Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Pamela Pollock sued her supervisor, Michael Kelso, in 2018 for sexual harassment and racial discrimination, alleging that Kelso asked her for sexual intercourse in 2016 and, after she rejected him, promoted less qualified individuals of other races to positions she sought. The trial court initially ruled that Pollock’s suit was time-barred, a decision which was affirmed by the appellate court. However, in 2021, the California Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that the statute of limitations begins when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the adverse promotion decision, that the defense bears the burden on this issue, and that costs or fees on appeal cannot be awarded to a prevailing defendant without determining the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.Following the Supreme Court’s directions, the appellate court remanded the case and ordered costs for Pollock. Pollock then moved for attorney fees in the trial court, which awarded her $493,577.10. Kelso appealed this award. Before the trial date, Kelso and Pollock settled the bulk of their case, with Pollock moving to dismiss her underlying case with prejudice except for the attorney fee award, which Kelso was appealing. The trial court retained jurisdiction regarding the fee award.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court denied Pollock’s motion to dismiss Kelso’s appeal, affirming that Kelso was appealing from a final collateral order. On the merits, the court affirmed the fee award, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining Pollock as the prevailing party and in the amount awarded. The court found that the trial court’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and that the fee award, including the use of a 1.8 multiplier, was reasonable. View "Pollock v. Kelso" on Justia Law

Eva Osborne, the plaintiff, sued Pleasanton Automotive Company, LOP Automotive Company LP, HAG Automotive Investments LP, and Bob Slap, alleging workplace misconduct by Slap during her four years as his executive assistant. The claims included discrimination, retaliation, harassment, failure to prevent harassment and retaliation, and wage and hour violations. Slap later filed a cross-complaint against Osborne, alleging libel, slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional interference with contractual relations, and negligence based on statements Osborne made in a letter to HAG’s HR director.The Alameda Superior Court granted Osborne’s special motion to strike Slap’s cross-complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that her statements were protected activity and rejecting Slap’s arguments that they were extortionate and illegal. The court held that Slap could not establish minimal merit in his claims because Osborne’s statements were both absolutely and conditionally privileged under Civil Code section 47, and Slap failed to show malice to overcome the conditional privilege. Slap appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, applied de novo review and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court rejected Slap’s attempt to invoke an exception to the anti-SLAPP statute for activity that is illegal as a matter of law. The court concluded that the litigation privilege barred Slap’s claims, preventing him from meeting his burden under the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis to show his claims had minimal merit. The court did not address Osborne’s alternative arguments regarding the conditional privilege, malice, or the prima facie showing on Slap’s claims. View "Osborne v. Pleasanton Automotive Co., LP" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Jeannine Bedard, a Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officer, refused to comply with the City of Los Angeles’s COVID-19 vaccination mandate and did not sign a “Notice of Mandatory COVID-19 Vaccination Policy Requirements.” Consequently, the Chief of Police sought to terminate her employment. The LAPD Board of Rights reviewed the proposed discipline, found Bedard guilty of failing to comply with conditions of employment, and upheld her discharge. The Board also found that the City violated Bedard’s due process rights by not providing sufficient time to respond to the charges, awarding her back pay, which the City did not pay.Bedard filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, arguing that the disciplinary action was procedurally and legally invalid and seeking reinstatement and back pay. The trial court found the termination justified but agreed that the City violated Bedard’s due process rights by not giving her enough time to respond. The court awarded her back pay but upheld her termination.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Bedard’s termination was justified due to her refusal to comply with the vaccination mandate, which was a condition of her employment. The court found substantial evidence supporting that Bedard’s refusal to vaccinate, not just her refusal to sign the Notice, was the basis for her termination. The court also held that the penalty of termination was not an abuse of discretion given the public health implications of her refusal to vaccinate. Additionally, the court agreed that the Skelly violation entitled Bedard to back pay but did not warrant reinstatement. The judgment was affirmed. View "Bedard v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Julian Rodriguez, an hourly machine operator for Lawrence Equipment, Inc., filed a class action lawsuit in December 2015 alleging various wage-and-hour violations under the California Labor Code. Rodriguez claimed that Lawrence failed to pay for all hours worked, provide adequate meal and rest breaks, issue accurate wage statements, and pay final wages timely. In July 2014, Rodriguez had signed an arbitration agreement with Lawrence, which led to the arbitration of his non-PAGA claims. The arbitrator ruled in favor of Lawrence, finding that Rodriguez failed to prove any of the alleged Labor Code violations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County confirmed the arbitration award and entered judgment in favor of Lawrence. Rodriguez appealed the judgment, but it was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Subsequently, Lawrence moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Rodriguez's remaining PAGA claim was barred by issue preclusion because the arbitrator had already determined that no Labor Code violations occurred. The trial court initially denied the motion but later granted it after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, which influenced the court's interpretation of PAGA standing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court held that the arbitrator's findings precluded Rodriguez from establishing standing as an aggrieved employee under PAGA. The court concluded that issue preclusion applied because the arbitrator's decision was final, the issues were identical, actually litigated, and necessarily decided, and the parties were the same. Consequently, Rodriguez lacked standing to pursue the PAGA claim, and the judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "Rodriguez v. Lawrence Equipment, Inc." on Justia Law

