Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Respondent is a former employee who won a judgment in Argentina's National Court of Labor Appeals against Citibank, N.A. Petitioner, the Argentinian branch of Citibank, N.A., filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association and brought the proceedings below. The district court compelled arbitration, preliminarily enjoined the employee from enforcing the Argentinian judgment against Petitioner, and held Respondent in contempt of court. It also denied his motion to dismiss.   The Second Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Petition. Therefore, the district court was without authority to issue its orders in this case. The court reversed the district court's orders -- including its order to compel arbitration, the preliminary injunction it entered against Respondent, its order finding Respondent in contempt, and its order requiring Respondent to pay the Branch's attorneys' fees and costs. The court concluded that because the Branch has not shown it enjoys independent legal existence and Citibank has not sought to substitute itself or join this action as the real party in interest, there has been no party adverse to Respondent. Without adverse parties, there can be no subject matter jurisdiction under Article III. View "The branch of Citibank, N.A., established in the Republic of Argentina v." on Justia Law

The United States (“the Government”) initiated a civil forfeiture suit in federal district court against a $380 million arbitration award fund, the majority of which is held in the United Kingdom. The fund belongs to PetroSaudi Oil Services (Venezuela) Ltd. (“PetroSaudi”), a private oil company incorporated in Barbados. PetroSaudi won the award in an arbitration proceeding against Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (“PDVSA”), a Venezuelan state energy company. The portion of the fund held in the United Kingdom (“the fund”) is held in an account controlled by the High Court of England and Wales (“the High Court”). The Government seeks forfeiture of the fund on the ground that it derives from proceeds of an illegal scheme to steal one billion dollars from the Malaysian sovereign wealth fund 1Malaysia Development Berhad (“1MDB”). PetroSaudi challenged two orders entered by the district court.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s interlocutory orders. The panel held that PetroSaudi’s appeal from the district court’s protective order under 18 U.S.C. Section 983 fell within this exception. Accordingly, the court had jurisdiction to consider the appeals of the two orders. The panel concluded that the sovereign immunity of the United Kingdom, as codified in the FSIA, did not protect the arbitration award fund from the two orders issued by the district court. The panel held that because the district court had in rem jurisdiction over the fund, it did not need in personam jurisdiction over PetroSaudi to issue an order preserving the fund. View "USA V. PETROSAUDI OIL SERV. (VENEZUELA) LTD., ET AL" on Justia Law

