Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In this insurance matter, the district court entered a final judgment and a post-judgment order. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the district court. After the time for filing a petition for rehearing expired and no petition for rehearing was filed, the remittitur issued. Three days later, Appellants’ counsel filed a motion to recall the remittitur, claiming that he did not become aware of the order of affirmance due to technical difficulties created by a virus on counsel’s servers “as well as switching to a new case management system.” However, the court’s electronic record reflected that an official notice of the order of affirmance was sent to Appellants’ counsel’s electronic filing account, and an email was sent to two separate email addresses at Appellants’ counsel’s law firm. The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that because Appellants’ counsel could have learned of the disposition in time to timely file a petition for rehearing, Appellants failed to demonstrate a basis on which the remittitur should be recalled. View "Fulbrook v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on recovery under an uninsured motorist (UM) insurance policy. Specifically, the issue was whether the burden of proof on summary judgment between the insured and the UM carrier was misallocated. The UM carrier denied coverage based on a claim that the at-fault driver was not "uninsured" as defined in the UM policy at issue here because the drive's liability carrier had not "legally denied" coverage. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in placing the burden of proof on the UM carrier in this instance, and therefore reversed. View "Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co. v. Castellanos" on Justia Law

More than three years after learning his insurance policy had expired and his agent had not procured a replacement, Joe Tally sued his insurance agent, Ronald McMorris, claiming he “breached a standard of care recognized in the State of Mississippi to the insured for not notifying [him] of the cancellation of [his insurance] policy.” Because Tally failed to bring his claims within the three-year statute of limitations, his claims were time-barred. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the circuit court’s denial of McMorris’s motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment in his favor. View "McMorris v. Tally" on Justia Law

In 2010, Debra Hackett was seriously injured in an accident in Sacramento County in which a tractor and trailer owned by Silva Trucking, Inc. and driven by Elaine McDonold jackknifed and collided with the vehicle being driven by Hackett. In 2012, the Hacketts filed a personal injury action in Sacramento County against Silva Trucking and McDonold. The jury awarded the Hacketts $34.9 million in damages. Silva Trucking was insured by Carolina Casualty Insurance Company (CCIC), who retained the law firm Cholakian & Associates to provide a defense. Silva Trucking had an excess liability insurance policy with Lexington Insurance Company (LIC), who retained the law firm Lewis, Brisbois, Bisgaard & Smith, LLP (Lewis Brisbois) as counsel. In 2014, Silva Trucking and McDonold brought suit in Sacramento County against LIC, CCIC, Cholakian & Associates and individual attorneys Kevin Cholakian and Jennifer Kung (collectively Cholakian), and Lewis Brisbois and individual attorney Ralph Zappala (collectively Lewis Brisbois). As to LIC and CCIC, the complaint alleged bad faith and breach of contract. As to the law firms and attorneys, the complaint alleged legal malpractice. The gravamen of the complaint was that the insurers unreasonably refused to accept the policy limit demand when the insured’s liability was clear and damages were known to be in excess of the policy limit. The attorneys failed to advise their insurer clients to accept the demand and the consequences of failing to do so, and failed to advise Silva Trucking and McDonold of their need for personal counsel. LIC and CCIC responded with demurrers. Lewis Brisbois answered with a general denial and asserted 22 affirmative defenses. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 396b, subdivision (a), where an action has been filed in the “wrong venue,” a defendant may move to transfer the case to the “proper court for the trial thereof.” In such a case, “if an answer is filed,” the court may consider opposition to the motion to transfer and may retain the action in the county where filed to promote the convenience of witnesses or the ends of justice. The question this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether, in a multi-defendant case, an answer must be filed by all defendants before the court may consider opposition to the motion to transfer venue. The Court concluded the answer was yes. In this case, the trial court considered opposition to the motion before all defendants had answered the complaint. Accordingly, the Court issued a preemptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion to transfer and to issue a new order granting the motion. View "Cholakian & Assoc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Nova is the trustee and fiduciary of the Charter Oak Benefit Plan. A participating employer took out insurance policies on its employee’s (Spencer) life, totaling $30 million, and placed them into the Plan. Spencer named Universitas as the sole, irrevocable beneficiary. After Spencer’s death, the insurer paid $30 million to the Plan. Nova denied Universitas’s claim for the proceeds. In binding arbitration, an arbitrator held Nova liable for $26,558,308. Nova declined to pay, filing suit to vacate the arbitration award. The court confirmed the award. Nova moved for reconsideration and for a stay of post‐judgment discovery, then moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. All were rejected. The district court granted Nova’s application to reinstate the motion to dismiss, but warned of potential penalties. Nova’s then‐counsel withdrew the motion; new counsel filed an amended motion, arguing complete diversity was lacking because Charter Oak was a citizen of New York, as was Universitas. Charter Oak was not a party; Nova argued that it was “a real and substantial party to the controversy.” The district court dismissed the motion. Nova refused to pay or to cooperate in discovery of its assets. The Second Circuit affirmed, awarding costs. The district court then sanctioned Nova by requiring it to deposit $30,181,880, the amount of the outstanding judgment, with the court. The Second Circuit vacated, holding that the court may not collect damages owed to a party by imposition of a sanction. View "Universitas Educ. LLC v. Nova Group Inc." on Justia Law

