Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Binzel, which manufactures welding equipment, owns the German DE 934 patent, filed in 1997, and the U.S. 406 patent, issued in 2002, which claims priority to the German application, for a method of manufacturing a contact tip for metal inert gas welding. Lismont, a resident of Belgium asserts that, beginning in 1995, he developed the method disclosed in both patents for Binzel and, that by mid-1997, he had disclosed the details to Binzel. Lismont contends that, despite Binzel's representations that he was the first to conceive of this method, Binzel filed the DE 934 application naming its employee, Sattler, as the inventor. In 2000-2002 Lismont initiated suits in the German Federal Court and sought information about the countries in which Binzel was pursuing patents and about the manufacture and sales of contact tips that used the method at issue. The German courts ruled against Lismont, finding that he failed to prove that he had an inventorship interest. The German Supreme Court rejected his appeal in 2009. Lismont then filed actions in the German Constitutional Court and in the European Court of Human Rights. In 2012, Lismont initiated U.S. litigation seeking to correct inventorship of the 406 patent (35 U.S.C. 256(a)). After discovery concerning the issue of laches, the court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Federal Circuit affirmed: Lismont failed to rebut the presumption of laches. View "Lismont v. Alexander Binzel Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Archangel Diamond Corporation Liquidating Trust, as successor-in-interest to Archangel Diamond Corporation (collectively, “Archangel”), appealed dismissal of its civil case against defendant OAO Lukoil (“Lukoil”), in which it alleged claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), breach of contract, and commercial tort law. The district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over Lukoil and under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Archangel Diamond Corporation was a Canadian company and bankrupt. The liquidating trust was located in Colorado. In 1993, Archangel entered into an agreement with State Enterprise Arkhangelgeology (“AGE”), a Russian state corporation, regarding a potential license to explore and develop diamond mining operations in the Archangelsk region of Russia. Archangel and AGE agreed that Archangel would provide additional funds and that the license would be transferred to their joint venture company. However, the license was never transferred and remained with AGE. In 1995, AGE was privatized and became Arkhangelskgeoldobycha (“AGD”), and the license was transferred to AGD. Diamonds worth an estimated $5 billion were discovered within the license region. In 1998, Lukoil acquired a controlling stake in AGD, eventually making AGD a wholly owned subsidiary of Lukoil. Pursuant to an agreement, arbitration took place in Stockholm, Sweden, to resolve the license transfer issue. When AGD failed to honor the agreement, Archangel reactivated the Stockholm arbitration, but the arbitrators this time concluded that they lacked jurisdiction to arbitrate the dispute even as to AGD. Archangel then sued AGD and Lukoil in Colorado state court. AGD and Lukoil removed the case to Colorado federal district court. The district court remanded the case, concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because all of the claims were state law claims. The state trial court then dismissed the case against both AGD and Lukoil based on lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal as to AGD, reversed as to Lukoil, and remanded (leaving Lukoil as the sole defendant). On remand, the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s previous dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds, which it had not addressed before, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The trial court granted Lukoil and AGD's motion to hold an evidentiary hearing, and the parties engaged in jurisdictional discovery. In 2008 and early 2009, the case was informally stayed while the parties discussed settlement and conducted discovery. By June 2009, Archangel had fallen into bankruptcy due to the expense of the litigation. On Lukoil’s motion and over the objection of Archangel, the district court referred the matter to the bankruptcy court, concluding that the matter was related to Archangel’s bankruptcy proceedings. Lukoil then moved the bankruptcy court to abstain from hearing the matter, and the bankruptcy court concluded that it should abstain. The bankruptcy court remanded the case to the Colorado state trial court. The state trial court again dismissed the action. While these state-court appeals were still pending, Archangel filed this case before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, maintaining that Lukoil had a wide variety of jurisdictional contacts with Colorado and the United States as a whole. Finding no reversible error in the district court's ruling dismissing the case on forum non conveniens grounds, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Archangel Diamond v. OAO Lukoil" on Justia Law

Noboa, while living in Illinois, booked a trip to Mexico by using the Orbitz website. In the lobby of the Barcelo hotel, she booked an eco-tour, operated by Rancho. During the tour, the all-terrain vehicle in which Noboa was riding overturned. She died as a result of her injuries. The district court dismissed her estate's suit against Barcelo and Rancho, finding neither company subject to jurisdiction in Illinois. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that Noboa's death was connected to Illinois through a causal chain that began with her booking the trip while in Illinois. View "Noboa v. Barcelo Corp. Empresaria, SA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that SK Fund, a sovereign wealth fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan, misrepresented the value of certain notes issued by non‐party BTA, a Kazakhstani corporation majority‐owned by SK Fund, in connection with a 2010 restructuring of BTA Bank’s debt. At issue on appeal, and one of first impression, is whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2), immunizes an instrumentality of a foreign sovereign against claims that it violated federal securities laws by making misrepresentations outside the United States concerning the value of securities purchased by investors within the United States. The court agreed with the district court that SK Fund is not immune from suit under the FSIA because plaintiffs’ claims are “based upon . . . an act outside the territory of the United States” that “cause[d] a direct effect in the United States.” The court declined to exercise appellate jurisdiction to consider SK Fund’s argument that the district court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over it consistent with due process. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and dismissed in part. View "Atlantica Holdings, Inc. v. Sovereign Wealth Fund" on Justia Law

