Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky addressed the procedural issue of whether a notice of appeal could be filed electronically in a termination of parental rights (TPR) case that had been sealed. The court had to interpret the relevant statutes and rules, which stated that TPR cases should be sealed upon the entry of the final order and that sealed cases were not eligible for electronic filing. The Court of Appeals had ruled that the appellant had complied with the rules for timely filing a notice of appeal, as the rules were ambiguous about whether a TPR case could be electronically filed after it had been sealed.However, the Supreme Court of Kentucky disagreed with the lower court. It held that the statutory law and administrative rule, read together, effectively prohibited a notice of appeal from being electronically filed in a TPR case. The Court found no ambiguity in this interpretation. It pointed out that the rules clearly stated that TPR cases were always confidential but would only be sealed upon the entry of the trial court’s final order. Once sealed, these cases were no longer subject to mandatory electronic filing.Therefore, the Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded that the appellant had not complied with the rules for timely filing a notice of appeal, as the notice should have been filed conventionally. As a result, the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s termination of the appellant's parental rights. View "CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES V. D.W." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed a decision by the Court of Appeals that had remanded a case back to the Fayette Circuit Court over the perception of a jurisdictional error. The original plaintiff, Timothy Poole, had filed a lawsuit against Valetta Browne, Executive Director of the Kentucky Office of Bar Admissions (KYOBA), alleging she had negligently performed her duties and caused him damages. This allegation came after Poole was erroneously informed that he had passed the bar exam, only to be told three days later that he had not due to a data entry error. Browne had filed a motion to dismiss the case based on the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction over the practice of law and her own immunity from Poole's claim.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Poole's complaint, though on different grounds. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals had failed to adequately consider the Supreme Court's full authority over bar admissions. The court also recognized that individuals who serve in a judicial capacity, such as Browne, are immune from civil liability for conduct and communications occurring in the performance of their duties. The court further clarified that Browne's actions, which Poole complained of, were the functional equivalent of judicial duties, thereby granting Browne absolute immunity. View "BROWNE V. POOLE" on Justia Law

In the case under review, the defendant, Paradise Burkhead, was charged with crimes committed when she was a juvenile. Under the juvenile transfer statute in effect at the time of her hearing, her case was transferred from the Jefferson District Court to the Jefferson Circuit Court for adult prosecution because she was over fourteen years old and had committed a felony with a firearm. After a new juvenile transfer statute came into effect, which eliminated the mandatory transfer requirement, Burkhead sought to have her case transferred back to the district court for a second transfer hearing. The circuit court granted her motion, despite the Commonwealth's objection. The Commonwealth appealed this decision, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the lower courts' decisions.The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the Commonwealth's interlocutory appeal was proper and that the circuit court erred by ordering a second transfer hearing. The court found that the interlocutory appeal was justified under KRS 22A.020(4) because it was adverse to the Commonwealth's interests, the proceedings were not suspended, the appeal followed normal rules and procedures, and the Attorney General affirmed that appellate review was important to the correct and uniform administration of the law.As for the retroactive application of the new juvenile transfer statute, the court held that "proceedings" in KRS 446.110 refers to the distinct phases of a case. Therefore, the court must apply the current procedural law governing the particular procedural phase being undertaken. The court held the transfer hearing was a completed phase of the criminal process, and nothing in KRS 446.110 suggested that a court must repeat a completed phase to comply with a procedural amendment. Therefore, the circuit court erred in remanding the case for a second transfer hearing. The case was remanded to the Jefferson Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "COMMONWEALTH V. BURKHEAD" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal denying a writ of prohibition against the circuit court, holding that S.I.A. Limited's argument that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over it was unavailing.SIA, a foreign Gibraltar corporation, allegedly engaged in illegal gambling activities involving Kentucky residents. SIA later voluntarily dissolved. SIA subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, requesting that the circuit court apply the law of Gibraltar to determine that the case must be dismissed because SIA was no longer a legal entity capable of being sued. