Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In this interlocutory appeal from the circuit court’s review of an agency ruling, the Supreme Court adopted the United States Supreme Court’s test for standing as set forth in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992) and held that the existence of a plaintiff’s standing is a constitutional requirement to prosecute any action in the courts of the Commonwealth, including seeking judicial review of an administrative agency’s final order.The putative petitioner in this case, a Medicaid beneficiary (the patient), sought judicial review of a final order of the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Human Services ruling that the patient lacked standing to pursue an appeal of an insurer’s denial of reimbursement to a hospital for the patient’s services. The hospital, acting as the patient’s representative, sought judicial review of the Cabinet’s final order. The circuit court denied the Cabinet and the insurer’s motions to dismiss the petition. The Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the case, holding (1) Kentucky courts have the responsibility to ascertain whether a plaintiff has constitutional standing to pursue the case in court; and (2) under that test, the patient did not have the requisite constitutional standing to pursue her case in the courts of the Commonwealth. View "Commonwealth v. Sexton" on Justia Law

In this eminent domain action challenging the just compensation paid for property to be taken, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the court of appeals dismissing this appeal for failure to name an indispensable party, holding that Riley v. Department of Highways, 375 S.W.2d 245 (Ky. 1963), remains sound and applicable to the circumstances before the Court in this case.The court of appeals dismissed this appeal because the notice of appeal failed to include the name of Edward Gravell, the husband of one of Appellants, a tenant-in-common owning the property. The court of appeals reasoned that Edward’s interest, an inchoate right, would be affected by the appellate court’s decision, and thus, he was an indispensable party. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals’s decision was contrary to applicable precedent in Riley; and (2) Edward was not an indispensable party at this stage of the proceeding. View "Hagan v. Commonwealth, Transportation Cabinet" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ decision to deny a writ of prohibition sought by Miki Thompson in this case alleging that Kara Vance’s suicide was caused by Timothy Lavender’s negligent prescribing of the acne medicine, Accutane.Lavender and Pikeville Dermatology served a subpoena duces tecum seeking production of records and reports pertaining to Vance held by Dr. Marilyn Cassis, Vance’s therapist. Dr. Cassis objected to production of these records without a court order, so Lavender and Pikeville Dermatology obtained a trial court order compelling compliance with the subpoena. Thompson then petitioned for a writ of prohibition, which the court of appeals denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its discovery order. View "Thompson v. Honorable Eddy Coleman" on Justia Law

The scope of appellate review of an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s determination of qualified official immunity is limited to the specific issue of whether immunity was properly denied.In this interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals not only agreed with the trial court that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity but also conclusively determined that Defendants were not negligent as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, holding that the court of appeals exceeded its scope of appellate review when it addressed the substantive claim of negligence on an interlocutory appeal of a decision about qualified official immunity. View "Baker v. Fields" on Justia Law

The scope of appellate review of an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s determination of qualified official immunity is limited to the specific issue of whether immunity was properly denied.In this interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals not only agreed with the trial court that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity but also conclusively determined that Defendants were not negligent as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, holding that the court of appeals exceeded its scope of appellate review when it addressed the substantive claim of negligence on an interlocutory appeal of a decision about qualified official immunity. View "Baker v. Fields" on Justia Law

In this case, a sheriff’s termination of a deputy sheriff was not constrained by the procedural due process protections purportedly afforded to the deputy sheriff under a now-outdated version of Ky. Rev. Stat. 15.520.Plaintiff, the deputy sheriff, sued the sheriff, alleging that the sheriff violated the due process procedures set forth in section 15.520, otherwise known as the Police Officers’ Bill of Rights. The trial court granted summary judgment for the sheriff. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that section 15.520 mandates that a sheriff who, like the sheriff in this case, elects to receive Kentucky Law Enforcement Foundation Program funding is bound by the due process procedures of that statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 15.520 was not meant to provide due process rights to sheriffs’ deputies. View "Elliott v. Lanham" on Justia Law

In this case, a sheriff’s termination of a deputy sheriff was not constrained by the procedural due process protections purportedly afforded to the deputy sheriff under a now-outdated version of Ky. Rev. Stat. 15.520.Plaintiff, the deputy sheriff, sued the sheriff, alleging that the sheriff violated the due process procedures set forth in section 15.520, otherwise known as the Police Officers’ Bill of Rights. The trial court granted summary judgment for the sheriff. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that section 15.520 mandates that a sheriff who, like the sheriff in this case, elects to receive Kentucky Law Enforcement Foundation Program funding is bound by the due process procedures of that statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 15.520 was not meant to provide due process rights to sheriffs’ deputies. View "Elliott v. Lanham" on Justia Law

In this case arising from the 1996 murder of LeBron Gaither, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals that, in the circumstances of this case, the Estate of LeBron Gaither was entitled to post-judgment interest on damages awarded by the Board of Claims from the date of the initial circuit court judgment. This was the third appeal in this matter. In this appeal, the Kentucky State Police, a department within the Commonwealth’s Justice and Public Safety Cabinet, argued that the Court of Appeals misconstrued Civil Rule 54.01 and Ky. Rev. Stat. 360.040, 44.130 and 44.140, which govern post-judgment interest on Board of Claims’ awards. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the Court of Appeals correctly read the Board of Claims Act as according circuit court judgments entered pursuant to the Act the same treatment under the post-judgment interest statute as ordinary civil judgments; and (2) the Court of Appeals properly held that post-judgment interest began to accrue from the circuit court’s initial judgment. View "Commonwealth, Justice & Public Safety Cabinet v. Gaither" on Justia Law

In this case arising from the 1996 murder of LeBron Gaither, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals that, in the circumstances of this case, the Estate of LeBron Gaither was entitled to post-judgment interest on damages awarded by the Board of Claims from the date of the initial circuit court judgment. This was the third appeal in this matter. In this appeal, the Kentucky State Police, a department within the Commonwealth’s Justice and Public Safety Cabinet, argued that the Court of Appeals misconstrued Civil Rule 54.01 and Ky. Rev. Stat. 360.040, 44.130 and 44.140, which govern post-judgment interest on Board of Claims’ awards. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the Court of Appeals correctly read the Board of Claims Act as according circuit court judgments entered pursuant to the Act the same treatment under the post-judgment interest statute as ordinary civil judgments; and (2) the Court of Appeals properly held that post-judgment interest began to accrue from the circuit court’s initial judgment. View "Commonwealth, Justice & Public Safety Cabinet v. Gaither" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the circuit court dismissing Appellants’ appeal of a Georgetown-Scott County Planning Commission for lack of jurisdiction. The Planning Commission had approved a plat amendment requested by a developer to remove a planned lake from the development plan applicable to Appellants’ subdivision. Appellants appealed. The circuit court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter because Appellants had not strictly complied with the provisions of Ky. Rev. Stat. 100.347 by taking their appeal within the statutorily-allotted time period. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants failed to commence their action before the expiration of the time allotted by section 100.347(2). View "Isaacs v. Caldwell" on Justia Law