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) creates “navigators,” to assist consumers in purchasing health insurance from exchanges, 42 U.S.C. 18031(i), and authorizes the Department of Health and Human Services to establish standards for navigators and exchanges. HHS regulations recognize: federal navigators, certified application counselors (CACs), and non-navigator assistance personnel. They conduct many of the same activities, but federal navigators have more extensive duties. Plaintiffs, federally-certified counselor designated organizations, employ CACs. The federal government established a Missouri Federally Facilitated Exchange. The Health Insurance Marketplace Innovation Act (HIMIA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 376.2000, regulates “person[s] that, for compensation, provide[] information or services in connection with eligibility, enrollment, or program specifications of any health benefit exchange.” Regulatory provisions dictate what state navigators and cannot do. Plaintiffs challenged: the definition of state navigators; three substantive provisions; and penalty provisions. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the ACA preempted HIMIA. The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, finding likelihood of success in challenges to HIMIA requirements that: state navigators refrain from providing information about health insurance plans not offered by the exchange; that in some circumstances, the navigator must advise consultation with a licensed insurance producer regarding private coverage; and that CACs provide information about different health insurance plans and clarify the distinctions. The court vacated the preliminary injunction, holding that ACA does not entirely preempt HIMIA. View "St. Louis Effort For AIDS v. Huff" on Justia Law

Farm Bureau County Mutual Insurance Company filed this declaratory judgment action against Cristil Rogers, Farm Bureau’s insured, seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Rogers in an underlying tort action and requesting court costs and attorney fees. Rogers answered and prayed for recovery of her court costs and attorney fees. The trial court denied Farm Bureau’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Farm Bureau had a duty to defend Rogers in the tort action. The order did not expressly address the parties’ claims for attorney’s fees. The court of appeals dismissed Farm Bureau’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the order denying Farm Bureau’s motion for summary judgment was not final and appealable because Rogers did not file a cross-motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the fact that Rogers did not file a cross-motion for summary judgment did not preclude the trial court from entering a final judgment; but (2) in the absence of the trial court’s intent with respect to the parties’ claims for attorney’s fees, the order at issue did not dispose of all parties and claims. View "Farm Bureau County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rogers" on Justia Law

The home of Keith Conley was insured through an insurance policy issued by Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company. Conley’s son fatally murdered his girlfriend, Jessica Newsome, in Conley’s home. Gregory and Loretta Newsome brought a wrongful death action against Conley for damages arising from Jessica’s death. Kentucky Farm Bureau provided a defense to Conley for the Newsomes’ claims against him and intervened in the action seeking a declaration that the policy did not provide coverage to Conley for the claims arising from Jessica’s murder. The trial court ruled that the homeowner’s policy provided coverage for Conley’s acts. Kentucky Farm Bureau subsequently filed a Ky. R. Civ. P. 59.05 motion asking the court to alter or amend its order. The trial court denied the motion. Kentucky Farm Bureau then filed a notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding that the Rule 59.05 motion was deficient due to a lack of “particularity” and therefore failed to toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, although Kentucky Farm Bureau’s Rule 59.05 motion did not strictly adhere to the particularity requirement of Ky. R. Civ. P. 7.02, the defect was not so serious that it should have been stricken. View "Ky. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Conley" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on a dispute over insurance coverage following a private airplane crash. Garmin International, Inc., purchased an insurance policy from Appellees (the insurance companies). In 2008, while the insurance policy was in effect, Appellant Henry Bartle, an individual who had some dealings with Garmin, crashed while piloting his malfunctioning personal aircraft, injuring himself and his passengers. Bartle sought coverage under Garmin’s insurance policy for indemnification from claims brought against Bartle by his injured passengers. Appellees, the insurers, brought suit federal district court seeking a declaration under the Declaratory Judgment Act that Bartle did not qualify as an "Insured" under Garmin’s policy. Bartle submitted evidence to the district court to demonstrate he was indeed an "Insured," but the district court refused to consider much of the evidence because the evidence failed to conform to district court rules regarding proper citation. Without considering this evidence, the district court granted summary judgment to the insurers, finding that Bartle was not an "Insured" under the policy. Bartle appealed both the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the insurers and its refusal to consider the excluded evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: "[t]he district court concluded, and Mr. Bartle acknowledged, that the exhibits submitted could not be feasibly used by the district court without great difficulty. The district court cannot be expected to review evidence, evaluate arguments, or arrive at reasoned conclusions without usable citations. In this case the merits cannot be separated from the process, and ultimately Mr. Bartle bore the responsibility to present evidence that would allow a rational trier of fact to find in his favor." View "Certain Underwriters v. Bartle" on Justia Law

In March, 2004, Harris closed on a home with a mortgage loan from MPI. To be licensed in Missouri, MPI, as obligor and principal, bought two “Missouri Residential Mortgage Brokers Bonds” from Hartford, its surety, RSMo 443.849. The surety bonds stated that the two parties were “jointly and severally” bound for payment to any person “who may have a claim against” MPI. Harris sued MPI for violating the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, sections 407.010-.1500. Harris obtained a judgment for compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees. Hartford had notice of the suit against MPI, but chose not to intervene. As surety, Hartford failed to pay the judgment amount due on the bonds. In 2012, Harris sued Hartford for breach of contract, vexatious refusal to pay, and equitable garnishment. The district court granted Hartford summary judgment, rejecting the 10-year statute of limitations in RSMo 516.110(1) in favor of the three-year statute in section 516.130(2). The Eighth Circuit reversed. Harris’s claim against Hartford sought the amount due on the bonds, not a penalty. View "Harris v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law