Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Appellant Murray Plumbing and Heating Corporation (Murray) briefly employed Respondent as a journeyman pipefitter in 2019–2020. In 2020, Respondent sued for civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), alleging Murray did not provide meal and rest breaks or accurate wage statements; pay all wages in a timely manner; or reimburse business expenses. The employment relationship was governed by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Respondent's union and Murray. The CBA requires arbitration of disputes—including ones arising under PAGA—as the sole and exclusive remedy. Murray moved to compel arbitration, and the trial court denied the motion.The right to file a PAGA action generally cannot be waived by contract. However, the Labor Code exempts construction workers from PAGA if a CBA covers wages, hours and working conditions and (1) has a grievance and arbitration procedure to redress Labor Code violations; (2) clearly waives PAGA; and (3) authorizes the arbitrator to award all remedies available under the Labor Code.Here, the Second Appellate District held that the parties’ CBA clearly waives PAGA and satisfies the requirements of section 2699.6, as a matter of law. Thus, the court determined that the parties' dispute is exempt from PAGA, reversing the trial court's order and remanding with instructions for the trial cour to grant Murray's motion to compel arbitration. View "Oswald v. Murray Plumbing & Heating Corp." on Justia Law

Clemens, then an employee, provided ExecuPharm with sensitive information, including her address, social security number, bank, and financial account numbers, insurance, and tax information, passport, and information relating to her family. Clemens’s employment agreement provided that ExecuPharm would “take appropriate measures to protect the confidentiality and security” of this information. After Clemens left ExecuPharm, a hacking group (CLOP) accessed ExecuPharm’s servers, stealing sensitive information pertaining to current and former employees, including Clemens. CLOP posted the data on the Dark Web, making available for download 123,000 data files pertaining to ExecuPharm, including sensitive employee information. ExecuPharm notified current and former employees of the breach and encouraged precautionary measures. Clemens reviewed her financial records and credit reports for unauthorized activity; placed fraud alerts on her credit reports; transferred her bank account; enrolled in ExecuPharm’s complimentary one-year credit monitoring services; and purchased three-bureau additional credit monitoring services for herself and her family for $39.99 per month.Clemens's suit under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), was dismissed for lack of Article III standing. The court concluded that Clemens’s risk of future harm was not imminent, but “speculative.” Any money Clemens spent to mitigate the speculative risk was insufficient to confer standing; even if ExecuPharm breached the employment agreement, it would not automatically give Clemens standing to assert her breach of contract claim. The Third Circuit vacated. Clemens’s injury was sufficiently imminent to constitute an injury-in-fact for purposes of standing. View "Clemens v. Execupharm Inc" on Justia Law

Appellant challenges the district court’s dismissal of his complaint -- which alleges whistleblower protection and discrimination claims relative to his employment at the federal Drug Enforcement Agency (the “DEA” or the “Agency”) -- for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the whistleblower protection claims, and the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of those claims. However, the court remanded the case to the district court so that it may consider in the first instance whether it possesses subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of Appellant’s discrimination claims.   The court explained that Appellant points out that if an IRA appeal cannot serve as the basis for a mixed case, then an employee alleging both WPA claims and discrimination claims would be required to pursue those claims separately. But because the MSPB cannot consider an employee’s discrimination allegations as part of his IRA appeal, his WPA claims and his discrimination claims are, by necessity, already bifurcated.   Lastly, Appellant argues that even if he failed to allege a mixed case, the district court should still have considered his discrimination claims. However, the district court considered only whether Appellant’s discrimination claims were properly before it as part of a mixed case, not whether it could adjudicate the Title VII claims independently of the other claims. Accordingly, remand is necessary for the district court to decide in the first instance whether it may address the merits of Appellant’s Title VII claims. View "Robert Zachariasiewicz, Jr. v. DOJ" on Justia Law

