Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Irma Leibas, a correctional officer at the Cook County Department of Corrections (DOC), has pre-existing medical conditions requiring workplace accommodations, including up to three additional breaks per shift. After the DOC denied her request for these accommodations, Leibas sued, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois initially denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on Leibas’s accommodation and discrimination claims. However, upon reconsideration and after both parties supplemented the record, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that Leibas was not a qualified individual under the ADA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court examined whether Leibas could perform the essential functions of her position with or without reasonable accommodation. The court found that maintaining the safety and security of the DOC is an essential function of a correctional officer. Leibas’s requested accommodation of additional breaks, including rest periods, was deemed unreasonable given the unpredictable and violent environment of the DOC, which requires officers to be able to stand for long periods and respond to emergencies without delay. The court also noted that the DOC’s staffing shortages and the need for continuous coverage further complicated the feasibility of Leibas’s requested accommodations.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that Leibas did not provide sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact that she could perform the essential functions of her position with the requested accommodations. View "Leibas v. Dart" on Justia Law

In May 2019, the City of Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety imposed a 44-hour suspension on Officer David Meinhardt, which was upheld by the City of Sunnyvale Personnel Board. Meinhardt challenged the suspension by filing a petition for writ of administrative mandate in the Santa Clara County Superior Court. On August 6, 2020, the court issued an order denying the petition. Subsequently, on September 25, 2020, a formal judgment was entered, and Meinhardt filed a notice of appeal on October 15, 2020.The Fourth Appellate District, Division One, dismissed the appeal as untimely, concluding that the August 6 order was the final judgment from which Meinhardt should have appealed. The court reasoned that the order denied the petition in its entirety and did not contemplate further action, thus starting the 60-day period for filing an appeal.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to resolve the uncertainty about when the time to appeal starts in writ of administrative mandate proceedings. The court held that the time to appeal begins with the entry of a "judgment" or the service of notice of entry of "judgment," rather than with the filing of an "order" or other ruling. This decision was based on the plain language of relevant statutes and rules, which contemplate the entry of a "judgment," and the policy of providing clear jurisdictional deadlines to avoid inadvertent forfeiture of the right to appeal. The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, concluding that Meinhardt's notice of appeal was timely filed within 60 days of the entry of the September 25 judgment. View "Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale" on Justia Law

Samuel Amos fell from the roof of a shop building he was helping David Tidwell construct on property owned by Travis and Tabitha Plambeck. Tidwell had promised to pay Amos for his work. Amos filed a workers’ compensation claim against Tidwell and the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Benefits Guaranty Fund for his injuries. Tidwell requested the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board dismiss Amos’s claim, alleging he had not hired Amos. The Board found that Amos had an employment contract with Tidwell but determined Tidwell was not an “employer” under the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act, reasoning that the employment was based on friendship and thus fell within consumptive uses exempt from the Act’s coverage.The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board’s decision, agreeing that Tidwell’s activities were consumptive rather than productive. The Commission also speculated that Amos’s work might fall under the statutory exemption for “harvest help and similar part-time or transient help,” although the Board had not made findings on this issue. Amos appealed, arguing that the Commission and the Board incorrectly construed the law and that there is no “buddy” exemption to the employer-employee relationship under the Act.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The Court held that the Commission erred by creating an implicit exemption for “buddies” and by applying the productive/consumptive distinction to Tidwell’s employment of Amos. The Court clarified that the productive/consumptive distinction applies only to householders and not to individuals like Tidwell who hire others for work on third-party properties. The Court also found that the Commission improperly speculated about the applicability of the statutory exemption for part-time or transient help without proper findings. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Amos v. Tidwell" on Justia Law

