Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves Nicholas Vichio, a warehouse supervisor at US Foods, Inc. who was terminated after the arrival of a new vice president of operations, Charles Zadlo. Vichio, who had previously received positive performance reviews, was placed on a performance improvement plan by Zadlo and subsequently terminated. Vichio filed a lawsuit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of US Foods, concluding that Vichio failed to show that the performance issues cited were a pretext for discrimination.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. The appellate court concluded that Vichio had presented sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to infer discrimination. This evidence included the sudden negative performance reviews upon the arrival of Zadlo, the seemingly predetermined nature of Vichio's termination, the identical language in performance improvement plans for Vichio and another older employee, and the hiring of a younger employee to replace Vichio. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Vichio v. US Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

In the case involving Sandra Lopez and Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Omaha, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case, holding that the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for workplace injuries. Lopez, an employee of Catholic Charities, sued her employer alleging assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress following a realistic active shooter drill conducted at her workplace. She claimed physical and mental injuries as a result of the drill. The district court dismissed the suit, asserting that her exclusive remedy was workers’ compensation. On appeal, Lopez argued that she should be able to pursue tort theories of recovery against her employer for injuries suffered if the employer acted with a specific intent to injure the employee. However, the court found that even if an employer acts with a specific intent to injure an employee, the resulting injury is accidental if it is unexpected or unforeseen to the person suffering the injury, and thus compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The court also rejected Lopez's constitutional challenge due to non-compliance with procedural requirements and her public policy argument because it was not grounded on any specific statute or recognized legal authority. View "Lopez v. Catholic Charities" on Justia Law

Doris Lapham, a former employee of Walgreen Co., filed a lawsuit against the company claiming violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and Florida’s Private Sector Whistleblower Act (FWA). Lapham asserted that Walgreens interfered with her attempts to obtain leave under the FMLA to care for her disabled son, and retaliated against her for those attempts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Walgreens on all claims.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Appeals Court held that the proper causation standard for both FMLA and FWA retaliation claims is but-for causation, meaning that the plaintiff must prove that the adverse action would not have occurred but for the purported cause. Here, Lapham failed to show that Walgreens’ stated reasons for her termination (insubordination and dishonesty) were merely pretext for retaliation and that, but for her attempts to exercise her FMLA rights, she would not have been fired. Furthermore, Lapham failed to produce evidence showing she suffered any remediable prejudice due to Walgreens' alleged interference with her FMLA rights. View "Lapham v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the petitioner, Jay Watson, filed a grievance against his employer, the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks (FWP or agency), claiming he was underpaid for six years due to an agency error in implementing a new pay system. The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, ruled in favor of Watson and reversed the Final Agency Decision issued by the Board of Personnel Appeals (BOPA or Board). The court also awarded attorney fees to Watson. FWP appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana.The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not err in reversing BOPA’s decision. The court found that BOPA incorrectly applied the Montana Wage Payment Act (MWPA) to Watson's grievance, which was pursued under the agency's grievance process. The court found that the MWPA provides a process independent from the agency grievance process and its restrictions and benefits do not apply to Watson's claim. As such, the MWPA's three-year limitation does not apply to Watson’s claim, and the court affirmed the District Court’s reinstatement of the Hearing Officer’s pay determination.However, the Supreme Court held that the District Court erred in awarding attorney fees to Watson. The court noted that Montana follows the “American Rule” regarding fee awards, which provides that “absent statutory or contractual authority, attorney’s fees will not be awarded to the prevailing party in a lawsuit.” There was no contractual or statutory authority providing for attorney fee awards for prevailing parties in this case, and the court found that this case was not frivolous litigation or litigated inappropriately by FWP. Therefore, an exception to the generally applicable American Rule was not established. The court reversed the attorney fee award and remanded for entry of an amended judgment. View "Watson v. FWP" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit examined claims by Colleen M. Johnson against her former employer, Midwest Division-RBH, LLC (Belton Regional Medical Center), her supervisor Patrick Avila, and her replacement Nicole Pasley. Johnson had been on medical leave for nine months due to heart-related issues when she informed Belton Regional that she could not give a return date. The next day, the company terminated her employment. Johnson sued under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), claiming age and disability discrimination, and also brought common law claims for emotional distress, defamation, and property damage. The district court dismissed the common law claims and granted summary judgment on the MHRA claims.On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court rejected Johnson’s argument that her common law claims were not preempted by the MHRA, ruling that the MHRA provided the exclusive remedy for claims arising out of an employment relationship and that she had fraudulently joined the Missouri defendants to prevent removal. The court also found that Johnson could not establish a prima facie case of age or disability discrimination under the MHRA because she did not provide evidence that her age or disability was the “determinative influence” on her termination. Instead, the court concluded that Johnson was fired due to her refusal to provide a date when she would return from medical leave, not because of her age or disability. Finally, the court ruled that Johnson had waived her argument of constructive discharge by failing to provide meaningful legal analysis in her opposition to summary judgment. View "Johnson v. Midwest Division - RBH, LLC" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the plaintiff, Kevin Barber, appealed against his former employer, Bradford Aquatic Group, LLC, alleging wrongful termination. Bradford Aquatic Group, a North Carolina-based company, had employed Barber as a Regional Business Development Manager for its Rocky Mountain region, which includes Montana. The employment contract between Barber and the company included a choice-of-law and forum selection clause, specifying that any disputes arising from the agreement would be governed by North Carolina law and adjudicated in North Carolina courts.Barber, a resident of Montana, argued that Montana law should apply to his claims of wrongful discharge, breach of contract, and bad faith, and that the suit should be heard in Montana. The district court dismissed Barber's claims due to improper venue, based on the choice-of-law and forum selection clauses in the employment agreement.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the choice-of-law provision in the employment agreement was valid and that North Carolina law should apply to Barber's claims. The court also upheld the validity of the forum selection clause, concluding that it is enforceable under North Carolina law. Therefore, the court determined that the dispute should be adjudicated in North Carolina, not Montana. View "Barber v. Bradford Aquatic" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska was asked to determine whether the question of a deceased worker's status as an employee or independent contractor under the Alaska Worker's Compensation Act should be determined by a jury or a judge. The lawsuit was initiated by the estate of Nicholson Tinker, a worker who was killed in a construction accident while working for Mark Welty, doing business as North Country Services. Welty had no workers' compensation coverage at the time of the accident. Tinker's estate argued that he was an employee and that under the Act, Welty was presumed negligent because he had no compensation coverage. Welty argued that Tinker was an independent contractor, hence the Act did not apply.The superior court decided that the question of employee status was an issue for the jury to decide. The estate appealed this decision, arguing that the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Benson v. City of Nenana determined that a judge, not a jury, should decide the issue of a worker's status under the Act.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska agreed with the estate, holding that the superior court must determine whether Tinker was an employee or independent contractor under the Act as a preliminary issue before trial. The Court reasoned that the applicability of the Act is a legal determination with factual underpinnings that the court should decide as a preliminary matter. The Court also noted that determining the employee status promptly is significant due to its potential impact on basic issues such as the type of action a party can bring or the burden of proof for negligence. Therefore, the Court reversed the superior court’s order that the jury decides the issue of employee status and remanded for further proceedings. View "Leona Seal, Personal Representative of the Estate of Nicholson J. Tinker v. Mark C. Welty D/B/A North Country Services" on Justia Law

