employed in various capacities by plaintiff SG Homecare, Inc. before abruptly leaving to start a competing firm, defendant Verio Healthcare, Inc. SG Homecare filed the underlying complaint, alleging the individual defendants breached their contractual and fiduciary duties, and misappropriated trade secrets. Schrier and his wife cross-complained against SG Homecare and its owner, Thomas Randall Rowley (together, the “SG parties”), alleging wrongful termination and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant Verio Healthcare and the individual defendants were represented by Donald Wagner of the firm Buchalter Nemer, PLC. Shortly after the cross-complaint was filed, the SG Parties moved to disqualify Buchalter Nemer. The motion was based on an assertion that shortly before the individual defendants’ departure from SG Homecare, Buchalter Nemer executed a retainer agreement with SG Homecare and was either currently representing SG Homecare, or, alternatively, the present litigation was substantially related to Buchalter Nemer’s prior representation of SG Homecare (requiring disqualification in either event). Adding to mix: Wagner, as a member of the California State Assembly, relied on statutory entitlement to a continuance and extension of time of the entire litigation. The trial court denied the motion for a stay without explanation. Defendants petitioned the Court of Appeals court for a writ of mandate to order the trial court to grant the stay. The Appeals court summarily denied the petition, but the California Supreme Court granted review and remanded back to the Appeals court with instructions to issue an order to show cause. The Court of Appeals issued that order and denied the writ, namely because it found that the trial court acted within its discretion in its finding that the stay would "defeat or abridge the other party's" right to relief. View "Verio Healthcare v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Currency loaned money at high interest rates to elderly artists who owned rights to receive royalty payments from music rights management companies. Wertheim persuaded artists to assign their royalty rights and any causes of action they might have against Currency. After Wertheim’s judgment against Currency had been vacated, the superior court in the interpleader proceedings released all deposited funds to Currency. Currency then moved to recoup from Wertheim the $238,615.45 in attorney fees that had been paid to the royalty payors, contending all or most of those entities’ fees were incurred as a result of Wertheim’s litigation tactics. In opposition to the motion, Wertheim contended the fees were incurred as a result of Currency’s litigation tactics. The superior court found no merit to either side's argument. Currency appeals the order denying its motion for attorney fees. The court concluded that equity does not require that Wertheim pay at least some of the fees where Wertheim had a colorable claim on the interpleaded funds in the form of a judgment, and Currency could have avoided the interpleader action by paying the judgment. Therefore, the trial court acted within its discretion in finding it “proper” for Currency to pay the attorney fees and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wertheim LLC v. Omidvar" on Justia Law

A client personally financed the sale of his business corporation. His attorney drafted documents that secured the buyer’s debt with corporate stock and an interest in the buyer’s home. Over seven years later the government imposed tax liens on the corporation’s assets; according to the client, it was only then he learned for the first time that his attorney had not provided for a recorded security interest in the physical assets. The client sued the attorney for malpractice and violation of the Alaska Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA). The superior court held that the statute of limitations barred the client’s claims and granted summary judgment to the attorney. But after review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that it was not until the tax liens were filed that the client suffered the actual damage necessary for his cause of action to be complete. Therefore, the Court reversed the superior court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jones v. Westbrook" on Justia Law

Riding in a non-competitive charity bicycling event, Minick fell while descending a hill in Petaluma. Erwin, riding behind Minick, saw him lose control of his bicycle after hitting a large pothole. Minick exhausted his administrative remedies, and then, represented by Watson, brought suit under Government Code section 835. The city moved for summary judgment, arguing that Minick, who had no recollection of the accident, had no proof of any dangerous condition on public property. Watson opposed the motion, attaching grainy, low-resolution black-and-white photographs of the alleged site, a copy of a police report containing Erwin's statement that he saw a pothole where Minick fell; and an engineer's expert declaration that a defect in the street caused the fall. The court issued a tentative ruling denying the motion. At the hearing, Watson appeared, but showed signs of physical distress and was taken to a hospital by ambulance. The day before a continued hearing, the court again tentatively denied the motion. After hearing arguments, the court granted the motion, referring to Watson’s arguments as “ludicrous.” The court later granted relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b), accepting Watson’s explanation that he had been suffering from a serious illness for which he was under heavy medication. The court of appeal affirmed., When a court finds a wholesale disintegration of the attorney’s professional capacity because of a medical crisis, the availability of relief for excusable neglect is within the court’s sound discretion. View "Minick v. City of Petaluma" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit held, in 2012, that the plaintiffs, injured by a 2007 flood in Bagley, Wisconsin, had forfeited an argument concerning Wis. Stat. 88.87, which concerns liability for negligent design and maintenance of a railroad grade that causes an obstruction to a waterway. Plaintiffs’ counsel identified new plaintiffs and refiled the same litigation in Arkansas state court to pursue that argument. The new suit was removed to the Western District of Wisconsin, which dismissed. The defendant asked the court to sanction plaintiffs’ counsel under FRCP 11 or 28 U.S.C. 1927 for pursuing frivolous claims and engaging in abusive litigation tactics. The court denied that request, reasoning that although the claims were all but foreclosed by the 2012 decision, they were not frivolous. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, but reversed the denial of sanctions. The record indicated that counsel unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings by filing suit in Arkansas, which had no connection to the case. On rehearing, the Seventh Circuit noted its inherent authority to sanction willful abuse of the judicial process. Stombaugh long had notice of the conduct on which BNSF sought sanctions, and had multiple opportunities make his case against the award of sanctions. View "Boyer v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law

