Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Farrar began working for NASA in 2010. When NASA fired him five months later, he filed an administrative action alleging disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 791 –794g. For the most part, Farrar prevailed. NASA awarded him compensatory damages, costs, and fees of about $13,000. Farrar appealed to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which increased the award to about $35,000 and ordered NASA to pay Farrar within 60 days. Farrar could either accept the Commission’s disposition or file a civil action within 90 days. After NASA paid him, Farrar filed a civil action. Because Farrar accepted the money from NASA, the district court dismissed his case.The D.C. Circuit reinstated the suit, finding no statute or regulation that required Farrar to return, or offer to return, the money before filing suit. A federal employee cannot bind the government to an administrative finding of liability and then litigate only the remedy in court but that rule does not address whether a federal employee who has retained an administrative remedy must disgorge, or offer to disgorge, the award upon filing a de novo lawsuit. The Commission’s regulations show it is aware that it sometimes orders agencies to pay an employee’s damages before the employee files a civil action but nevertheless retained discretion to order payment before 120 days. View "Farrar v. Nelson" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of BNSF in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging constructive discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) under Nebraska law. The court concluded that the Railway Labor Act (RLA) divested the district court of subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's constructive discharge claim and thus the claim was properly dismissed.However, the court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the IIED claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) because that claim can be resolved interpreting the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, the district court did have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. Nevertheless, the court concluded that dismissal was appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) because the complaint failed to state a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Nebraska law no matter what the collective bargaining agreement says. In this case, plaintiff alleged that BNSF or its employees disciplined and fired him without cause and berated him with expletive laced language and threats of physical violence. The court explained that it is unnecessary to interpret the collective bargaining agreement to conclude that these allegations do not support a reasonable inference of liability. Rather, plaintiff's allegations of discipline and termination without cause are insufficient to generate a reasonable inference of liability because discipline and termination without cause are not so outrageous that they give rise to a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Nebraska law. View "Richardson v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were employees of Buffalo Wild Wings Restaurants owned and/or operated by defendants. In their lawsuit against defendants, plaintiffs asserted individual and class claims under various provisions of the Labor Code and the California Unfair Competition Law, and claims for violations of the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004. The trial court certified eight classes and two subclasses, but later decertified all classes except for a subclass of dual rate employees who allegedly were underpaid by defendants for overtime hours worked. We refer to this subclass as the dual rate overtime subclass. The issue presented by this appeal was whether defendant employers violated California law in their method of calculating the regular rate of pay for purposes of compensating overtime hours of employees who worked at different rates of pay within a single pay period (dual rate employees). Defendants used the rate-in-effect method, by which dual rate employees were paid for overtime hours based on the rate in effect when the overtime hours began. Plaintiffs contended California law required defendants to use the weighted average method, by which dual rate employees were paid for overtime based on an hourly rate calculated by adding all hours worked in one pay period and dividing that number into the employee’s total compensation for the pay period. The trial court found, among other things, that defendants did not violate California employment law by using the rate-in-effect method for calculating the overtime rate of pay. Based on the ruling in the bench trial, the trial court decertified the dual rate overtime subclass and dismissed the PAGA claims. Plaintiffs appealed the order decertifying the dual rate overtime subclass and the order dismissing the PAGA claims. The Court of Appeal affirmed: California law did not mandate the use of the weighted average method, and defendants’ dual rate employees, including plaintiffs, overall received net greater overtime pay under the rate-in-effect method than they would have received under the weighted average method. View "Levanoff v. Dragas" on Justia Law

Steve Lands appealed summary judgment entered in favor of Betty Ward d/b/a Lucky B's Trucking ("Lucky B") in a suit he filed seeking damages for injuries sustained on the job. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Lucky B on both of Lands's claims against it -- negligence and wantonness -- because it held that Lucky B did not owe Lands a duty. Tennessee Valley Land and Timber, LLC ("TVL&T"), contracted with Lands to haul timber for processing at various locations in the Southeast. Kenneth Ward, the owner of TVL&T, provided Lands with a 1994 Peterbilt 379 Truck ("the truck") to make the deliveries. According to Lands, when Kenneth first provided the truck, he told Lands that it was sometimes difficult to start. If the truck would not start, Kenneth instructed Lands to use a "hot-wire" method, which required Lands to use a 12-inch piece of partially exposed wire to "jump" the truck while its ignition was left in the on position. Although TVL&T allowed Lands to use the truck for work, the truck was owned by Lucky B. After a delivery, Lands had to hot-wire the truck to start it. Lands put the truck in neutral, engaged the parking brake, and got out of the truck to use the hot-wire method. With both feet on the front-wheel axle and a cigarette lighter in hand, he lifted the hood and connected the 12-inch piece of wire to the firewall solenoid. The truck jumped back to life and sent Lands to the ground. The truck then rolled over Lands, severing the muscles in the lower half of his leg. Lands sued Lucky B, TVL&T, and other entities for negligence and wantonness. The essence of Lands's claims was that Lucky B, as the owner of the truck, had a duty under statute, regulation, and common law to inspect the truck and maintain it in safe condition. By failing to inspect and maintain it, he argued, the truck fell into disrepair and triggered the sequence of events that caused his injuries. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded Lands made out a prima facie case of negligence. While questions about causation and his own possible negligence remained, the Court found Lands was entitled to have those questions answered by a jury. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's summary judgment on that claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. With respect to Lands' wantonness claims, the Court found no evidence of heightened culpability required to prove wantonness. Judgment as to that claim was affirmed. View "Lands v. Ward d/b/a Lucky B's Trucking" on Justia Law

