Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Guzman, driving a truck for his employer (Progressive), rear-ended the plaintiff’s vehicle. The plaintiff was driving a truck for his employer. Following the accident, the plaintiff returned to work for three weeks, but then left his employment. During the following months, the plaintiff continued to receive treatment. His former employer’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier, Liberty, paid for the treatment.Plaintiff sued The defendants served a $200,000 offer to settle (Code of Civil Procedure 998). Plaintiff rejected the offer. The parties stipulated that a $256,631.76 workers’ compensation lien existed and that the defendants would admit negligence, but not causation as to the plaintiff’s injuries. The jury returned a verdict of $115,000.Opposing the plaintiff’s fee petition, the defendants argued that the plaintiff should not recover fees and post-offer costs because the verdict did not exceed the section 998 offer. Defendants’ costs totaled $174,830.29. The court awarded the plaintiff $50,600 in attorney fees and the $475.98 pre-offer filing fee in costs. Although Labor Code section 3856 requires costs to be paid from the judgment, the court added the fees and costs to the verdict, then concluded the defense had a net gain over the plaintiff and was the prevailing party and entered an $8,754.22 final judgment in favor of the defendants.The court of appeal affirmed. The court erred by adding attorney fees to the verdict when calculating the net judgment. A $59,354.31 defense judgment should have been entered there was no “judgment for damages recovered” from which the plaintiff’s reasonable litigation expenses and attorney fees or Progressive’s workers’ compensation lien could be paid. (Lab. Code 3856(b)). The defendants had not challenged their $8,754.22 judgment. View "Oakes v. Progressive Transportation Services, Inc." on Justia Law

A putative nationwide class of current and former members sued MEF, a membership-based spa-services company, alleging that MEF increased fees in violation of the membership agreement. The parties settled. In exchange for the release of all claims against MEF, class members could submit claims for “vouchers” for MEF products and services. The district court approved the settlement as “fair, reasonable, and adequate” under FRCP 23(e).The Ninth Circuit vacated. If a class action settlement is considered a “coupon” under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) additional restrictions apply to the settlement approval process. The court did not defer to the district court’s determination that the MEF vouchers were not coupons but applied a three-factor test, examining whether settlement benefits require class members “to hand over more of their own money before they can take advantage of” those benefits, whether the credit was valid only for “select products or services,” and how much flexibility the credit provided. The district court also failed to adequately investigate some of the potentially problematic aspects of the relationship between attorneys’ fees and the benefits to the class, which impacted the fairness of the entire settlement, not just attorneys’ fees. The district court did not apply the appropriate enhanced scrutiny; it failed to adequately address the three warning signs of implicit collusion. View "McKinney-Drobnis v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC" on Justia Law

B. Reid Zeh filed a lawsuit alleging that the American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. (“ACLU”) had published a post on its blog containing defamatory statements asserting that Zeh, who was the public defender for misdemeanor cases in Glynn County, Georgia, had charged an indigent criminal defendant a fee for his public defense services. The ACLU moved to strike the defamation lawsuit pursuant to Georgia’s anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (“anti-SLAPP”) statute. Zeh then filed two motions requesting discovery. The trial court denied the motion to strike without ruling on Zeh’s discovery motions, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the anti-SLAPP motion. The Georgia Supreme Court granted the ACLU's petition for certiorari to address what standard of judicial review applies in this situation and whether, under that standard, the trial court erred by denying the anti-SLAPP motion to strike. After applying the proper standard of review to the existing record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred by denying the ACLU’s motion to strike. The Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision upholding that ruling. But because the trial court failed to rule on Zeh’s requests for discovery, the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals with direction that it remand the case to the trial court to rule on the discovery motions and for further proceedings. View "American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. Zeh" on Justia Law

Moreci sustained work-related injuries assertedly caused by his use of scaffolding constructed by Scaffold Solutions. Moreci received workers’ compensation benefits, paid by Starstone Insurance. Moreci, while represented by the Boxer law firm, filed a personal injury action against third-party defendants, including Scaffold. Moreci settled the case. As part of the settlement, Moreci agreed to assume the defense of Scaffold for claims arising from Moreci’s accident and pay any resulting judgment. Before the dismissal of Moreci’s action, Starstone intervened, seeking reimbursement from the defendants for the benefits it had paid to Moreci. Boxer became associated co-counsel for Scaffold, which filed an answer to Starstone’s complaint in intervention.Starstone Insurance moved to disqualify Boxer, arguing conflict of interest. The trial court held Starstone had no standing to seek the disqualification of counsel and denied the motion. The court of appeal affirmed. Because disqualification would have no effect on the alleged harms, Starstone sought the wrong legal remedy by bringing a disqualification motion. Any harm to Scaffold or Moreci stemming from a breach of the duty of loyalty in any way by their attorneys is “of no concern” to Starstone. View "Moreci v. Scaffold Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

The court of appeal consolidated appeals from three attorneys’ fees motions by a judgment creditor (Wertheim) seeking over $800,000 for its efforts to enforce a 2009 judgment entered after a jury awarded it approximately $39,000. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of fees as to the appeal bond fee motion but reversed, in part, the denial of fees as to post-judgment enforcement fees. The court noted that even standing alone, these fee claims are striking in relation to the amount of the underlying judgment and also must be considered in light of the more than 40 appeals occasioned by the parties’ competing businesses in the last 12 years. The court concluded that the motion for post-judgment enforcement fees was timely but characterized Wertheim’s litigation strategy as “unnecessary and objectively unreasonable.” View "Wertheim, LLC v. Currency Corp." on Justia Law

