Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Park sued his former attorneys for breach of fiduciary duty and intentional interference with Park’s plan to purchase cardroom casinos. Park alleged that in 2003-2012, the defendants represented Park’s gaming businesses before the California Gambling Control Commission and the Bureau of Gambling Control. The attorney-client relationship ended with a dispute about monthly billing rates. Thereafter, the defendants allegedly thwarted Park’s efforts to secure ownership interests in the two cardroom casinos by using Park’s confidential information, assisting his competitors, and making disparaging remarks about Park to regulators and others.Park issued third-party subpoenas duces tecum to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and to Deputy Attorney General Torngren, who represents the Bureau of Gambling Control, requesting communications and documents pertaining to Park and the casinos. The DOJ reportedly reviewed several hundred thousand electronic documents but produced fewer than a hundred. During the production, the trial court ordered Park to pay $32,836.25 to defray the “undue burden or expense” of the DOJ’s compliance with Park’s subpoena. When the production was complete, the court ordered Park to pay the DOJ an additional $111,618.75. The court of appeal affirmed. The court properly exercised its discretion under the Electronic Discovery Act in the Code of Civil Procedure, section 1985.8(l). View "Park v. Law Offices of Tracey Buck-Walsh" on Justia Law

Cesar was shot and killed in 2016. Murder charges were filed against Santacruz, Cervantes, Alcantar, and Duran. Vallejo (Duran’s mother) was charged as an accessory after the fact. Judge Colin dismissed that charge against Vallejo in the interest of justice under Penal Code 1385 on February 20, 2020. Judge Colin later recused himself at the request of the prosecution. The case was assigned to Judge Clark, who found Judge Colin’s recusal to have been a concession to retroactive disqualification, and on June 22, 2020, granted the prosecution’s motion to set aside as void all rulings of Judge Colin dating back to January 9, including the February 20 dismissal, thereby reinstating the accessory count against Vallejo.The court of appeal vacated Judge Clark’s ruling, noting that whether the February 20 dismissal was an appropriate exercise of discretion was not before the court. Judge Colin’s order dismissing the charge against Vallejo was a final order terminating the trial court’s authority over her case. The prosecution had a clear remedy to address the trial court’s alleged bias or appearance of bias underlying the dismissal—an appeal under Penal Code 1238,(a)(8), but elected not to appeal. Judge Clark was without jurisdiction to set aside the dismissal. View "Vallejo v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Following the death of their twenty-five-year-old son Cory Bisher (“Cory”), Brenton and Carla Bisher filed suit, without representation by counsel, against eleven defendants comprising both named individuals and corporate entities alleging their medical malpractice resulting in Cory’s death. Each parent brought their own wrongful death claims, and Carla filed a survival action on behalf of Cory’s estate (“Estate”). Following protracted proceedings, the trial court struck the amended complaint with prejudice because of defects in the Certificates of Merit mandated by Rule of Civil Procedure 1042.3 in professional liability suits against licensed professionals. On appeal, the Superior Court sua sponte determined that the Bishers committed two errors that jointly deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over all claims: Carla’s unauthorized practice of law and the lack of verification of the complaint. The panel concluded that it too lacked jurisdiction and quashed the appeal. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that neither the unauthorized practice of law in the trial court, nor the lack of verification identified by the Superior Court, implicated subject-matter jurisdiction, and thus could not be raised sua sponte. The Supreme Court also disagreed with the panel’s alternative holding that the trial court properly struck the amended complaint because of the defects in the Certificates of Merit. Because the unauthorized practice of law issue will be ripe for further litigation on remand, the Supreme Court concluded that pleadings unlawfully filed by non-attorneys were not void ab initio. "Instead, after notice to the offending party and opportunity to cure, the pleadings are voidable in the discretion of the court in which the unauthorized practice of law took place." View "Estate of Bisher v. Lehigh Vly Health Net." on Justia Law

Simpson's insurer, the Fund, paid Simpson’s medical costs ($16,225) arising from a car accident. Simpson hired the Firm to represent her in a personal injury suit. The Fund maintained a right of subrogation and reimbursement. Simpson settled her suit for $30,000. After depositing the settlement funds in a trust account, the Firm paid $9,817.33 to Simpson, $1,000.82 to other lienholders, and $10,152.67 to its own operating account for fees and expenses, offering the Fund $9,029.18. The Fund sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) section 502(a)(3), claiming an equitable lien of $16,225. The Firm issued a $9,029.18 check to the Fund, exhausting the settlement funds.The district court issued a TRO requiring the Firm to maintain $7,497.99 in its operating account. The Firm argued that the Fund sought a legal remedy because the Firm no longer possessed the settlement funds; ERISA 502(a)(3) only authorizes equitable remedies. The Fund argued that it sought an equitable remedy because the settlement funds were in the Firm’s possession pursuant to the TRO and cited the lowest intermediate balance test: a defendant fully dissipates a plaintiff’s claimed funds (by spending money from the commingled account to purchase untraceable items) only if the balance in the commingled account dipped to $0 between the date the defendant commingled the funds and the date the plaintiff asserted its right to the funds. The district court granted the Firm summary judgment, reasoning that the Firm dissipated the settlement funds before the TRO issued; the Fund could not point to specific recoverable funds held by the Firm and sought a legal remedy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that no issues had been preserved for review. View "Sheet Metal Workers' Health & Welfare Fund of North Carolina v. Law Office of Michael A. DeMayo, LLP" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part in an action challenging the district court's award of attorney's fees and costs. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in setting the attorneys' rates or in excluding the managing partner's hours as unwarranted. However, the district court abused its discretion by excluding all hours related to plaintiff's three summary judgment motions and 1.6 hours for two oppositions: to a successful motion for extension of time to file the answer, and to a successful motion to continue the trial. Finally, the court need not appoint a new judge for remand where judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion, and judicial remarks that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to a party ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Burton v. Nilkanth Pizza Inc." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's award of attorney's fees to plaintiffs in an action alleging violations of the McKinney-Vento Act (MVA), the Rehabilitation Act (RA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court declined to take up an issue regarding whether the MVA provides a private right of action for students experiencing homelessness and their families for the first time on appeal. The court explained that the State never raised an argument in the district court that the students and their mothers lacked a cause of action or that they could not recover attorneys' fees for time spent pursuing the claim. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in making the State jointly and severally liable for the fees imposed against the district defendants. View "Scott C. v. Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education" on Justia Law

