Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The scope of appellate review of an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s determination of qualified official immunity is limited to the specific issue of whether immunity was properly denied.In this interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals not only agreed with the trial court that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity but also conclusively determined that Defendants were not negligent as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, holding that the court of appeals exceeded its scope of appellate review when it addressed the substantive claim of negligence on an interlocutory appeal of a decision about qualified official immunity. View "Baker v. Fields" on Justia Law

In this case, a sheriff’s termination of a deputy sheriff was not constrained by the procedural due process protections purportedly afforded to the deputy sheriff under a now-outdated version of Ky. Rev. Stat. 15.520.Plaintiff, the deputy sheriff, sued the sheriff, alleging that the sheriff violated the due process procedures set forth in section 15.520, otherwise known as the Police Officers’ Bill of Rights. The trial court granted summary judgment for the sheriff. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that section 15.520 mandates that a sheriff who, like the sheriff in this case, elects to receive Kentucky Law Enforcement Foundation Program funding is bound by the due process procedures of that statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 15.520 was not meant to provide due process rights to sheriffs’ deputies. View "Elliott v. Lanham" on Justia Law

In this case, a sheriff’s termination of a deputy sheriff was not constrained by the procedural due process protections purportedly afforded to the deputy sheriff under a now-outdated version of Ky. Rev. Stat. 15.520.Plaintiff, the deputy sheriff, sued the sheriff, alleging that the sheriff violated the due process procedures set forth in section 15.520, otherwise known as the Police Officers’ Bill of Rights. The trial court granted summary judgment for the sheriff. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that section 15.520 mandates that a sheriff who, like the sheriff in this case, elects to receive Kentucky Law Enforcement Foundation Program funding is bound by the due process procedures of that statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 15.520 was not meant to provide due process rights to sheriffs’ deputies. View "Elliott v. Lanham" on Justia Law

In this case arising from the 1996 murder of LeBron Gaither, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals that, in the circumstances of this case, the Estate of LeBron Gaither was entitled to post-judgment interest on damages awarded by the Board of Claims from the date of the initial circuit court judgment. This was the third appeal in this matter. In this appeal, the Kentucky State Police, a department within the Commonwealth’s Justice and Public Safety Cabinet, argued that the Court of Appeals misconstrued Civil Rule 54.01 and Ky. Rev. Stat. 360.040, 44.130 and 44.140, which govern post-judgment interest on Board of Claims’ awards. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the Court of Appeals correctly read the Board of Claims Act as according circuit court judgments entered pursuant to the Act the same treatment under the post-judgment interest statute as ordinary civil judgments; and (2) the Court of Appeals properly held that post-judgment interest began to accrue from the circuit court’s initial judgment. View "Commonwealth, Justice & Public Safety Cabinet v. Gaither" on Justia Law

In this case arising from the 1996 murder of LeBron Gaither, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals that, in the circumstances of this case, the Estate of LeBron Gaither was entitled to post-judgment interest on damages awarded by the Board of Claims from the date of the initial circuit court judgment. This was the third appeal in this matter. In this appeal, the Kentucky State Police, a department within the Commonwealth’s Justice and Public Safety Cabinet, argued that the Court of Appeals misconstrued Civil Rule 54.01 and Ky. Rev. Stat. 360.040, 44.130 and 44.140, which govern post-judgment interest on Board of Claims’ awards. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the Court of Appeals correctly read the Board of Claims Act as according circuit court judgments entered pursuant to the Act the same treatment under the post-judgment interest statute as ordinary civil judgments; and (2) the Court of Appeals properly held that post-judgment interest began to accrue from the circuit court’s initial judgment. View "Commonwealth, Justice & Public Safety Cabinet v. Gaither" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the circuit court dismissing Appellants’ appeal of a Georgetown-Scott County Planning Commission for lack of jurisdiction. The Planning Commission had approved a plat amendment requested by a developer to remove a planned lake from the development plan applicable to Appellants’ subdivision. Appellants appealed. The circuit court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter because Appellants had not strictly complied with the provisions of Ky. Rev. Stat. 100.347 by taking their appeal within the statutorily-allotted time period. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants failed to commence their action before the expiration of the time allotted by section 100.347(2). View "Isaacs v. Caldwell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court overruled Shamrock Coal Co. v. Taylor, 697 S.W.2d 952 (Ky. App. 1985), which holds that a complaint that exhibits “a clear attempt at verification” is sufficiently compliant with Ky. Rev. Stat. 341.450(1) to authorize judicial review.At issue in this case was whether Appellee had substantially complied with the verification requirement of section 341.450(1) when he filed a complaint seeking judicial review of an adverse decision of the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission (KUIC). The circuit court dismissed the complaint based upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission, 382 S.W.3d 826 (Ky. 2012). The Court of Appeals reversed, citing Shamrock. The Supreme Court reversed after overruling Shamrock, holding that the complaint in this case failed to satisfy the verification requirement of section 341.450(1). View "Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The failure of Terry Scott and Damon Fleming to appeal the denial of their respective grievances against the Kentucky State Police (KSP) by the Personnel Cabinet precluded their subsequent action filed in the circuit court. The trial court dismissed most of Scott’s and Fleming’s claims but nevertheless permitted the case to go forward. After a trial, the court held that Scott and Fleming had met their burden of showing a prima facie case of an equal protection violation, entitling them to equitable relief. The court of appeals affirmed, thus rejecting KSP’s argument that Scott and Fleming had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Scott’s and Fleming’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies barred their direct action in the circuit court. View "Kentucky State Police v. Scott" on Justia Law

Personal-injury law firm Hughes & Coleman was entitled to quantum meruit compensation after being hired and then fired by Travis Underwood, who was injured in a car crash. Shortly after Underwood discharged Hughes & Coleman and hired another attorney, Underwood agreed to a final settlement of his claims. Hughes & Coleman asserted an attorney’s lien on the new counsel’s contingency attorney fee on the final settlement, claiming it was entitled to a quantum meruit share of the fee as compensation for its services rendered before being terminated. The trial court concluded that Hughes & Coleman was discharged without cause and apportioned seventy-five percent of the contingency fee to the firm. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that Underwood had valid cause for terminating Hughes & Coleman’s services. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) case precedent entitles a discharged lawyer to receive, on a quantum meruit basis, a portion of a contingency fee on a former client’s recovery so long as the termination was not for cause; and (2) because Hughes & Coleman’s firing was not for cause, the firm was entitled to quantum meruit compensation. View "Hughes & Coleman, PLLC v. Chambers" on Justia Law

The administrative law judge (ALJ) in this case did not err in failing to give effect to a settlement agreement reached after the issuance of its order and opinion and raised in a petition to reconsider.This case arose from Appellant’s filing of a claim alleging work-related injuries against his employer. An ALJ issued an opinion and award denying Appellant permanent partial disability, permanent total disability, and future medical benefits. Appellant filed a petition for reconsideration based on a settlement reached prior to receipt of the opinion. The ALJ denied the petition. The Workers’ Compensation Board and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the alleged terms of the settlement were never properly brought before the ALJ, Appellant did not properly raise the issue, and the ALJ did not err in declining to review the agreement. View "Kidd v. Crossrock Drilling, LLC" on Justia Law