Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

An assistant prosecuting attorney, Jennifer Janetsky, filed a lawsuit against Saginaw County, the Saginaw County Prosecutor’s Office, John McColgan, and Christopher Boyd. Janetsky alleged violations of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA), public policy violations, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment. The case stemmed from Janetsky’s handling of a criminal sexual conduct prosecution and subsequent alleged retaliatory actions by her supervisors, McColgan and Boyd, after she reported concerns about a plea agreement.The Saginaw Circuit Court granted summary disposition to the Saginaw County Prosecutor’s Office on all claims, to all defendants on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, and to McColgan on the intentional-tort claims, but denied the motion for the remaining claims. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment in part, ordering summary disposition in favor of all defendants on the remaining claims. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider unresolved issues. On remand, the Court of Appeals again reversed in part, ordering summary disposition on the intentional-tort and public-policy claims in favor of all defendants and on the WPA claim in favor of Saginaw County.The Michigan Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s denial of summary disposition. The Supreme Court determined that Saginaw County was an employer under the WPA, allowing Janetsky to sue under the Act. The Court also established a test for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, remanding the case to the trial court to apply this test. Additionally, the Court found genuine issues of material fact regarding Janetsky’s intentional-tort claims, including false imprisonment and assault and battery, sufficient to defeat summary disposition. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Janetsky v. County Of Saginaw" on Justia Law

Jeanne Weinstein, a former server at The Ridge Great Steaks & Seafood, filed a collective action complaint alleging that the restaurant and its operator, Stephen Campbell, violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by not meeting the federal minimum wage requirement. The Ridge paid servers and bartenders $2.15 per hour, supplementing their income with tips to meet the $7.25 minimum wage. The Ridge also required servers and bartenders to contribute 3% of their gross food sales to a tip pool, which was used to pay support staff. Any excess tips were supposed to be distributed to bartenders, but there were inconsistencies in the record-keeping and distribution process.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted unopposed motions to voluntarily dismiss five opt-in plaintiffs. The court also ruled partially in favor of the defendants on summary judgment, finding that the tip pool funds were not distributed to non-tipped employees. The remaining issue for trial was whether the defendants retained any portion of the tip pool funds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that Rule 41(a) permits the dismissal of a single plaintiff in a multiple-plaintiff case if all claims brought by that plaintiff are dismissed. The court also found no error in the district court's conclusion that the defendants did not retain any of the extra tips and operated a lawful tip pool within the parameters of the FLSA. Consequently, the defendants successfully asserted the tip credit defense, and the plaintiffs could not prevail on their minimum wage claim. View "Weinstein v. 440 Corp." on Justia Law

Timothy Upchurch, a Black man, has worked at the Indiana Department of Correction’s Correctional Industrial Facility (CIF) for over thirty years. He filed discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII against the State of Indiana, challenging his demotion from Correctional Lieutenant to Officer, subsequent written reprimands, a suspension, and non-promotions. The district court substituted the Indiana Department of Correction for the State of Indiana as the defendant and granted summary judgment to the Department.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana found insufficient evidence of race discrimination or retaliation to support Upchurch's claims. Upchurch appealed, challenging the substitution of the Department for the State as the defendant and the summary judgment decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court that the Indiana Department of Correction was the proper defendant under Title VII, as it had actual hiring and firing responsibility. The court also reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo, finding that the Department provided nondiscriminatory explanations for its actions, and Upchurch failed to show these explanations were pretextual. The court noted that Upchurch did not provide sufficient evidence to support his claims of race discrimination or retaliation, including failing to show that comparators were similarly situated or that the Department's actions were motivated by his race or complaints about discrimination.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that no reasonable jury could find that race discrimination or retaliation motivated the adverse employment actions against Upchurch. View "Upchurch v. Indiana" on Justia Law

