Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Armando Guevara worked as a domestic service employee for Robert and Maria Zamora for over a decade, performing various tasks such as cleaning, car maintenance, and grocery shopping. Occasionally, he also provided services for the Zamoras' businesses, Lafise Corporation and Latin American Financial Services, Inc. (LAFS). Guevara was paid $1,365.88 biweekly, but there was no written employment agreement, and the parties disagreed on whether this amount represented a salary or an hourly wage. The Zamoras claimed they paid him an hourly rate with overtime, while Guevara asserted he was paid a salary without proper overtime compensation.Guevara filed a putative class action against the Zamoras, Lafise, and LAFS for unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that Guevara was not covered by the FLSA through either "enterprise coverage" or "individual coverage." The court also found that Guevara was fully compensated for all his overtime work hours based on the Zamoras' testimony and calculations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment. The appellate court determined that there was a genuine dispute regarding Guevara's regular hourly rate and, therefore, his overtime rate. The court noted that the Zamoras did not maintain accurate records, and the evidence presented created a genuine issue of fact that should be determined by a jury. The appellate court also vacated the district court's ruling on whether Lafise was a joint employer, as the lower court failed to provide sufficient reasoning and did not address the relevant factors. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Guevara v. Lafise Corp." on Justia Law

A national news reporter employed by a prominent newspaper sued her employer and six of its editors in Superior Court, alleging violations of the D.C. Human Rights Act and the common law tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. She claimed that the defendants discriminated against her based on her status as a sexual assault victim and her gender, took adverse employment actions against her, subjected her to a hostile work environment, and retaliated against her for protesting their discriminatory actions.The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and filed a special motion to dismiss under the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act, arguing that the claims arose from acts in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues of public interest. The Superior Court denied the special motion to dismiss, finding that the claims did not arise from speech protected by the Anti-SLAPP Act, but granted the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, concluding that the complaint failed to plausibly allege unlawful discrimination or retaliation.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the denial of the special motion to dismiss, agreeing that the Anti-SLAPP Act did not apply. The court reversed the dismissal of the counts alleging adverse action discrimination, finding that the complaint plausibly alleged that the defendants took certain adverse employment actions against the reporter in violation of the Human Rights Act. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the hostile work environment and retaliation claims, concluding that the allegations did not meet the necessary legal standards. The court also noted that it was premature to decide whether the defendants' actions were protected by the First Amendment, leaving that issue open for further proceedings. View "Sonmez v. WP Company, LLC" on Justia Law

Rodney Martin worked for B.F. Goodrich Company from 1966 to 2012 and was exposed to vinyl chloride monomer until 1974. He was diagnosed with angiosarcoma of the liver in December 2019 and died in July 2020. His widow, Candice Martin, filed a civil action in November 2021, alleging that Rodney’s occupational exposure caused his illness and death. She invoked the exception in section 1.1 of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act to avoid its exclusivity provisions.PolyOne filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and Goodrich filed a motion to dismiss under the exclusivity provisions, arguing that section 1.1 did not apply and that using it would infringe on their due process rights. The district court denied these motions and certified two questions for interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which then certified three related questions to the Illinois Supreme Court.The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case and answered the certified questions. The court held that section 1(f) of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act is a period of repose for purposes of section 1.1. The court also determined that section 1.1 applies prospectively under section 4 of the Statute on Statutes, meaning it applies to new actions filed after the amendment was enacted. Finally, the court found that applying section 1.1 prospectively does not violate Illinois’s due process guarantee, as defendants did not have a vested right in an exclusivity defense before the employee’s injury was discovered. View "Martin v. Goodrich Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, train dispatchers for Bombardier Mass Transit Corporation, filed claims for unpaid wages, alleging they were entitled to overtime wages and wage statement penalties for on-call time. Initially, they sought relief through the labor commissioner’s Berman hearing process, which was denied. Subsequently, they requested a de novo hearing in the San Diego Superior Court, where they prevailed, receiving over $140,000 in back wages and penalties. They then moved for attorney fees and costs, which the trial court granted, awarding $200,000.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, the plaintiffs' claims were initially denied by the labor commissioner. Upon seeking a de novo trial, the superior court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding them unpaid wages and penalties. The court also granted their motion for attorney fees and costs, amounting to $200,000, rejecting Bombardier’s argument that section 98.2, subdivision (c) was the exclusive statute for awarding attorney fees and costs in such cases.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. Bombardier contended that section 98.2, subdivision (c) should be the sole basis for awarding attorney fees and costs in a de novo trial following a Berman hearing. The appellate court disagreed, affirming the trial court’s decision. The court held that prevailing plaintiffs in superior court actions for unpaid wages are generally entitled to an award of reasonable fees and costs under sections 218.5, 226, and 1194, and nothing in section 98.2 suggests otherwise. The court emphasized that the Berman process is designed to benefit employees and should not restrict their remedies. Thus, the order awarding $200,000 in attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs was affirmed. View "Villalva v. Bombardier Mass Transit Corp." on Justia Law