In July 2017, Jeremy Thornhill said that he had injured his back while working. He sought workers’ compensation benefits from his employer, Walker-Hill and its insurance carrier, Zurich American Insurance Company of Illinois (collectively, Employer/Carrier), but the Employer/Carrier denied that Thornhill had sustained a compensable injury. Ultimately, the parties agreed to compromise and settled pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 71-3-29 (Rev. 2021). Thornhill submitted the settlement to the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission for approval. After examining the application, the Commission approved the settlement and dismissed Thornhill’s case with prejudice. Pursuant to the settlement, Thornhill signed a general release,” which reserved his right to pursue a bad faith claim. Believing he had exhausted his administrative remedies, Thornhill filed a bad faith suit against the Employer/Carrier. The Employer/Carrier moved to dismiss, arguing that Thornhill had not exhausted administrative remedies—and that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction—because the Commission never made a factual finding that he was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court granted the motion on that basis. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding that Thornhill indeed exhausted his administrative remedies and that the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear his bad faith claim. Finding no reversible error in the appellate court’s decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Thornhill v. Walker-Hill Environmental, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant La’Tonya Ford worked at Jackson National Life Insurance (“Jackson”) for about four years. During her time there, Ford allegedly suffered sex- and race-based discrimination; faced retaliation for complaining about her treatment; endured a hostile work environment; and was constructively discharged. After she left Jackson for another job, Ford sued the company for (1) discrimination; (2) retaliation; (3) hostile work environment; and (4) constructive discharge. Jackson moved for summary judgment; the district court granted Jackson’s motion and dismissed all of Ford’s claims. Ford now appeals, urging us to reverse the court on each claim. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her discrimination claim. But it reversed in part the dismissal of her retaliation claim; her hostile-work-environment claim; and her constructive-discharge claim. View "Ford v. Jackson National Life, et al." on Justia Law

Canyon County employed William Hartman as a heavy equipment operator at the Pickles Butte landfill in Nampa, Idaho, from 2012 until 2017. In February 2017, Hartman reported to Canyon County’s Human Resources Office that a female co-worker was being sexually harassed. The next month, Hartman, who was an army veteran, told both the director of the landfill, David Loper, and his immediate supervisor that he was taking narcotics prescribed to him for chronic pain. Canyon County requested Hartman provide, by a set deadline, medical documentation confirming his prescription and verifying that his use of narcotics would not adversely impact his ability to safely operate equipment. Hartman stated he was attempting to obtain the documentation, but he failed to provide it within the requested timeframe. On April 28, 2017, Loper sent Hartman a “Notice of Intent to Terminate,” informing him that his employment with Canyon County would be terminated effective May 2, 2017. The notice stated that pursuant to Rule 11.04 of the Canyon County Personnel Manual and “I.C. § 72-1701 et. seq. [sic],” Hartman could request a good faith hearing concerning the termination within two days of receiving the letter. Prior to Hartman’s receipt of the notice, Canyon County paid Hartman the balance of his accrued leave. Hartman did not request a good faith hearing. Hartman filed a notice of tort claim with Canyon County on July 27, 2017, alleging he had been unlawfully terminated. He filed a charge of discrimination with the Idaho Human Rights Commission on August 3, 2017. On November 28, 2018, Hartman filed a complaint against Canyon County, alleging: (1) disability-based discrimination in violation of the Idaho Human Rights Act (“IHRA”) and Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (2) unlawful retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”); and (3) unlawful termination in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”). Hartman later voluntarily dismissed his USERRA claim. After considering the parties’ supplemental briefing the district court issued a written decision, granting Canyon County’s motion for summary judgment. Finding that the district court erred in its grant of summary judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hartman v. Canyon County" on Justia Law

In March 2018, the officers were involved in the fatal shooting of a homeless man. The Oakland Police Department investigated the incident, concluding that the officers’ use of force was reasonable and complied with Police Department policy. The Chief of Police agreed. Separately, the Community Police Review Agency (CPRA), the investigative body of the City’s civilian oversight Police Commission, investigated the incident and determined that the use of force was objectively reasonable. The Compliance Director disagreed with the Chief of Police and the CPRA, instead recommending termination of the officers for unreasonable use of force. After their termination, the officers sought a writ of mandate and declaratory relief in state court.The Ninth Circuit vacated, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court’s judgment on the pleadings in favor of Defendants and remanded with instructions to remand this case to state court. The panel held that this was a case arising under state law that properly belonged in the state courts. Recognizing that under Section 1331, a case can “arise under” federal law in two ways, the panel determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under both branches of federal question jurisdiction. First, the panel lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the federal cause of action branch because federal law did not create the causes of action asserted. The panel next held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the substantial federal question branch. View "FRANCISCO NEGRETE V. CITY OF OAKLAND" on Justia Law