Rodney Burch, the former Public Works Director for the City of Chubbuck, Idaho, filed a lawsuit against the City and Mayor Kevin England, alleging First Amendment retaliation and violations of Idaho state law. Burch claimed that adverse employment actions were taken against him due to his protected speech, which included criticisms of England’s policies and performance, advocacy for a city administrator position, and displaying a political yard sign supporting England’s opponent during the mayoral election.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that Burch’s criticisms and advocacy were made pursuant to his official duties and thus were not protected speech under the First Amendment. However, the court recognized that Burch’s political yard sign was protected speech. Despite this, the court concluded that Burch failed to establish a First Amendment violation because the defendants had adequate justification for their actions and would have taken the same actions regardless of the yard sign.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit agreed that Burch’s criticisms and advocacy were unprotected as they were part of his official duties. The court also found that while Burch’s yard sign was protected speech, the defendants had legitimate reasons for their actions, including Burch’s unprotected speech and the need to maintain effective city operations. Additionally, the court held that Burch’s state law claim was time-barred as the adverse employment actions occurred outside the statute of limitations.In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for the defendants, holding that Burch’s First Amendment retaliation claim and Idaho state law claim both failed as a matter of law. View "Burch v. City of Chubbuck" on Justia Law

George Merithew, a former police officer with the City of Omaha Police Department (OPD), sued the City of Omaha under the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act (NFEPA) for retaliation. Merithew, who began his employment with OPD in 1996 and was promoted to lieutenant in 2009, reported a violation of the Palmer Consent Decree in May 2018 and subsequently claimed retaliation by the police chief. He filed a charge of discrimination with the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission (NEOC) in April 2020 after receiving a 20-day suspension. In June 2020, he received a termination letter, was suspended with pay, and later retired in February 2021 under an "Early Delayed Retirement Option."The District Court for Douglas County granted summary judgment in favor of the City, finding that any alleged discriminatory actions before June 25, 2019, were time-barred and that Merithew failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. The court determined that Merithew did not suffer an adverse employment action and lacked evidence of a causal connection between his protected conduct and the alleged retaliation. Additionally, the court found that the City provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, which Merithew failed to prove were pretextual.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's enforcement of the statute of limitations, barring claims for actions before June 25, 2019. However, the Supreme Court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Merithew was subjected to an adverse employment action, whether there was a causal connection between his protected conduct and the adverse action, and whether the City's reasons were pretextual. The court reversed the summary judgment in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Merithew v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

Ryan Vanicek was killed in a traffic accident when a tractor-trailer driven by Kenneth Kratt, on behalf of Sandair Corporation, collided with his pickup truck. Jessica Vanicek, Ryan's wife, filed a wrongful death and survival action against Kratt and Sandair. Lyman-Richey Corporation, Ryan's employer, intervened under Nebraska's worker's compensation statute. A magistrate judge struck Jessica's claim for punitive damages and denied her leave to amend her complaint. The district court later compelled a settlement over Jessica's objection and ordered the funds to be deposited without post-judgment interest.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska initially referred the issue of punitive damages to a magistrate judge, who struck the claim, applying Nebraska law. The district court overruled Jessica's objection to this order. The district court also granted summary judgment to the defendants on the claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and denied a motion for partial summary judgment on pre- and post-impact damages. The district court approved a $5 million settlement proposed by Lyman-Richey, finding it fair and reasonable based on expert reports and the defendants' insurance policy limits. Jessica appealed the denial of her motion to amend and the settlement approval.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit dismissed Jessica's appeal regarding the denial of her motion to amend for lack of jurisdiction, as she failed to object to the magistrate judge's order in the district court. The court affirmed the district court's approval of the settlement, finding no abuse of discretion in its evaluation of damages and the defendants' ability to satisfy the judgment. The court also upheld the district court's decision to deny post-judgment interest, concluding that Jessica was estopped from claiming it due to her attorney's dilatory conduct. View "Vanicek v. Lyman-Richey Corp." on Justia Law

