Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Jeffrey Cockrum developed mesothelioma after working for Alcoa Inc. for several decades, where he was exposed to asbestos without adequate protective measures. Alcoa was aware of the dangers of asbestos and the potential for long-term health issues, but did not provide sufficient warnings or protections. Cockrum was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2022 and subsequently filed a personal injury lawsuit against Howmet Aerospace, Inc., the corporate successor to Alcoa, claiming deliberate intent to injure by exposing him to asbestos.The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Howmet, concluding that Cockrum could not meet the deliberate injury exception under Washington’s Industrial Insurance Act (IIA), which requires actual knowledge that injury was certain to occur. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, citing the precedent set in Walston v. Boeing Co., which held that employees could not sue for latent diseases like mesothelioma because they could not meet the required level of certainty.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and overruled the Walston decision, recognizing it as incorrect and harmful. The court held that in cases of latent diseases, virtual certainty is sufficient to prove an employer’s actual knowledge that injury was certain to occur. This new standard does not alter the general requirement for immediate and visible injuries but is limited to latent disease cases. The court remanded the case to the trial court to determine summary judgment under the virtual certainty standard. View "Cockrum v. C.H. Murphy/Clark-Ullman, Inc." on Justia Law

David Keane's employment with Expeditors Hong Kong Limited (Expeditors HK) was terminated on December 11, 2023. Keane subsequently filed a lawsuit against Expeditors HK and Expeditors International of Washington, Inc. (Expeditors US) in the District of Massachusetts, alleging federal and state law claims related to his termination. Expeditors HK is a wholly owned subsidiary of Expeditors US. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and improper venue for the federal law claim.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the claims against Expeditors HK and the non-contract claims against Expeditors US for lack of personal jurisdiction. The contract claims against Expeditors US were dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The court found that Keane failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his assertion that Expeditors HK was an alter ego of Expeditors US.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissals. The appellate court held that the Massachusetts federal district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Expeditors HK. Regarding the claims against Expeditors US, the court found that Keane could not prevail without proving wrongful termination by Expeditors HK, and he failed to allege sufficient facts or legal theories to impute Expeditors HK's actions to Expeditors US. The court concluded that Keane's complaint did not provide adequate grounds to disregard the corporate formalities between Expeditors US and Expeditors HK. View "Keane v. Expeditors International of Washington, Inc." on Justia Law

AllService Plumbing and Maintenance, Inc. is a small, family-owned plumbing company in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. In 2009, a union organizer named Charles LeBlanc began efforts to unionize AllService’s workforce. An employee, Joe Lungrin, opposed the unionization and informed the company’s Vice President, Luke Hall, about LeBlanc’s activities. The union filed a petition with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to hold an election among AllService’s employees. After agreeing on an election date, AllService laid off three employees. The union lost the election, and subsequently filed a complaint with the NLRB alleging that AllService violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by surveilling, threatening, and interrogating employees, and by laying off employees due to their union activities.An NLRB administrative law judge (ALJ) found in 2011 that AllService violated the NLRA and ordered the reinstatement of the laid-off employees with backpay. AllService did not file timely exceptions, and the NLRB adopted the ALJ’s findings in 2012. A second ALJ calculated damages in 2013, and the NLRB ordered AllService to pay over $100,000. However, the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning in 2014 invalidated the NLRB’s quorum, leading the Board to set aside its decision and dismiss its enforcement petition.In 2022, the NLRB issued a notice to show cause for re-adopting the 2013 ALJ decision, blaming administrative oversight for the delay. AllService objected, citing significant business losses due to floods in 2016 and 2021. The NLRB ignored these objections and adopted the 2013 decision. The NLRB then applied to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for summary enforcement of its 2022 order.The Fifth Circuit denied the NLRB’s request for summary enforcement, finding that the Board failed to prove that enforcement would be equitable. The court held that the Board’s delay and administrative neglect were extraordinary circumstances excusing AllService’s failure to exhaust specific objections. The court also granted AllService’s petition for review, finding that the Board lacked substantial evidence to attribute Lungrin’s activities to AllService and to find that the pre-election layoffs were related to union activity. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Allservice Plumbing" on Justia Law

