Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

When A.F. was 11 years old, she applied for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her father, Jeffrey F., who held joint legal custody with her mother, Andrea F. Mother was the original guardian ad litem (GAL), and she retained attorney Edward Castro to represent A.F. Father successfully moved to disqualify Mother as the GAL and Castro as A.F.’s counsel. A.F. appealed the order disqualifying Castro. A new GAL was not appointed. Although A.F. brought the petition on her own behalf, the family court in her parents’ dissolution matter, appointed a “minor’s counsel” to represent her best interests there, in anticipation of changes to the custody and visitation arrangement that could result from the outcome in the DV matter. A.F. retained attorney Aaron Smith, to represent her in the DV matter. The court disqualified Smith for numerous reasons, including that there was a potential conflict of interest from having her maternal grandfather serve as a third-party guarantor. The court also interviewed A.F. and determined she was not competent to retain counsel independently, and it found Smith did not meet the requirements detailed by the California Rules of Court to serve as a “minor’s counsel.” The court appointed counsel in the DV matter, and prohibited Smith from replacing the attorney the court appointed as a “minor’s counsel.” A.F. appealed, contending that the issue of selecting her attorney should have been stayed pending the appeal of the court’s order disqualifying Castro. She also contended it was error to appoint counsel in the DV matter and to disqualify the attorney she chose to represent her there. The Court of Appeal: (1) concluded the court had subject matter jurisdiction to act in the DV matter while the first appeal was pending because her original attorney substituted out of the case; (2) reversed the appointment of a “minor’s counsel,” which was improper in a DV matter where a minor seeks a restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA); (3) affirmed the order voiding the agreement between A.F. and Smith and removing Smith as her attorney on the basis that A.F. lacked competency to select her attorney independently; (4) reversed the order prohibiting Smith from serving as A.F.’s attorney in the matter because it was an abuse of discretion to completely disqualify him on the basis that the court rejected the fee agreement or that he failed to meet the requirements of Rule 5.242. View "A.F. v. Jeffrey F." on Justia Law

SE Property Holdings, LLC (“SEPH”) obtained a deficiency judgment against Neverve LLC (“Neverve”) after Neverve defaulted on loans secured by a mortgage on its property. Following this judgment, Neverve received the proceeds from an unrelated settlement. But Neverve transferred those proceeds to attorneys representing Neverve’s principal in payment of attorney’s fees relating to the principal’s personal bankruptcy proceedings. SEPH then sued Neverve based on Neverve’s allegedly fraudulent transfer of those settlement proceeds. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Neverve, finding that the Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act’s (“FUFTA”) “catch-all” provision did not allow for (1) an award of money damages against the transferor, (2) punitive damages, or (3) attorney’s fees. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Neverve on SEPH’s equitable lien claim, as Neverve no longer possessed the settlement proceeds at issue.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that based on the narrow interpretation of FUFTA in Freeman v. First Union National Bank, 865 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 2004), the court believes the Florida Supreme Court would determine that FUFTA’s catch-all provision does not allow for an award of money damages against the transferor, an award of punitive damages, or an award of attorney’s fees. Thus, the district court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of Neverve on SEPH’s FUFTA claims. And the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Neverve on SEPH’s equitable lien claim. View "SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Neverve LLC" on Justia Law

Attorney and his law firm, Pesner Kawamato Conway, P.C. (collectively, Conway), appealed the district court’s order rejecting the bankruptcy court’s report and recommendation to enjoin Smith Development, Inc.’s legal malpractice suit against Conway and to impose sanctions for violating the Barton doctrine and the automatic stay.   The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal, finding that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because the district court’s decision rests on the abstention principles. The court explained that Conway suggests the district court had no authority to enter an abstention order because, under Barton, the district court itself lacked jurisdiction over Smith Development’s malpractice claims. However, the court wrote that this argument fares no better than the first. Barton concerns subject-matter jurisdiction over a separate action, not jurisdiction over the proceedings in which a party seeks Barton protection in the first place. And even if the court accepted the argument’s doubtful premise, it fails on its own logic because the bankruptcy court issued a report and recommendation to the district court, thereby authorizing the district court to rule on the matter. Further, the court found that even if it recognized a narrow exception to Section 1334(d)’s clear jurisdictional bar, the district court’s order would not fall within it. View "Martin Conway v. Smith Development, Inc." on Justia Law

