Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

After a 21-year career as a firefighter with the City of Pocatello, Richard Nelson was diagnosed with leukemia. Nelson brought a workers’ compensation claim against the City. The Industrial Commission determined that the City failed to rebut a statutory presumption of causation with substantial and competent evidence. The City appealed, arguing there was substantial evidence to rebut the presumption that Nelson’s cancer was caused by his employment. The City also argued Idaho Code section 72-438(14)(b) unconstitutionally discriminated between the employers of firefighters who had cancer and the employers of other employees who claim to have contracted an occupational disease. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial Commission. View "Nelson v. City of Pocatello" on Justia Law

This case involved the definition of the term "impairment" in the context of Oregon's workers' compensation statutory scheme, and whether claimant Marisela Johnson’s loss of grip strength (that was determined to be caused in material part by an accepted, compensable condition and, in part, by a denied condition. Claimant contended that ORS 656.214 entitled an injured worker to compensation for the full measure of impairment due in material part to, and resulting in material part from, the compensable injury, including any impairment stemming from the denied condition, if applicable. SAIF Corporation disagreed, arguing that the definition of impairment did not include loss caused by a denied condition because it was not “due to” the “compensable industrial injury.” The Oregon Supreme Court concluded claimant was entitled to the full measure of her impairment. View "Johnson v. SAIF" on Justia Law

Employee Christie Mitchell appealed a summary judgment order in favor of NBT Bank, N.A. regarding its policy of deducting her overtime compensation from her commissions so that she was never paid more than gross commissions regardless of how many hours she worked in a week. She contended the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) required the bank to pay her entire gross commissions plus overtime wages. Because the FLSA contained no such requirement, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mitchell v. NBT Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Christopher Ross, a former prosecutor with the Riverside County District Attorney’s office (DA’s Office), sued the County of Riverside for whistleblower retaliation and disability discrimination after the DA’s Office allegedly demoted him and refused to accommodate medical issues in response to Ross raising concerns that the DA’s Office was prosecuting an innocent man for murder. During a deposition, the former district attorney who preceded then-District Attorney Paul Zellerbach, Rodric Pacheco, testified about a conversation he had with the district attorney who succeeded Zellerbach, Mike Hestrin. Pacheco testified that he and Hestrin shared the view that Zellerbach was one of the most unethical attorneys they had encountered as prosecutors. Ross subpoenaed Hestrin for a deposition about his communications with the unidentified County lawyers, as well as regarding advice Hestrin provided to Ross in Hestrin’s capacity as an official in the prosecutors’ union in which Ross was a member. The County moved to quash the subpoena, which the trial court granted. The trial court found Hestrin’s alleged communications with the unidentified County lawyers were irrelevant to Ross’s retaliation and discrimination claims, and that Ross could obtain evidence regarding his union rights from other sources. Ross sought a writ of mandate to direct the trial court to vacate its order granting the motion to quash and to enter a new order denying it. The Court of Appeal denied the petition as it related to evidence concerning Hestrin’s role counseling Ross regarding his union rights. The Court granted the petition as it related to alleged requests by the unidentified County lawyers that Hestrin alter his testimony regarding Zellerbach’s ethical character. “[A]lthough we agree with the trial court that the testimony is irrelevant to the merits of Ross’s substantive claims against the County, the testimony is relevant to Zellerbach’s credibility, and he will likely be a material trial witness. Testimony showing the unidentified County lawyers attempted to suppress or alter a witness’s testimony about the credibility of a material witness is also relevant to show the County’s consciousness of guilt.” View "Ross v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the comprehensive remedial scheme provided by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., for recovery of damages when an employer violates the federal overtime law, 29 U.S.C. 207, precludes an employee from alternatively pursuing remedies under the wage act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148, for the untimely payment of overtime wages due solely pursuant to the FLSA.Plaintiffs, employees of Defendant, brought this action alleging violations of the FLSA for failure to pay overtime wages, violations of the wage act for failure to pay the FLSA overtime wages in a timely manner, and violations of federal and state minimum wage laws. The motion judge allowed summary judgment as to Defendant's liability under the federal overtime law and wage act. After a trial, the trial judge awarded damages. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) the trial judge's trebling of damages pursuant to the wage act was error; (2) the jury instructions for the calculation of overtime wages under the FLSA contained a methodological error; and (3) Defendant's remaining claims lacked merit. View "Devaney v. Zucchini Gold, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant Nicholas Kroll appealed the Court of Chancery’s dismissal of his complaint. Kroll was terminated from his position as a police officer for the City of Wilmington (the “City”) on the ground that he failed to comply with a departmental requirement that he reside in the City. A second ground was that he violated a departmental regulation regarding dishonesty by giving a false or inaccurate address on annual, required residency affidavits. After his dismissal, he filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the City, its police department, and its mayor, in his official capacity, breached the police Collective Bargaining Agreement (the “CBA”) and his right to due process by modifying the definition of the term “residence” in October 2017, and applying the modified definition to him without giving the Fraternal Order of Police an opportunity to bargain the new definition on behalf of its members. The modification, Kroll argued, was material to the decision to terminate his employment. He also sought an injunction reinstating him as a City police officer with back pay. Appellees moved to dismiss, arguing the Court of Chancery lacked jurisdiction over the complaint’s subject matter. The Appellees argued, in part, that Kroll had an adequate remedy at law in the form of a petition for a writ of certiorari, which was within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court. Appellees had not argued that Kroll’s complaint fell within the CBA grievance procedure (that issue was raised sua sponte by the Court of Chancery in its ruling). The parties agreed the disciplinary action taken against Kroll was not subject to the grievance procedure set forth in the CBA. Appellees agreed the Court of Chancery committed legal error by basing its decision on the CBA’s grievance procedure. They urged the Delaware Supreme Court, however, to affirm on the alternative grounds for dismissal that were asserted in the Court of Chancery. Finding the Court of Chancery did not address Appellees' arguments, the Supreme Court reversed judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kroll v. City of Wilmington" on Justia Law

