Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

This appeal stemmed from Alfred Brown’s lawsuit under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. secs. 701–796l, against his former employer, the Defense Health Agency. In April 2010, the Agency hired Brown as a healthcare fraud specialist (HCFS) assigned to the Program Integrity Office (PIO) in Aurora, Colorado. Shortly after joining the Agency, Brown told his supervisors that he had been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder and other panic and anxiety disorders related to his military service. When Brown’s symptoms worsened in September 2011, he was hospitalized and received in-patient treatment for one week. The Agency approved Brown’s request for leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The district court granted summary judgment for the Agency, determining that there were no triable issues on Brown’s claims that the Agency failed to accommodate his mental-health disabilities and discriminated against him based on those disabilities. Brown appealed, challenging the district court’s rulings that: (1) his requests for telework, weekend work, and a supervisor reassignment were not reasonable accommodations; and (2) he failed to establish material elements of his various discrimination claims. The Tenth Circuit found no reversible error: (1) granting Brown’s telework and weekend-work requests would have eliminated essential functions of his job, making those requests unreasonable as a matter of law; (2) Brown did not allege the limited circumstances in which the Agency would need to consider reassigning him despite the fact that he performed the essential functions of his position with other accommodations; (3) the Court declined Brown’s invitation to expand those limited circumstances to include reassignments that allow an employee to live a “normal life;” and (4) Brown did not allege a prima facie case of retaliation, disparate treatment, or constructive discharge. Summary judgment for the Agency was affirmed. View "Brown v. Austin, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Sharon Curcio, formerly a teacher with the Fontana Unified School District (the district), learned her personnel file included derogatory statements about her. When the district refused to allow Curcio to obtain or review those statements, she sought assistance from her union, the Fontana Teachers Association (FTA), and from the California Teachers Association (CTA). When the union didn't help, Curcio initiated proceedings before the Public Employees Relations Board (the board), claiming FTA and CTA breached their duties of fair representation and engaged in unfair practices in violation of the Educational Employment Relations Act (the Act). When the board decided not to issue a complaint, Curcio filed this lawsuit and appealed when the superior court sustained FTA and CTA’s demurrer, without leave to amend, to Curcio’s second amended petition for writ of mandate. The demurrer was grounded on FTA and CTA’s claims that the board had the exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether Curcio had or had not stated an unfair practice and, therefore, the superior court lacked jurisdiction. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Curcio v. Fontana Teachers Assn. CTA/NEA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Santiago Medina appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of his putative joint employer, defendant Equilon Enterprises, LLC (Shell), which was a Shell Oil Company subsidiary doing business as Shell Oil Products US. Shell owned gas stations and operated them through contracts with separate companies called MSO operators, one of which employed plaintiff as a gas station cashier and manager. Plaintiff sued the MSO operator and Shell, alleging violations of the California Labor Code, arguing that Shell was his joint employer, based upon Shell’s strict control over the operations of its gas stations. Relying on two prior published decisions of sister courts of appeal involving similar claims, Shell moved for summary judgment, arguing Shell was not plaintiff’s employer as a matter of law. The trial court concluded it was bound by these prior decisions and granted the motion. The Court of Appeal reversed, however, finding that the facts presented by plaintiff in this case, particularly with respect to the degree of Shell’s control over the MSO operators and gas station employees like plaintiff, differed meaningfully from the facts set forth in the two prior opinions. "In addition to these factual distinctions, we also disagree with the analysis of our sister courts on the application of the relevant tests for joint employer status to Shell’s operation. We conclude the undisputed facts presented in Shell’s motion show Shell both indirectly controlled plaintiff’s wages and working conditions and suffered or permitted plaintiff to work at Shell’s stations, either of which is enough to make Shell plaintiff’s joint employer." View "Medina v. Equilon Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff John Hayes prosecuted his employment discrimination case to a favorable verdict and judgment. During trial, two instances of misconduct prompted Defendant SkyWest Airlines, Inc. to request a mistrial. But it was Defendant’s own misconduct. Thus, the district court tried to remedy the misconduct and preserve the integrity of the proceedings, but did not grant Defendant’s request. After the trial, exercising its equitable powers, the district court granted Plaintiff’s request for a front pay award. Following final judgment, Defendant moved for a new trial based, in part, on the district court’s handling of the misconduct incidents and on newly discovered evidence. The district court denied that motion. Defendant appealed, asking the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to reverse and remand for a new trial or, at the very least, to vacate (or reduce) the front pay award. Finding the district court did not abuse its discretion or authority in this case, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the front pay award. View "Hayes v. Skywest Airlines" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that trial courts have inherent authority to ensure that Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) claims will be manageable at trial, and to strike such claims if they cannot be managed. In this case, plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Staples, alleging a representative claim under PAGA on behalf of himself and 345 other current and former Staples General Managers (GMs) in California. Plaintiff sought almost $36 million in civil penalties for alleged Labor Code violations, all premised on the theory that Staples had misclassified its GMs as exempt executives.In the published portion of the opinion, the court drew on established principles of the trial courts' inherent authority to manage litigation, including ensuring the manageability of representative claims, and concluded that: (1) trial courts have inherent authority to ensure that PAGA claims can be fairly and efficiently tried and, if necessary, may strike claims that cannot be rendered manageable; (2) as a matter of due process, defendants are entitled to a fair opportunity to litigate available affirmative defenses, and a trial court's manageability assessment should account for them; and (3) given the state of the record and plaintiff's lack of cooperation with the trial court's manageability inquiry, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking his PAGA claim as unmanageable. View "Wesson v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC" on Justia Law

