Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Several FVF ("the Defendant") employees filed a class action lawsuit against the Defendant alleging, among other things, that the company did not pay minimum and overtime wages. They also alleged a cause of action under the Private Attorney Generals Act ("PAGA") for civil penalties “for themselves and other current and former employees” for “labor law violations.” Defendant sought to compel arbitration based on agreements each of the employees had signed.In response, the employees claimed they did not recognize the purported arbitration agreement or the signatures on them. Moreover, the agreement presented by FVF contained unconscionable provisions. The trial court found that FVF did not prove the employees entered into a valid arbitration agreement.On appeal, the Second Appellate District affirmed, finding that, while employment agreements that compel the waiver of representative claims under the Private Attorney Generals Act are no longer generally contrary to public policy, the agreement in this case was unconscionable. View "Navas v. Fresh Venture Foods, LLC" on Justia Law

The controversy, in this case, is rooted in the propriety of a lawyer charging a wage earner a contingent attorney’s fee for prosecuting the wage earner’s Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) claims in a U.S. District Court. The wage earner paid the contingent fee and then sued his lawyer in Alabama state court to recover part of the fee. That court stayed the action so the wage earner and his lawyer could present the attorney’s fee controversy to the District Court that had presided over the FLSA case. The district court found the contingent fee excessive, ordered the lawyer to return the attorney’s fee, and dismissed the proceeding as moot.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal and instructed the district court to vacate its order and deny the attorney’s and Plaintiff’s motions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court explained that had Plaintiff’s Rule 60 motion sought actual Rule 60 relief, the district court would have had jurisdiction to entertain it because the district court had jurisdiction over the underlying FLSA and employment discrimination controversy. But Plaintiff did not ask for—and the District Court did not grant—the type of relief authorized by Rule 60. Doing anything more than reopening the matter that had previously been dismissed, which is all Rule 60 allows, required an independent jurisdictional basis. The district court did not have such an independent jurisdictional basis when it litigated the state court breach of contract action as if it had been brought under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332. View "Carlos Padilla v. Redmont Properties LLC, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was dismissed from her role as a Cadre On-Call Response Employee (CORE) for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 2017. Plaintiff claimed that her dismissal resulted from race-based discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Following administrative proceedings in which an administrative law judge rejected her complaint, Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s order granting FEMA summary judgment and denying her motion for additional time to conduct discovery, arguing that the court abused its discretion by declining to grant a continuance under Rule 56(d) as required by Chandler v. Roudebush.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that because Plaintiff failed to diligently pursue her limited discovery needs during the two-month continuance, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her Rule 56(d) motion. Further, Chandler cannot be construed as demanding further discovery where, as here, the government acquiesces, but the employee fails to diligently pursue it. Plaintiff received a de novo trial and treatment equal to that afforded to a private-sector employee. The district court did not contravene Chandler by denying further discovery and granting the summary judgment motion. View "Dominick v. DHS" on Justia Law

