Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A child in the custody of the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) suffered severe abuse by his adoptive mother. Just before his 21st birthday, he filed a tort suit against OCS and his adoptive mother. OCS moved to dismiss the lawsuit as untimely. The child argued that the statute of limitations should be tolled for three reasons: it was tolled while he was in OCS custody until age 19, collateral estoppel should prevent OCS from arguing he was competent to file suit, and equitable tolling should apply. The superior court rejected these arguments and dismissed the suit as untimely.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, found that the child’s claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations for tort claims. The court concluded that the statute of limitations was not tolled during the child’s extended foster care past age 18, as the age of majority in Alaska is 18. The court also found that the child was competent to file suit and that equitable tolling did not apply because the child had not demonstrated that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing on time.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that the statute of limitations was not tolled during the child’s extended foster care because the age of majority is 18, and the extended foster care statute does not create an exception. The court also held that OCS was not estopped from arguing the child was competent because the issues in the conservatorship and partial guardianship proceedings were not identical to the issue of competency to file suit. Finally, the court held that equitable tolling did not apply because the child did not demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances made it impossible to file on time. The judgment of the superior court was affirmed. View "Blake J. v. State" on Justia Law

In this juvenile proceeding, the Pitt County Department of Social Services (DSS) received several reports in 2021 regarding the respondent mother’s interactions with her children, Amanda, Jade, and Juliet. Incidents included the mother breaking a car window to reach Jade, hitting her with a belt, and leaving her outside in cold weather. DSS filed petitions alleging neglect and dependency for the children. The trial court admitted statements from Jade, who did not testify, and concluded that all three children were neglected and that Jade and Juliet were dependent.The District Court of Pitt County entered an order based on these findings. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that many of the trial court’s findings were based on inadmissible hearsay and reversed the trial court’s order, remanding the case with instructions to dismiss the juvenile petitions. The Court of Appeals held that the remaining findings were insufficient to support the trial court’s conclusions of neglect and dependency.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and found that the Court of Appeals did not adequately examine whether the remaining findings supported the trial court’s conclusions or whether the record contained sufficient evidence to support necessary findings. The Supreme Court determined that while some findings were unsupported, the record contained clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that could support the necessary findings for neglect and dependency adjudications. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings, allowing the trial court to enter a new order based on the existing record or conduct further proceedings as necessary. View "In re A.J., J.C., J.C" on Justia Law

The case involves the removal of a newborn child, N., from her mother, C.J., due to the mother's substance abuse and mental health issues. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) placed N. with a foster caregiver, who was a trial attorney for the County Counsel’s office. Maternal aunt (aunt) requested placement of N. shortly after her birth, but DCFS failed to assess her for over a year despite repeated requests from mother’s counsel, N.’s counsel, and aunt herself. During this period, visitation between N. and her family was severely limited, with the caregiver dictating the visitation schedule.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County repeatedly ordered DCFS to assess aunt for placement, but DCFS did not comply. Eventually, aunt’s home was approved for placement, but DCFS still did not move N. to aunt’s care, deferring to the caregiver’s objections. By the time the court considered aunt for placement, over a year had passed, and the court found it was too late to apply the relative placement preference. The court also found that it was not in N.’s best interest to move her due to her bond with the caregiver.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that DCFS’s delays in evaluating aunt for placement and the court’s lackluster response to the family’s pleas for supportive services were prejudicial. The court concluded that the juvenile court erred by failing to apply the relative placement preference under section 361.3 and that the error was prejudicial. The appellate court reversed the order terminating mother’s reunification services, the order denying mother’s section 361.3 motion, and the order terminating her parental rights, and remanded for further proceedings. The court also directed DCFS and the juvenile court to ensure compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) requirements. View "In re N.J." on Justia Law