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of appeals denied SIA's ensuing petition for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the law does not allow foreign corporations to use voluntary dissolution as a means to subsequently divest these Courts of such jurisdiction, and therefore, equity requires that this lawsuit continue. View "S.I.A. Ltd. v. Honorable Wingate" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court in this appeal challenging a ruling of the circuit court concerning the constitutionality of House Bill 348 (HB 348) and remanded the matter with instructions to dismiss the action in its entirety without prejudice, holding that Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed for lack of standing.HB 348 partially adopted the Supreme Court's 2016 proposed judicial redistricting plan, including the recommendation of the Supreme Court that one of the divisions of general jurisdiction in the thirty-first judicial circuit be eliminated. Plaintiff initiated this action arguing that HB 348's elimination of one division of general jurisdiction violated section 112(3) of the Kentucky Constitution. In a mixed ruling, the circuit court concluded that HB 348 was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment, holding that Plaintiff failed to allege a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact to confer constitutional standing in her individual capacity. View "Bradley v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals reviewing an appeal from an interlocutory order in a civil action denying immunity under Kentucky's "Stand Your Ground" law, Ky. Rev. Stat. 503.085, holding that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction.Defendant was indicted on charges of murder and first-degree assault. Defendant moved the trial court to find him immune from prosecution under section 503.085. The circuit court granted Defendant's motion for immunity and ordered that the indictments against him be dismissed with prejudice. Thereafter, Defendant filed motions for judgment on the pleadings in a civil case stemming from the same incident leading to the criminal charges, arguing that collateral estoppel and section 503.085(1) required that he be immune from civil action. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, finding that collateral estoppel applied. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion below, holding that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal. View "Childers v. Albright" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision dismissing Appellant's appeal from a circuit court order terminating her parental rights, holding that the court of appeals erred in holding that Appellant's failure to name the children in her notice of appeal was a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal.In ordering the appeal to be dismissed, the court of appeals held that serving the children's guardian ad litem with the notice of appeal was insufficient to cure the jurisdiction defect in this case of failing to name the children in either the caption or body of the notice of appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) service of the notice of appeal upon a child's guardian ad litem is sufficient to confer jurisdiction over that child to an appellate court; and (2) R.L.W. v. Cabinet for Human Resrouces, 756 S.W.2d 148 (Ky. App. 1988), is overruled insofar as it holds that the failure to name a child in a notice of appeal from a termination of parental rights is automatic grounds for dismissal. View "M.A.B. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted motions to dismiss this appeal from the court of appeals' denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus directing Jefferson Circuit Court Judge Olu A. Stevens to rule on a summary judgment motion, holding that the appeal must be dismissed as moot.During the pendency of this appeal, Judge Stevens issued an order granting summary judgment to Louisville Metro Government (LMG) and dismissing with prejudice all claims against it on the grounds of sovereign immunity. The judge rejected the claim of governmental immunity asserted by the other defendant, Parking Authority of River City, Inc. (PARC), based on multiple issues of material fact leading to the denial of its request for summary judgment. PARC, however, was cleared to seek an immediate interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal at hand, holding that because the request for a ruling on the summary judgment motion was issued, the need for a writ of mandamus no longer existed. View "Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government v. Honorable Olu A. Stevens" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals vacating the order of the trial court denying Ford Motor Company's motion for summary judgment, holding that neither the court of appeals nor this Court had appellate jurisdiction of this unauthorized interlocutory appeal.Plaintiff sued Ford and multiple other defendants, alleging that Ford was one of the parties responsible for causing his malignant mesothelioma. Just over two years after the suit was filed, Ford moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion in a one-sentence handwritten order that contained no analysis or reasoning. The merits panel of the court of appeals vacated the trial court's order and remanded for the trial court to enter another order with a basis for its determination. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, holding that the interlocutory order in this case did not meet the requirements of the collateral order doctrine, and therefore, the court of appeals and this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. View "Commonwealth v. Hess" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's request for a writ of prohibition and/or mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate the denial of her motion to stay discovery in a wrongful death/negligence action, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that denial of the stay would cause her great and irreparable harm, and therefore, a writ was unavailable to her.The wrongful death/negligence action named as defendants Petitioner, her former employer and others. Petitioner sought to stay discovery in the action until a parallel criminal case against her alone was completed. In this action seeking writ relief Petitioner sought to stay all civil discovery until her indictment was resolved so that she could freely exercise her constitutional right to remain silent. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to the requested writ. View "Barnes v. Honorable Julie Goodman" on Justia Law