J.H. participated in an employee welfare-benefit plan insured by Anthem Blue Cross Life and Health Insurance Company, with her son, A.H., as a beneficiary. After seeking benefits for A.H.'s yearlong stay at a mental-health treatment center, Anthem denied coverage, and Plaintiffs' appeal to Anthem was unsuccessful. Over a year after their final appeal through Anthem was decided, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit to recover benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).The United States District Court for the District of Utah dismissed the action, concluding it was time-barred under a provision of the Plan that required civil actions under ERISA § 502(a) to be brought within one year of the grievance or appeal decision. Plaintiffs argued that another sentence in the Plan set a three-year limitations period, creating an ambiguity that should be interpreted in their favor.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the two provisions were not inconsistent and both applied. The court explained that the one-year limitations period for § 502(a) actions and the three-year limitations period for other actions were distinct and could both be applicable. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, concluding that Plaintiffs' action was time-barred as it was filed beyond the one-year limitations period specified in the Plan. View "J.H. v. Anthem Blue Cross Life and Health Insurance" on Justia Law

In August 2021, the Cook County Health and Hospitals System implemented a policy requiring all personnel to be fully vaccinated against infectious diseases, including COVID-19. Exemptions were allowed for disability, medical conditions, or sincerely held religious beliefs. Plaintiffs, who are healthcare employees or contractors, requested religious exemptions, which were granted. However, the accommodation provided was a transfer to unpaid status pending termination, with a limited time to find a non-existent remote position. Plaintiffs argued this was religious discrimination violating the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois previously denied plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunctions against the vaccine mandates, including Cook County’s. The Seventh Circuit affirmed this denial, rejecting the plaintiffs' facial challenge to the mandate. On remand, plaintiffs amended their complaint but were denied permission to add a claim under the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act until after the court ruled on the County’s motion to dismiss. The district court dismissed the second amended complaint, considering it a facial challenge, which had already been ruled upon.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and held that the plaintiffs waived their as-applied challenge by not raising it in the district court or their opening brief on appeal. The court also noted that plaintiffs conceded they no longer sought injunctive relief and did not pursue a facial challenge. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the constitutional claim. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of leave to amend the complaint to include the Illinois RFRA claim. The court criticized the plaintiffs' counsel for poor advocacy and procedural errors. View "Lukaszczyk v Cook County" on Justia Law

Pamela McKenzie was shopping at a Walgreens in Houston in 2019 when she was detained on suspicion of shoplifting. A Walgreens employee called the police, suspecting McKenzie was the same person who had stolen from the store earlier that day. After reviewing surveillance footage, the police determined McKenzie was not the thief and released her. McKenzie claimed that other Walgreens employees had agreed she was not the thief, but the employee called the police anyway. She sued Walgreens for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, gross negligence, respondeat superior liability for employee negligence, and negligent hiring, training, and supervision (NHTS).The trial court denied Walgreens' motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), which allows for early dismissal of legal actions based on the exercise of free speech. A divided Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the trial court erred by not dismissing McKenzie’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, gross negligence, and vicarious liability for employee negligence. However, it held that the NHTS claim was not subject to dismissal under the TCPA because it was not entirely based on the employee’s exercise of free speech rights.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the TCPA does apply to McKenzie’s NHTS claim. The court concluded that McKenzie failed to meet her evidentiary burden to avoid dismissal, as she did not provide clear and specific evidence for each essential element of her NHTS claim. Consequently, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment in part and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, specifically for the dismissal of McKenzie’s NHTS claim. The remainder of the Court of Appeals' judgment was left undisturbed. View "WALGREENS v. MCKENZIE" on Justia Law

Dyamond Davis, an employee at the Shapiro Development Center, informed her supervisor on May 12, 2017, that she needed to leave work due to pregnancy-related morning sickness. Her supervisor allowed her to leave, reminding her to complete the necessary paperwork. Davis was later granted FMLA leave retroactive to May, but DHS determined that part of her May 12 absence was unauthorized because it believed FMLA did not cover morning sickness and that Davis violated policies requiring the substitution of accrued paid leave for FMLA leave. Consequently, DHS terminated her employment. Davis appealed her termination unsuccessfully to the Illinois Civil Service Commission and then filed a lawsuit alleging FMLA interference. Another employee, Antionette Burns, joined the lawsuit with a similar claim.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois dismissed Burns’s claim for lack of Article III standing and granted summary judgment in favor of DHS on Davis’s claim. The court found that Burns failed to establish a concrete injury-in-fact and that DHS was entitled to rely on the medical certification provided by Davis’s doctor, which did not indicate a need for intermittent leave for morning sickness.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of Burns’s claim without prejudice, agreeing that she failed to establish a concrete injury-in-fact. However, the court found that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding Davis’s FMLA claim. The court noted that morning sickness qualifies as a serious health condition under FMLA and that DHS was aware of Davis’s need for intermittent leave due to morning sickness. The court also found that DHS may have improperly applied its paid leave substitution policy, which could have led to Davis’s termination. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for DHS on Davis’s claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Davis v Illinois Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