A juvenile male, B.N.M., was accused of participating in the murder of his girlfriend’s parents when he was fifteen years old. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma transferred him to adult status, allowing him to be prosecuted as an adult. B.N.M. challenged this decision, arguing that the district court made errors in its analysis and that transferring him for adult prosecution was unconstitutional due to the severe penalties for first-degree murder.The district court's decision was based on the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, which outlines factors to consider when deciding whether to transfer a juvenile for adult prosecution. The magistrate judge found that the nature of the offense and the availability of programs to treat the juvenile’s behavioral problems weighed in favor of transfer. The magistrate judge noted that if B.N.M. were adjudicated as a juvenile, he would be released at twenty-one, and there was a low likelihood of sufficient rehabilitation by that age. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, despite B.N.M.'s objections.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. B.N.M. argued that the district court erred by misattributing testimony from the government’s expert to his expert and by not properly considering his role as a follower in the crimes. He also argued that the district court improperly shifted the burden of proof regarding the availability of community programs for his rehabilitation. The Tenth Circuit found that the misattribution of testimony did not affect the outcome and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the factors. The court also held that B.N.M.'s constitutional argument was not ripe for review. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to transfer B.N.M. for adult prosecution. View "United States v. B.N.M." on Justia Law

In the summer of 2022, two cousins, 17-year-old B.K. and 15-year-old S.K., visiting from Illinois, threw stolen fireworks into a Costco trash bin, causing a fire that resulted in property damage. The juveniles admitted to one delinquent act of criminal mischief each, while allegations of theft were dismissed by the State. Costco sought restitution for approximately $25,000, an amount initially considered by the State as “very unreasonable.” After a restitution hearing, the juvenile court issued a restitution order for $28,750, enforceable as a civil-judgment lien, holding the juveniles jointly and severally responsible for payment in full.The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's decision, holding that the restitution orders amount to enforceable judgment liens. The panel acknowledged that the governing statute does not expressly state that the restitution order is a judgment lien or that the juvenile court may enter the restitution order as a civil judgment. However, the court found the criminal restitution statute, which does consider a restitution order as a judgment lien, instructive.The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision, holding that the juvenile court lacked the authority to enforce its order as a civil-judgment lien. The court found that the juvenile restitution statute does not contain language that characterizes restitution as a civil judgment. The court also emphasized that Indiana courts must construe the juvenile code liberally to ensure that children within the juvenile justice system are treated as persons in need of care, protection, treatment, and rehabilitation. The court concluded that reading a judgment-lien provision into the Juvenile Restitution Statute runs counter to these statutory directives. The case was remanded for reconsideration of the restitution order in light of the court's holding. View "B. K. v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

The case involves a minor, Andrew M., who tested positive for methadone at birth and was placed in foster care. His biological parents, S.M. and A.M., failed to reunify with him. Despite this, the juvenile court decided not to terminate the parents' parental rights, citing the parental-benefit exception, which applies if a parent shows that they maintained regular visitation with the child, the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parents, and terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even considering the benefit of a new, adoptive home.The Superior Court of Orange County had previously ordered Andrew to be removed from parental custody and provided the parents with reunification services. However, the parents failed to reunify with Andrew and their services were terminated. The court then scheduled a permanency planning hearing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three reviewed the case. Andrew's appointed appellate counsel argued that the juvenile court's decision not to terminate the parents' parental rights was an abuse of discretion. The Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA), although a respondent in this appeal, supported Andrew's counsel's position. The court agreed with Andrew's counsel and the SSA, concluding that the circumstances did not support the application of the parental-benefit exception. The court reversed the lower court's order and remanded the matter with instructions. View "In re Andrew M." on Justia Law

The case involves two petitioners, Daniel Dilly, Superintendent of the Rubenstein Juvenile Center (RJC), and Nancy Oldaker, Health Services Administrator at RJC, who were held in contempt of court by Judge Kurt Hall of the Circuit Court of Lewis County, West Virginia. The contempt charges arose from an incident involving a resident of RJC, identified as D.P., who suffered a broken jaw during a fight with other residents. The court had ordered that D.P. be taken off RJC grounds for an X-ray and that his mother be notified of his medical appointments. The court found that these orders were not adequately followed by the petitioners.The Circuit Court of Lewis County held a hearing to review D.P.'s placement and medical care, resulting in a "Medical Care Order" that directed RJC to schedule an appointment for D.P. with his oral surgeon and to allow D.P.'s mother to attend the appointment. The court also ordered RJC to provide a report concerning the incident that led to D.P.'s injury. When these orders were not fully complied with, the court held a "show cause" hearing and found both Superintendent Dilly and Ms. Oldaker in contempt of court, fining each of them $250.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found that procedural errors in the lower court's contempt proceedings deprived the court of jurisdiction to impose such sanctions. The court noted that the lower court failed to provide the petitioners with adequate notice that they were facing indirect criminal contempt proceedings and did not afford them jury trials before imposing the fines. The court concluded that the contempt orders were void and granted the petitioners' requested writs of prohibition, thereby preventing the lower court from enforcing the contempt orders. View "State ex rel. Dilly v. Hall" on Justia Law