Regina M. Thornton was employed by Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc. as Associate Director - Patient Safety. In September 2021, Ipsen required employees to receive COVID-19 vaccinations. Thornton requested a religious exemption, which Ipsen denied. After she did not comply with the vaccination requirement, Ipsen terminated her employment. Thornton sued Ipsen in the Superior Court of Massachusetts, alleging violations of Title VII, Massachusetts law (Chapter 151B), the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (MDR). Ipsen removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts and moved to dismiss all counts. The Magistrate Judge granted Ipsen's motion, dismissing Thornton's complaint. Thornton appealed.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed Thornton's complaint, finding that she failed to state a plausible claim of religious discrimination under Title VII or Chapter 151B. The court concluded that Thornton did not adequately state her religious beliefs or how they related to vaccines. The court also found that Thornton's federal constitutional claims failed because Ipsen was not a state actor, and her MDR claims failed because the MDR does not provide a private right of action.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the Magistrate Judge's dismissal of Thornton's religious discrimination claims under Title VII and Chapter 151B, finding that she had plausibly alleged that her religious beliefs conflicted with the vaccination requirement. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of her federal constitutional claims, as the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to private actors like Ipsen. The court also affirmed the dismissal of her MDR claims, noting that Thornton had waived any argument that her claim should be reimagined under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. View "Thornton v. Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc." on Justia Law

EMD Sales, Inc. distributes food products in the Washington, D.C. area and employs sales representatives who manage inventory and take orders at grocery stores. Several sales representatives sued EMD, alleging that the company violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to pay them overtime. EMD argued that the sales representatives were outside salesmen and therefore exempt from the FLSA’s overtime-pay requirement.The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland held a bench trial and found EMD liable for overtime pay because EMD did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that its sales representatives were outside salesmen. The court ordered EMD to pay overtime wages and liquidated damages. EMD appealed, arguing that the District Court should have used the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard instead of the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment, adhering to Circuit precedent that required employers to prove FLSA exemptions by clear and convincing evidence.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies when an employer seeks to demonstrate that an employee is exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime-pay provisions of the FLSA. The Court reasoned that the FLSA does not specify a standard of proof for exemptions, and in the absence of such specification, the default preponderance standard should apply. The Court reversed the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera" on Justia Law

Michael Gifford, a beneficiary of the Operating Engineers 139 Health Benefit Fund, sought reimbursement for out-of-network medical expenses incurred during his treatment for a stroke and subsequent brain aneurysm surgery. The Fund denied the claim, stating the services were not provided in an emergency and were not medically necessary. Gifford's wife, Suzanne, appealed the decision, but the Fund upheld the denial after consulting two independent medical reviewers who concluded the surgery was not an emergency and not medically necessary.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted the Fund's motion for summary judgment, agreeing that the Fund's decision was not arbitrary and capricious. The court also granted the Fund's motion for a protective order, limiting discovery to the administrative record. The Estate of Michael Gifford, represented by Suzanne, appealed the decision, arguing that the Fund failed to conduct a full and fair review by not considering a surgical note from Dr. Ahuja, which was not included in the administrative record.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the Fund's denial of benefits was not arbitrary and capricious, as the Fund reasonably relied on the independent medical reviewers' reports and the administrative record. The court also found that the Fund was not required to seek out additional information not provided by the claimant. Additionally, the court upheld the district court's grant of the protective order, finding no abuse of discretion in limiting discovery to the administrative record. The court concluded that the Fund provided a full and fair review of the claim, and the denial of benefits was reasonable. View "Estate of Gifford v Operating Engineers 139 Health Benefit Fund" on Justia Law

