Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves plaintiff Angelo Riccitelli and defendant Town of North Providence, through its Finance Director, Maria Vallee. Riccitelli, a retired firefighter, filed a complaint against the town, alleging that it failed to pay him the full amount required by a collective bargaining agreement. The agreement required the town to provide Riccitelli with a "supplemental pension payment" equal to the difference between his pension and the "monthly net pay" that he received at retirement, less any pension deductions. The dispute centered around the interpretation of the term "monthly net pay."The Supreme Court of Rhode Island found that the Superior Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Riccitelli because the collective bargaining agreement was not in the record. The court emphasized that the entire contract must be reviewed to determine whether a provision is clear and unambiguous. Without the agreement in the record, Riccitelli failed to carry his initial burden as the party moving for summary judgment, leaving open a critical question of fact—the content of the collective bargaining agreement. The court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and returned the record to the Superior Court for further proceedings. View "Riccitelli v. The Town of North Providence" on Justia Law

The case involves American Medical Response of Connecticut (AMR), a company that operates ambulances and employs emergency medical technicians and paramedics, and the International Association of EMTs and Paramedics (Union). The Union and AMR had a collective bargaining agreement that was in effect from 2019 through 2021. During the COVID-19 pandemic, AMR invoked an emergency provision in the agreement and cut shifts due to reduced demand. The Union raised concerns about AMR's actions and requested specific information from AMR to investigate potential grievances. AMR refused to provide some of the requested information, arguing that the emergency provision in the agreement excused it from providing the information during the pandemic. The Union filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging that AMR's refusal to provide the information violated the duty to bargain under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The NLRB sided with the Union, and AMR sought review of this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed with the NLRB's decision. The court held that the NLRB was required to determine whether the collective bargaining agreement relieved AMR of the duty to provide the requested information. The court explained that the NLRA requires the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, including those provisions that limit a union's information rights. The court expressed that the NLRB had put the cart before the horse by concluding that AMR failed to provide information before determining whether AMR had a contractual duty to provide such information. As a result, the court granted AMR’s petition for review, denied the NLRB's cross-application for enforcement, vacated the NLRB's order, and remanded the case back to the NLRB for it to consider whether the collective bargaining agreement excused AMR from providing the requested information. View "American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

In this putative class action lawsuit, Maria Johnson, a former employee of Lowe's Home Centers, LLC, brought claims on behalf of herself and other Lowe's employees under California's Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) for alleged violations of the California Labor Code. Johnson had signed a pre-dispute employment contract that included an arbitration clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to compel arbitration of Johnson's individual PAGA claim, as a valid arbitration agreement existed and the dispute fell within its scope. However, the district court's dismissal of Johnson's non-individual PAGA claims was vacated. The lower court had based its decision on the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of PAGA in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, which was subsequently corrected by the California Supreme Court in Adolph v. Uber Techs., Inc. The state court held that a PAGA plaintiff could arbitrate their individual PAGA claim while also maintaining their non-individual PAGA claims in court. The case was remanded to the district court to apply this interpretation of California law. The Ninth Circuit rejected Lowe's argument that Adolph was inconsistent with Viking River. View "JOHNSON V. LOWE'S HOME CENTERS, LLC" on Justia Law

In the case of Brett Lane v. the State of Alaska, Department of Family & Community Services, Office of Children’s Services, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the lower court's decision denying the Office of Children's Services's (OCS) post-trial motion for a new trial on liability. The court concluded that the weight of the evidence supported the jury's verdict on Lane's theories of retaliation. However, the court found an error in the jury instruction relating to noneconomic damages caused by a dangerous client, Wilson. As a result, the court vacated the damages judgment and remanded for a new trial solely on noneconomic damages. The court also remanded the matter back to the lower court for an evidentiary hearing on OCS's claim that the jury award duplicated workers’ compensation benefits that Lane received. The court held that OCS should be given the opportunity to prove that the jury award created an impermissible duplication of damages. View "State of Alaska v. Lane" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of former firefighters who retired from the city of Meriden and claimed damages from the city and the Meriden Municipal Pension Board for alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement. The plaintiffs, who retired in 2015, claimed that they should have received an increase in their pension benefits based on a 2% wage increase that was awarded retroactively in an arbitration process after the plaintiffs had retired. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that the defendants had breached the collective bargaining agreement by failing to recalculate the plaintiffs' pension benefits based on the retroactive wage increase.On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the defendants did not breach the collective bargaining agreement. This conclusion was based on the fact that the pension plan did not allow for the recalculation of pension benefits for retirees who voluntarily retired before the issuance of the arbitration award. The court noted that the pension plan only allowed for a retroactive adjustment of pension benefits for those who were forced to retire due to reaching the mandatory retirement age of 65. The court also held that the trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case, rejecting the defendants' claim that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing the lawsuit. View "Stiegler v. Meriden" on Justia Law

