Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Wataniya, a Qatari corporation, operates restaurant franchises in the Middle East and North Africa. It has never operated any franchises in the U.S., nor does it have any offices, representatives, or employees in Michigan. Other defendants are natural persons, all citizens of Qatar. Beydoun,a U.S. citizen, was approached in Michigan by a Wataniya representative about becoming Wataniya’s CEO to “bring Western culture and restaurant franchises to the Middle East.” Beydoun accepted the position and moved to Qatar in 2007; his family followed in 2008. After moving to Qatar, Beydoun made several business trips to Michigan on Wataniya’s behalf. Wataniya purchased restaurant equipment from Michigan companies. After the relationship soured, the company accused Beydoun of mismanagement and of stealing significant sums of money. Beydoun responded that the company had not paid him his salary nor reimbursed him for living expenses. Wataniya revoked his exit visa, rendering Beydoun unable to leave Qatar. Beydoun filed suit in the Qatari courts seeking back pay and benefits. Wataniya counter-sued for $13.7 million and lodged a criminal complaint. Wataniya’s lawsuit and the criminal complaint were dismissed and Beydoun was awarded $170,000 by the Qatari courts. Beydoun was not legally permitted to return to Michigan until more than a year had passed. Beydoun sued in Michigan, alleging false imprisonment, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Beydoun failed to establish that the claims proximately resulted from Wataniya’s contacts with MichiganView "Beydoun v. Wataniya Rest. Holding, QSC" on Justia Law

The Republic appealed the district court's dismissal of its claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., the Foreign Practices Act (FCPA), 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1 et seq., and common law. The Republic filed suit against defendants, alleging that they conspired with Iraq's former president, Saddam Hussein and others, to corrupt and plunder an United Nations humanitarian program called Oil-for-Food. The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) and declined to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff's remaining claims. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the RICO claims were properly dismissed on the basis of in pari delicto; the Republic does not have a right of action under the FDCPA; and the common-law claims arose under state law, and the district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them.View "The Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG" on Justia Law

The Swareks filed suit against Herman Derr and DPI in Chancery Court, alleging that Derr and his corporation breached a contract for the sale of Mississippi farmland. Derr died while the action was pending and years later, Derr Heirs filed suit against the Swareks in the German Regional Court seeking a declaratory judgment that they were not liable for any claims arising from the putative land contract. After the initiation of the German lawsuit but before the decision of the Regional Court, the Swareks dismissed all of their claims against Derr with prejudice and withdrew a pending motion to substitute the Derr Heirs in the Mississippi action. The Regional Court dismissed the Derr Heirs' claim but the German Higher Regional Court reversed. Subsequently, the Derr Heirs returned to Mississippi and attempted to enforce a German order for costs in federal district court. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to enforce the German cost award where the Higher Regional Court's decision to sidestep the comity determination and readjudicate claims that had already been settled in the Chancery Court violated the Mississippi public policy of res judicata and the Swarek's right to permanently terminate their claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Derr, et al. v. Swarek, et al." on Justia Law

In 2008, plaintiffs were driving a 2004 Jeep Cherokee in San Joaquin County, when the vehicle rolled over and the roof collapsed. Young sustained injuries, rendering her a permanent quadriplegic. Young’s daughter allegedly suffered physical and emotional harm. They filed suit, claiming that the roof and restraint systems were defectively designed. The vehicle at issue was designed, manufactured, and distributed by DaimlerChrysler Corporation (DCC), a former indirect subsidiary of Daimler. Among others, the complaint named Daimler and DCC as defendants. Daimler is a German public stock company that designs and manufactures Mercedes-Benz vehicles in Germany and has its principal place of business in Stuttgart. Before 1998, DCC was known as Chrysler Corporation. After a 1998 agreement, Chrysler Corporation became an indirect subsidiary of Daimler and changed its name to DCC. DCC was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan. It ceased to be a subsidiary of Daimler in 2007, changing its name to Chrysler LLC. Daimler is not a successor-in-interest to DCC or Chrysler LLC. Plaintiffs served Daimler with the complaint in accordance with the Hague Convention. The trial court quashed service for lack of personal jurisdiction over Daimler AG. The court of appeal affirmed, relying on the 2014 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman.View "Young v. Daimler AG" on Justia Law

Fellowes filed a breach-of-contract suit against Changzou Fellowes, a business established in China, under the international diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(2). Without discussing subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court entered a preliminary injunction in favor of Fellowes, despite the court’s assumption that Changzhou Fellowes had not been served with process. The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that diversity jurisdiction is proper only if Changzhou Fellowes has its own citizenship, independent of its investors or members. Deciding whether a business enterprise based in a foreign nation should be treated as a corporation for the purpose of section 1332 can be difficult. Given the parties’ agreement that Changzhou Fellowes is closer to a limited liability company than to any other business structure in the U.S., it does not have its own citizenship and it does have the Illinois citizenship of its member Hong Kong Fellowes, which prevents litigation under the diversity jurisdiction. View "Fellowes Inc. v. Changzhou Xinrui Fellowes Office Equip. Co." on Justia Law

Idento makes robotic milking machines in the Netherlands. BouMatic, LLC, based in Wisconsin, entered into an agreement for purchasing and reselling those machines in Belgium. BouMatic claims that Idento breached the agreement by selling direct to at least one of BouMatic’s Belgian customers and by failing to provide parts and warranty service. The district court dismissed, ruling that commercial transactions in the European Union do not expose Idento to litigation in Wisconsin even though BouMatic has its headquarters there, the parties exchanged drafts between Wisconsin and the Netherlands, and Idento shipped one machine to Wisconsin. After exploring the nature of the business entities, the Seventh Circuit vacated for consideration of personal jurisdiction in light of the contract language. Litigants cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction by agreement or omission, but personal jurisdiction is a personal right that a litigant may waive or forfeit. View "BouMatic LLC v. Idento Operations BV" on Justia Law

After the Republic of Argentina defaulted on its external debt, NML, one of its bondholders, prevailed in 11 debt-collection actions filed against Argentina in New York. To execute its judgments, NML sought discovery of Argentina’s property, serving subpoenas on nonparty banks for records relating to global financial transactions. The district court granted motions to compel compliance. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting Argentina’s argument that the order transgressed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1602. The Supreme Court affirmed; the FSIA does not immunize a foreign-sovereign judgment debtor from post-judgment discovery of information concerning its extraterritorial assets. The FSIA replaced factor-intensive loosely-common-law-based immunity with “a comprehensive framework for resolving any claim of sovereign immunity” so that any sort of immunity defense made by a foreign sovereign in a U.S. court must stand or fall on its text. The FSIA established jurisdictional immunity, section 1604, which was waived here. FSIA execution immunity under sections 1609, 1610, 1611, generally shields “property in the United States of a foreign state” from attachment, arrest, and execution. Nothing forbids or limits discovery in aid of execution of a foreign-sovereign judgment debtor’s assets. Even if Argentina is correct that section 1609 execution immunity implies coextensive discovery-¬in-aid-of-execution immunity, there would be no protection from discovery a foreign sovereign’s extraterritorial assets. Section 1609 immunizes only foreign-state property “in the United States.” The prospect that NML’s general request for information about Argentina’s worldwide assets may turn up information about property that Argentina regards as immune does not mean that NML cannot pursue its discovery. View "Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd." on Justia Law