Marlon Quesada, a deputy sheriff with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, was not promoted to sergeant despite taking the sergeant's examination in 2017 and 2019, scoring in band two and band one respectively. Quesada had a mixed employment record, including two suspensions for misconduct and a 2015 investigation that was terminated due to the statute of limitations. Quesada claimed the Department improperly considered this time-barred investigation during the promotion process.The Los Angeles County Superior Court denied Quesada's petition for a writ of mandate, which sought to compel the Department to promote him and provide back pay and other damages. The trial court rejected Quesada's argument for a burden-shifting approach and found that Quesada did not establish that the Department's decision was illegal.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. Quesada argued that the trial court should have applied a burden-shifting approach similar to that used in discrimination cases under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. The appellate court declined to adopt this approach, noting that Quesada's case did not involve discrimination based on race or membership in a historically oppressed group. The court emphasized that the standard approach to civil litigation, where the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, was appropriate.The appellate court also found substantial evidence supporting the Department's decision not to promote Quesada, citing his mediocre performance evaluations and past misconduct. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that Quesada's policy arguments did not justify a departure from the standard legal approach. View "Quesada v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

Joe David Hudson was injured while working for Joplin Regional Stockyards, Inc. (JRS) in 2002. In 2005, Hudson, JRS, and JRS' insurer, Star Insurance Company, entered into a settlement agreement where Hudson received an $80,000 lump sum. The settlement left future medical expenses for Hudson's left ankle open. In 2011, Hudson had a below-the-knee amputation, which Star refused to cover. Hudson filed the settlement in circuit court in 2013, and the court rendered judgment in accordance with the settlement. Hudson later filed an equitable garnishment action, leading Star to pay $92,000 for his medical bills. In 2015, Star agreed to reimburse Hudson up to $610,311.75 for future medical expenses. In 2016, Hudson and JRS entered into a subordination agreement, acknowledging all payments due under the judgment had been received.In 2022, Hudson filed a motion to revive the judgment, which JRS opposed, arguing the judgment had been satisfied and the Division of Workers' Compensation had not determined the future medical care provision. JRS also filed a motion for relief from the judgment, claiming it was void due to lack of due process. The Circuit Court of Jasper County sustained Hudson's motion to revive the judgment and overruled JRS' motion for relief.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and determined that JRS had standing to appeal. The court found that the circuit court erred in reviving the judgment because JRS had satisfied the judgment by paying the $80,000 lump sum. The court reversed the circuit court's order sustaining Hudson's motion to revive the judgment and overruled Hudson's motion to revive the judgment. Hudson's motion for damages for a frivolous appeal was also overruled. View "Hudson v. Joplin Regional Stockyards, Inc." on Justia Law