In this case, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three heard an appeal from Amanda Neeble-Diamond against a postjudgment order, awarding costs exceeding $180,000 to the prevailing defendant, Hotel California By the Sea. The original lawsuit involved both statutory and nonstatutory causes of action based on Neeble-Diamond's alleged employment status with Hotel California, which was determined by the jury to be that of an independent contractor, not an employee. Following this judgment, Hotel California sought costs and attorney fees. The trial court denied attorney fees but awarded costs, which led to Neeble-Diamond's appeal.The issue at hand was whether the trial court could award costs to the defendant without finding that the plaintiff's California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) claims were objectively frivolous. The appellate court agreed with Neeble-Diamond, reversing the order that awarded costs to Hotel California. The court highlighted that in FEHA cases, a prevailing defendant has no automatic right to recover costs. Instead, the defendant must move the court to make a discretionary award of such costs, based in part on a specific finding that the action was frivolous.Hotel California forfeited any claim to costs by failing to file the necessary motion for costs as they did for attorney fees, rendering their cost memorandum ineffective. As a result, Neeble-Diamond had no obligation to respond to the cost memorandum, and the court erred by signing an "amended judgment" that included an award of $180,369.41 in costs to Hotel California. View "Neeble-Diamond v. Hotel California By the Sea, LLC" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i, the issue was whether a subrogee insurance company, which timely intervened pursuant to HRS § 386-8(b), has an independent right to continue to pursue claims and/or legal theories against a tortfeasor that were not asserted by the subrogor employee, after summary judgment has been granted against the subrogor employee, on the subrogor employee’s claims. This case involved Hyun Ju Park, a bartender who was shot by an off-duty Honolulu Police Department officer while at work. Park sued the City and County of Honolulu, alleging negligence and other claims. Dongbu Insurance Co., Ltd., the workers' compensation insurance carrier for Park's employer, intervened in the case, alleging additional negligence claims that Park had not raised. The City moved to dismiss all of Park’s claims and some of Dongbu's claims, which the court granted, leaving two of Dongbu's claims - negligent supervision and negligent training - remaining. The City then moved for summary judgment against Dongbu, arguing that since Park's claims were dismissed, Dongbu's claims also failed.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i held that a subrogee insurance company, which timely intervened, does have an independent right to continue to pursue claims and/or legal theories against a tortfeasor that were not asserted by the subrogor employee, even after summary judgment has been granted against the subrogor. The court reasoned that an affirmative answer protects subrogation, aligns with Hawai‘i’s workers’ compensation subrogation law, and does not undermine employers’ and insurers’ intervention rights. The court also rejected the City's claim preclusion argument, stating that Dongbu's remaining claims for negligent supervision and negligent training had not yet been decided and were not barred by res judicata. Therefore, Dongbu may continue to pursue its non-dismissed claims. View "Park v. City and County of Honolulu" on Justia Law

In the case between Jennifer Harris and FedEx Corporate Services, Inc., Harris alleged race discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that Harris's § 1981 claims were time-barred under her employment contract, making them fail as a matter of law. However, the court found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict for Harris on her Title VII retaliation claim. In view of Title VII’s $300,000 cap on damages and the evidence presented at trial, the court remitted Harris’s compensatory damages to $248,619.57 and concluded she was not entitled to punitive damages. FedEx was not entitled to a new trial because of the court’s evidentiary ruling. View "Harris v. FedEx Corporate Services" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner, Gary Stricklen, filed a claim for permanent total disability with the Workers' Compensation Commission, which was dismissed by an administrative law judge. The Multiple Injury Trust Fund (MITF) argued it was not liable because all of Stricklen's injuries occurred while he was employed by the same employer. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that the phrase "subsequent employer" in 85A O.S.Supp.2019 § 32 refers to the employer at the time of the employee's "subsequent injury" referenced in the same statute, which is used for the purpose of that statute for a claim against the MITF. The court reversed the Commission's order that was based on the erroneous view of the statutory language and remanded the case for further proceedings. The petitioner's constitutional issue was not addressed because the court's interpretation of the statutory language did not require it. View "STRICKLEN v. MULTIPLE INJURY TRUST FUND" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Louisiana was asked by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on whether the commencement of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue interrupts prescription as to causes of action, understood as legal claims rather than the facts giving rise to them, not asserted in that suit. This query arose from the case of Randall Kling who initially filed suit in state court alleging his dismissal from the Louisiana Office of Alcohol and Tobacco Control was in retaliation for submitting written complaints about workplace and ethics violations. He later filed a complaint in federal district court citing substantially similar facts and seeking relief for violations of his federal First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.The Supreme Court of Louisiana answered the certified question by stating that prescription or the period within which a lawsuit may be filed is interrupted when notice is sufficient to fully inform the defendant of the nature of the claim of the plaintiff, and what is demanded of the defendant. The Court explained that the essence of interruption of prescription by suit is notice to the defendant of the legal proceedings based on the claim involved. The court emphasized that notice is sufficient when it fully informs the defendant of the nature of the plaintiff's claim, and what is demanded of the defendant. Thus, the court took a balanced approach between a broad interpretation of interruption and a narrow one, placing emphasis on notice to the defendant, addressed on a case-by-case basis. View "KLING VS. HEBERT" on Justia Law