Paula Emerson, a former Cook County Corrections Officer, was terminated in 2019 after being on disability leave since 2012 due to anxiety, depression, and PTSD. Emerson claimed her termination was in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim in 2014 and a Title VII lawsuit against Cook County and its employees, which she lost. She alleged that the same attorneys represented the County in both her workers' compensation proceedings and the Title VII case, and discussed her cases with those responsible for her termination.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Emerson's initial complaint for failure to state a claim, allowing her to amend it. Emerson's amended complaint was also dismissed with prejudice for failing to cure deficiencies. The court found that filing a workers' compensation claim was not a protected activity under the ADA and that Emerson did not adequately allege that her workers' compensation claim caused her termination. Emerson's request for limited discovery was denied due to lack of specific allegations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that Emerson's complaint did not plausibly allege that her workers' compensation claim caused her termination, noting the five-year gap between the claim and her firing. The court also upheld the denial of Emerson's discovery request, deeming it speculative, and found no abuse of discretion in denying her Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration, as she presented no new evidence or manifest error of law or fact. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Emerson v. Dart" on Justia Law

A Catholic priest, Andrew J. Syring, sued the Archdiocese of Omaha, alleging defamation, tortious interference with prospective employment, slander per se, breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. His claims stemmed from the Archdiocese publishing his name on a list of clergy with substantiated claims of sexual misconduct and a subsequent phone conversation where a church official referenced this list when discussing Syring's potential employment as a hospital chaplain.The District Court for Cuming County granted summary judgment for the Archdiocese on Syring's defamation claim, finding it barred by Nebraska’s one-year statute of limitations. The court ruled that the initial publication of the list in 2018 started the limitations period, and subsequent updates to the list did not constitute republication. The court also granted summary judgment on Syring's intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, concluding that Syring failed to provide medical evidence of severe emotional distress.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the single publication rule applied to the Archdiocese's list, meaning the statute of limitations began with the initial publication. The court also found that the Archdiocese's conduct did not meet the high threshold for extreme and outrageous behavior required for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.Additionally, the court upheld the dismissal of Syring's claims for tortious interference, slander per se, and breach of fiduciary duty, citing the ministerial exception. This doctrine prevents courts from interfering with the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers, thus barring Syring's claims related to his employment and the Archdiocese's internal governance decisions. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, dismissing all of Syring's claims. View "Syring v. Archdiocese of Omaha" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the law firm Abraham Watkins Nichols Agosto Aziz & Stogner and its former associate, Edward Festeryga. Abraham Watkins terminated Festeryga’s employment after discovering that he attempted to take clients and firm files to a new firm. Abraham Watkins sued Festeryga in Texas state court for conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and tortious interference with contract. Festeryga moved to dismiss the suit under Texas’s anti-SLAPP statute, the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), which stayed the expedited discovery sought by Abraham Watkins. Despite agreeing to produce certain documents, Festeryga filed a notice of removal to federal court, claiming diversity jurisdiction as a Canadian citizen.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas remanded the case back to state court. The district court did not address whether Festeryga had shown diversity of citizenship but concluded that Festeryga waived his right to remove by participating in state court proceedings, specifically by filing a TCPA motion to dismiss. The district court found that this action demonstrated an intent to invoke the jurisdiction of the state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case to determine if it had appellate jurisdiction over the remand order. The court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction, citing its precedent in In re Weaver, which held that waiver-based remand orders are jurisdictional under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and thus unappealable under § 1447(d). The court noted that although it disagreed with the reasoning in Weaver, it was bound by the rule of orderliness to follow the precedent. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Abraham Watkins Nichols Agosto Aziz & Stogner v. Festeryga" on Justia Law

Michele Tourangeau filed a complaint against her former employer, Nappi Distributors, alleging nine employment-related claims. Nappi moved for summary judgment on all claims, but the District Court denied the motion for all but one claim, leading to a jury trial. The jury found in favor of Nappi on all claims. Tourangeau then filed a motion for a new trial, citing juror bias and errors in jury instructions, which the District Court denied.Tourangeau appealed the District Court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. She argued that the District Court erred in not disqualifying a juror who allegedly displayed bias and failed to answer voir dire questions truthfully. The District Court had previously determined that the juror's conduct and Facebook activity did not demonstrate bias sufficient to warrant disqualification. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the District Court's handling of the juror bias allegations, noting that the District Court had appropriately assessed the juror's behavior and responses.Tourangeau also challenged the jury's verdict on one of her Equal Pay Act (EPA) claims, arguing that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence and that the District Court erred in not giving a specific jury instruction. The appellate court upheld the District Court's decision, finding that Nappi had provided sufficient evidence that the pay differential was based on a business decision unrelated to sex. The court also agreed with the District Court's refusal to give the requested jury instruction, as there was no evidence of a prior illegal practice of gender discrimination in hiring.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment, concluding that there was no reversible error in the handling of the juror bias allegations or the EPA claim. View "Tourangeau v. Nappi Distributors" on Justia Law