La Vonya Price worked intermittently as a part-time substitute special education aide at the Victor Valley Unified School District (the District) before applying for a full-time position. She received an offer for a full-time position that was contingent on passing a physical exam. When she failed the physical exam for not being “medically suitable for the position,” the District rescinded the offer, terminated her as a substitute, and disqualified her from any future employment with the District. Price sued the District for retaliation and various disability-related claims, but the trial court granted summary judgment to the District. Price appealed, contending the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment to the District because there were triable issues of fact concerning all of her claims. The Court of Appeal agreed as to her first claim for disability discrimination, but disagreed as to the rest of her claims. View "Price v. Victor Valley Union High School Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Brandon Fresquez filed suit against his former employer, defendant BNSF Railway Company (BNSF), claiming that BNSF violated the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) by terminating his employment in retaliation for him engaging in certain activities that were expressly protected under the FRSA. A jury found in favor of Fresquez on his claim of retaliation under the FRSA, and awarded him $800,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages. Following the trial, Fresquez moved for an award of back and front pay. The district court granted that motion in part and awarded Fresquez a total of $696,173. BNSF argued on appeal: (1) it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the merits of Fresquez’s claims; (2) alternatively, it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of punitive damages. BNSF further argues that it was entitled to a new trial on the merits of Fresquez’s claims based on the district court’s admission of character and other prejudicial evidence; (3) it was entitled to a new trial on the issue of compensatory damages; and (4) the district court abused its discretion by awarding Fresquez ten years’ worth of front pay. Rejecting these arguments, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed judgment. View "Fresquez v. BNSF Railway" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a campus police officer, initiated a retaliation action after he was terminated following an incident where he responded to a call for an intoxicated man who had lost consciousness. Employer's reason for Plaintiff's discharge was that he did not properly handle the situation, and it warranted termination. The trial court accepted Employer's reason as non-pretextual and granted Employer's motion for summary judgment.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding there are no genuine disputes of material fact that would allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of Plaintiff. Assuming without deciding that Plaintiff established a prima facie case of retaliation, Employer's proffered reason for Plaintiff's termination was legitimate and non-pretextual. View "Christopher Thompson v. University of Arkansas Brd of Trustees" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Stacey Wright worked as the charge nurse in the cardiac catheterization lab at Castle Rock Adventist Hospital (“Castle Rock”), a unit of the Portercare Adventist Health System (“Portercare”). After she was denied a transfer within Portercare and was terminated from her position at Castle Rock, Wright brought Title VII claims for discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted Portercare summary judgment, concluding it advanced legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment decisions and Wright failed to adduce evidence supporting a finding of pretext. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. View "Wright v. Portercare Adventist" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her employer based on theories of (1) failure to accommodate in violation of the Rehabilitation Act; (2) retaliation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act; and (3) pregnancy discrimination under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act after she was terminated following her request for an accommodation related to unspecified "child-birth complications." The district court granted summary judgment for GOSA on all three claims.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that as part of her initial burden to establish that a requested accommodation is reasonable under the Rehabilitation Act, an employee must put her employer on notice of the disability for which she seeks an accommodation and provide enough information to allow her employer to understand how the accommodation she requests would assist her. View "Nicole Owens v. State of Georgia, Governor's Office of Student Achievement" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jane Doe was the founder and owner of a company called House of Lync, which was purchased by defendant SoftwareONE Inc. As part of the acquisition, plaintiff was offered a position with defendant as “Head Solutions Sales, Skype for Business,” which she accepted. At the time, plaintiff was 49 years old. Nine months later, defendant hosted a “National Sales Kick-off” event in Cancun, Mexico. Plaintiff attended, and felt the event was “full of outlandish behavior.” Plaintiff refused to participate, and later complained to the president of defendant’s American division. Beginning shortly after the event, defendant received complaints about plaintiff, including her “demeaning manner, withholding of important information, bullying, humiliation, and other unacceptable behaviors.” Defendant reassigned plaintiff to a new position: “Global Alliances and Practice Development Leader, Skype for Business.” About six months after plaintiff’s reassignment, Jason Cochran, defendant’s director of technical solutions told plaintiff, during an after-work event, that defendant “is a guy’s club,” plaintiff was “never going to make it” working for defendant, and called plaintiff a “bitch.” After plaintiff complained, defendant’s human resources manager investigated, “coached” Cochran, and informed plaintiff that defendant did not condone this behavior. A few months later, defendant purchased another company similar to plaintiff’s. Defendant then terminated plaintiff, citing poor performance and redundancy. Plaintiff sued defendant, alleging her firing was discriminatory and retaliatory. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing: (1) plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case for discrimination or retaliation; (2) defendant had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating plaintiff; and (3) plaintiff could not show defendant’s nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual. The trial court granted defendant’s motion and entered judgment for defendant. In moving for a new trial, plaintiff argued, among other things, that even absent evidence of pretext, her claims could and should have survived summary judgment because she made a sufficient showing of retaliatory intent. The trial court agreed and granted plaintiff’s motion. Defendant timely appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision overturning summary judgment. View "Doe v. Software One" on Justia Law

Abbey Dickerson appealed to the Judicial Department Personnel Board of Review (“Board”) after she was terminated by the Eighteenth Judicial District (“District”). As required by the Personnel Rules, the Board appointed an attorney (who happened to be a retired court of appeals judge) to serve as the hearing officer on her case. Following an evidentiary hearing, the hearing officer changed the disciplinary action to a ninety-day suspension without pay. The District then appealed to the Board, but the Board affirmed the hearing officer’s decision. Because the District remained concerned about Dickerson’s suitability to return to her position, however, it sought review of the Board’s final order by filing a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) claim in Denver district court. The question presented by this case for the Colorado Supreme Court asked whether the Board was either a “governmental body” or a “lower judicial body” within the meaning of C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), such that its decision to affirm, modify, or reverse a disciplinary action could be challenged in district court. The Supreme Court held that the Personnel Rules precluded district court review of a final order by the Board. View "Colorado Judicial Dept. 18th Judicial District" on Justia Law