A juvenile, K.C., was charged with two serious misdemeanors: carrying dangerous weapons and possession of marijuana. As K.C. was 17 at the time of the incident, the juvenile court had initial jurisdiction. However, after K.C. turned 18, the State filed a petition to waive the juvenile court's jurisdiction. In preparation for the waiver hearing, K.C. hired a forensic psychologist, Dr. Tracy Thomas, to conduct an evaluation. K.C. requested the State to cover Dr. Thomas's fees, which were estimated to be $7,990. The juvenile court initially authorized the fees but later set a limit of $4,590, deeming the full amount unreasonable. K.C. filed a motion for additional expert fees, which was denied by the juvenile court. K.C. then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the juvenile court acted illegally by not properly determining whether the requested expert fees were reasonable.The Supreme Court of Iowa agreed with K.C. that the juvenile court's order was not supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that three of the four reasons the juvenile court initially cited for deeming the full fee unreasonable were no longer relevant. The court also found that the juvenile court failed to provide any explanation for why it declined to increase the fee award or reconsider its denial. The Supreme Court of Iowa concluded that the juvenile court's reasoning was based on an erroneous application of law and thereby abused its discretion.The Supreme Court of Iowa sustained the writ of certiorari, vacated the juvenile court's orders denying K.C.'s requests for additional expert fees, and remanded the matter for entry of an order authorizing the full $7,791.20 in expert fees for Dr. Thomas's work. View "K.C. v. Iowa District Court for Polk County" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Taylor C., who was declared a ward of the court at the age of 14. After his wardship ended, Taylor successfully moved to dismiss his wardship petitions under the Welfare and Institutions Code section 782. He then sought to seal his juvenile court records. However, the juvenile court denied his request, citing his prior adjudications for committing forcible lewd conduct, which made his records ineligible for sealing under section 781, subdivision (a)(1)(F). Taylor appealed, arguing that the dismissal of his wardship petitions erased the adjudication of his offenses as if they never existed.The lower court had granted Taylor's motion to dismiss his wardship petitions, finding that the interests of justice and Taylor's welfare warranted dismissal and that he was no longer in need of rehabilitation. However, it denied his motion to seal his juvenile court records, citing the prohibition in subdivision (a)(1)(F) of section 781 on sealing records relating to his forcible lewd conduct offenses.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the dismissal of a juvenile petition under section 782 does not obviate the prohibition on sealing records under section 781, subdivision (a)(1)(F) in cases involving certain delineated offenses. The court found that Taylor's records were ineligible for sealing because section 782, subdivision (e) provides that dismissal of a petition does not alone constitute a sealing of records and section 781, subdivision (a)(1)(F), precludes sealing due to the forcible lewd conduct offenses. View "In re Taylor C." on Justia Law

In 2022, a delinquency petition was filed against G.W., a 17-year-old, alleging that he had committed acts that would be considered theft and criminal trespass if committed as an adult. G.W. admitted to one allegation of theft and one allegation of criminal trespass. After G.W. went missing and was later found in Mississippi, he was returned to Indiana for his dispositional hearing. The juvenile court rejected G.W.'s request for home detention and ordered wardship of G.W. to the Department of Correction (DOC). However, the court's dispositional order did not include specific findings to support G.W.'s commitment, as required by statute.The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's decision but acknowledged that the order failed to comply with the applicable statutory requirements. The panel remanded the case for an amended dispositional order which includes the written findings and conclusions required by the statute. After the Court of Appeals had delivered its decision, but before it had certified that decision, the juvenile court issued an amended dispositional order which included the required statutory findings.The Indiana Supreme Court held that when a juvenile court fails to enter the requisite findings of fact in its dispositional order, an appellate court should neither affirm nor reverse. Instead, the proper remedy is to remand the case under Indiana Appellate Rule 66(C)(8) while holding the appeal in abeyance. This process adheres to the applicable statutory requirements, preserves the distinct roles played by trial courts and appellate courts, and (in some cases) justifies the cost of juvenile detention. The court remanded the case to the juvenile court for entry of its amended dispositional order. View "G.W. v. State" on Justia Law