Nucor Steel Tuscaloosa, Inc. ("Nucor"), appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of Zurich American Insurance Company ("Zurich") and Onin Staffing, LLC ("Onin"), on claims asserted by Nucor arising from an alleged breach of an indemnification agreement. Nucor operated a steel-manufacturing facility in Tuscaloosa. Nucor had an internship program that offered part-time work to technical-school students, who, as part of the internship program, earned both academic credit and work experience relevant to their vocational training. In 2010, Nucor entered into a "Temporary Services Agency Agreement" ("the TSA Agreement") with Onin, a personnel-staffing agency, whereby Onin was to manage the employment of the technical-school students selected by Nucor for its internship program. Korey Ryan was a student at Shelton State Community College who applied for Nucor's internship program through Shelton State. In October 2014, Ryan was killed while working in the course of his duties at the Nucor facility. Ricky Edwards, a Nucor employee, directed Ryan to stand in a certain area in front of a water filter so that he would be clear of a moving crane. Edwards stated that he then turned his attention back to the load and began moving the crane. Ryan's right boot was struck by and became caught underneath the gearbox as the crane was moving. Ryan was dragged by the crane along the concrete floor through the narrow passageway between the crane and the warehouse wall, where he was crushed to death against a building support beam. Ryan's estate brought a wrongful-death action against Nucor; OSHA cited Nucor for a "serious" safety violation and fined it. Zurich issued a letter to Nucor and Onin in which it questioned whether the general-liability policy afforded coverage for the claims asserted in the wrongful-death action. Zurich noted that neither the indemnification provision in the TSA Agreement nor the additional-insured endorsement contained in the policy applied to in instances when the alleged "bodily injury" and/or "property damage" was caused by Nucor’s sole wrongful conduct. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the particular facts and circumstances underlying the wrongful- death action did not trigger the indemnification provision and the payment of an insurance benefit; rather, the facts and circumstances voided the indemnification provision altogether. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurance company. View "Nucor Steel Tuscaloosa, Inc. v. Zurich American Insurance Company et al." on Justia Law

In its petition seeking a workplace violence restraining order, Goals alleged that its employee and shareholder, A.K., needed protection from Rosas because he “verbally harassed and threatened” her, making her feel unsafe. Goals claimed Rosas told A.K. that he owned firearms, and caused her to have panic attacks. The court denied a request for a temporary restraining order, citing insufficient evidence that Rosas threatened A.K. with violence, and set the matter for hearing on June 10, 2019. On June 1, Rosas was timely served with the petition and a notice of hearing.Rosas filed an opposition on June 7, denying every allegation in the petition, arguing that the petition lacked evidentiary support and had been filed for an improper purpose (related to ongoing civil litigation). He sought sanctions and requested a two-week continuance because he was “out of town on a charitable bicycle ride,” and needed more time to prepare for the hearing. Neither Rosas nor his counsel appeared in court for the hearing. In Rosas’s absence, a judge denied a continuance and, after hearing A.K.'s testimony, granted the requested two-year restraining order. The court of appeal affirmed. Code of Civil Procedure 527.8(o) does not require trial courts to grant respondents a continuance once they have responded to a petition for a restraining order. View "Goals for Autism v. Rosas" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a years-long dispute between Robert Elgee and the Retirement Board of the Public Employee Retirement System of Idaho (“PERSI”) regarding the payment of retirement benefits accrued during Elgee’s service as a magistrate judge. Elgee became eligible for PERSI benefits in 2010, but operating under an erroneous interpretation of the statutes it administers, PERSI maintained Elgee was not then entitled to receive benefits. Eleven years, numerous administrative determinations, and two judicial review actions later, the parties continued to disagree on issues relating to the calculation of benefits, the interest due on benefits, and whether Elgee was entitled to damages for the tax consequences of receiving a lump sum payment of retroactive benefits. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court as to the applicable rate of interest, reversed as to the remaining issues, and remanded for entry of judgment. On remand the district court was directed to enter judgment that reflected: (1) the PERSI Board’s determination that Elgee was due interest at the regular rate of interest under the PERSI statutes was affirmed; (2) the PERSI Board’s determination that Elgee was due interest from 2013, rather than 2010, was set aside; (3) the PERSI Board’s determination that Elgee was due benefits under the contingent annuitant option, rather than the regular retirement option was affirmed; (4) the PERSI Board’s determination that Elgee failed to prove his tax loss claim in 2018 was set aside; and (5) the PERSI Board’s determination that tax loss damages were not available under the PERSI statutes was affirmed. View "Elgee v. Retirement Brd. of the Public Employee (PERSI)" on Justia Law