VLM, a Montreal-based supplier, sold frozen potatoes to IT in Illinois. After nine successful transactions, IT encountered financial difficulty and failed to pay for the next nine shipments. Invoices sent after delivery included a provision purporting to make IT liable for collection-related attorney’s fees if it breached the contracts. VLM sued; the deadline for an answer passed. The court entered a default. On defendants' motion, the court vacated the default as to IT’s president only. All three defendants then filed answers, contesting liability for attorney’s fees. The judge applied the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code and found that the fee provision had been incorporated into the contract. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods applied. On remand, the judge applied the Convention and held that the fee provision was not part of the contracts and that IT could benefit from this ruling, despite the prior entry of default. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. IT never expressly assented to the attorney’s fees provision in VLM’s trailing invoices, so under the Convention that term did not become a part of the contracts. VLM waived its right to rely on the default by failing to raise the issue until its reply brief on remand. View "VLM Food Trading Int'l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co." on Justia Law

Maghreb appealed the district court's grant of plaintiff's motion for non-recognition of a Moroccan judgment under Texas's Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgment Recognition Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 36.001–36.008. Under de novo review, the court held that the Texas Recognition Act’s due process standard requires only that the foreign proceedings be fundamentally fair and inoffensive to “basic fairness.” In this case, the Moroccan judicial system does not present an exceptional case of “serious injustice” that renders the entire system fundamentally unfair and incompatible with due process. Therefore, the district court erred in concluding that non-recognition was justified under Section 36.005(a)(1) of the Texas Recognition Act. The court further concluded that plaintiff has not established, as required by the Texas Recognition Act, that Morocco would refuse to recognize an otherwise enforceable foreign judgment simply because it was rendered in Texas. The court rejected plaintiff's claims regarding service of process and his amenability to jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "DeJoria v. Maghreb Petroleum Exploration" on Justia Law

Philos Tech, an Illinois company, sent equipment to Korea for delivery to P&D in connection with an alleged joint venture between the companies. The nature and origins of the joint venture are disputed. Defendant Don-Hee Park visited Illinois twice and met with Philos. Philos Tech filed suit in Illinois in 2008, alleging that P&D, Don-Hee and Jae-Hee unlawfully converted that equipment by refusing to return it after failing to increase Philo’s shares in P&D. The parties presented the court with competing translations of the documents, all of which are in Korean. There were transfers of funds and equipment between Korea and Illinois, but the purpose and details are unclear. The district court granted Philos Tech default judgment and awarded damages. After Philos Tech attempted to enforce this judgment in Korea, Defendants moved to vacate the judgment under FRCP 60(b)(4), asserting that the Illinois court’s judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court concluded that the request was untimely, but the Seventh Circuit reversed. Following a remand, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants and denial of Philos Tech’s motion asking the court to vacate its judgment on account of the Parks’ alleged fraud. View "Philos Techs., Inc. v. Philos & D, Inc." on Justia Law

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) removes sovereign immunity in actions involving personal injury or death resulting from an act of state-sponsored terrorism, 28 U.S.C. 1605A. Subsection 1610(g) allows plaintiffs with a judgment against a state sponsor of terrorism to attach and execute the judgment against property of the foreign state itself and any agency and instrumentality of the state. The plaintiffs, relatives of men who were kidnapped and murdered in 2004 by al-Qaeda, while working as U.S. military contractors in Iraq, obtained a default judgment under FSIA for $413 million. A month later, the court clerk sent a copy of the default judgment to the Syrian Foreign Ministry via a private delivery service; the delivery was rejected. The next day, Syria filed an appeal challenging the district court’s personal jurisdiction. The court stayed enforcement pending appeal. The District of Columbia Circuit found personal jurisdiction proper and affirmed the default judgment; found that a “reasonable time” had passed after entry of judgment and notice to Syria; and authorized attachment and execution of the judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed registration of the judgment in Illinois and the lower court’s issuance of a “turn over” order, rejecting the objections of other claimants of the Syrian assets View "Wyatt v. Gates" on Justia Law

In 2009, on Highway 101 in Monterey County, a bus driver lost control of the vehicle, which collided with bridge rails. The bus, carrying 34 French tourists, rolled; 18 occupants were ejected. Several were thrown over the bridge onto railroad tracks. The driver and four passengers were killed; 21 were severely injured. Capitales Tours and other defendants moved to dismiss or stay California lawsuits, asserting that France was the suitable forum. Plaintiffs argued that most of the documents and witnesses were in California, and that medical personnel and hospitals would likely receive nothing if the cases were transferred. There were more than $5 million in outstanding medical bills. The court found that public and private interest factors favored France because plaintiffs sought application of the French Tourism Code and would require translation. The court stayed the actions for one year. If France accepted jurisdiction, the actions would be dismissed. Capitales initiated proceedings in Paris, but the pretrial judge invoked lis pendens, because the Monterey court had not completely declined jurisdiction. While appeal was pending in France, the California court of appeal affirmed the stay. On remittitur, Capitales moved to dismiss, citing plaintiffs’ failure to initiate proceedings in France and resistance to their jurisdiction. The court dismissed. The court of appeal reversed, holding that further proceedings are necessary before dismissal. View "Auffert v. Capitales Tours" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, investment funds, filed suit seeking, by ex parte application, to discover certain documents from the defendant American and international accounting firms relating to audits conducted by their Middle Eastern affiliates. 28 U.S.C. 1782 provides assistance to litigants in proceedings before foreign and international tribunals. The statute authorizes a district court, “upon the application of any interested person,” to order a party “found” in the judicial district in which the court sits to produce discovery “for use” in a foreign proceeding. The court concluded that (1) assuming arguendo that the funds were “interested person[s]” in ongoing foreign proceedings, the funds did not establish that the evidence they sought was “for use” in those proceedings; and (2) the district court did not err in finding that additional proceedings that the funds asserted they intended to initiate were not “within reasonable contemplation” at the time the application was made. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the application. View "Certain Funds v. KPMG LLP" on Justia Law