Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a class action against Walmart, alleging three violations of California Labor Code's wage-statement and meal-break requirements; first, plaintiff alleged that Walmart did not provide adequate pay rate information on its wage statements, Cal. Lab. Code 226(a)(9); second, he claimed that Walmart failed to furnish the pay-period dates with his last paycheck, section 226(a)(6); and third, he asserted that Walmart did not pay adequate compensation for missed meal breaks, section 226.7(c). Plaintiff sought relief under California's Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA).The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff lacked standing to bring the meal-break claim because he did not suffer injury himself. The panel explained that PAGA's features diverge from the assignment theory of qui tam injury in Vermont Agency of Nat. Res. V. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000), and they depart from the traditional criteria of qui tam statutes. In regard to the two wage-statement claims, the panel held that plaintiff had standing but that Walmart did not breach California law. The panel explained that, because Walmart must retroactively calculate the MyShare overtime adjustment based on work from six prior periods, the panel did not consider it an hourly rate "in effect" during the pay period for purposes of section 226(a)(9). Therefore, Walmart complied with the wage statement law here. The panel also held that Walmart's Statements of Final Pay do not violate the wage statement statute. View "Magadia v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Jackie Usher and Eric Leung, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated (sometimes collectively, plaintiffs), appealed a judgment in favor of defendant Shirley White (Shirley). In 2014, plaintiffs brought a putative wage-and-hour class action lawsuit against defendants White Communications, LLC (White Communications or the company) and DirecTV, LLC (DirecTV). Under California Labor Code section 558.1, a “natural person who is an owner, director, officer, or managing agent” of an employer may be personally liable if that person, on behalf of the employer, “violates, or causes to be violated” certain wage and hour laws as provided in the statute. The court granted summary judgment for defendant, concluding as a matter of law she was not liable under section 558.1 because it found undisputed evidence that she did not participate in the determination to classify plaintiffs as independent contractors. The court therefore held defendant did not “cause[]” any violation of the enumerated sections of the Labor Code, as set forth in section 558.1 and in plaintiffs’ operative complaint. The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court’s analysis and affirmed its judgment. View "Usher v. White" on Justia Law

Claimant Sadeta Zebic appealed the Commissioner of Labor’s decision not to certify a question for review to the superior court, arguing that the Commissioner had no discretion not to certify her proposed question. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded it did not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal because claimant previously appealed to the superior court, and the statutory scheme provided that a workers’ compensation claimant could appeal either to the superior court or directly to the Supreme Court. View "Zebic v. Rhino Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

Preeminent took over a security services contract but refused to hire two guards who had previously worked at the D.C. site. According to the Union, SEIU, the refusal violated a collective-bargaining agreement. In May 2018, the district court ordered the parties to arbitrate. Preeminent stalled for over a year, first refusing to commit to paying its share of the arbitration fees and then accusing an arbitrator of bias for seeking assurance of payment. SEIU moved for contempt. In November 2018, the court ordered Preeminent to pay half the cost. In January 2019, the court found that Preeminent had acted in bad faith and awarded SEIU attorneys’ fees. In June 2019, the court found Preeminent in civil contempt, imposed a $20,000 fine if Preeminent failed to arbitrate within 30 days, and awarded further costs and attorneys’ fees. A third arbitrator completed the arbitration. In November 2019, the court fixed the total amount of costs and attorneys’ fees at $51,000. Days later, Preeminent filed a notice of appeal, challenging the order compelling arbitration, the June 2019 contempt order, and the November 2019 fee order.The D.C. Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the arbitration and contempt orders, which were final decisions not timely appealed, 28 U.S.C. 2107(a), but affirmed the fee award. The 30-day filing deadline is jurisdictional. View "Service Employees International Union Local 32BJ v. Preeminent Protective Services, Inc." on Justia Law

A cannery worker reported two injuries: one to his back and one to his shoulder. He suffered these injuries at different times but while working for the same employer. The employer paid some medical benefits for both injuries but eventually challenged its obligation to provide further care. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board denied the worker’s claim for more medical benefits, and the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board’s decision. The worker appealed pro se. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded the Commission properly affirmed the Board’s decision as to the back injury, but that the Board’s findings as to the shoulder injury lacked adequate support in the record. The Commission’s decision was therefore reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Espindola v. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc." on Justia Law

Rudy Alarcon filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking to invalidate hearing officer Robert Bergeson’s decision upholding the City of Calexico’s (City) termination of Alarcon’s employment as a City police officer. The City filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging Bergeson’s decision to award Alarcon back pay based on his finding that the City failed to provide Alarcon with sufficient predisciplinary notice of allegations that Alarcon had been dishonest during the investigation that led to his termination. The trial court consolidated the petitions and issued a written ruling that denied both petitions. As to Alarcon’s petition, the trial court determined that Alarcon had not met his burden to establish the charges against him were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court also found that the weight of the evidence demonstrated that Alarcon had “used force” and “discourteous language” during the arrest that led to his termination. With respect to the City’s petition, the trial court determined that “the hearing officer’s lengthy finding that the dishonesty charges were not properly noticed does not rise to the level of an abuse of discretion.” After review, the Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment with respect to Alarcon; the Court determined the City’s cross- appeal was untimely and should have been dismissed. View "City of Calexico v. Bergeson" on Justia Law