JAMS, Inc. provided private alternative dispute resolution services by promoting, arranging and handling the hiring of neutral individuals, such as retired judges, to assist with resolution of disputes. This action arose out of representations made on the JAMS Web site regarding the background of the Honorable Sheila Prell Sonenshine (Retired), and JAMS's operations in offering alternative dispute resolution (ADR) services. Kevin Kinsella alleged he relied upon certain representations made on the Web site when he agreed to stipulate to hire Sonenshine as a privately compensated judge to resolve issues related to his marital dissolution case and later discovered the representations were either untrue or misleading. JAMS and Sonenshine filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike Kinsella's complaint. The court found the action exempt from the anti-SLAPP procedure under the commercial speech exemption of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17, subdivision (c). JAMS and Sonenshine filed a petition for writ of mandate or other relief. The Court of Appeal stayed the proceedings and issued an order to show cause why relief should not be granted to allow the Court an opportunity to consider the issues raised in the petition related to the scope of the commercial speech exemption of section 425.17, subdivision (c). After consideration of the matter, the Court of Appeal agreed the commercial speech exemption applied and precluded the use of the anti-SLAPP procedure in this case. The petition was accordingly denied. View "JAMS, Inc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Attorney Donald Gilbert represented the Utah Down Syndrome Association and several of its founders in litigation between the Association and the Utah Down Syndrome Foundation, Inc. Gilbert filed this petition for extraordinary relief challenging (1) a 2008 district court judgment ordering Gilbert to disgorge $30,000 taken from Foundation bank accounts to pay his attorney fees, (2) an injunction that originally barred Gilbert’s clients from paying him with Foundation funds, (3) an order denying Gilbert’s motion to vacate the 2008 judgment, and (4) an order denying Gilbert’s motion for relief from the 2008 judgment. The Supreme Court denied Gilbert’s petition for extraordinary relief, holding (1) Gilbert unreasonably delayed seeking extraordinary relief from the injunction, the disgorgement order, and the denial of his motion to vacate; and (2) Gilbert failed to pursue the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy of direct appeal from the denial of his motion for relief from judgment. View "Gilbert v. Third Dist. Court Judges" on Justia Law

On behalf of Lightspeed, which operates websites purveying online pornography, attorneys Hansmeier, Steele, and Duffy sued a John Doe defendant in Illinois state court under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030, then served ex parte subpoenas, demanding that Internet service providers (ISPs), provide personally identifiable information of more than 6,600 “co‐ conspirators.” They filed similar actions in several states, apparently hoping to extract quick settlements from individuals whose personal information was revealed. The ISPs removed the Illinois case to federal court. Meanwhile, a California court imposed sanctions on the attorneys in a similar case; they began voluntarily dismissing cases. After the Lightspeed case was dismissed, a defendant sought attorney’s fees. The court imposed sanctions of $261,025.11, jointly and severally, against the attorneys. They failed to pay. The court scheduled a show‐cause hearing. The attorneys, who claimed insolvency, did not comply with interrogatories and requests for production. After the attorneys attempted to interfere with their financial institutions’ compliance with subpoenas, the court held them in contempt. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The attorneys continued their "shenanigans." The Lightspeed defendants discovered efforts to hide assets; the district court again imposed contempt and discovery sanctions. The Seventh Circuit dismissed Hansmeier’s appeal, noted that Duffy is now deceased, and affirmed the discovery sanction, but vacated the contempt sanction for Steele. View "Lightspeed Media Corp. v. Smith" on Justia Law