After (Decedent) died, two of his three adult children brought a pro se diversity action in the District of Minnesota against Defendant, Decedent’s second wife. They asserted multiple claims arising from Defendant’s alleged use of her power as Decedent’s attorney-in-fact to close two Certificates of Deposit and keep funds that Decedent intended would benefit his children. Defendant moved to dismiss, alleging lack of diversity jurisdiction because Decedent’s third child, like Defendant, is a resident of California and is an indispensable, non-diverse party. Defendant filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs’ incomplete assignment did not establish diversity jurisdiction. The district court determined it has diversity subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the FAC claims with prejudice because they fail to state a claim and Plaintiffs are not real parties in interest. Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s dismissal.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court found that the district court properly granted Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion because Plaintiffs’ FAC failed to state plausible claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and civil theft. Therefore, the court wrote it need not separately consider the district court’s alternative ruling that Plaintiffs are not “real parties in interest” under Rule 17(a). Further, the court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing with prejudice the claims asserted in the FAC. The court explained it does not agree that additional claims regarding Defendant’s use of the CD proceeds after she was done acting as Attorney-in-Fact would necessarily have been futile. But without a proposed amended complaint to consider, the district court did not abuse its discretion by assuming they would be. View "Eric Sorenson v. Joanne Sorenson" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed an order granting plaintiffs' motion to compel compliance with prior discovery orders and imposing monetary and issue sanctions. The trial court imposed 11 potentially case-dispositive issue sanctions and $37,575 in monetary sanctions against defendants for having “repeatedly disregarded their obligations in Discovery” and having “repeatedly fought the Court Orders that tell them they must comply.” The court-appointed discovery referee, who recommended those sanctions, commented that in his almost 20 years of service as a neutral, mediator, arbitrator, and referee he had never seen “such blatant disregard of discovery and discovery orders.” In their notice of appeal, defendants asserted their appeal included both the monetary sanctions and the issue sanctions. The Court of Appeal found the order imposing monetary sanctions was directly appealable under California Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1(a)(11) and (12). However, the order imposing issue sanctions was not directly appealable. The issue sanctions were not inextricably intertwined with the monetary sanctions. The Court therefore granted plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the appeal regarding issue sanctions. The Court also found defendants failed to establish the trial court should have found they acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances made the imposition of monetary sanctions unjust. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the award of monetary sanctions and dismissed the appeal in all other respects. View "Deck v. Developers Investment Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Idaho Supreme Court's review centered on a residence in the Boise foothills that was damaged by a landslide, which ultimately prevented the builder from obtaining a certificate of occupancy. BrunoBuilt, Inc., the general contractor of the project, sued multiple parties, including Erstad Architects, PA, the architectural firm for the project, Andrew Erstad, the principal architect, and Cheryl Pearse, the project manager from Erstad Architects, PA (collectively, Defendants), for professional negligence in connection with work completed for construction of the residence. Defendants successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the two-year statute of limitations in Idaho Code section 5-219(4) barred BrunoBuilt’s claim. Two years after the district court issued its memorandum decision and order granting summary judgment, BrunoBuilt moved the district court for reconsideration, citing new evidence and arguments. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration, concluding it was “untimely, lacking in diligence, and improper.” BrunoBuilt then appealed, challenging the decision of the district court on summary judgment and additionally asserting that the court erred in an earlier order deconsolidating the cases with other defendants. Prior to oral argument, Defendants moved the Supreme Court to sanction counsel for BrunoBuilt pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2 for non-disclosure of material procedural facts in its opening brief. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision granting summary judgment against BrunoBuilt, and agreed that the conduct of BrunoBuilt’s attorney on appeal ran afoul of Rule 11.2, and imposed sanctions. View "BrunoBuilt, Inc. v. Erstad Architects, PA" on Justia Law

Dr. Heidari and Dr. Moradi owned a dental practice. Heidari sued Moradi for breach of contract. Moradi filed a cross-complaint, claiming that Heidari fraudulently misappropriated over $1.7 million. Moradi’s counsel, Kamarei, brought in Heidari’s wife, Padideh. Padideh sued Moradi and his attorney for malicious prosecution after the dismissal of Moradi’s cross-complaint. Moradi and Kamarei asserted the unclean-hands defense based on Padideh’s alleged misconduct in the underlying action—testifying falsely at her deposition.A jury determined that Padideh “ha[d] unclean hands,” barring her recovery. The court of appeal affirmed. A defendant asserting unclean hands in a malicious prosecution action need not demonstrate that absent the misconduct, they would have prevailed in the underlying action. But the misconduct “must relate directly to the transaction concerning which the [malicious-prosecution] complaint is made. It must infect the cause of action involved and affect the equitable relations between the litigants." There was substantial evidence that Padideh showed a lack of candor or even lied in her deposition in the underlying action, and that this had a direct effect on Kamarei and Moradi’s litigation decisions in that action, which was the precipitating action for this malicious prosecution suit. View "Padideh v. Moradi" on Justia Law