A dental hygienist brought claims for sex discrimination, retaliation, and negligence against her former employer and supervisors. She alleged that her supervisor made repeated sexual advances and harassed her throughout her employment. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the retaliation claims and allowed the other claims to proceed to trial. A jury awarded the plaintiff $575,000 in emotional distress damages and $2 million in punitive damages. However, the district court granted a motion for a new trial, finding the damages excessive and indicative of unfair prejudice. In the second trial, the court precluded certain evidence, and the jury awarded the plaintiff only $1 in nominal damages.The plaintiff appealed the district court’s summary judgment ruling, the order granting a new trial, and the evidentiary rulings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on the retaliation claims, agreeing that the plaintiff did not engage in protected activity as required for such claims. The court also upheld the district court’s decision to grant a new trial, finding no abuse of discretion in the determination that the jury’s damages award was excessive and indicative of prejudice. Additionally, the court affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings, including the exclusion of the plaintiff’s psychiatric records, portions of a coworker’s deposition testimony, and an anonymous fax.The Second Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in any of its challenged rulings and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Qorrolli v. Metropolitan Dental Associates" on Justia Law

Krista Dittus sued her former employer, Black Hills Care and Rehabilitation Center, LLC, and the company that took over its operations, RC North SD Skilled Nursing Facility, LLC d/b/a Avantara North, alleging wrongful termination in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. Avantara denied the allegations, asserting it had no employment relationship with Dittus at the time of her termination. Black Hills Care did not respond or appear in the case.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Pennington County, South Dakota, granted summary judgment in favor of Avantara after striking Dittus's untimely response to the motion for summary judgment. The court found no genuine issues of material fact and ruled that Avantara was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Written orders were entered, and Avantara's counsel served notice of entry of the orders on Dittus's counsel via the court's electronic filing system on September 15, 2023. Dittus's counsel filed a notice of appeal and a civil case docketing statement through the same system on October 13, 2023, but only the docketing statement was served on Avantara's counsel.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and determined that it lacked appellate jurisdiction due to Dittus's failure to serve the notice of appeal on Avantara's counsel as required by SDCL 15-26A-4. The court emphasized that both timely filing and service of the notice of appeal are mandatory jurisdictional requirements. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. View "Dittus v. Black Hills Care & Rehab and Avantara" on Justia Law

Terry Hall worked for BPM Lumber, LLC, and was terminated in 2015 after failing a drug test. In 2018, Hall filed a claim for permanent occupational disability benefits, alleging various health issues due to exposure to a mixture of hydraulic fluid and diesel fuel at work. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed Hall's claim, finding that the medical evidence did not support the work-relatedness of his conditions.Hall appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board, which affirmed the ALJ's decision in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further explanation regarding the rejection of the University Evaluator’s report on Hall’s respiratory impairment. The ALJ provided additional findings on remand, again dismissing Hall's claims. Hall appealed to the Board, which affirmed the ALJ's decision. Hall then sought review from the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals held that the Board’s initial July 22, 2022, Order was final and appealable, precluding Hall from raising certain issues again. The court affirmed the Board’s decision on the merits of the remaining issues.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the Board’s July 22, 2022, Order was final and appealable, and Hall’s failure to appeal that order immediately precluded him from raising those issues in a subsequent appeal. The court also noted that the workers’ compensation process does not require exhaustion of all administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. View "HALL V. BPM LUMBER, LLC" on Justia Law

Sarah Lindsley filed a discrimination lawsuit against her employer, Omni Hotels Management Corporation, alleging sex-based pay discrimination under the Equal Pay Act (EPA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Lindsley claimed that her initial salary was set too low due to her sex, causing her to earn less than her male colleagues despite subsequent raises. She also alleged that she faced harassment and that her complaints about pay discrepancies were ignored.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas initially granted summary judgment in favor of Omni on all claims. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for trial on the pay-discrimination claims under Title VII and the EPA. At trial, the jury found Omni not liable under the EPA but awarded Lindsley over $25 million in Title VII damages despite finding no liability under Title VII. The district court deemed the jury's answers inconsistent, amended the verdict form, and ordered further deliberation. The jury then found for Lindsley on her Title VII claim, again awarding over $25 million in damages, which the district court reduced under the statutory cap.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court did not err in handling the first verdict form but did err in handling the second verdict form. The appellate court found that the jury's answers in the second verdict form were inconsistent, as they found that any pay disparity resulted from a factor other than sex (an affirmative defense to both the EPA and Title VII claims) but still awarded Title VII damages. The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Lindsley v. Omni Hotels" on Justia Law