Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Desert Regional Medical Center, Inc. (DRMC) appealed trial court orders denying DRMC’s first amended petitions to compel nurses Leah Miller, Lynn Fontana, and Renita Romero (Respondents) to arbitrate their labor claims alleging rest and meal break violations by DRMC. DRMC contended the trial court erred by denying its petitions to compel arbitration and failing to stay Respondents’ individual claims until after completion of arbitration of a separate proceeding initiated by Respondents’ union (the California Nurses Association) on behalf of all nurses employed by DRMC in California. DRMC argued the trial court erred in denying DRMC’s petitions to compel arbitration based on a finding DRMC waived the right to arbitrate. DRMC argued the issue of waiver had to be determined by the arbitrator, not the trial court, and, even if the court has jurisdiction to decide waiver, there was insufficient evidence to support its finding of waiver. DRMC further contended Respondents were estopped from arguing waiver because Respondents’ Union was responsible for DRMC’s delay in petitioning to compel arbitration and agreed, in a separate proceeding, to arbitrate the Union’s group grievance. After review, the Court of Appeal rejected DRMC’s contentions and affirmed the order denying DRMC’s amended petitions to compel arbitration and request for a stay. View "Desert Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. Miller" on Justia Law

Jaludi worked at Citigroup. After he reported company wrongdoing, he was demoted, transferred, and (in 2013) terminated. He claims Citigroup blacklisted him from the financial industry. In 2015, Jaludi sued Citigroup for retaliation under both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and RICO. The district court sent his claims to arbitration. Jaludi appealed the arbitration order. In early 2018, while that appeal was pending, he filed an administrative complaint with the Secretary of Labor, adding one new allegation that, in late 2017, a headhunter had stopped returning his calls. In 2019, the Third Circuit remanded, holding that he was not required to arbitrate his Sarbanes-Oxley claims.On remand, the district court dismissed, finding his administrative complaint untimely. Though Sarbanes-Oxley required an administrative complaint within 180 days of the retaliatory conduct, he had waited more than two years after the last incident. Jaludi argued that the court should have granted him leave to amend because the 2017 allegation that he added in his administrative complaint happened fewer than 180 days before that complaint, making it timely. The Third Circuit affirmed. Although neither filing the administrative complaint after the statute of limitations had run nor suing before exhausting his administrative remedies was jurisdictional under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Jaludi’s delay in filing justified the dismissal. View "Jaludi v. Citigroup & Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Robert Parsons worked for Defendant-respondent Estenson Logistics, LLC (Estenson) , and Estenson paid its employees weekly. Estenson’s pay period ran from Sunday through the following Saturday. It paid its employees on the second Monday after the end of the pay period, which was nine calendar days after the end of the pay period. If Monday was a holiday, it paid its employees on Tuesday, which was 10 calendar days after the end of the pay period. California Labor Code section 204(d) provided that wages for employees who are paid weekly were deemed timely if paid “not more than seven calendar days following the close of the payroll period.” What happens if the seventh calendar day falls on a Saturday? Parsons argued the wages had to be paid on that Saturday. Estenson argued the wages could be paid the following Monday, because Code of Civil Procedure section 12a provided that weekends were holidays, and further provided, “If the last day for the performance of any act provided or required by law to be performed within a specified period of time is a holiday, then that period is hereby extended to and including the next day that is not a holiday.” The trial court agreed with Estenson, and granted summary judgment in its favor on a wage and hour claim brought by Parsons. To this, the Court of Appeal also agreed, and thus affirmed. View "Parsons v. Estenson Logistics, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2011, plaintiff R. Kemp was convicted, released from prison, and placed on parole. In 2020, Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon) offered Kemp a job in Sacramento. Defendant Accurate Background LLC (Accurate) provided a background report to Amazon revealing Kemp’s criminal conviction. Amazon then withdrew its job offer. Because Kemp’s 2011 conviction predated the 2020 report by more than seven years, he filed a complaint alleging Accurate: (1) violated the California Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA); (2) violated the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA); and (3) derivatively violated the state’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL). Accurate filed a demurrer: Kemp’s parole ended in 2014, which predated the 2020 report by less than seven years. Accurate argued under the ICRAA and the CCRAA, “the term ‘parole’ refers to the end of the parole period,” thus barring liability. Alternatively, Accurate argued the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) preempted the state ICRAA, and therefore Kemp’s ICRAA claim was barred as a matter of law. The trial court overruled Accurate’s demurrer, in part, finding “the plain meaning of ‘from the date of . . . parole’ refers to the start date of conditional release.” The court sustained Accurate’s demurrer, in part, finding “the FCRA preempts the ICRAA claim.” Accurate and Kemp both filed petitions for extraordinary writ relief to the Court of Appeal. The Court held the phrase "from the date of parole" referred to the start date of parole, and the FCRA did