Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around Timothy Poole, a law graduate who failed the Kentucky Bar Examination five times. Poole claimed that the Kentucky Office of Bar Admissions (KYOBA) and its Executive Director, Valetta Browne, denied him necessary accommodations, leading to his repeated failures. He sought either retroactive admission to the Kentucky Bar Association or permission to retake the exam with all his accommodations.Previously, Poole had initiated a lawsuit in Fayette Circuit Court, alleging negligence on Browne's part regarding the October 2020 exam, which caused him emotional distress, loss of employment opportunities, and other damages. However, the complaint was dismissed, with the court ruling that individuals serving in a judicial capacity are immune from civil liability for their conduct and communications during their duties.The Supreme Court of Kentucky, after reviewing Poole's petition, his interactions with the KYOBA, and the accommodations offered, found that Poole was given appropriate accommodation and ample opportunities to pass the bar exam. The court noted that Poole voluntarily chose to sit for the exam twice without any accommodations, despite having inquired about them and allegedly possessing the required materials for his application. The court also pointed out that Poole never voiced any objection to the additional testing time allowance afforded to him and did not appeal that determination.The court also clarified that the rule limiting attempts to pass the bar exam to five, including attempts on the Uniform Bar Examination (UBE) taken in Kentucky or any other jurisdiction from February 2021 onwards, applies to all attempts, not just those after February 2021.The court concluded that Poole's application process and the exams were conducted in a fair and equitable manner, and any failure to approve and implement additional accommodations was due to Poole's failure to apply for them or seek appellate review of the accommodation granted. The court affirmed the KYOBA's determination that Poole had exhausted his attempts to pass the Kentucky Bar Exam and denied his requests for relief. View "Poole v. Browne" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a car accident that occurred on November 4, 2015, involving Donna Powers and Fendol Carruthers, Jr. Carruthers was charged and pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Powers claimed to have sustained serious, permanent injuries from the crash. Carruthers was insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) with a policy limit of $50,000. Powers began receiving Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits from her own insurance carrier, Kentucky Farm Bureau (KFB). The Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA) imposes a two-year statute of limitations for tort actions arising from motor vehicle accidents. Powers received her last PIP payment on August 4, 2016, meaning any tort claim she wished to assert arising from her accident with Carruthers must have been filed by August 4, 2018.Powers filed a complaint in McCracken Circuit Court on April 3, 2018, asserting a negligence claim against Carruthers and an underinsured motorist (UIM) claim against KFB. However, Carruthers had died two years earlier in March 2016, unbeknownst to Powers or her attorneys. The case remained stagnant for the next year, with Powers failing to take any action to rectify the portion of her complaint that was a nullity against Carruthers. It wasn't until August 2019 that Powers successfully moved the district court to appoint the Public Administrator to act as Administrator of Carruthers’s Estate.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the decisions of the lower courts, which had dismissed Powers’s negligence claim against Carruthers, denied Powers’s motions for substitution and revival, denied Powers’s motion for leave to amend her complaint to raise a new claim, and granted summary judgment in favor of KFB. The court held that Powers’s claim against Carruthers was null, and her attempted claim against the Estate was untimely. Furthermore, Powers’s inability to recover from Carruthers or the Estate foreclosed her underinsured motorist claim against KFB. View "Powers v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The case originates from a dispute over the jurisdiction for a child custody matter. The parties involved are Justin Aldava and Alyssa Baum, parents of H.A., a child born in Texas in 2019. The couple moved from Texas to Kentucky, then to Washington for Aldava's work, and back to Texas. Eventually, Baum and H.A. moved back to Kentucky. In November 2020, Baum filed a petition for an order of protection in Kentucky, indicating she sought temporary custody of H.A. Aldava filed a custody petition in Texas in December 2020. The issue arises from the interpretation of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), specifically the definition of "home state" and "temporary absence".The Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded that under the UCCJEA, a bright-line, objective standard should be used to determine a child's "home state" - focusing on where the child has lived in the six months preceding the custody proceeding, and not the intent of the parties. Applying this standard, the court found that neither Texas nor Kentucky had initial jurisdiction over H.A. when custody was first raised, as H.A. had not lived in any state long enough to establish "home state" status. However, Kentucky