The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act applied a two-year limitations period to claims for “compensation for disability.” In 1988, the legislature reconfigured one type of compensation — for permanent partial disability — as compensation for permanent partial impairment. The claimant here argued this amendment exempted claims for impairment compensation from the statute of limitations. The Alaska Supreme Court disagreed: because the statutory text contains ambiguity and the legislative history evinced no intent to exempt impairment claims from the statute of limitations, the Court ruled that claims for impairment compensation were subject to the Act’s two-year limitations period. A secondary issue in this case was whether the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board properly denied paralegal costs for work related to other claims. The applicable regulation required a claim for paralegal costs be supported by the paralegal’s own affidavit attesting to the work performed. To this, the Supreme Court rejected the claimant’s argument that this regulation was contrary to statute and the constitution. View "Murphy v. Fairbanks North Star Borough" on Justia Law

For 28 years, the employees managed the Kazalis's motel. They were paid salaries and annual bonuses. In 2017, the Kazalis terminated the employees and paid their salaries, but not the 2017 bonuses, despite conceding that they were owed. The employees filed suit. The Kazalis made a Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer to pay $300,000 in “settlement of all claims ... costs, expenses, attorneys’ fees, interest, and any other damages.“ After that offer expired, the Kazalis sent Wasito and Soenjoto checks for $75,876.90 for the 2017 bonuses including interest and penalties. The employees accepted the checks.The case proceeded to trial. A jury ruled in favor of the employees and awarded about $1200. The Kazalis sought post-offer costs under section 998 because the employees failed to obtain a better result at trial. The court found section 988's cost-shifting provisions violated Labor Code 206.5 by withholding undisputed compensation while attempting to settle all claims. The court awarded costs plus $66,700 in attorney fees, finding that the employees were the “prevailing party” (Lab. Code, 218.5) because they “were paid substantially more . . . after filing the case.” The court of appeal affirmed. The cost-shifting provision of section 998 did not apply. Labor Code sections 206 and 206.5 preclude a section 998 offer that resolves disputed wage claims if there are undisputed wages due at the time of the offer. View "Wasito v. Kazali" on Justia Law

At issue before the Mississippi Supreme Court in this case was whether the Civil Service Commission for the City of Jackson (Commission) sufficiently and clearly certified its findings when it affirmed the Jackson Police Department’s termination of Officer Justin Roberts. The Supreme Court found that because the Commission failed to set forth with sufficient clarity and specificity its reasons for affirming Roberts’s termination, the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Circuit Court were reversed, and the matter remanded to the Commission to comply with the Supreme Court's directive to certify in writing and to set forth with sufficient clarity and specificity its factual findings. View "Roberts v. City of Jackson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against CJS Solutions, a Florida entity doing business as The HCI Group, in the District of Minnesota. Plaintiffs moved to certify a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The putative class of plaintiffs was composed of all HCI employees hired on a per-project basis who were not paid wages for out-of-town travel to and from remote project locations. After the district court conditionally certified a collective action limited to claims arising out of travel to and from Minnesota, it granted summary judgment for HCI on the ground that plaintiffs were not employees when traveling.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court did not err in finding defendant had not waived its jurisdictional defense to plaintiffs' claims for certification of collective actions covering all of defendant's employees for all of their travel time anywhere in the United States; the district court properly excluded all claims with no connection with the forum state of Minnesota; and, in regard to the out-of-town travel claims, the district court did not err in finding that two plaintiffs were not employees when traveling and that defendant had no obligation to pay for their time. View "Vallone v. CJS Solutions Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Anthem provides health insurance and hires nurses to review insurance claims. The company pays those nurses a salary but does not pay them overtime. Canaday, an Anthem nurse who lives in Tennessee, filed a proposed collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 206. claiming that the company misclassified her and others as exempt from the Act’s overtime pay provisions. A number of Anthem nurses in other states opted into the collective action.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the out-of-state plaintiffs on personal jurisdiction grounds. In an FLSA collective action, as in the mass action under California law, each opt-in plaintiff becomes a real party in interest, who must meet her burden for obtaining relief and satisfy the other requirements of party status. Anthem is based in Indiana, not Tennessee. General jurisdiction is not an option for out-of-state claims. Specific jurisdiction requires a connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue. The out-of-state plaintiffs have not brought claims arising out of or relating to Anthem’s conduct in Tennessee. View "Canaday v. The Anthem Companies, Inc." on Justia Law