The federal district court for the Western District of Washington certified a question of law to the Washington Supreme Court. The federal court asked the Supreme Court to clarify the standards for equitable tolling in civil cases under Washington law. The underlying federal case involved a long-running dispute between a certified class of more than 25,000 Washington teachers (Teachers) and the Department of Retirement Systems (DRS). The federal district court determined that while the Teachers established a Fifth Amendment takings claim, the applicable statute of limitations on that claim lapsed several years before the Teachers filed this suit. The Teachers asked the federal district court to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to allow the suit to proceed despite the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court answered the certified question by reiterating the four conditions it previously identified as necessary to justify equitable tolling of a statute of limitations in the civil context. Washington law allows equitable tolling of a statute of limitations in a civil suit when: (1) the plaintiff has exercised diligence; (2) the defendant’s bad faith, false assurances, or deception has interfered with the plaintiff’s diligent efforts; (3) tolling is consistent with (a) the purpose of the underlying statute and (b) the purpose of the statute of limitations; and (4) justice requires tolling the statute of limitations. View "Fowler v. Guerin" on Justia Law

Innovel hired Diakon to take furniture from warehouses to customers’ homes. Plaintiffs, two of Diakon's drivers, were citizens of Illinois who drove out of Innovel’s Illinois warehouses and made deliveries to customers in Illinois, Indiana, and Missouri. They signed “Service Agreements” that classify the drivers as independent contractors yet include detailed expectations for the drivers, covering uniforms, business cards, truck decals, and how to perform deliveries and installations. The Agreements select Virginia law to govern the parties’ relations and authorize Diakon to deduct fees and penalties from the drivers’ pay for truck rental fees, insurance, workers’ compensation coverage, damaged merchandise, and customers’ refused deliveries.Plaintiffs sued, alleging that Diakon misclassified them as independent contractors when they were employees under Illinois law. Illinois courts apply a three-part test to determine employee status, which is more likely to classify workers as employees than is Virginia law, which would treat the plaintiffs as contractors. The Illinois Wage Payment and Collections Act allows deductions from pay only if the employee consents in writing at the time of the deduction.The district judge certified a class but ruled in favor of Diakon. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The plaintiffs’ claims arise from their work in Illinois, not from their contracts. The Illinois Act governs payment for work in Illinois regardless of what state’s law governs other aspects of the parties' relations. View "Timothy Johnson v. Diakon Logistics, Inc." on Justia Law

Technology Credit Union (TCU) sought a workplace violence restraining order (WVRO) (Code Civ. Proc., 527.81) restraining Rafat and protecting TCU’s employee, M.L., claiming that Rafat had made a credible threat of violence against M.L. M.L.’s declaration, described a single encounter between her and Rafat at TCU, during which Rafat “became visibly angry and became aggressive towards” her, made a video recording of her “without her consent,” “made several rude and inappropriate statements questioning [her] mental competency,” repeatedly refused her request to stop recording, and “forced a pen and paper back towards [her] and demanded that [she] write down his number.” M.L. believed that Rafat “will come back and seek [her] out” because Rafat “frequently visits” TCU. Rafat admitted that he made a video recording of the interaction, which he posted on his YouTube channel, but denied M.L.’s other claims and denied that he made a credible threat of violence.The court of appeal reversed the entry of a WVRO. The evidence is insufficient to show that Rafat made a credible threat of violence. Rafat’s conduct was rude, impatient, aggressive, and derogatory; he had a history of using aggressive language, including making offensive remarks. However, the only threats he made were litigation and complaints to a federal agency. His actions toward M.L. consisted of berating her, complaining to her supervisor, and posting an accurate video of their interaction on YouTube. View "Technology Credit Union v. Rafat" on Justia Law