Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
by
Henry Beverly, a financial analyst at Abbott Laboratories, took a personal leave of absence during which he began working for Cook County without informing Abbott. His leave was extended twice, but when he requested a third extension, Abbott had already filled his position and terminated his employment. Beverly sued Abbott, alleging racial discrimination and defamation, among other claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of Abbott on some of Beverly’s claims, including those related to his termination, while allowing others to proceed to trial. The jury found in favor of Abbott on the remaining claims. Beverly appealed, challenging several pretrial, trial, and post-trial rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the reduction in Beverly’s job duties did not amount to a constructive discharge and that Abbott’s reason for terminating Beverly’s employment was not pretextual. The court also upheld the district court’s mid-trial judgment as a matter of law on Beverly’s defamation claim, finding that the statement in question was a non-actionable opinion. Additionally, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s trial rulings, including those related to impeachment attempts and the exclusion of certain evidence. The court concluded that Beverly’s arguments did not warrant a new trial and affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. View "Beverly v. Abbott Laboratories" on Justia Law

by
The case involves Lion Elastomers, a synthetic rubber manufacturer, and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Lion Elastomers had been found guilty of unfair labor practices by the NLRB for threatening, disciplining, and discharging an employee, Joseph Colone, for engaging in protected activities. The NLRB applied the Atlantic Steel standard to assess whether Colone's behavior lost its protected status. However, before the appeal of the Board’s decision had been briefed, the NLRB issued a new interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in a case called General Motors, which overruled Atlantic Steel. The NLRB then sought a remand to apply this new interpretation to the Lion Elastomers case.The case was remanded to the NLRB by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. However, instead of applying the new interpretation from General Motors as expected, the NLRB used the remand proceeding to overrule General Motors and return to the Atlantic Steel standard. Lion Elastomers argued that the NLRB exceeded the scope of the remand and violated its due-process rights during the remand proceeding.The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Lion Elastomers. The court found that the NLRB had exceeded the scope of the remand by not applying the General Motors standard as expected. The court also found that the NLRB had violated Lion Elastomers's due-process rights by not giving the company an opportunity to be heard before deciding to overturn General Motors. The court vacated the NLRB's decision and remanded the case back to the NLRB, instructing it to apply the General Motors standard to this case. View "Lion Elastomers v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

by
Samantha Peifer, an employee of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, filed a lawsuit against her employer alleging pregnancy discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Peifer, who was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis and later became pregnant, requested accommodations from her employer due to her inability to perform certain tasks. Her requests were initially denied, but later granted after she filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). However, she was not allowed to work from home as requested due to her high-risk pregnancy and exposure to COVID-19. Peifer eventually resigned, citing discriminatory treatment, and filed additional charges with the EEOC.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted the Board's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Peifer could not establish a prima facie case for any of her claims. Peifer appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the District Court's decision. The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court that Peifer's claims partly failed but concluded that the District Court was best situated to analyze the impact of the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis on whether Peifer makes out a prima facie case under an adverse employment action theory. The Court of Appeals also concluded that Peifer makes out a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination based on the Board’s denials of her light-duty requests under a failure to accommodate theory. The case was remanded for further analysis on Peifer’s adverse employment theory and failure to accommodate theory, while the District Court’s decisions on Peifer’s constructive discharge allegation and retaliation claim were affirmed. View "Peifer v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole" on Justia Law

by
The case involves William Rios, a part-time security guard for Centerra Group LLC, who was fired after being found asleep at his post. Rios, who has diabetes, sued Centerra alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). He claimed that he had an episode of hypoglycemic shock which caused him to fall asleep on the job, and thus, Centerra should have accommodated his disability. However, Rios did not present any evidence that Centerra knew about his hypoglycemic episode when it fired him.The district court granted summary judgment to Centerra on all claims. Rios appealed, challenging the district court's decisions on his ADA discrimination claim, ADA claim for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, ADA claim for hostile work environment, ADA claim for retaliation, and the denial of his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) motion seeking additional discovery to respond to the motion for summary judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions. The court found that Rios failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Centerra held a discriminatory animus toward him based on his disability. The court also found that Rios failed to provide any evidence of discriminatory animus that would allow a reasonable jury to infer that Centerra's reasons for firing Rios were pretextual. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rios's Rule 56(d) motion given his failure to show good cause or due diligence in pursuing discovery for information regarding similarly situated employees. View "Sheridan v. Centerra Group, LLC" on Justia Law

by
The case involves Susan George, a teacher who had worked for the Susanville Elementary School District for several years before resigning to teach at another school district. She later returned to the District. Upon her return, the District did not credit her for the years of experience she gained at the other school district following her resignation. George filed a petition for writ of mandate arguing the District violated the uniformity requirement of Education Code section 45028 and the restoration requirement of section 44931 when placing her on the salary schedule without accounting for the years of experience she gained while outside the District after her resignation.The trial court found that the District complied with the Education Code. It ruled that the collective bargaining agreement prevented George from acquiring credit for the two years she worked for another school district. The trial court further found the uniformity requirement did not afford George relief and the District complied with the restoration requirement by restoring George to her prior position. Consequently, the trial court denied George’s petition for writ of mandate.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the District violated the uniformity requirement by failing to place George at step 15 of the District’s salary schedule. The court disagreed with the District's argument that the uniformity requirement is inapplicable to George’s placement on the salary schedule because the restoration requirement controls the placement of teachers rehired within 39 months. The court found that the District must credit George with up to 12 years of out-of-district experience. The court remanded the case with directions to issue a writ compelling the District to place George on its salary schedule in compliance with Education Code section 45028 as construed herein, with appropriate back pay and benefits. The District was ordered to pay costs on appeal. View "George v. Susanville Elementary School District" on Justia Law