In 2010, Plaintiff filed several employment claims against her employer. In 2013, the parties reached a settlement agreement. However, before the parties reached their agreement, Plaintiff resigned in lieu of termination. Plaintiff then filed a subsequent claim against her employer, alleging retaliation.The D.C. Circuit held that the initial settlement agreement did not preclude Plaintiff’s ability to bring a retaliation claim. The parties’ initial agreement released Plaintiff’s employer for “all claims” related to her employment; however, it also carved out various exceptions, including Plaintiff’s ability to pursue any claims she raised in her separate grievance, including her claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The D.C. Circuit remanded the case for the district court to determine if Plaintiff properly presented the claim for consideration. View "Karin Weng v. Martin J. Walsh" on Justia Law

After discovering apparent financial malfeasance by the plaintiff, then president of Local 1637, the Amalgamated Transit Union (“ATU”) imposed the trusteeship, thereby removing plaintiff and the other Local 1637 executive board members from office. Plaintiff filed a single-plaintiff action against ATU and several of its officers. Later, while that action was still pending, plaintiff filed a second, multiplaintiff action in which he and a majority of the other former executive board members of Local 1637 asserted related claims against ATU, the same ATU officers, and several other defendants.Because the claims against these defendants in the two cases otherwise involved the same causes of action and the same parties, the assertion of those claims in the second suit violated the doctrine of claim-splitting. The Ninth Circuit found that the district court correctly concluded that, with respect to the claims against ATU and its officers, the additional plaintiffs in the multi-plaintiff action were adequately represented by the plaintiff in the single plaintiff action. Because the claims against these defendants in the two cases otherwise involved the same causes of action and the same parties, the assertion of those claims in the second suit violated the doctrine of claim splitting. The circuit court affirmed the district court finding that the court properly dismissed the duplicative claims against the ATU Defendants in the multiplaintiff suit. View "JOSE MENDOZA, JR. V. AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION" on Justia Law

Cromer, formerly a “managing loan officer” for Union Home Mortgage, agreed to several restrictive covenants, including that he would “not become employed in the same or similar capacity” with a competitive entity. Cromer left Union and started working for Homeside Financial as a “non-producing” branch manager. Union sought a preliminary injunction to enforce Cromer’s restrictive covenants, citing the 2016 Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. 1836; the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act; the non-compete, confidentiality, and nonsolicitation covenants; the contractual duty of loyalty; and the common law duty of loyalty. Against Homeside, Union alleged tortious interference with business relationships and with contracts.The district court issued an injunction—without any time limitation—prohibiting Cromer, and anyone acting in concert, from “competing with Union Home.” The Sixth Circuit vacated. The injunction failed to satisfy the specificity requirements of FRCP 65(d)(1), was overbroad, and was otherwise improperly granted under the standard for preliminary injunctions. The broad prohibition covers any form of competition, irrespective of Cromer’s employer, job title, or duties, and created an inherent risk that the scope of the injunction exceeds the Agreement that the parties signed. The district court also failed to consider whether the non-compete covenant is reasonable and thus enforceable. View "Union Home Mortgage Corp. v. Cromer" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Jose Mejia et al. appealed following a jury verdict in favor of defendant Roussos Construction, Inc. Principally, they contended the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury regarding the “ABC test” which determined whether a worker was an employee or an independent contractor for purposes of California wage laws. The trial court had instructed the jury that before the ABC test was applied, plaintiffs had to first establish that they were hired by Roussos Construction or its agent. The Court of Appeal agreed this was error. Plaintiffs also raised several contentions contingent on the Court of Appeal finding plaintiffs were misclassified as independent contractors as a matter of law. The Court reversed the trial court and remanded for a new trial. The Court did not reach plaintiffs' second argument in light of its mandate for a new trial. View "Mejia v. Roussos Construction, Inc." on Justia Law