In 2011, the automaker FCA transferred the work that plaintiffs (engineers) had previously performed at FCA’s company headquarters to a new location. The plaintiffs filed a grievance with their union, UAW, in 2016. UAW failed to pursue it. In 2017, plaintiffs filed essentially the same grievance, but UAW again did not pursue it. By this time, plaintiffs had learned of a massive bribery scheme involving FCA and UAW; they believed that those bribes had affected the 2011 job-relocation process and UAW’s treatment of their grievances. In 2018, plaintiffs filed the same grievance again. Nearly two years later, UAW found the grievance meritorious.Plaintiffs sued FCA, UAW, and individual defendants in 2020, raising claims under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185(a), and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims as untimely under the LMRA’s six-month limitations period. Plaintiffs pursuing a hybrid LMRA claim must sue once they “reasonably should know that the union has abandoned” their claim. Plaintiffs learned of their RICO injuries as early as 2011 and learned of the bribery allegations in 2017 but waited until 2020 to file their complaint, with no explanation for the delay. View "Baltrusaitis v. United Auto Workers" on Justia Law

In April 2017 and June 2017, Appellant Diane Zilka filed petitions with the Philadelphia Department of Revenue (the “Department”), seeking refunds for the Philadelphia Tax she paid from 2013 to 2015, and in 2016, respectively. During the relevant tax years, Appellant resided in the City, but worked exclusively in Wilmington, Delaware. Thus, she was subject to four income taxes (and tax rates) during that time: the Philadelphia Tax; the Pennsylvania Income Tax (“PIT”); the Wilmington Earned Income Tax (“Wilmington Tax”); and the Delaware Income Tax (“DIT”). The Commonwealth granted Appellant credit for her DIT liability to completely offset the PIT she paid for the tax years 2013 through 2016; because of the respective tax rates in Pennsylvania versus Delaware, after this offsetting, Appellant paid the remaining 1.93% in DIT. Although the City similarly credited against Appellant’s Philadelphia Tax liability the amount she paid in the Wilmington Tax — specifically, the City credited Appellant 1.25% against her Philadelphia Tax liability of 3.922%, leaving her with a remainder of 2.672% owed to the City — Appellant claimed that the City was required to afford her an additional credit of 1.93% against the Philadelphia Tax, representing the remainder of the DIT she owed after the Commonwealth credited Appellant for her PIT. After the City refused to permit her this credit against her Philadelphia Tax liability, Appellant appealed to the City’s Tax Review Board (the “Board”). The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review as whether, for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis implicated here, state and local taxes had to be considered in the aggregate. The Court concluded state and local taxes did not need be aggregated in conducting a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, and that, ultimately, the City’s tax scheme did not discriminate against interstate commerce. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court order. View "Zilka v. Tax Review Bd. City of Phila." on Justia Law

Above All Termite & Pest Control ("Above All") employed Henry Keim as a salaried pest-control technician and provided him with an employer authorized vehicle for work use. Above All’s policy limited the quantity of supplies technicians could keep in their authorized vehicles overnight. When technicians needed to replenish supplies, Above All authorized them to drive their vehicles to Above All’s shop instead of driving directly to a worksite, to retrieve whatever they required, and then to go from the shop to the scheduled sites. On the morning of the accident, Keim clocked in, received his schedule, and concluded that his vehicle lacked sufficient supplies. On his way to the shop for supplies, Keim sustained injuries in a car accident. The Judge of Compensation dismissed Keim’s claim petition with prejudice, concluding that Keim was merely commuting to work when he sustained injuries. The Appellate Division applied the “authorized vehicle rule” and reversed the dismissal order. The New Jersey Supreme Court concurred with the appellate court, finding Keim was “in the course of employment” under the “authorized vehicle rule” at the time of the accident because Above All authorized a vehicle for him to operate and his operation of that identified vehicle was for business expressly authorized by Above All. View "Keim v. Above All Termite & Pest Control" on Justia Law