The case involves a former principal of a charter school, Emily Roseberry, who alleged that the school district superintendent, Pauline Harvey, overstepped her authority in violation of Alaska statutes and the governing charter school contract and bylaws. Roseberry was fired after making complaints about Harvey’s conduct to the superintendent, the board of education, and an independent commission. Roseberry initially filed suit in federal court, raising federal civil rights claims and a state whistleblower claim. The federal court dismissed her federal claims with prejudice and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state whistleblower claim.Roseberry then filed suit in state court, bringing the whistleblower claim and three additional state-law claims: intentional interference with contractual relations, negligent supervision, and defamation. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were barred by issue and claim preclusion. The superior court agreed and dismissed the complaint. Roseberry appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and concluded that Roseberry’s state claims were not barred by issue and claim preclusion. The court held that the federal court’s dismissal of Roseberry’s First Amendment claim did not preclude her whistleblower claim because the definitions of “matter of public concern” under the First Amendment and the Alaska Whistleblower Act are different. The court also held that Roseberry’s additional state-law claims were not barred by claim preclusion because the federal court would likely have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them, given that it had already declined to exercise jurisdiction over the whistleblower claim.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the superior court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Roseberry v. North Slope Borough School District" on Justia Law

Charlene Carter, a flight attendant for Southwest Airlines, was terminated after sending graphic anti-abortion messages to the president of the flight attendants' union, Audrey Stone. Carter, a pro-life Christian, opposed the union's leadership and its participation in the Women's March, which she viewed as supporting abortion. After an arbitrator found that Southwest had cause to terminate Carter under its corporate policies, Carter sued Southwest and the union, claiming her termination violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Railway Labor Act (RLA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas ruled in favor of Carter, finding that Southwest and the union had discriminated against her based on her religious beliefs and practices. The court permanently enjoined Southwest and the union from interfering with the religious expression of any Southwest flight attendant and held Southwest in contempt for failing to comply with its judgment. Both Southwest and the union appealed, and Carter cross-appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's denial of Southwest's motion for judgment as a matter of law on Carter's belief-based Title VII claim and RLA retaliation claim, remanding with instructions to enter judgment for Southwest. The court affirmed the judgment against Southwest on Carter's practice-based Title VII claims and the dismissal of Carter's RLA interference claim. The court also affirmed the judgment against the union on all claims but vacated the permanent injunction and remanded for additional proceedings. Additionally, the court vacated the contempt order against Southwest. View "Carter v. Southwest Airlines Company" on Justia Law

Kenneth Ray Jr. died from asphyxiation due to an industrial accident involving nitrogen gas. His widow, Sharmel Culver, was awarded death benefits and subsequently applied for an additional award, alleging that Ray’s employer, TimkenSteel Corporation, violated specific safety requirements (VSSR). The Industrial Commission of Ohio denied the application, finding that the specific safety requirements did not apply because nitrogen gas is not considered "toxic" or a "poison."Culver sought a writ of mandamus from the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which determined that the commission abused its discretion. The court issued a limited writ, directing the commission to reconsider the VSSR analysis, concluding that nitrogen gas, in the concentration present in the elevator-control room, was toxic and thus fell under the applicable safety regulations.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reversed the Tenth District’s judgment. The court held that the commission did not abuse its discretion in denying the additional award. The court found that the commission’s decision was supported by some evidence, including expert testimony and industry literature indicating that nitrogen gas is not inherently toxic. The court emphasized that the regulations in effect at the time of Ray’s death defined "air contaminants" as including only "toxic" gases, and the evidence did not support a finding that nitrogen gas met this definition. The court concluded that the commission’s interpretation of the regulations was reasonable and that the Tenth District erred in substituting its own judgment for that of the commission. View "State ex rel. Culver v. Indus. Comm." on Justia Law