Bethany Scheer was employed by Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth Health System, Inc. (SCL) from 2014 to 2019. During her employment, Scheer faced performance issues and was placed on a performance improvement plan (PIP) that included mandatory counseling through SCL’s employee assistance program (EAP). Scheer initially agreed to the PIP but later refused to sign a form authorizing the disclosure of her counseling attendance and compliance, leading to her termination. Scheer sued SCL under the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act and the Rehabilitation Act, alleging discrimination based on a perceived disability.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment in favor of SCL. The court concluded that the mandatory referral to counseling did not constitute an adverse employment action because it did not cause a significant change in Scheer’s employment status, as required by precedent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis rejected the significance test previously used and established a new standard requiring plaintiffs to show they suffered "some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment." The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration under the new standard set forth in Muldrow. The district court must now determine if Scheer suffered "some harm" as a result of SCL’s actions. View "Scheer v. Sisters of Charity" on Justia Law

Dr. Joseph Jimenez, a former medical officer for the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), alleged race and national origin discrimination, retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. Dr. Jimenez, who identifies as Hispanic, claimed that his employer required him to work as a correctional officer while non-Hispanic doctors were exempt. He also alleged that the BOP denied him a reasonable accommodation for his mental health conditions.The district court dismissed Dr. Jimenez’s Title VII claims related to certain adverse employment actions for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court granted summary judgment to the BOP on the remaining Title VII claims, finding no evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory motives. The court later dismissed Dr. Jimenez’s Rehabilitation Act claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, rejecting his attempt to correct a citation error in his complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that Dr. Jimenez failed to exhaust administrative remedies for his claims related to the denial of bonuses and failure to promote. The court also found that Dr. Jimenez did not present sufficient evidence to show that his race, national origin, or protected activity influenced the BOP’s actions. Additionally, the court upheld the dismissal of the Rehabilitation Act claim, agreeing that the citation error was not a mere scrivener’s error and that Dr. Jimenez did not demonstrate good cause to amend his complaint after the scheduling order deadline. View "Jimenez v. Acting United States Attorney General" on Justia Law

David Jenny, an employee of L3Harris Technologies, Inc., suffered from recurring cellulitis, which was aggravated by frequent international travel required by his job. He requested and was granted an accommodation to book seats with extra legroom on long flights. However, within three months of this accommodation, Jenny was denied permission to travel for routine business, removed from his leadership role, and ultimately discharged. Jenny sued L3Harris for discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act.The United States District Court for the District of Utah acknowledged that Jenny established a prima facie case of discrimination and retaliation and produced sufficient evidence that L3Harris’s explanation for his discharge was pretextual. Despite this, the district court granted summary judgment to L3Harris, citing the exception set out in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., concluding that Jenny’s evidence did not sufficiently link his discharge to any discriminatory or retaliatory motive.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court improperly applied the Reeves exception. The Tenth Circuit held that Jenny had indeed met the requirements of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Jenny, did not meet the requirements for invoking the Reeves exception. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to L3Harris and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jenny v. L3Harris Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, consisting of several Cement and Concrete Workers District Council Funds and their fiduciary, sued Defendants Manny P. Concrete Co., Inc. and Manny P. Con Industries, Inc. for failing to make fringe benefit contributions as required by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The CBA mandated contributions to the Funds for work performed by employees within its jurisdiction. An audit revealed that Defendants owed significant amounts in unpaid contributions and dues checkoffs.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs. The court deemed the matters within Plaintiffs' Requests for Admissions admitted due to Defendants' failure to respond timely. Consequently, the court found no genuine disputes of material fact and ruled that Plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deeming the matters admitted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36. The court found that the requests sought admissions of fact or the application of law to fact, which are permissible under Rule 36. The appellate court also agreed that Defendants' failure to respond timely constituted implied admissions, and the district court was correct in not allowing Defendants to withdraw or amend these admissions.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, concluding that there were no genuine disputes of material fact regarding the contributions owed by Defendants. The court noted that Defendants' arguments and evidence did not sufficiently counter the admissions and findings from the audit. Thus, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Cement and Concrete Workers District Council Welfare Fund v. Manny" on Justia Law