by
Tomas Perez, an underground haul truck driver, sued his former employer, Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc., alleging that the company wrongfully interfered with his rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) when it terminated his employment. Perez claimed that he had suffered a serious health condition that prevented him from performing his job, and that Barrick terminated his employment because he sought protected leave. Barrick, however, argued that Perez had faked his injury and violated company policy.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. The jury found in favor of Barrick, concluding that Perez failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered a serious health condition preventing him from performing his job or that Barrick terminated his employment because he sought protected leave. Perez appealed the decision, arguing that the district court erred by not instructing the jury that only contrary medical evidence could defeat his doctor’s certification of a serious health condition.The case was then reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The court held that the FMLA does not require an employer to present contrary medical evidence before contesting a doctor’s certification of a serious health condition. Therefore, the district court did not err by failing to instruct the jury that only contrary medical evidence could defeat Perez’s doctor’s certification. The jury was allowed to properly consider the non-medical evidence that Barrick offered at trial in support of its argument that Perez did not have a serious health condition within the meaning of the Act. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Barrick. View "Perez v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc." on Justia Law

by
This case involves a dispute over a provision in a collective bargaining agreement between the City of Austin and the Austin Firefighters Association. The provision, known as Article 10, grants 5,600 hours of "Association Business Leave" (ABL) annually for firefighters to conduct union-related activities. The petitioners, including the State of Texas and several individuals, argued that Article 10 violates the "Gift Clauses" of the Texas Constitution, which prohibit governmental entities from making gifts of public resources to private parties. They contended that the ABL provision improperly benefits the union by allowing firefighters to use paid time off for union activities, some of which they alleged were misused for improper purposes.The case was initially dismissed under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), with the trial court granting relief to the Association, including the award of fees and sanctions. On appeal, the trial court's findings of fact went unchallenged, and the focus was primarily on whether the agreement itself violated the Gift Clauses.The Supreme Court of Texas held that Article 10 does not violate the Gift Clauses. The court found that the provision is not a gratuitous gift but brings a public benefit, serves a legitimate public purpose, and the government retains control over the funds to ensure that the public purpose is achieved. The court emphasized that the ABL must be used for activities that directly support the mission of the Fire Department or the Association and are consistent with the Association’s purposes. The court also reversed the trial court's order granting the Association's TCPA motion to dismiss and its award of sanctions and fees against the original plaintiffs. View "BORGELT v. AUSTIN FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, IAFF LOCAL 975" on Justia Law

by
A group of medical providers sued a former employee for breach of an employment agreement. The employee counterclaimed, alleging he was owed unpaid wages and bonuses. The providers initially raised "failure to state a claim" as their sole affirmative defense. However, after nearly four years of litigation, they attempted to argue for the first time that the contract was illegal and therefore void. The lower court found that the providers had waived this affirmative defense and issued a judgment in favor of the employee. The providers appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, concluding that the lower court had abused its discretion by refusing to consider the providers' claim of illegality.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma disagreed with the Court of Civil Appeals. It held that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in striking the providers' last-minute effort to raise a new affirmative defense. The court noted that the providers had failed to raise the illegality defense in their initial responsive pleading and did not seek to amend their answer in a timely manner. Furthermore, the providers did not raise the illegality defense until after the trial court had already awarded summary judgment to the employee on the issue of breach of contract, more than ten months after the close of discovery, more than nine months after the lower court's deadline for filing dispositive motions, and almost four years after the original lawsuit was filed. The court concluded that the record was sufficient to support a finding that the providers' delay was unjustified and prejudicial. The court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, affirmed the trial court's order striking the illegality affirmative defense, and remanded the case to the Court of Civil Appeals to resolve any remaining undecided issues raised in the appeal. View "Tulsa Ambulatory Procedure Center v. Olmstead" on Justia Law

by
The case involves Benjamin Stanley, who was employed by Western Michigan University (WMU) for about a month before his employment was terminated. Stanley, who has severe ADHD, claimed that WMU and certain supervisors discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). He also brought a claim under Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA), as well as a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed Stanley’s federal claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on Eleventh Amendment immunity and dismissed his state-law claims for failure to comply with the Michigan Court of Claims Act’s notification statute.The district court's dismissal of Stanley's claims was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Stanley’s federal claims and the denial of Stanley’s motion for leave to amend his complaint. However, the court vacated the judgment in part and remanded to the district court to dismiss Stanley’s federal and state-law claims without prejudice. The court found that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Stanley’s ADA claims because the defendants were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Stanley lacked standing to request injunctive relief from the individual defendants. The court also found that the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide Stanley’s state-law claims because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over any federal issues. View "Stanley v. Western Michigan University" on Justia Law

by
The case involves Gabrielle Barbour, who alleges that she was denied employment as a Special Agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in retaliation for her participation in a class action lawsuit against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for workplace discrimination. The district court dismissed Barbour's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.The district court found that Barbour failed to establish a causal link between her protected activity (the lawsuit against the FBI) and the adverse employment action (non-selection by the DEA). The court also found that Barbour's complaint affirmatively pleaded legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for her non-selection, which were not rebutted by Barbour.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that the district court erred in its analysis of the complaint's allegations and in requiring Barbour to rebut the DEA's proffered reasons for her non-selection at the motion to dismiss stage. The appellate court concluded that the complaint's allegations were sufficient to support a plausible inference of a causal link between Barbour's lawsuit against the FBI and the DEA's subsequent refusal to hire her. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Barbour v. Garland" on Justia Law