Ge, then a citizen of China, entered the U.S. on a student visa. After pursuing his education for four years, he enlisted in the Army through the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) program, which allows foreign nationals to enlist in the armed forces and thereafter apply for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. 1440(a). Ge filed his application in May 2016. After completing interviews and tests administered by USCIS, he received notice in July 2017, that his naturalization oath ceremony had been scheduled for later that month. Days later, he was informed that the ceremony had been canceled. USCIS had a new policy, requiring that enhanced Department of Defense background checks for all MAVNI applicants before their naturalization applications could be granted.Ge filed suit in December 2018, under 8 U.S.C. 1447(b). The district court directed USCIS to adjudicate Ge’s naturalization application within 45 days. Shortly after the court’s remand order, Ge reported that he had been sworn in as a citizen. The court dismissed Ge’s action. Ge then sought attorneys fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412, alleging that he was the “prevailing party” and that USCIS’s position was not “justified in law and fact at all stages.” The district court denied his motion, ruling that Ge did not qualify as a prevailing party because its remand was not a judgment on the merits or consent decree that created a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.” The Fourth Circuit affirmed. After the remand order, Ge was still the applicant; USCIS was still the agency that could grant or deny the application. The legal relationship had not changed. View "Ge v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Services" on Justia Law

Moniz managed a staffing firm's (Adecco’s) relationship with Google. Correa was assigned to work at Google. Moniz and Correa sued Adecco to recover civil penalties for alleged violations of the Labor Code. Under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), an employee aggrieved by alleged Labor Code violations may act as an agent of the Labor Workforce and Development Agency (LWDA) to bring an action to recover civil penalties. If an aggrieved employee settles such an action, the court must review and approve the settlement; civil penalties are distributed 75 percent to the LWDA and 25 percent to the aggrieved employees.Moniz settled her case first. The court approved the settlement. Correa challenged the settlement process and approval, including the manner in which the court treated Correa's and LWDA's objections to the settlement, the standard used by the court to approve the settlement, numerous alleged legal deficiencies, and the trial court’s ruling denying her attorney fees and an incentive payment. The court of appeal reversed. While the court applied an appropriate standard of review by inquiring whether the settlement was “fair, adequate, and reasonable” as well as meaningful and consistent with the purposes of PAGA, it is not possible to infer from the record that the trial court assessed the fairness of the settlement’s allocation of civil penalties between the affected aggrieved employees or whether such allocation comports with PAGA. View "Moniz v. Adecco USA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased Berkeley property intending to demolish an existing structure and build a new residence. Richards, a licensed contractor, demolished the structure but did not build the new house. Plaintiffs sued Richards alleging breach of oral contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and promissory estoppel. Richards propounded requests for admission (RFAs) asking the plaintiffs to admit the parties did not enter into an oral contract and did not have a meeting of the minds. Plaintiffs denied the RFAs.The trial court denied Richards’s motion for summary judgment finding triable issues of material fact. After the close of evidence, Richards unsuccessfully moved for a directed verdict. The jury returned a defense verdict, concluding that Richards did not make a promise with clear and unambiguous terms. Richards moved for attorney fees and costs (Code of Civil Procedure 2033.420), arguing that the plaintiffs had no reasonable basis to deny the RFAs and “failed to realistically evaluate their claims and perform a reasonable investigation.” The court awarded Richards $239,170.86 in attorney fees and costs. The court of appeal affirmed. the trial court was well-positioned to evaluate the reasonableness issue as it presided over the case from start to finish. Neither the denial of summary judgment nor the denial of a directed verdict precluded the award. View "Spahn v. Richards" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's award of over $3 million in attorney fees and expenses to plaintiffs in a settlement involving Missouri's foster-care system. Plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of a group of foster children, alleging that Missouri did not have adequate procedures in place to guard against the overuse of psychotropic drugs. The court concluded that the district court properly placed the burden on plaintiffs to support the hours claimed. The district court then evaluated the billing records, attorney-by-attorney, and disregarded any entries that were excessive or vague, leaving no doubt that plaintiffs had failed to prove their entitlement to all the fees and expenses they had requested. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in setting the fee award and rejected defendants' contentions to reduce the award. View "M.B. v. Tidball" on Justia Law