not preempt Kemp’s ICRAA claim. Thus, the appellate court directed the trial court to vacate its prior order, which partially sustained Accurate’s demurrer, and to issue a new order overruling the demurrer in its entirety. View "Kemp v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Thomas Burckhard appealed a judgment entered following consideration of Larson Latham Huettl LLP’s motion for summary judgment. Burckhard began employment with Larson Latham Huettl LLP (hereinafter LLH) in January 2019. In May 2019 Burckhard signed an employment contract, under which Burckhard agreed he would receive compensation based upon projected hours billed. Any overpayment resulting from a deficiency between the projected hours he would bill and the actual hours he billed would be considered a debt owed by Burckhard to LLH. Burckhard’s employment with LLH ended on August 15, 2020. At that time, Burckhard was paid for 697.88 projected billable hours more than his actual billable hours resulting in an overpayment of compensation in the amount of $29,885.38. LLH filed suit alleging breach of contract seeking to recover the excess compensation plus pre-judgment interest. The district court granted LLH’s motion finding there were no issues of material fact and LLH was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Burckhard appealed, arguing summary judgment was improper because the contract’s purpose was frustrated, the contract is unconscionable, the contract fails for lack of consideration, LLH waived its right to obtain payment, there is a genuine dispute as to the amount of the damages, and the district court abused its discretion in denying Burckhard additional time for discovery. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined Burckhard failed to prove there was a genuine dispute as to any material fact. The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of LLH and properly dismissed all of Burckhard’s affirmative defenses. View "Larson Latham Huettl, LLP v. Burckhard" on Justia Law

The Bishop’s School (the School) terminated Chad Bishop’s (Bishop) employment as a teacher after it became aware of a text exchange between Bishop and a former student. Bishop filed a lawsuit asserting a breach of contract claim against the School and defamation claims against the School and Ron Kim, the Head of the School, based on the termination letter they sent to Bishop and a statement Kim made that was published in the student newspaper. Defendants filed a special motion to strike the first amended complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) as well as a demurrer. The trial court granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion as to the defamation claims but denied it as to the contract claim against the School. The court also overruled the School’s demurrer to the contract claim. Bishop appealed the anti-SLAPP ruling. On cross-appeal, the School challenged the court’s order denying anti-SLAPP protection for the contract claim. The School also sought a writ of mandate directing the trial court to sustain its demurrer to the contract claim. After review, the Court of appeal concluded: (1) defendants did not meet their burden to show that Bishop’s allegations regarding the termination letter, which supported the defamation claim, or the termination itself, which supported the contract claim, involved protected activity; (2) defendants met their burden to show that Kim’s statement was protected activity, and Bishop failed to show that the defamation claim as based on that activity had minimal merit; and (3) without having filed a writ petition, there was no basis for the School to seek writ relief from the court’s order overruling its demurrer ruling on the contract claim. The Court therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s order and remanded the matter with directions. View "Bishop v. The Bishop's School" on Justia Law

Plaintiff pursued a claim under the Labor Code Private Attorney General Act of 2004 against Defendants Premier Valley, Inc. (doing business as Century 21 MM) and Century 21 Real Estate LLC, to enforce civil penalties for violations of the Labor Code. The trial court sustained Defendants’ demurrer to the operative complaint without leave to amend. Plaintiff appealed. The appeal involved issues of statutory interpretation with regard to the following question: What is the applicable test or governing standard for determining whether a real estate salesperson is an “employee” or an “independent contractor” for purposes of the Labor Code’s wage and hour provisions? The resolution of this question turned on interpreting recently enacted Labor Code section 2778, subdivision (c)(1), and other provisions incorporated therein.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court concluded that the applicable test for the purpose at hand is the test set forth in Unemployment Insurance Code sections 650 and 13004.1, as incorporated in Business and Professions Code section 10032, subdivision (b), which is itself incorporated in Labor Code section 2778, subdivision (c)(1). The trial court reached the same conclusion and applied the correct test in ruling on the Defendants’ demurrer.   