Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Two consolidated cases arise out of the Hungarian government’s confiscation of property owned by Jews during the Holocaust. The questions raised by these appeals bear on whether survivors of the Hungarian Holocaust may hale the Hungarian government and its instrumentalities into United States courts to answer for a subset of the wrongs they committed. The plaintiffs invoked the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s expropriation exception as a means to pierce the Hungarian state’s sovereign immunity and assert jurisdiction in federal district court. Defendants object that the exception is inapplicable. The district court dismissed the claims of the plaintiffs asserting statelessness but concluded that most of the plaintiffs asserting Czechoslovakian nationality could proceed.   The DC Circuit largely affirmed. The court concluded that the plaintiffs claiming statelessness—have not made out a recognized claim within a Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act exception. Assuming without deciding that those plaintiffs were de facto stateless at the time of the alleged takings, as they claim, the plaintiffs have nevertheless failed to identify adequate affirmative support in sources of international law for their contention that a state’s taking of a stateless person’s property amounts to a taking “in violation of international law” within the meaning of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.   The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motions to dismiss the claims of some of the plaintiffs asserting Czechoslovakian nationality, with a few exceptions. The district court correctly determined that four of those plaintiffs had plausibly alleged they were Czechoslovakian nationals at the time of the takings. The court concluded that as for the five Lebovics sisters, the district court should have dismissed their claims. View "Rosalie Simon v. Republic of Hungary" on Justia Law

Menasha licensed Nulogy’s software, Nulogy Solution. Years later, Deloitte reviewed Menasha’s systems in hopes of better integrating Nulogy Solution into Menasha’s other software. Deloitte and Menasha asked Nulogy to share proprietary information. Nulogy alleges that the two used this information to reverse engineer an alternative to Nulogy Solution. In 2020, Nulogy filed suit in Ontario’s Superior Court of Justice, alleging breach of contract by Menasha and violations of trade secrets by Menasha and Deloitte. Deloitte objected to jurisdiction in Canada.Nulogy voluntarily dismissed its trade secret claims against both companies and refiled those claims in the Northern District of Illinois under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. 1836(b). The breach of contract claims against Menasha remained pending in Canada. Menasha moved to dismiss the U.S. trade secrets litigation. Menasha’s contract with Nulogy contained a forum selection clause, identifying Ontario, Canada. Deloitte did not join that motion but filed its own motion to dismiss arguing failure to state a claim. The district court dismissed the claims against Menasha but reasoned that the forum non-conveniens doctrine required the dismissal of the entire complaint, including the claims against Deloitte.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Nulogy’s claims against Menasha but reversed the Deloitte dismissal. Deloitte has no contractual agreement with Nulogy identifying Canada as the proper forum and continues to insist that Canadian courts do not have jurisdiction. View "Nulogy Corp. v. Menasha Packaging Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc. was sued in the Southern District of New York and filed a third-party complaint against Appellee EVA Airways Corporation, seeking indemnification and contribution. The district court granted EVA’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. UPS appealed, arguing that EVA was subject to specific personal jurisdiction based on both New York’s long-arm statute and the Montreal Convention.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that Appellant UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc. was sued in the Southern District of New York and filed a third-party complaint against Appellee EVA Airways Corporation, seeking indemnification and contribution. The district court granted EVA’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. UPS now appeals, arguing that EVA was subject to specific personal jurisdiction based on both New York’s long-arm statute and the Montreal Convention. View "UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc. v. EVA Airways Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee Baker Hughes Services International, LLC, after winning an Ecuadorian arbitration against the Ecuador-based Pesago Consortium, secured an arbitral award enforceable jointly and severally against the Consortium’s two members: Defendant and third-party Campo Puma Oriente S.A. Plaintiff then brought its award to Oklahoma and sued Defendant to confirm the award in the United States. Plaintiff again prevailed, and the district court entered judgment against Defendant for the award’s amount, prejudgment interest, and attorney’s fees. Defendant challenged the enforcement of the arbitration award, arguing: (1) the U.S. district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the award; (2) the district court should not have confirmed the award because the parties never agreed to arbitrate their dispute; and (3) the district court improperly awarded attorney’s fees and incorrectly calculated prejudgment interest. After its review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed affirm everything except the district court’s award of prejudgment interest, which was vacated and remanded for the district court to reconsider. View "Baker Hughes Services International v. Joshi Technologies International" on Justia Law

Respondent the State of Libya (“Libya”) appealed from a district court judgment granting Petitioner Olin Holdings Limited’s (“Olin”) petition to confirm an arbitration award issued under a bilateral investment treaty between Libya and the Republic of Cyprus and denying Libya’s cross-motion to dismiss the petition on forum non-conveniens grounds. On appeal, Libya’s primary argument is that the district court erred by declining to independently review the arbitrability of Olin’s claims before confirming the final award.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that Libya was not entitled to de novo review of the arbitral tribunal’s decisions because it “clearly and unmistakably” agreed to submit questions of arbitrability to the arbitrators in the first instance. The court further concluded that the district court properly confirmed the final award and rejected Libya’s cross-motion to dismiss the petition. The court explained that regarding the public and private interest factors, the district court held that Libya fell well short of satisfying its heavy burden because it “failed to identify even one” factor that weighed in favor of dismissal. On appeal, Libya makes “no persuasive argument identifying an error in the factual or legal components of the district court’s discretionary decision.” View "Olin Holdings Ltd. v. State of Libya" on Justia Law

