Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Dianne Carson first filed an application for retirement disability benefits in November 2007. Based on the recommendation of a hearing officer, the Kentucky Retirement Systems (KERS) denied Carson's claim. Carson did not seek judicial review of KERS's order, choosing instead to file a second application in October 2009. Based on a recommendation of a different hearing officer, KERS again denied Carson's claim. Carson sought judicial review and the circuit reversed and remanded with instructions for KERS to consider all of the medical evidence Carson submitted. The Court of Appeals affirmed. KERS argued that Carson's second application should have been dismissed under the doctrine of res judicata. "If res judicata applied to this action, Carson would have been barred from filing a second application that was based on the same claim as her first application. However, KRS 61.600(2) requires KERS to accept an employee's timely filed "reapplication based on the same claim of incapacity" and to reconsider the claim 'for disability if accompanied by new objective medical evidence.'" This case was remanded for KERS to undertake the correct review of the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Kentycky Retirement Systems v. Carson" on Justia Law

Stanley M. Chesley requested relief from the Court of Appeals under CR 65.07, which authorizes a party to request injunctive relief from the circuit court in the form of a restraining order, temporary injunction, or permanent injunction in a final judgment. In this case, the entry of a final judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty, which required Chesley to comply with an unpaid judgment, did not occur during the pendency of the case and therefore cannot be viewed as being a temporary injunction. Instead of being an injunction, the order was a post-judgment order in furtherance of respondents' efforts to collect on the outstanding judgment against Chesley. Because the order was not an injunction, it is not subject to review under CR 65.07. Accordingly, Chesley is not entitled to relief under CR 65.09. The court therefore denied Chelsey's motion for interlocutory relief. View "Chesley v. Abbott" on Justia Law

The Estate of Pratikshya Gurung filed a negligence action against Norton Hospital after Gurung was born with brain damage and quadriplegia. On appeal, Norton challenged the Court of Appeals' dismissal as moot of a writ action filed by Norton over a discovery dispute with the Estate. The court concluded that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion because its decision was not based on sound legal principles where Norton's writ action is not moot because relief can still be afforded. The court stated that it is true that the documents Norton alleges are privileged have now been provided to the Estate, but options remain. Accordingly, the court remanded for consideration of Norton's asserted privilege in light of the court's decision in Tibbs v. Bunnell. View "Norton Hosp. v. Hon. Barry L. Willett" on Justia Law

Scotty Hedgespeth and Linda Cundiff (together, Hedgespeth) filed suit against the Taylor County Fiscal Court alleging ownership of land where a new bridge would be constructed and requesting that the trial court issue a temporary injunction to prevent the construction of the new bridge. The trial court denied the request. Thereafter, Hedgespeth requested that the Court of Appeals grant him interlocutory relief from the order pursuant to Ky. R. Civ. P. 65.07. The Court of Appeals denied the motion. Hedgespeth subsequently requested that the Supreme Court grant him interlocutory relief from the Court of Appeals’ decision pursuant to Rule 65.09. The Supreme Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for interlocutory relief, holding that Plaintiff failed to show “extraordinary cause.” View "Hedgespeth v. Taylor County Fiscal Court" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with two counts of first degree sexual abuse. Appellant filed a motion to suppress statements he made to police during a custodial interrogation in the absence of his appointed counsel. The trial court initially granted Appellant’s motion to suppress. The trial court reversed itself, however, and denied the motion after the United States Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Montejo v. Louisiana, which overturned long-standing Sixth Amendment precedent. Appellant entered a conditional Alford plea to two counts of first-degree sexual abuse. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed after declining to apply the Montejo rationale in the context of state right-to-counsel law, holding that the rationale of Linehan v. Commonwealth is the correct manifestation of the right to counsel under Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution. View "Keysor v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Pratikshya Gurung (“the Estate”) was born with brain damage and quadriplegia. The Estate filed in the circuit court a medical negligence action against Norton Hospital. During the course of discovery, the Estate requested production from Norton of various hospital documents relating to patient safety. Norton argued that the documents were not discoverable. The trial court compelled the production of the disputed documents and denied Norton’s privileged claim. Norton filed a petition in the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition and a request for an order staying execution of the trial court’s discovery order. The Estate, in turn, received an emergency hearing with the trial court. Before the hearing on Norton’s emergency motion in the court of appeals and after the Estate’s emergency hearing with the trial court, the trial court handed the copies of the disputed documents directly to counsel for the Estate. The court of appeals subsequently dismissed Norton’s writ petition as moot. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, holding that the court of appeals abused its discretion because its decision was not based on sound legal principles. Remanded for consideration of Norton’s asserted privilege. View "Norton Hospitals, Inc. v. Hon. Barry Willett" on Justia Law

Glenn Hampton suffered a work-related injury during his employment with Flav-O-Rich. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found Hampton to be permanently totally disabled and awarded him permanent total disability benefits. The Workers' Compensation Board vacated the ALJ’s opinion and remanded, finding that the ALJ’s summary of the evidence and findings of fact were not sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review. Hampton filed a petition for review with the court of appeals. The court dismissed the petition as prematurely filed from a non-final Board opinion, concluding that because the Board’s opinion did not divest Hampton of a vested right and did not direct or authorize the ALJ to enter a different award on remand, it was not final and appealable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding under the test from Davis v. Island Creek Coal Co., the Board’s opinion was final and appealable. View "Hampton v. Flav-O-Rich Dairies" on Justia Law

A Law Firm had an escrow account with a Bank and authorized an employee to sign checks on the account by herself. The employee began embezzling money from the Firm’s various escrow accounts by engaging in a scheme called “check-kiting,” which involved the employee writing and depositing checks between the Bank account and the Law Firm’s account at another bank. More than three years after the last activity on the Bank account the Law Firm sued the Bank, raising four claims, including violations of the Uniform Commercial Code and common-law causes of action. The court of appeals concluded that the claims were barred by the one-year repose period of Ky. Rev. Stat. 355.4-406. The Supreme Court affirmed on other grounds, holding that the claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations under Ky. Rev. Stat. 355.4-111. View "Mark D. Dean, P.S.C. v. Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co." on Justia Law

Some members of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters (Union), an unincorporated association of carpenters, volunteered to help build a barn for Birchwood Conservation Center, a non-profit organization, but failed to complete the barn. Birchwood filed a complaint alleging breach of contract or promissory estoppel. The trial court dismissed Birchwood’s action for lack of standing. Birchwood then filed an amended complaint substituting four new party plaintiffs who did possess standing. The trial court dismissed the new plaintiffs’ claims, concluding that the Union could not be sued because it was a voluntary association. The court of appeals reversed, determining that the Union waived the defense of lack of capacity to be sued. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal of the case, holding that, under the facts of this case, the Union did not waive the defense of lack of capacity to be sued. View "United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Birchwood Conservancy" on Justia Law