In an action brought by the Cassirer family under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, seeking the return of a Pissarro painting stolen by the Nazis and now in the possession of Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation (TBC), an entity created and controlled by the Kingdom of Spain, the Ninth Circuit certified to the California Supreme Court the following question concerning the third step in California’s governmental interest choice-of-law test: Whether, under a comparative impairment analysis, California’s or Spain’s interest is more impaired if California’s rule that a person may not acquire title to a stolen item of personal property (because a thief cannot pass good title, and California has not adopted the doctrine of adverse possession for personal property), were subordinated to Spain’s rule that a person may obtain title to stolen property by adverse possession.   Applying the first step of California’s governmental interest test, the panel concluded that the issue in question was a question of personal property law: whether TBC or the Cassirers own the painting; and the relevant law of the two jurisdictions of Spain and California was different. Applying the second step of the test, the panel concluded that a true conflict existed between Spanish and California law, meaning that each jurisdiction had a legitimate interest in the application of its law and policy. The third step of the test required application of the law of the jurisdiction whose interest would be more impaired if its law were not applied. View "DAVID CASSIRER, ET AL V. THYSSEN-BORNEMISZA COLLECTION" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s judgment dismissing their claims against the Republic of Argentina (“Argentina”) in connection with sovereign bonds issued by Argentina and purchased by Plaintiffs. The Second Circuit vacated in part the district court’s previous judgment of dismissal and remanded the case for the district court to determine in the first instance whether Plaintiffs are entitled to bring suit under Argentine law. The district court found on remand that Plaintiffs were not. Plaintiffs appealed again, arguing that the district court’s findings are erroneous and that Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure offers them an alternative avenue to enforce their rights under the bonds in federal court.
The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs are not entitled to bring suit under Argentine law and that nothing in Rule 17 can be read to alter that result. The court explained that under Rule 17(a)(3), “[t]he court may not dismiss an action for failure to prosecute in the name of the real party in interest until, after an objection, a reasonable time has been allowed for the real party in interest to ratify, join, or be substituted into the action.” The court wrote that it has already concluded that Plaintiffs do not have the right to recover the bonds under Argentine law – the applicable substantive law in this case. That being so, Rule 17 provides no alternative avenue for Plaintiffs to bring suit in federal court. View "Bugliotti v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Noble House, L.L.C. (“Noble House”) appealed a judgment of dismissal, without prejudice, based on forum non conveniens, granted in favor of Defendant Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London (“Underwriters”). The district court ruled that the parties’ insurance policy contained an enforceable forum-selection clause requiring litigation in the courts of England and Wales and that a return-jurisdiction clause was not required.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that although there are arguably two forum-selection clauses at play, one foreign and one domestic, the district court concluded that the forum-election clause selecting the courts of England and Wales controls. Noble House does not dispute this conclusion in its opening brief. Nor does Noble House dispute that the foreign forum-selection clause is mandatory. Only the foreign forum-selection clause’s enforceability is contested, which is addressed under the “unreasonable under the circumstances” framework – not the usual “available and adequate” framework. Further, the court held that Noble House does not carry its “heavy burden of proof” to show that the clause selecting the courts of England and Wales is unreasonable under the circumstances. Moreover, Noble House offers no compelling reason justifying its filing in Texas or why its action could not be filed timely in the foreign fora. Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not err when it: (1) concluded that the foreign forum-selection clause is enforceable, or (2) failed to include a return-jurisdiction clause and total waiver of any statute-of-limitations defenses. View "Noble House v. Certain Underwriters" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a citizen of India, worked as a crew member on the Stargate, a merchant ship managed by the Singapore-based shipping company Eastern Pacific. Plaintiff brought suit against Eastern Pacific in the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging tort claims under the Jones Act and general maritime law, as well as contract claims arising from a collective bargaining agreement. In March 2020—after Plaintiff brought his complaint and Eastern Pacific consented to federal court jurisdiction, but before Plaintiff perfected service—Eastern Pacific sued Plaintiff in Goa, India. In the Indian suit, Eastern Pacific sought an anti-suit injunction to prevent Plaintiff from litigating in American court. Plaintiff sought an anti-suit injunction to prohibit Eastern Pacific from prosecuting its Indian suit against him. Finding the Indian litigation vexatious and oppressive and determining that it need not show comity to the Indian court that had attempted to enjoin the American suit, the district court granted the injunction in favor of Plaintiff. Eastern Pacific appealed the district court’s grant of the anti-suit injunction.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that there is no basis to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in granting the anti-suit injunction. The court reasoned that the district court was well within its discretion to conclude that the vexatiousness of the Indian litigation outweighed any comity concerns. View "Ganpat v. Eastern Pacific Shipping" on Justia Law

In its prior decision, the Ninth Circuit rejected Optional’s contention that DAS should be held in contempt for allegedly failing to comply with the May 2013 final judgment that was entered in these forfeiture proceedings. Optional filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) motion to amend the May 2013 judgment to provide that (1) the $12.6 million that DAS had received “is impressed with a constructive trust in favor of Optional” and that (2) “DAS is directed to return that $12,602,824.09, with interest, to Optional’s counsel.” Optional argued that the May 2013 judgment’s failure to specifically award the $12.6 million to Optional was a “scrivener’s error” that should be corrected under Rule 60(a). The district court denied Optional’s Rule 60(a) motion.   The Ninth Circuit granted DAS Corporation’s motion to summarily affirm the district court’s decision. First, the panel denied Optional’s motion to strike DAS’s papers, which alleged that DAS was not a proper party in this matter. The panel held that this contention was frivolous. The panel held that DAS had standing to object to the proposed entry of a subsequent final judgment that, in its view, did not correctly reflect the court’s earlier rulings that finally disposed of the matter as to DAS. The panel granted DAS’s motion for summary affirmance. Finally, the panel held that despite being warned in the prior decision that its prior litigation maneuvers had gone too far, Optional filed this utterly meritless appeal and filed a frivolous motion contesting DAS’s right even to be heard in this appeal. View "OPTIONAL CAPITAL, INC. V. DAS CORPORATION, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are 21 U.S. citizens who were harmed, and the estate and family members of a U.S. citizen who was killed in rocket attacks carried out in Israel in 2006 by the terrorist organization Hizbollah. Plaintiffs alleged that the Lebanese Canadian Bank (“LCB”) provided extensive financial assistance to Hizbollah in the years leading up to the attacks. In 2011, Defendant Société Générale de Banque au Liban SAL (“SGBL”) acquired all of LCB’s assets and liabilities in a transaction conducted under the laws of Lebanon. Plaintiffs sued for damages under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990 and sought to hold SGBL liable as LCB’s successor. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that SGBL did not inherit LCB’s status for purposes of personal jurisdiction when it acquired LCB’s assets and liabilities.   The Second Circuit concluded that Plaintiffs’ successor-jurisdiction theory raises an important and unresolved issue under New York law. Accordingly, the court certified the following two questions to the New York Court of Appeals:1. Under New York law, does an entity that acquires all of another entity’s liabilities and assets, but does not merge with that entity, inherit the acquired entity’s status for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction? 2. In what circumstances will the acquiring entity be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New York? View "Lelchook v. Société Générale de Banque au Liban SAL" on Justia Law