obtained temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA due to Baum's petition for an order of protection. Consequently, Kentucky was the only state with any jurisdiction over H.A., and the custody action should be heard there. The court concluded that the Texas court's later finding that Texas was H.A.'s home state did not divest Kentucky of jurisdiction. The ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. View "ALDAVA V. JOHNSON" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky was asked to determine whether the 2017 and 2021 amendments to KRS 413.249, which extended the statute of limitations for civil claims of childhood sexual assault and abuse, could be applied retroactively to revive claims that were already time-barred. The case arose out of the alleged sexual abuse of Samantha Killary by her adoptive father, Sean Jackman, and others. Killary filed a lawsuit against Jackman and others in 2018, after Jackman was convicted of the abuse. However, the defendants argued that the claims were time-barred under the 2007 version of KRS 413.249, which was in effect when the abuse occurred. The trial court and Court of Appeals disagreed on whether the 2017 and 2021 amendments could be applied retroactively to revive Killary's claims.The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that while KRS 413.249 is a remedial statute that should be applied retroactively, the defendants had a vested right to assert a statute of limitations defense that was not overcome by the addition of a new triggering event in the 2017 and 2021 amendments. Furthermore, the court found that the 2021 amendment's provision for the revival of time-barred claims did not apply to Killary's claims because they were already time-barred at the time of the amendment's enactment. The court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the claims against the defendants. The court based its decision on a long line of Kentucky cases holding that a vested right to assert a statute of limitations defense cannot be divested by retroactive legislation. View "Thompson v. Killary" on Justia Law

In 2019, Keith McWhorter and his wife, Carol, filed a lawsuit against Baptist Healthcare System, Inc., alleging medical negligence and loss of consortium. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs failed to file a certificate of merit as required by Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 411.167, a law enacted to reduce meritless lawsuits against medical providers. The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice due to this omission. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing they had complied with the requirements of KRS 411.167(7) and that the defendant had waived the certificate of merit argument by not including it in their initial answer. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that none of the issues the plaintiffs raised were properly preserved for appellate review, as they did not call these errors to the attention of the trial court. However, the court did note that had the claim of compliance under KRS 411.167(7) been properly before the court, they would have held that a plaintiff must file this information with the complaint. As a result, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, dismissing the case with prejudice. View "MCWHORTER V. BAPTIST HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC." on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky analyzed KRS 411.167, a law requiring claimants to file a certificate of merit alongside their complaint. The plaintiff, Mario Sanchez, had filed a suit against doctors and the medical facility, but without a certificate of merit. The trial court dismissed the case because Sanchez failed to comply with KRS 411.167. Sanchez appealed, arguing that the certificate requirement only applied to parties representing themselves, and that his responses to the defendant's discovery requests effectively complied with the statute. The Court of Appeals disagreed with Sanchez's interpretation but remanded the case back to the trial court to determine if Sanchez's failure to file a certificate of merit was due to excusable neglect under CR 6.02.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed that KRS 411.167 applies to all claimants, whether represented by counsel or not, and rejected Sanchez's argument that he technically and substantively complied with the statute. The court ruled that strict compliance with the statute was required, rendering the statute effectively meaningless if only substantial compliance was necessary. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision to remand the case back to the trial court, stating that Sanchez's failure to adequately request relief under CR 6.02 at the trial court level should not benefit him now. