Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In an interlocutory appeal, Pekin Insurance Company challenged the denial of its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Pekin was an Illinois company not licensed to sell insurance in Mississippi. Pekin asserted it had not entered into a contract with a Mississippi Resident, had not committed a tort in Mississippi and had not done any business in Mississippi-- making in ineligible to be subject to the jurisdiction of Mississippi courts under the Mississippi long-arm statute. The Mississippi Supreme Court, after review of the facts of this case, found that Pekin voluntarily submitted itself to Mississippi's jurisdiction in federal court when it asked that court to resolve the same coverage dispute over which it claimed here that Mississippi courts had no jurisdiction. The Court accordingly affirmed the trial court here in denying Pekin's motion to dismiss, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Pekin Insurance Company v. Hinton" on Justia Law

A group of New York-based third party payor health insurers (“TPPs”) that provided prescription drug benefits to union members appealed a Superior Court judgment dismissing with prejudice their second amended complaint. At issue were claims brought by the TPPs under various state consumer fraud laws against AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP, and Zeneca Inc. (collectively “AstraZeneca”). The TPPs alleged that AstraZeneca falsely advertised its more expensive patented prescription drug "Nexium" as superior to the less expensive generic drug "Prilosec," causing the TPPs to overpay for Nexium when generic Prilosec would have sufficed. After conducting an extensive choice of law analysis, the Superior Court determined that New York law controlled the TPPs’ claims. The court then held that the TPPs failed to state a claim under New York’s consumer fraud statute for failure to allege legally sufficient causation. The TPPs appealed, arguing the Superior Court's choice of law analysis was flawed, and that the Superior Court's causation analysis was equally flawed. After a careful review of the record on appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the ultimate judgment of the Superior Court, finding it not necessary to discuss whether the Superior Court correctly analyzed the choice of law issue, because under either state consumer fraud statute the TPPs could not recover damages as a matter of law. View "Teamsters Local 237 Welfare Fund, et al. v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP" on Justia Law

Stacey and Mark Bent sued USAA for breach of their homeowners’ policy and violations of the Texas Insurance Code. The Bents subsequently stopped making mortgage payments, and their lender foreclosed on their home. The Bents’ case against USAA, however, proceeded to trial. The jury concluded that USAA had not breached the homeowner’s policy but did violate chapter 541 of the Insurance Code. The trial court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict but later granted the Bents’ motion for new trial. The court of appeals conditionally granted a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order and render judgment on the jury’s verdict, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion on each of its bases for ordering a new trial. The Bents sought relief in mandamus from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied the Bents’ mandamus petition, holding (1) three of the trial court’s bases for ordering a new trial failed to satisfy the facial requirements set forth in In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P. and In re United Scaffolding, Inc.; and (2) on the remaining basis at issue on appeal, the court of appeals correctly found that the record did not support the trial court’s stated rationale. View "In re Bent" on Justia Law

Alan Jesperson was injured in a motor vehicle accident when his motorcycle was struck from behind by a vehicle owned by Mary Basha and driven by Matthew Badelalla while Badelalla was making deliveries for Jet’s Pizza. Auto Club Insurance Association (ACIA) was notified of Jesperson’s injuries and that it was the highest-priority no-fault insurer. It began making payments to Jesperson shortly after it received that notice. Jesperson brought an action against Basha, Badelalla, and Jet’s seeking damages for the injuries he had sustained. He later moved to amend his complaint to add a claim against ACIA after it stopped paying him no-fault benefits. The trial court entered a default judgment against Badelalla and Basha, entered an order allowing Jesperson to amend the complaint, and entered an order severing Jesperson’s claims for trial. A jury returned a verdict of no cause of action with regard to Jesperson’s claims against Jet’s. Before trial on the remaining claim, ACIA moved for summary judgment, arguing that Jesperson’s claim against it was barred by the statute of limitations in MCL 500.3145(1). The court agreed that the statute of limitations barred Jesperson’s claim and granted ACIA’s motion for summary disposition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the exception in MCL 500.3145(1) to the one-year limitations period when the insurer has previously made a payment applied only if the insurer has made a payment within one year after the date of the accident. Jesperson appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court found that the insurer's payment of no-fault benefits more than a year after the date of the accident satisfied the second exception to the one-year statute of limitations in MCL 500.3145(1). The Court vacated the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the insurer and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Jesperson v. Auto Club Insurance Association" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Tenet Healthsystem Desert, Inc. (Hospital) appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendants Blue Cross of California, doing business as Anthem Blue Cross (Blue Cross), Anthem Blue Cross Life and Health Insurance Company (BC Life), and Anthem UM Services, Inc. (Anthem UM). Hospital sued Anthem, as well as Eisenhower Medical Center (Eisenhower) and Keenan & Associates (Keenan), when the defendants refused to pay approximately $1.9 million the cost of medical services that Hospital provided to an insured patient following extensive communications with Anthem over a period of approximately 50 days regarding "authorization" for the services. The defendants ultimately denied coverage for the medical services based on an exclusion in the patient's policy for injuries sustained as a result of having a blood alcohol level over the legal limit. Hospital alleged that Anthem's continuing to "authorize" medical services during the patient's stay at Hospital, even after Anthem was made aware that the patient was admitted with a blood alcohol level far exceeding the legal limit, constituted a misrepresentation as to coverage, on which Hospital relied in providing care to the patient. The trial court determined that the Hospital's third amended complaint (TAC) lacked the necessary specificity to survive a demurrer, and entered judgment for Anthem. The Court of Appeal, however, reversed, concluding the TAC alleged facts with sufficient particularity to overcome a demurrer. The Court therefore reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Tenet Healthsystem Desert v. Blue Cross of Cal." on Justia Law