Respondent is a former employee who won a judgment in Argentina's National Court of Labor Appeals against Citibank, N.A. Petitioner, the Argentinian branch of Citibank, N.A., filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association and brought the proceedings below. The district court compelled arbitration, preliminarily enjoined the employee from enforcing the Argentinian judgment against Petitioner, and held Respondent in contempt of court. It also denied his motion to dismiss.   The Second Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Petition. Therefore, the district court was without authority to issue its orders in this case. The court reversed the district court's orders -- including its order to compel arbitration, the preliminary injunction it entered against Respondent, its order finding Respondent in contempt, and its order requiring Respondent to pay the Branch's attorneys' fees and costs. The court concluded that because the Branch has not shown it enjoys independent legal existence and Citibank has not sought to substitute itself or join this action as the real party in interest, there has been no party adverse to Respondent. Without adverse parties, there can be no subject matter jurisdiction under Article III. View "The branch of Citibank, N.A., established in the Republic of Argentina v." on Justia Law

The United States (“the Government”) initiated a civil forfeiture suit in federal district court against a $380 million arbitration award fund, the majority of which is held in the United Kingdom. The fund belongs to PetroSaudi Oil Services (Venezuela) Ltd. (“PetroSaudi”), a private oil company incorporated in Barbados. PetroSaudi won the award in an arbitration proceeding against Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (“PDVSA”), a Venezuelan state energy company. The portion of the fund held in the United Kingdom (“the fund”) is held in an account controlled by the High Court of England and Wales (“the High Court”). The Government seeks forfeiture of the fund on the ground that it derives from proceeds of an illegal scheme to steal one billion dollars from the Malaysian sovereign wealth fund 1Malaysia Development Berhad (“1MDB”). PetroSaudi challenged two orders entered by the district court.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s interlocutory orders. The panel held that PetroSaudi’s appeal from the district court’s protective order under 18 U.S.C. Section 983 fell within this exception. Accordingly, the court had jurisdiction to consider the appeals of the two orders. The panel concluded that the sovereign immunity of the United Kingdom, as codified in the FSIA, did not protect the arbitration award fund from the two orders issued by the district court. The panel held that because the district court had in rem jurisdiction over the fund, it did not need in personam jurisdiction over PetroSaudi to issue an order preserving the fund. View "USA V. PETROSAUDI OIL SERV. (VENEZUELA) LTD., ET AL" on Justia Law

In an action brought by the Cassirer family under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, seeking the return of a Pissarro painting stolen by the Nazis and now in the possession of Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation (TBC), an entity created and controlled by the Kingdom of Spain, the Ninth Circuit certified to the California Supreme Court the following question concerning the third step in California’s governmental interest choice-of-law test: Whether, under a comparative impairment analysis, California’s or Spain’s interest is more impaired if California’s rule that a person may not acquire title to a stolen item of personal property (because a thief cannot pass good title, and California has not adopted the doctrine of adverse possession for personal property), were subordinated to Spain’s rule that a person may obtain title to stolen property by adverse possession.   Applying the first step of California’s governmental interest test, the panel concluded that the issue in question was a question of personal property law: whether TBC or the Cassirers own the painting; and the relevant law of the two jurisdictions of Spain and California was different. Applying the second step of the test, the panel concluded that a true conflict existed between Spanish and California law, meaning that each jurisdiction had a legitimate interest in the application of its law and policy. The third step of the test required application of the law of the jurisdiction whose interest would be more impaired if its law were not applied. View "DAVID CASSIRER, ET AL V. THYSSEN-BORNEMISZA COLLECTION" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s judgment dismissing their claims against the Republic of Argentina (“Argentina”) in connection with sovereign bonds issued by Argentina and purchased by Plaintiffs. The Second Circuit vacated in part the district court’s previous judgment of dismissal and remanded the case for the district court to determine in the first instance whether Plaintiffs are entitled to bring suit under Argentine law. The district court found on remand that Plaintiffs were not. Plaintiffs appealed again, arguing that the district court’s findings are erroneous and that Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure offers them an alternative avenue to enforce their rights under the bonds in federal court.
The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs are not entitled to bring suit under Argentine law and that nothing in Rule 17 can be read to alter that result. The court explained that under Rule 17(a)(3), “[t]he court may not dismiss an action for failure to prosecute in the name of the real party in interest until, after an objection, a reasonable time has been allowed for the real party in interest to ratify, join, or be substituted into the action.” The court wrote that it has already concluded that Plaintiffs do not have the right to recover the bonds under Argentine law – the applicable substantive law in this case. That being so, Rule 17 provides no alternative avenue for Plaintiffs to bring suit in federal court. View "Bugliotti v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Noble House, L.L.C. (“Noble House”) appealed a judgment of dismissal, without prejudice, based on forum non conveniens, granted in favor of Defendant Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London (“Underwriters”). The district court ruled that the parties’ insurance policy contained an enforceable forum-selection clause requiring litigation in the courts of England and Wales and that a return-jurisdiction clause was not required.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that although there are arguably two forum-selection clauses at play, one foreign and one domestic, the district court concluded that the forum-election clause selecting the courts of England and Wales controls. Noble House does not dispute this conclusion in its opening brief. Nor does Noble House dispute that the foreign forum-selection clause is mandatory. Only the foreign forum-selection clause’s enforceability is contested, which is addressed under the “unreasonable under the circumstances” framework – not the usual “available and adequate” framework. Further, the court held that Noble House does not carry its “heavy burden of proof” to show that the clause selecting the courts of England and Wales is unreasonable under the circumstances. Moreover, Noble House offers no compelling reason justifying its filing in Texas or why its action could not be filed timely in the foreign fora. Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not err when it: (1) concluded that the foreign forum-selection clause is enforceable, or (2) failed to include a return-jurisdiction clause and total waiver of any statute-of-limitations defenses. View "Noble House v. Certain Underwriters" on Justia Law