Pamela Pollock sued her supervisor, Michael Kelso, in 2018 for sexual harassment and racial discrimination, alleging that Kelso asked her for sexual intercourse in 2016 and, after she rejected him, promoted less qualified individuals of other races to positions she sought. The trial court initially ruled that Pollock’s suit was time-barred, a decision which was affirmed by the appellate court. However, in 2021, the California Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that the statute of limitations begins when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the adverse promotion decision, that the defense bears the burden on this issue, and that costs or fees on appeal cannot be awarded to a prevailing defendant without determining the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.Following the Supreme Court’s directions, the appellate court remanded the case and ordered costs for Pollock. Pollock then moved for attorney fees in the trial court, which awarded her $493,577.10. Kelso appealed this award. Before the trial date, Kelso and Pollock settled the bulk of their case, with Pollock moving to dismiss her underlying case with prejudice except for the attorney fee award, which Kelso was appealing. The trial court retained jurisdiction regarding the fee award.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court denied Pollock’s motion to dismiss Kelso’s appeal, affirming that Kelso was appealing from a final collateral order. On the merits, the court affirmed the fee award, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining Pollock as the prevailing party and in the amount awarded. The court found that the trial court’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and that the fee award, including the use of a 1.8 multiplier, was reasonable. View "Pollock v. Kelso" on Justia Law

Eva Osborne, the plaintiff, sued Pleasanton Automotive Company, LOP Automotive Company LP, HAG Automotive Investments LP, and Bob Slap, alleging workplace misconduct by Slap during her four years as his executive assistant. The claims included discrimination, retaliation, harassment, failure to prevent harassment and retaliation, and wage and hour violations. Slap later filed a cross-complaint against Osborne, alleging libel, slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional interference with contractual relations, and negligence based on statements Osborne made in a letter to HAG’s HR director.The Alameda Superior Court granted Osborne’s special motion to strike Slap’s cross-complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that her statements were protected activity and rejecting Slap’s arguments that they were extortionate and illegal. The court held that Slap could not establish minimal merit in his claims because Osborne’s statements were both absolutely and conditionally privileged under Civil Code section 47, and Slap failed to show malice to overcome the conditional privilege. Slap appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, applied de novo review and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court rejected Slap’s attempt to invoke an exception to the anti-SLAPP statute for activity that is illegal as a matter of law. The court concluded that the litigation privilege barred Slap’s claims, preventing him from meeting his burden under the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis to show his claims had minimal merit. The court did not address Osborne’s alternative arguments regarding the conditional privilege, malice, or the prima facie showing on Slap’s claims. View "Osborne v. Pleasanton Automotive Co., LP" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Jeannine Bedard, a Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officer, refused to comply with the City of Los Angeles’s COVID-19 vaccination mandate and did not sign a “Notice of Mandatory COVID-19 Vaccination Policy Requirements.” Consequently, the Chief of Police sought to terminate her employment. The LAPD Board of Rights reviewed the proposed discipline, found Bedard guilty of failing to comply with conditions of employment, and upheld her discharge. The Board also found that the City violated Bedard’s due process rights by not providing sufficient time to respond to the charges, awarding her back pay, which the City did not pay.Bedard filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, arguing that the disciplinary action was procedurally and legally invalid and seeking reinstatement and back pay. The trial court found the termination justified but agreed that the City violated Bedard’s due process rights by not giving her enough time to respond. The court awarded her back pay but upheld her termination.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Bedard’s termination was justified due to her refusal to comply with the vaccination mandate, which was a condition of her employment. The court found substantial evidence supporting that Bedard’s refusal to vaccinate, not just her refusal to sign the Notice, was the basis for her termination. The court also held that the penalty of termination was not an abuse of discretion given the public health implications of her refusal to vaccinate. Additionally, the court agreed that the Skelly violation entitled Bedard to back pay but did not warrant reinstatement. The judgment was affirmed. View "Bedard v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law