Peter Quach filed a lawsuit against California Commerce Club (Commerce Club) after being terminated from his job at the casino where he had worked for nearly 30 years. Quach's complaint included claims of wrongful termination, age discrimination, retaliation, and harassment, and he demanded a jury trial. Commerce Club had previously provided Quach with a signed arbitration agreement from 2015, which mandated binding arbitration for employment-related disputes. Instead of moving to compel arbitration, Commerce Club answered the complaint and engaged in extensive discovery, including propounding interrogatories and taking Quach’s deposition.The Los Angeles County Superior Court denied Commerce Club’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that Commerce Club had waived its right to arbitrate by engaging in litigation for 13 months. The court noted that Commerce Club had actively participated in discovery and requested a jury trial, actions inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. Commerce Club appealed, and the Second Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that Quach had not shown sufficient prejudice from Commerce Club’s delay in seeking arbitration.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and abrogated the state’s arbitration-specific prejudice requirement, aligning with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. The court held that under California law, as under federal law, courts should apply the same principles to determine waiver of the right to compel arbitration as they do for other contracts. The court concluded that Commerce Club had waived its right to compel arbitration by engaging in litigation conduct inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. View "Quach v. Cal. Commerce Club, Inc." on Justia Law

Stanford Clacks, an African American truck driver, was employed by Kwik Trip, Inc. and experienced racial harassment from fellow employees. During his training, Clacks was harassed by two trainers, Tom Roerkohl and Brett Nechkash, who used racial epithets and made derogatory remarks. Clacks reported these incidents to his supervisor, Sean Clements, but did not initially specify the racial nature of the harassment. After completing his training, Clacks continued to face sporadic racial harassment, including receiving a racially charged note from Nechkash. Clacks went on voluntary pandemic leave in March 2020 and later reported the harassment to Kwik Trip’s Human Resources department, prompting an investigation that led to the termination of the offending employees. Kwik Trip offered Clacks his job back or a severance package, both of which he declined.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment in favor of Kwik Trip on all claims. The court applied the sham-affidavit rule to exclude parts of an affidavit Clacks submitted in opposition to summary judgment, finding it contradicted his earlier deposition testimony. The court found that Clacks did not present sufficient evidence to support his claims of a hostile work environment and retaliation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the district court properly applied the sham-affidavit rule and that Clacks did not provide sufficient evidence to support his claims. Specifically, the court found that Kwik Trip took reasonable steps to address the harassment once it was reported and that Clacks did not suffer an adverse employment action as he was offered his job back. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find Kwik Trip liable for a hostile work environment or retaliation. View "Clacks v. Kwik Trip, Incorporated" on Justia Law

Jo Spence, a licensed attorney, was terminated from her position at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) after eleven years. She claimed her termination was retaliatory, following her filing of internal discrimination complaints and whistleblower disclosures. Spence alleged discrimination based on race, sex, and age, and also claimed the VA engaged in illegal preferential hiring practices. She filed a complaint in the district court after the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) upheld her termination, citing her poor performance.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed most of Spence’s claims for failure to state a claim and granted summary judgment on her remaining claim. The court found that Spence, despite being pro se, was not entitled to the leniency typically afforded to pro se litigants due to her legal training and experience. The court dismissed her initial lengthy complaints and allowed her to amend them multiple times, but ultimately dismissed her claims with prejudice for failing to comply with the court’s page limits and pleading requirements.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the liberal pleading standard for pro se litigants does not apply to licensed attorneys. It found that Spence failed to plead sufficient facts to support her claims of retaliation and discrimination, and that her termination was supported by substantial evidence of poor performance. The court also upheld the district court’s dismissal of her claims with prejudice, noting Spence’s repeated failure to comply with court rules and orders. The appellate court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings. View "Spence v. DVA" on Justia Law