Daza worked as a geologist for INDOT from 1993 until the agency fired him in 2015. In 2017, he sued, citing 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983, the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. He alleged that INDOT and its officials had discriminated against him based on race, color, age, and political speech and had retaliated against complaints he made regarding the alleged discrimination.Days after the district court granted INDOT summary judgment in 2018, Daza filed a second action, again alleging discrimination and retaliation based on race, color, age, and political speech, contending that INDOT’s failure to rehire him for the vacancy left after INDOT dismissed him was an independent act of discrimination and retaliation because INDOT filled his position with a young and inexperienced white man. In the first suit, Daza had expressly contended that INDOT’s failure to rehire him and its decision to hire an unqualified replacement proved that INDOT was attempting to cover up its discrimination and retaliation. The Seventh Circuit again affirmed summary judgment in favor of INDOT. Claim preclusion barred the second case. View "Daza v. Indiana" on Justia Law

Gould was appointed as a business agent for the Carpenters Regional Council by the Executive Secretary-Treasurer (EST). Gould began complaining of financial and administrative waste in 2008. The EST removed Gould. Gould sued, asserting wrongful termination. Gould received voluminous Council documents in discovery and, in a letter to the EST, outlined alleged financial improprieties and breaches of fiduciary duties. The Council hired the Calibre accounting firm to perform an audit and invited Gould to assist in the investigation. Gould questioned Calibre’s independence but agreed to provide documents.Gould subsequently sought to amend his state court suit to add Labor Code breach of fiduciary duty counts against the EST, 29 U.S.C. 501(b). The Council declared that the EST’s approval of expenditures was outside the scope of Gould’s demand letter and therefore “Calibre was not asked to investigate” The state court denied Gould leave to add the claims. The documents Gould provided were never forwarded by the Council's attorney to Calibre. The audit concluded that the Council’s expense reimbursement policy was sound. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of Gould’s motion for leave to file a federal complaint under 29 U.S.C. 501(b) against the EST. A union member who files a Section 501(b) lawsuit after a union has taken action in response to the member’s request should show an objectively reasonable ground for belief that the union’s accounting or other action was not legitimate. Gould failed to make the necessary showing and failed to meet the condition precedent of a timely and appropriate request to sue or recover damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief within a reasonable time. View "Gould v. Bond" on Justia Law

After a jury awarded plaintiff $16 in unpaid minimum wages and $16 in liquidated damages and found against her on causes of action alleging she had been raped by her employer, the trial court determined that plaintiff was the prevailing party for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 and awarded her $19,523 in costs, as well as $3.20 in attorney fees based on the formula in section 1031 that multiples the wages recovered by 20 percent.In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded that, in this case where plaintiff lost all of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) claims, lost some non-FEHA claims, and prevailed on some non-FEHA claims, the award of costs is governed by the interaction of section 1032 and Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b). The court concluded that section 12965, subdivision (b) bars plaintiff from recovering the costs caused solely by the inclusion of the FEHA causes of action in this lawsuit. Furthermore, the other costs incurred in the lawsuit are recoverable under section 1032, subject to the discretionary exception in section 1033, subdivision (a). The court directed the trial court on remand to determine which cost items, if any, are barred by section 12965, subdivision (b) before entering an award in accordance with sections 1032 and 1033.The court also concluded that the parties' dispute over attorney fees requires an interpretation of section 1031 and Labor Code section 1194. The court explained that the literal terms of these attorney fees provisions cover this case because of the recovery of minimum wages. In situations where these statutes overlap, the court concluded that section 1194 controls because it is the more specific statute and its attorney fees provision is the most recently enacted. Therefore, the trial court court should have exercised the discretion granted by section 1194 and awarded plaintiff reasonable attorney fees, rather than applying section 1031 and awarding 20 percent of the wages recovered. The court remanded for reasonable attorney fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the issues of attorney fees and costs. View "Moreno v. Bassi" on Justia Law