The court held that under Labor Code Section 2778(c)(1), Plaintiff is an Independent Contractor as a matter of law. Further, the court held that Labor Code Section 2778(c)(1) is constitutional. Finally, the court found that Plaintiff’s separate employment agreement for his sales manager position is not relevant for purposes of his representative PAGA cause of action. View "Whitlach v. Premier Valley, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant Sharlene Allen was a former employee of the San Diego Convention Center Corporation (SDCCC). After SDCCC terminated Allen, she filed a class action lawsuit against SDCCC alleging various violations of the California Labor Code. The trial court largely sustained SDCCC’s demurrer to the complaint on the grounds that the corporation was exempt from liability as a government entity. The court, however, left intact one claim for untimely payment of final wages under Labor Code sections 201, 202, and 203,1 and derivative claims under the Unfair Competition Law and the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). Allen then moved for class certification for her surviving causes of action. The trial court denied the motion based on Allen’s concession that her claim for untimely final payment was not viable because it was derivative of the other claims dismissed at the demurrer stage. Allen appealed the denial of the motion for class certification, which she claimed was the "death knell" of her class claims and thus, the lawsuit. She argued the trial court’s ruling on the demurrer was incorrect because SDCCC did not establish as a matter of law that it was exempt from liability. In response, SDCCC argued Allen’s appeal should have been dismissed as taken from a nonappealable order. Alternatively, SDCCC contended the trial court’s order sustaining its demurrer was correct, and the subsequent denial of class certification should be affirmed. The Court of Appeal rejected SDCCC’s assertion that the order was not appealable. However, the Court agreed that class certification was properly denied by the trial court and affirmed the order. View "Allen v. San Diego Convention Center Corp., Inc." on Justia Law

A Mississippi trial court dismissed David Saunders’s claims against the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) based on judicial estoppel because Saunders did not list these claims in his prior Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Until December 2010, Saunders served as football operations coordinator at the University of Mississippi. From January 2011 to October 2014, Saunders worked as an assistant football coach for the University of Louisiana. Based on Saunders’s alleged rule violations while at each institution, the NCAA conducted separate investigations and enforcement proceedings against both schools. The NCAA concluded Saunders had violated NCAA rules while at Louisiana. As punishment, the NCAA issued a show-cause directive to any NCAA member institution that may want to employ Saunders in an athletics position from January 2016 to January 2024. Saunders retained an attorney to represent him in NCAA proceedings. The attorney insisted financial strain prevented Saunders from traveling to defend himself personally. After a second show-cause directive, Saunders and his attorney discussed suing the NCAA, but at that time he did not pursue a lawsuit. Months later, Saunders filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy averring he had no claims against third parties. Saunders received a bankruptcy discharge in July 2018. Almost two years later, Saunders sued the NCAA: it was not until another football coach sued the NCAA, and made it past the summary judgment stage, that Saunders believed he had an actual shot at taking on the NCAA in court. The NCAA simultaneously filed an answer and a motion for summary judgment. In both, it asserted Saunders’s claims were barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel because Saunders had not disclosed these claims against the NCAA in his 2018 bankruptcy proceedings. The court ruled that Saunders’s claims against the NCAA belonged to Saunders’s bankruptcy estate, so the bankruptcy trustee was substituted as the real party in interest and plaintiff in the action. Further, while judicial estoppel did not bar the trustee from pursuing these claims for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate, Saunders himself was barred by judicial estoppel from pursuing his claims against the NCAA, including the declaratory-relief claim abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee. The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred for two reasons: (1) the trial judge erred by estopping Saunders from pursuing this type of declaratory relief; and (2) it was error for the trial court to presume Saunders should be estopped based on his mere knowledge of the facts giving rise to his claims against the NCAA, coupled with his failure to list these claims on his bankruptcy schedule. View "Saunders v. National Collegiate Athletic Association" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lindsay Buero brought a class action against defendants Amazon.Com Services, Inc. and Amazon.com, Inc. in Oregon state court, alleging, among other things, that defendants had violated Oregon’s wage laws by failing to pay employees for time spent in mandatory security screenings at the end of their work shifts. Defendants removed the case to federal court and moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that the time spent in the security screenings was not compensable. In support of that argument, defendants cited Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, (574 US 27), a case involving a similar claim against defendants, in which the United States Supreme Court held that, under federal law, time spent in the security screenings at issue in that case was not compensable. The district court agreed with defendants, noting the similarities between Oregon administrative rules enacted by the state’s Bureau of Labor and Industries (BOLI) and federal law. Plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit and filed a motion asking that court to certify a question to the Oregon Supreme Court on whether time spent in security screenings is compensable under Oregon law. The Ninth Circuit granted the motion. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded Oregon law aligned with federal law regarding what activities were compensable. Therefore, under Oregon law, as under federal law, time that employees spend on the employer’s premises waiting for and undergoing mandatory security screenings before or after their work shifts is compensable only if the screenings are either: (1) an integral and indispensable part of the employees’ principal activities or (2) compensable as a matter of contract, custom, or practice. View "Buero v. Amazon.com Services, Inc." on Justia Law