Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

After years of litigation over royalties and rights related to musical compositions, the trial court determined that Currency is entitled to the royalties and the rights to one set of musical compositions, that it has a security interest in the other musical compositions, and that Structured has no rights.Currency appealed from the denial of its motion to recover the attorney fees it incurred litigating consolidated appeals resolved in 2019. Structured appealed from the denial of its motion for sanctions (Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7.1) in which it argued that Currency’s motion for attorney fees was frivolous.The court of appeal affirmed. The law of the case doctrine barred Currency’s motion. A party is not entitled to section 128.7 sanctions unless the target of the motion has had 21 days to withdraw the allegedly offending paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial. When calculating the earliest possible day that a motion for sanctions can be filed, the day the motion was served is excluded and the last day is included. The trial court properly denied Structured's motion for sanctions because it resolved the attorney fees motion on the 21st day after service of the motion for sanctions, the last day of the safe harbor period. View "Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Structured Asset Sales LLC" on Justia Law

In a lawsuit against his former clients and their new attorneys, attorney Pech alleged that the new attorneys interfered with his fee agreement by advising the clients not to file a complaint that Pech drafted. The new attorneys moved to strike all of Pech’s claims against them under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP “Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation” statute). Pech argued the anti-SLAPP motion should have been denied because the new attorneys failed to identify specific allegations of protected conduct to be stricken and the new attorneys’ interference with the fee agreement was not a protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute, or if it was protected, he established a probability of prevailing on the merits.The trial court granted the motion in part, striking the claim for interference with contract. The court of appeal affirmed. The new attorneys identified the conduct supporting the claim for interference with contract that they asserted was protected under the anti-SLAPP statute: advice about proposed litigation against a third party, including the clients’ rights and obligations under a fee agreement with another attorney. Pech did not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits, because his claim is barred by the litigation privilege contained in Civil Code section 47(b). View "Pech v. Doniger" on Justia Law

In 2006, Suburban, owned by Barus, and ROC formed ROC/Suburban LLC, which acted as a vendor to Suburban. In 2010, Barus retained attorney Carlson for legal advice in unwinding that relationship. ROC sued Suburban, alleging breach of fiduciary duty. The Gaspero Law Firm defended Suburban in the ROC litigation. In June 2015, the court entered judgment for ROC and ordered Suburban to pay 50% of the fair value of the assets that Barus had improperly transferred out of ROC/Suburban.In May 2016, Barus and Suburban filed a legal malpractice action against Carlson, who allegedly recommended or approved the self-help actions that resulted in the breach of fiduciary duties. The circuit court held that the claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations (735 ILCS 5/13- 214.3(b)) because the injury began when the plaintiffs retained new counsel and that the plaintiffs knew they were injured in 2013 at the latest when the judge stated that Carlson had committed malpractice.The appellate court reversed; the Illinois Supreme Court agreed. The plaintiffs did not suffer a realized injury until the court found a breach of fiduciary duty and entered a judgment against them. Although plaintiffs may have been alerted in 2013 that counsel misadvised them, the possibility of damages was not actionable until the ROC litigation ended and plaintiffs became obligated to pay damages as a result of Carlson’s advice. View "Suburban Real Estate Services, Inc. v. Carlson" on Justia Law

After losing their bids for the November 2019 elections for Quitman County Chancery and Circuit Clerk, Shirley Smith Taylor and Tea “Windless” Keeler, respectively, filed election contests. In July 2020, following a two-day trial of the consolidated contests, the court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dismissing the election contests with prejudice and finding that six enumerated claims brought by Taylor and Keeler were frivolous.Further, the court denied Brenda Wiggs’s and T.H. “Butch” Scipper’s requests that Taylor and Keeler be sanctioned, and that Wiggs and Scipper be awarded attorneys’ fees under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) and the Litigation Accountability Act of 1988 (LAA). The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed in part the circuit court’s denial of an award of attorneys’ fees under Rule 11(b) since the court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in part the circuit court’s decision to deny the imposition of sanctions and award of attorneys’ fees under the LAA in light of its finding that six of Taylor’s and Keeler’s claims were frivolous. View "In Re: Contest of the November 5, 2019 General Election for the Chancery Clerk of Quitman, Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal dismissed plaintiff's appeal of the trial court's order denying attorney fees following her settlement of an action with Westlake Services under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act. The court concluded that plaintiff's appeal is from a nonappealable order, and plaintiff's appeal does not fall within the scope of the collateral order doctrine.The court concluded that the trial court's order concerning fees, costs and prejudgment interest was neither a judgment rendered but not yet entered within the meaning of California Rule of Court 8.104(d)(1) nor an intended ruling subsequently finalized in a judgment or order of dismissal as contemplated by rule 8.104(d)(2). Furthermore, the notice of appeal falls far outside the limited scope of the mandatory provision of rule 8.104(d)(1) and the court's discretion under rule 8.104(d)(2) to treat as appealable an otherwise nonappealable order. Even if the court had discretion to save the appeal, the court would decline to exercise it. Finally, plaintiff's appeal of the order does not fall within the scope of the collateral order doctrine where she contends that the order directs the payment of costs and prejudgment interest but did not attempt to appeal the portion of the trial court's order awarding costs and prejudgment interest. View "Sanchez v. Westlake Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Richard Daniels appealed a trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants Attorney James Goss, Attorney Matthew Hart, and law firm Facey Goss & McPhee P.C. (FGM), arguing the court erred when it concluded he could not prove defendants caused his injury as a matter of law. Defendants represented plaintiff in a state environmental enforcement action where he was found liable for a hazardous-waste contamination on his property. On appeal, plaintiff claimed defendants failed to properly raise two dispositive defenses: the statute of limitations and proportional liability. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded plaintiff would not have prevailed on either defense if raised and therefore affirmed the grant of judgment to defendants. View "The Estate of Richard S. Daniels, by and through Julie Lyford in her capacity as Executor et al." on Justia Law