Following the Flint Water Crisis, thousands of cases were brought for the various harms minors, adults, property owners, and business owners endured as a result of lead-contaminated water. Putative class action lawsuits and individual lawsuits were consolidated in the Eastern District of Michigan, where Co-Lead Class Counsel and Co-Liaison Counsel were appointed to represent the putative class and individual plaintiffs. After years of negotiation, Co-Lead Class Counsel and Co-Liaison Counsel, together with the Settling Defendants, reached a record-breaking settlement. The court approved the settlement and awarded attorneys’ fees and reimbursement for expenses. Three Objector groups appealed that award.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Objectors are not entitled to detailed discovery of billing and cost records; assertions that those records would have shown excessive billing or revealed the inclusion of time not performed for the common benefit are entirely speculative. The Objectors lack standing to appeal the structure of the fee award; they would fare no better with or without the Common Benefit Assessments applicable to their claims. Were they to have standing, they did not demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in awarding Common Benefit Assessments, particularly when those assessments achieve parity among settlement beneficiaries and are reasonable under the circumstance. The court upheld an award of $500 for bone scans. View "Waid v. Snyder" on Justia Law

This writ proceeding involves a statutory challenge for cause filed against a trial court judge presiding over a wrongful termination lawsuit. The parties are Plaintiff and his former employer, Defendant Bassett Unified School District. Following a multimillion-dollar jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff, the trial judge in this action, Honorable Stephanie Bowick, received a text message from another judge on the court, Honorable Rupert Byrdsong. According to Judge Bowick, Judge Byrdsong had previously informed Judge Bowick that attorneys from his former firm were trying the case. Pointing to Judge Byrdsong’s apparent support for Plaintiff and the resulting verdict in Plaintiff’s favor, the school district sought Judge Bowick’s disqualification, asserting that a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial. The disqualification motion was assigned to Orange County Superior Court Judge Maria D. Hernandez. The assigned judge denied the disqualification motion. Defendant sought review by petition for writ of mandate   The Second Appellate District denied the petition. The court held that the disqualification motion was properly denied. The court reasoned that there is no adverse inference arising from Judge Bowick’s final ruling on the evidentiary issue. Further, the court found that the facts Judge Bowick disclosed do not require disqualification. Moreover, the court wrote, the timing of Judge Bowick’s disclosure does not suggest an appearance of bias. View "Bassett Unified School Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Erica Fox appealed a circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of her former criminal-defense attorneys, Harold Hughston, III and Sheila Morgan. In 2016, Ronnie Credille murdered Fox's husband, Jason Fox. Credille shot Jason in the head as he entered the doorway of the residence that he shared with Fox and their children. Fox and Credille were alleged to have been involved in an adulterous relationship. A grand jury indicted Fox for capital murder on January 12, 2017. The trial court presiding over the criminal action declared Fox indigent and appointed Hughston and Morgan to represent her. Fox was convicted for capital murder, for which she received a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Fox contended that, at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, she made it clear to her defense attorneys that she wanted to appeal her conviction and sentence and that they represented to her that a notice of appeal had been perfected. Despite that representation, there was no oral notice of appeal contained in the transcript of the sentencing hearing. The attorneys moved for a new trial on Fox's behalf; that motion was denied by operation of law approximately one month later. The trial court nevertheless held a hearing on the motion, in which the motion was formally denied. This denial ended up being void for the trial court's want of jurisdiction. Because the deadline by which Fox was required to file a written notice of appeal of her conviction and sentence was calculated from the date on which her motion for a new trial was denied by operation of law, her written notice of appeal was due to be filed on or before March 11, 2019. After the trial court denied Fox's motion for a new trial, the attorneys moved to withdraw from representing Fox. Fox received an appointed appellate counsel, Charlie Bottoms, who attempted to get the appeals court to reinstate the appeal or order a new sentencing hearing. Fox ultimately sued her trial attorneys for legal malpractice for not lodging the appeal at trial. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded Fox failed to demonstrate any statutory tolling provision applied in her case, therefore it granted the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defense attorneys. View "Fox v. Hughston, et al." on Justia Law