The law firm Hepworth Holzer, LLP (“Hepworth Holzer” or “the firm”), petitioned the Idaho Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition, seeking relief from a district court order disqualifying it as counsel for Dr. Gary Tubbs in a personal injury lawsuit against Bogus Basin Recreational Association, Inc. (“Bogus Basin”). Bogus Basin was represented by Elam & Burke in the proceedings. Elam & Burke moved to disqualify Hepworth Holzer after an associate attorney who worked at Elam & Burke when Tubbs initiated his lawsuit went to work for Hepworth Holzer and assisted the firm on a memorandum in support of a motion to reconsider filed in the case. The district court granted Elam & Burke’s motion. The district court ordered that “[a]ny attorney associated with Hepworth Holzer, LLP, including [the associate attorney], are disqualified from any further representation of [Dr.] Gary Tubbs in this matter and from providing any information from its files after January 21, 2021, and cannot relay any information discussed or received about this case after January 21, 2021[,] to Tubbs or any new attorney/firm representing Tubbs.” Hepworth Holzer contended the district court’s disqualification and gag order was clearly erroneous and unconstitutional. Finding the district court erred in issuing its disqualification order, the Supreme Court granted Hepworth Holzer's request for mandamus relief. The disqualification and gag order were vacated; and a new judge was ordered to preside over further proceedings. View "Hepworth Holzer, LLP v. Fourth Judicial District" on Justia Law

The law firm of Sirote & Permutt, P.C., and attorney C. Randall Caldwell, Jr., each claimed they were entitled to one-third of the attorneys' fees that were owed for a BP oil spill settlement. Sirote and Caldwell litigated their dispute against each other, and, following a bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of Caldwell and awarded the funds to him. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the trial court had sufficient evidence to find the existence of a valid referral agreement between Caldwell and Cunningham Bounds as well as the existence of an attorney-client relationship between Caldwell and the Woerner entities. Sirote was not entitled to replace Caldwell as referring counsel merely because the Woerner entities terminated their attorney-client relationship with Caldwell. And the trial court's finding that Caldwell earned his referral fees at the time he referred the Woerner entities' BP claims did not require reversal. Finally, it is clear that the trial court did not award postjudgment interest. In all respects, the Court affirmed the trial court. View "Sirote & Permutt, P.C. v. Caldwell" on Justia Law

In a suit concerning oil and gas royalties, Poole, an attorney, represented only himself. Poole's interest in the royalties is “less than 1%,” the other owners were members of two families. Poole sought “$50,745 for fees and [$1,572.75] for costs for work successfully defending the trial court judgment on appeal” plus “$46,020 for fees and $1,269.29 for costs for work performed in the Superior Court.” Poole requested that payment be made from the interpleaded royalties, citing the equitable common fund theory, which allows a party, who has paid for counsel to prosecute a lawsuit that creates or preserves a fund from which others will benefit, to require those other beneficiaries to bear their fair share of the litigation costs. Other parties objected, reasoning that an award would deplete the royalties available for distribution to family members; one told the court that Poole’s involvement was "counterproductive.”The court of appeal affirmed the denial of an award of attorneys’ fees under the common fund theory. An attorney who represents only himself and does not pay or become liable to pay consideration in exchange for legal representation may not recover attorney fees under the equitable common fund doctrine but may seek recovery of legitimate, reasonable costs excluding attorney fees under that doctrine. View "Leiper v. Gallegos" on Justia Law

The appointment of a guardian ad litem for a parent in a dependency proceeding radically changes the parent's role, transferring direction and control of the litigation from the parent to the guardian ad litem. While necessary to protect the rights of an incompetent parent—an individual incapable of understanding the nature and purpose of the proceeding or unable to assist counsel in a rational manner—appointment of a guardian ad litem is not a tool to restrain a problematic parent, even one who unreasonably interferes with the orderly proceedings of the court or who persistently acts against her own interests or those of her child.The Court of Appeal reversed the order appointing a guardian ad litem for mother, concluding that the appointment of a guardian ad litem for mother is not supported by substantial evidence and was not harmless. In this case, mother's clashes with counsel were not the result of any mental health disorder but were deliberate and strategic, designed to frustrate and delay proceedings she believed were going to be unfavorable to her. The court noted that, while mother is unquestionably a difficult party, a guardian ad litem cannot be appointed without any finding of her incompetence. View "In re Samuel A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff John Hayes prosecuted his employment discrimination case to a favorable verdict and judgment. During trial, two instances of misconduct prompted Defendant SkyWest Airlines, Inc. to request a mistrial. But it was Defendant’s own misconduct. Thus, the district court tried to remedy the misconduct and preserve the integrity of the proceedings, but did not grant Defendant’s request. After the trial, exercising its equitable powers, the district court granted Plaintiff’s request for a front pay award. Following final judgment, Defendant moved for a new trial based, in part, on the district court’s handling of the misconduct incidents and on newly discovered evidence. The district court denied that motion. Defendant appealed, asking the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to reverse and remand for a new trial or, at the very least, to vacate (or reduce) the front pay award. Finding the district court did not abuse its discretion or authority in this case, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the front pay award. View "Hayes v. Skywest Airlines" on Justia Law