Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Galstians abandoned their properties in Iran in 1978, when the family fled to Los Angeles after the overthrow of the Shah. In 1996, the Iranian government allowed the Galstians to enter Iran and begin reclaiming and selling the properties. By 2003, Minassian and Izadi held powers of attorney for the remaining properties. In 2008, Minassian and Izadi executed a general quitclaim deed transferring all remaining properties to themselves for little or no consideration. Galstian discovered the transfers in 2010, demanded that title be returned, and hired an Iranian attorney, who pressed criminal charges in Iran. The Galstians died in 2012. Their children sued Minassian and Izadi in 2013, asserting breach of fiduciary duty, accounting, and conversion. Minassian argued the Iranian civil court provides a suitable forum for an action brought by Iranian citizens against Iranian citizens and that the California court lacked power to enforce an order directing the transfer of real property in Iran. The trial court stayed the action under Code of Civil Procedure 410.30(a), finding that the interest of substantial justice would be served by having the action heard in another forum. The court of appeal reversed, finding insufficient evidence to show Iran is a suitable alternative forum. View "Aghaian v. Minassian" on Justia Law

Holocaust survivors and the heirs of victims sued the Hungarian national railway, the national bank, and private banks for the roles they played in the World War II genocide against Hungarian Jews. In 2012 appeals, the Seventh Circuit held that the national railway and national bank, instrumentalities of the government, could be sued in a U.S. federal court if the plaintiffs could demonstrate that they had exhausted any available Hungarian remedies or had a legally compelling reason for failure to do so. The court mandated dismissal of claims against two private banks for lack of personal jurisdiction, but denied requests by Erste Bank to review denial of its motion to dismiss. On remand, the district court dismissed the claims against the national defendants for failure to prove exhaustion of Hungarian remedies and dismissed Erste Bank on forum non conveniens grounds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissals, without prejudice. While international law does not require exhaustion of domestic remedies before plaintiffs can say that international law was violated, principles of international comity require that these plaintiffs attempt to exhaust domestic remedies before foreign courts can provide remedies. If plaintiffs find that attempts to pursue remedies in Hungary are frustrated unreasonably or arbitrarily, a U.S. court could hear the claims. View "Albert v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank" on Justia Law

Lee was the CEO of Hyundai Securities from 1996 to 2000. Several shareholders of Hyundai brought, in Korea, a shareholders’ derivative action, alleging securities fraud by Lee. The court entered judgment in favor of Hyundai in the amount of about 24,000,000 U.S. dollars plus interest at the Korean statutory rate. Appeals in Korea were dismissed. Hyundai filed suit under California’s “Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act” (Code Civ. Proc. 1713-1724), seeking recognition of the Korean Judgment. On remand, Hyundai acknowledged it had been compensated for portions of the judgment. Lee asserted that the court could not recognize part of the judgment as it was a penalty or fine and could not award interest at the rate of 20 percent because such a rate was contrary to the law and public policy of California. The trial court granted summary judgment and awarded Hyundai the principal sum of $5,031,231, interest of $3,787,397, daily interest of $2,756 per day from May 27, 2014 until entry of judgment, and post-judgment interest at the Korean rate of 20 percent per annum. Lee appeals. The court of appeal affirmed recognition of the judgment, but reversed the imposition of a 20 percent post-judgment rate of interest. View "Hyundai Sec. Co., Inc. v. Lee" on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit against the Republic of Cuba and others in Florida state court, alleging that appellees tortured appellant and that appellant continues to suffer the consequences of the torture. Appellant was incarcerated in Cuba in the 1960s and 1970s, and endured unlawful incarceration and torture committed by the Cuban government and its codefendants. Appellant obtained a default judgment in state court and now seeks to execute that judgment on patents and trademarks held or managed by appellees in this action, who are allegedly agents and instrumentalities of Cuba. The court affirmed the district court's denial of appellant's request because the Florida state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the default judgment. View "Jerez v. Republic of Cuba" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ismail Yaman, a Turkish citizen, and respondent Linda Yaman, a United States citizen, were married in Turkey in August 2000, and respondent became a Turkish citizen in October 2000. Their first child, K.Y., was born in March 2002, in the United States. In January 2003, the family moved to Turkey. The couple’s second child, E.Y., was born in Turkey in August 2003. In early to mid-2004, the respondent became suspicious that petitioner was sexually abusing their older child. In December 2004, the parties separated, and early the next year, petitioner initiated divorce proceedings in the Turkish Family Court. On March 13, 2006, after conducting six hearings in which the court considered evidence from both parties and from the independent experts, the Turkish court rejected respondent’s claim that petitioner had abused the children, and issued an order granting sole legal custody of the children to petitioner and granting respondent visitation. Respondent appealed the order to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Turkey on two occasions, and both times the appellate court affirmed the family court’s order. The family court finalized its order in 2007. Within weeks after the family court’s order became final, and without notice to petitioner, respondent fled Turkey with the children by engaging the services of a self-proclaimed “snatch back” specialist. After years of searching, petitioner, who remained in Turkey, was informed in December 2011 that respondent and the children were living in New Hampshire. Petitioner filed a petition pursuant to Article 2 of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction2 and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) with the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. Following a three-day evidentiary hearing, the court ruled that the return of the children to Turkey would not pose a grave risk of harm to them because respondent had not established that petitioner abused them. The court also found, however, that the respondent had established that the children were “settled” in New Hampshire within the meaning of Article 12 of the Hague Convention; in light of this finding, the court ruled that it lacked the authority to order the children’s return to Turkey. Alternatively, the court ruled that, given the facts of the case, even if it did have the authority to do so, it would not order the return of the children to Turkey. Petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which determined that the district court erred in ruling that it lacked authority to order the return of “settled” children, but affirmed the trial court’s alternative ruling denying return of the children on equitable grounds as a sustainable exercise of discretion. After its review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not err in granting enforcement of the Turkish custody order.View "In the Matter of Ismail Yaman and Linda Yaman" on Justia Law