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision to dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice due to Sanchez's failure to file a certificate of merit. View "MCMILLIN, M.D. V. SANCHEZ" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky addressed the procedural issue of whether a notice of appeal could be filed electronically in a termination of parental rights (TPR) case that had been sealed. The court had to interpret the relevant statutes and rules, which stated that TPR cases should be sealed upon the entry of the final order and that sealed cases were not eligible for electronic filing. The Court of Appeals had ruled that the appellant had complied with the rules for timely filing a notice of appeal, as the rules were ambiguous about whether a TPR case could be electronically filed after it had been sealed.However, the Supreme Court of Kentucky disagreed with the lower court. It held that the statutory law and administrative rule, read together, effectively prohibited a notice of appeal from being electronically filed in a TPR case. The Court found no ambiguity in this interpretation. It pointed out that the rules clearly stated that TPR cases were always confidential but would only be sealed upon the entry of the trial court’s final order. Once sealed, these cases were no longer subject to mandatory electronic filing.Therefore, the Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded that the appellant had not complied with the rules for timely filing a notice of appeal, as the notice should have been filed conventionally. As a result, the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s termination of the appellant's parental rights. View "CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES V. D.W." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed a decision by the Court of Appeals that had remanded a case back to the Fayette Circuit Court over the perception of a jurisdictional error. The original plaintiff, Timothy Poole, had filed a lawsuit against Valetta Browne, Executive Director of the Kentucky Office of Bar Admissions (KYOBA), alleging she had negligently performed her duties and caused him damages. This allegation came after Poole was erroneously informed that he had passed the bar exam, only to be told three days later that he had not due to a data entry error. Browne had filed a motion to dismiss the case based on the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction over the practice of law and her own immunity from Poole's claim.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Poole's complaint, though on different grounds. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals had failed to adequately consider the Supreme Court's full authority over bar admissions. The court also recognized that individuals who serve in a judicial capacity, such as Browne, are immune from civil liability for conduct and communications occurring in the performance of their duties. The court further clarified that Browne's actions, which Poole complained of, were the functional equivalent of judicial duties, thereby granting Browne absolute immunity. View "BROWNE V. POOLE" on Justia Law

In the case under review, the defendant, Paradise Burkhead, was charged with crimes committed when she was a juvenile. Under the juvenile transfer statute in effect at the time of her hearing, her case was transferred from the Jefferson District Court to the Jefferson Circuit Court for adult prosecution because she was over fourteen years old and had committed a felony with a firearm. After a new juvenile transfer statute came into effect, which eliminated the mandatory transfer requirement, Burkhead sought to have her case transferred back to the district court for a second transfer hearing. The circuit court granted her motion, despite the Commonwealth's objection. The Commonwealth appealed this decision, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the lower courts' decisions.The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the Commonwealth's interlocutory appeal was proper and that the circuit court erred by ordering a second transfer hearing. The court found that the interlocutory appeal was justified under KRS 22A.020(4) because it was adverse to the Commonwealth's interests, the proceedings were not suspended, the appeal followed normal rules and procedures, and the Attorney General affirmed that appellate review was important to the correct and uniform administration of the law.As for the retroactive application of the new juvenile transfer statute, the court held that "proceedings" in KRS 446.110 refers to the distinct phases of a case. Therefore, the court must apply the current procedural law governing the particular procedural phase being undertaken. The court held the transfer hearing was a completed phase of the criminal process, and nothing in KRS 446.110 suggested that a court must repeat a completed phase to comply with a procedural amendment. Therefore, the circuit court erred in remanding the case for a second transfer hearing. The case was remanded to the Jefferson Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "COMMONWEALTH V. BURKHEAD" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal denying a writ of prohibition against the circuit court, holding that S.I.A. Limited's argument that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over it was unavailing.SIA, a foreign Gibraltar corporation, allegedly engaged in illegal gambling activities involving Kentucky residents. SIA later voluntarily dissolved. SIA subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, requesting that the circuit court apply the law of Gibraltar to determine that the case must be dismissed because SIA was no longer a legal entity capable of being sued. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of appeals denied SIA's ensuing petition for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the law does not allow foreign corporations to use voluntary dissolution as a means to subsequently divest these Courts of such jurisdiction, and therefore, equity requires that this lawsuit continue. View "S.I.A. Ltd. v. Honorable Wingate" on Justia Law