Two months after Covert filed a lawsuit for breach of warranty under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, FCA (an automaker) served Covert with a settlement offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 for $51,000, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Covert filed objections to that offer. Covert with a second section 998 offer, 15 months later, for $145,000 with identical terms. A jury awarded Covert $48,416 in damages and penalties.On appeal, FCA argued both of its section 998 offers were valid, and because the jury awarded Covert less than the amount of either offer, the trial court erred in awarding Covert attorneys’ fees and costs and denying FCA its costs.The court of appeal agreed that both offers were valid; the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider whether the first offer was made in good faith. Covert did not meet his burden to show the second offer was not in good faith. If the trial court finds the first offer was made in good faith, it shall award FCA its costs reasonably incurred after the first offer was served and deny Covert his attorneys’ fees and costs. If the court finds the first offer was not made in good faith, it shall award Covert his attorneys’ fees and costs reasonably incurred before the date the second offer was served and award FCA its costs, including expert witness fees, reasonably incurred thereafter. View "Covert v. FCA USA, LLC" on Justia Law

Coley fraudulently procured satellite television programming from DIRECTV, then sold and distributed that programming to unwitting customers. On a cross-complaint against Coley under the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 605(a), the district court found that Coley was liable for 2,393 violations, and awarded DIRECTV a $2,393,000 judgment plus $236,000 in attorneys’ fees. Coley attempted to thwart DIRECTV’s recovery, failing to participate in post-judgment discovery, engaging in extensive dilatory litigation to prevent recovery against his shell companies, failing to comply with court orders, and other fraudulent acts.The district court amended the damages award to specify that it could be enforced against Coley and the related companies the court found were Coley’s alter egos, with joint and several liability, and later appointed a receiver to aid in the execution of the judgment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. DIRECTV then sought attorneys’ fees related to the appeal and all post-judgment enforcement proceedings. Coley filed a suggestion of bankruptcy that resulted in an automatic stay of court proceedings. DIRECTV obtained relief from the automatic stay and renewed its motion for $57,295 in fees and $1,403.03 in costs not covered by prior order. The Fourth Circuit granted the motion. Attorneys’ fees and costs incurred while pursuing post-judgment collection and enforcement litigation, including appeals, qualify for compensation under the mandatory fee-shifting provision of the Act. View "Coley v. DIRECTV, Inc." on Justia Law

Nichols prevailed in a discrimination action against his employer. The district court awarded Nichols $300,000 in compensatory damages and various forms of equitable relief, including back pay and pension contributions as well as reinstatement. Two years later, the district court awarded his attorney (Longo) $774,645.50 on a post‐trial motion for statutory attorney’s fees. While Longo’s appeal proceeded, Nichols filed a district court motion to adjudicate attorney’s fees and for other relief. He had executed a contingency fee agreement before filing the underlying discrimination action, and he challenged Longo’s assertion that he had a right to 45% of the entire relief, including the total monetary award and all equitable relief. Longo contended that he was entitled to that amount under the contingency fee arrangement in addition to the entire statutory attorney fees award. Nichols argued that Longo’s fee demand is excessive and violates Illinois Supreme Court Rule 1.5 because the contingency agreement itself was unconscionable.The district court, while expressing concern about Longo’s position, determined that its jurisdiction did not extend to attorney fee disputes after the case has been dismissed and jurisdiction has been relinquished. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the statutory attorney fee award. The district court correctly determined that the contingency contract dispute is not within its jurisdiction. View "Nichols v. Longo" on Justia Law

Chaganti sought a writ of error. While his appeal of a civil judgment was pending, he discovered evidence, which was not in existence at the time of the judgment, that the superior court judge who had summarily adjudicated his claims owned stock worth between $10,000 and $100,000 in AT&T. The defendants in Chaganti’s civil action, Cricket and New Cingular, are wholly owned subsidiaries of AT&T. Chaganti argued that the judge was disqualified under Code of Civil Procedure 170.1, which provides: “A judge shall be disqualified if any one or more of the following are true: ... The judge has a financial interest in the subject matter in a proceeding or in a party to the proceeding.” Financial interest means ownership of more than a one percent legal or equitable interest in a party, or a legal or equitable interest in a party of a fair market value in excess of $1,500.The action concerned a commercial lease; the named lessee was “AT&T Wireless PCS.” Rent was paid by checks from “AT&T.” The defendants were represented by “an Assistant Vice President and Senior Legal Counsel employed in the AT&T Legal Dept.” The court of appeal ordered the superior court to vacate the judgment, rejecting AT&T’s arguments that it was not a “party” to the proceeding and that Chaganti was precluded from obtaining a writ of error because he did not exercise due diligence in discovering the judge’s AT&T stock ownership. View "Chaganti v. Superior Court" on Justia Law