In 2008, Intervenors-Appellees Caterpillar Financial Services Asia Pte Ltd (“Caterpillar”) and Eksportfinans ASA (“Eksportfinans”) provided a loan to Marfield Limited Incorporated (“Marfield”) for the construction of an offshore construction vessel. To secure payment of this loan, Marfield executed and delivered a First Preferred Naval Mortgage to Eksportfinans and a Second Preferred Naval Mortgage to Caterpillar on December 19, 2008. As further security for outstanding sums owed to Caterpillar, Marfield executed a Third Preferred Naval Mortgage on April 17, 2014, encumbering the vessel. The vessel was flagged in Panama, so all three of those mortgages were submitted to the Panama government.In 2012, Caterpillar and Intervenor-Appellee the Norwegian Government (“Norway”) provided a loan to Shanara Maritime International S.A. (“Shanara”) for the construction of another offshore construction vessel. Once both vessels were complete, there were chartered until early 2014, when the Mexican government seized them. On February 28, 2014, Marfield and Shanara terminated their bareboat charters of the vessels, and the vessels remained in the Mexican government’s custody. Shanara and Marfield could not generate revenue on the vessels and began to fall behind on their loan payments to IntervenorsAppellees Caterpillar, Norway, KFW, and Eksportfinans (collectively, the “Lenders”). Shortly after that, the Mexican government separately seized the vessels in connection with the bankruptcy.Subsequently, the district court entered findings, including that (1) Marfield and Shanara are in default under the loan agreements; and (2) the Lenders’ preferred ship mortgages related to said default outrank Plaintiff's state-created liens arising from PLaintiff's attachment of the vessells under Texas state law. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding no clear error. View "Corporativo Grupo v. Marfield Ltd" on Justia Law

This is an international child custody dispute between Respondent and Petitioner over their minor children. While the family was residing in Germany, Respondent took the children to the United States and refused to return them. The Hague Convention generally requires children to be returned to the state of habitual residence so that the country’s courts may adjudicate the merits of any custody disputes. The Ninth Circuit previously vacated and remanded the district court’s first order to return the children to Germany. Because the Supreme Court issued its decision in Golan while the court was considering Respondent’s appeal of the second return order, the court also remanded that order for the district court’s reconsideration. The district court then granted the petition a third time.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting, on a second remand, Petitioner’s petition against Respondent for the return, pursuant to the Hague Convention, of the parties’ two children to Germany. Agreeing with other circuits, the panel held that, in cases governed by the Hague Convention, the district court has discretion as to whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing following remand and must exercise that discretion consistent with the Convention. The panel held that, on the second remand, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold a third evidentiary hearing when the factual record was fully developed. The panel held that, in making determinations about German procedural issues, the district court neither abused its discretion nor violated Respondent’s due process rights by communicating with the State Department and, through it, the German Central Authority View "BOGDAN RADU V. PERSEPHONE JOHNSON SHON" on Justia Law