Robert Smith’s employer, Najjar Lube Centers, Inc. dba Jiffy Lube, held a presentation for its employees to learn about a new Castrol product. Castrol employee Gus Pumarol led the presentation. Smith alleges that Pumarol made several comments to Smith during the presentation that he considered racist and offensive. Smith sued BP Lubricants USA, Inc. dba Castrol (BP) and Pumarol for harassment under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, and for discrimination under the Unruh Act. Smith also sued Pumarol for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The trial court sustained BP and Pumarol’s demurrer without leave to amend, and Smith timely appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment. The Court affirmed the trial court’s order sustaining BP and Pumarol’s demurrer to Smith’s FEHA claim without leave to amend, but concluded, however, that Smith sufficiently alleged claims for IIED and violation of the Unruh Act. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Smith v. BP Lubricants USA Inc." on Justia Law

Laura Register appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of Outdoor Aluminum, Inc., as to her claim alleging retaliatory discharge. Register worked as a laborer for Outdoor Aluminum. As part of her employment, Register laid out metal material, drilled or punched holes in the material, and deburred and cut the material. Register punched holes in the metal material with a hydraulic-press machine. The hydraulic press became misaligned and was not punching through the metal. When Register attempted to fix the press, the press exploded, causing a two-inch long and half-inch thick piece of metal to strike Register on the head above her right eye and temple. Register reported the incident to her supervisor, Roger Wise. As a result of the incident, Register's neck and head were injured and she had headaches, blurred vision, dizziness, balance problems, and pain. Register sought workers' compensation benefits and medical treatment from Outdoor Aluminum. Approximately a year after Register’s accident and subsequent medical treatments, Outdoor Aluminum management expressed concern with the length of Register’s rehabilitation. In June 2017, a nurse case manager reported to Outdoor Aluminum that Register had been released to full duty with zero impairment by one doctor; by July, Register had not returned to work under advice of another doctor. Because she had not returned to work, and based on the nurse case manager’s report, Outdoor Aluminum terminated Register. In 2018, Register sued Outdoor Aluminum seeking workers' compensation benefits and damages for retaliatory discharge. The parties engaged in discovery. In May 2020, Outdoor Aluminum moved for summary judgment, arguing Register could not show that her workers' compensation claim was the sole motivating factor behind the termination of her employment. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, finding Register presented substantial evidence that there were genuine issues of material fact that should have been resolved by a jury. View "Register v. Outdoor Aluminum, Inc." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question of law to the Oregon Supreme Court concerning whether a statutory damages cap applied to an award of noneconomic damages in an unlawful employment practice action. Plaintiff Max Zweizig filed suit in the federal district court in Oregon, alleging that corporate defendants had retaliated against him and that defendant Timothy Rote had aided and abetted the corporations in violation of Oregon statutes. The jury found for plaintiff and awarded him $1,000,000 in noneconomic damages. Over plaintiff’s objection, the district court entered a judgment for only half that amount after applying the non- economic damages cap set out in ORS 31.710(1). Defendant appealed, and plaintiff cross-appealed, challenging the reduction of the noneconomic damage award. The Supreme Court determined the damages cap in ORS 31.710(1) did not apply to an award of noneconomic damages for an unlawful employment practice claim under ORS 659A.030 in which the plaintiff did not seek damages that arose out of bodily injury and instead sought damages for emotional injury. View "Zweizig v. Rote" on Justia Law

In 2008, plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, Rite Aid, and her former supervisor. In 2010, a jury returned a special verdict in plaintiff's favor and awarded her $3.4 million in compensatory damages and $4.8 million in punitive damages. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial on compensatory damages on plaintiff's causes of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy against Rite Aid and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Rite Aid and the supervisor. In 2014, on retrial, the jury awarded plaintiff $321,000 on her wrongful termination cause of action against Rite Aid, $0 on her intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action against Rite Aid, and $20,000 on her intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action against the supervisor. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the case for another new trial on compensatory damages on plaintiff's wrongful termination cause of action against Rite Aid and her intentional infliction of emotional distress causes of action against Rite Aid and the supervisor. In 2018, at another retrial, the jury awarded plaintiff $2,012,258 on her wrongful termination cause of action against Rite Aid and $4 million on her intentional infliction of emotional distress causes of action against Rite Aid and the supervisor.In regard to the award of past noneconomic damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's rejection of the Martinez II guidance does not require reversal of the judgment and the trial court did not instruct the jury to award duplicative damages. In regard to the award of past economic damages for wrongful termination, the court agreed with Rite Aid that plaintiff's actual post-termination earnings must be deducted from the past economic damages award for wrongful termination. Accordingly, the court modified the judgment to reduce the award of past economic damages to plaintiff for wrongful termination by $140,840 to $323,418. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Martinez v. Rite Aid Corp." on Justia Law