Bokhari is a dual citizen of the U.S. and Pakistan. While living in Wisconsin, Bokhari allegedly conducted a fraudulent scheme with his brothers, bilking a nonprofit entity that administered the E‐Rate Program, a federal project to improve internet and telecommunications services for disadvantaged schools, out of an estimated $1.2 million, by submitting false invoices. In 2001, while the alleged fraud was ongoing, Bokhari moved to Pakistan, where, according to the prosecution, he continued directing the illegal scheme. In 2004, a federal grand jury in Wisconsin indicted the brothers for mail fraud, money laundering, and related charges. The brothers pleaded guilty and were sentenced to more than five years in prison. The government submitted an extradition request to Pakistan in 2005. Bokhari contested the request in Pakistani court, and the Pakistani government sent an attorney to plead the case for extradition. In 2007, following a hearing, a Pakistani magistrate declined to authorize extradition. In 2009, the U.S. secured a “red notice” through Interpol, notifying member states to arrest Bokhari should he enter their jurisdiction. In the U.S., Bokhari’s attorneys moved to dismiss the indictment and quash the arrest warrant. The district court denied Bokhari’s motion pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing the appeal as an improper attempt to seek interlocutory review of a non‐final pretrial order. View "United States v. Bokhari" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, foreign nationals, alleged that they were tortured and otherwise mistreated by American civilian and military personnel while detained at Abu Ghraib. CACI, a corporation domiciled in the United States, contracted with the United States to provide private interrogators to interrogate detainees at Abu Ghraib. Plaintiffs alleged that CACI employees instigated, directed, participated in, encouraged, and aided and abetted conduct towards detainees that clearly violated federal and international law. The court concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. does not foreclose plaintiffs' claims under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1350, and that the district court erred in reaching a contrary conclusion. In light of Kiobel, the court held that plaintiffs' claims "touch and concern" the territory of the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application of the Alien Tort Statute. Because the court was unable to determine whether the claims presented nonjusticiable political questions, the court did not reach the additional issue of the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' common law claims. The court vacated the district court's judgment with respect to all plaintiffs' claims and remanded. View "Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc." on Justia Law

After the Republic of Argentina defaulted on its external debt, NML, one of its bondholders, prevailed in 11 debt-collection actions filed against Argentina in New York. To execute its judgments, NML sought discovery of Argentina’s property, serving subpoenas on nonparty banks for records relating to global financial transactions. The district court granted motions to compel compliance. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting Argentina’s argument that the order transgressed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1602. The Supreme Court affirmed; the FSIA does not immunize a foreign-sovereign judgment debtor from post-judgment discovery of information concerning its extraterritorial assets. The FSIA replaced factor-intensive loosely-common-law-based immunity with “a comprehensive framework for resolving any claim of sovereign immunity” so that any sort of immunity defense made by a foreign sovereign in a U.S. court must stand or fall on its text. The FSIA established jurisdictional immunity, section 1604, which was waived here. FSIA execution immunity under sections 1609, 1610, 1611, generally shields “property in the United States of a foreign state” from attachment, arrest, and execution. Nothing forbids or limits discovery in aid of execution of a foreign-sovereign judgment debtor’s assets. Even if Argentina is correct that section 1609 execution immunity implies coextensive discovery-¬in-aid-of-execution immunity, there would be no protection from discovery a foreign sovereign’s extraterritorial assets. Section 1609 immunizes only foreign-state property “in the United States.” The prospect that NML’s general request for information about Argentina’s worldwide assets may turn up information about property that Argentina regards as immune does not mean that NML cannot pursue its discovery. View "Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd." on Justia Law

The European Community filed suit against RJR, alleging that RJR directed, managed, and controlled a global money-laundering scheme with organized crime groups in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute, 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., laundered money through New York-based financial institutions and repatriated the profits of the scheme to the United States, and committed various common law torts in violation of New York state law. The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the federal and state law claims; the court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that RICO cannot apply to a foreign enterprise or to extraterritorial conduct; the court concluded that, with respect to a number of offenses that constitute predicates for RICO liability and were alleged in this case, Congress had clearly manifested an intent that they apply extraterritorially; and, as to the other alleged offenses, the Complaint alleged sufficiently important domestic activity to come within RICO's coverage. The court also concluded that the district court erred in ruling that the European Community's participation as a plaintiff in this lawsuit destroyed complete diversity; the European Community is an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" under 28 U.S.C. 1603(b) and therefore, qualified as a "foreign state" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(4); and its suit against "citizens of a State or of different States" came within the diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc." on Justia Law

GDG filed suit, alleging that the Government of Belize breached a contract for the lease of office telecommunications. The district court dismissed based on the doctrines of forum non conveniens and international comity without reaching the merits of the dispute. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing for forum non conveniens without first evaluating the significance of a forum-selection clause in the underlying contract. Accordingly, the court vacated the forum non conveniens dismissal and remanded to allow the district court to determine the enforceability and significance of the forum-selection clause. The court also vacated the district court's dismissal on the alternative ground of international comity where retrospective international comity did not apply without a judgment from a foreign tribunal or parallel foreign proceedings and where prospective international comity did not apply to this commercial contract dispute. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "GDG Acquisitions, LLC v. Government of Belize" on Justia Law