Arthur Murdock, then a lieutenant with the Maine State Police, was injured when his cruiser was struck by another vehicle after Martin Thorne indicated that Murdock could turn in front of him into an intersection. Murdock filed a four-count complaint alleging negligence against Castigliola and Thorne and seeking uninsured motorist coverage from the Maine Department of Public Safety (DPS). The superior court granted the motions for summary judgment filed by both DPS and Thorne. Murdock appealed, and DPS cross-appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the superior court improvidently granted Murdock’s motion to enter final judgment on Murdock’s claims against Thorne and DPS pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1). View "Murdock v. Thorne" on Justia Law

The court originally remanded this case to the district court for additional fact-finding to establish complete diversity of citizenship between all plaintiffs and all defendants with instructions to reenter summary judgment if federal subject-matter jurisdiction could be properly established. After dismissing a nondiverse plaintiff it found was not a real party in interest to this case, the district court reentered its earlier grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurer on all claims. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of PMI Delaware and its grant of summary judgment to Lexington. The court concluded that the district court's dismissal of PMI Delaware pursuant to FRCP 21 as a "nominal or formal party" was proper because the district court found that though PMI Delaware was a named insured on the Insurance Policy, PMI Delaware would not be entitled to any portion of a successful judgment against Lexington because PMI Florida, not PMI Delaware, was the party against whom Blue Cross had filed suit and PMI Florida, not PMI Delaware, was the only party that made a claim for coverage to Lexington. Further, PMI Delaware was not even a party to the underlying Blue Cross contract, which provided healthcare coverage only to PMI Florida’s leased employees. Further, the court affirmed the district court's holding that Lexington owed no coverage to PMI Florida. Here, the court saw no contractual ambiguity; the Insurance Policy issued by Lexington explicitly excludes the coverage sought by PMI Florida. Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Lexington on PMI Florida’s claims for breach of contract and declaratory judgment. Finally, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Lexington on its claim of negligent misrepresentation where no jury could reasonably find that Yoohoo justifiably relied on the statement at issue as an indication that there would be coverage under the policy. View "Payroll Mgmt., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This dispute arose from injuries sustained by a platform worker employed by Vertex. Continental appealed the district court's final judgment in favor of Tetra and Maritech, requiring Continental and its codefendant insured, Vertex, to indemnify them. The court concluded that the summary judgment record is inadequate to determine whether the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. 1333(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), requires the adoption of Louisiana law as surrogate federal law where the court cannot determine whether there is an OCSLA situs, the court cannot determine whether federal maritime law applies, and the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act (LOIA), La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9:2780, is consistent with federal law. Accordingly, the court concluded that neither party is entitled to summary judgment as to whether LOIA must be adopted as surrogate federal law under OCSLA. The court remanded to the district court to determine the dispositive issue of whether Louisiana law must be adopted as surrogate federal law. View "Tetra Tech. v. Vertex Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking damages from American Family for their individual insurance claims, and the district court later granted American Family's motion to dismiss. The district court denied plaintiffs' motion to amend. Plaintiffs' motion to amend sought to change their theory of the case because the class action petition had challenged the contents of all American Family insurance policies in a declaratory judgment pleading while the proposed second amended petition claimed that American Family breached the contents of the insurance contract. Furthermore, the class action petition sought a class wide injunction, not individual damages, while the proposed second amended petition sought individual damages instead of a class wide injunction. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion because plaintiffs sought to change their theory of liability after their class action petition had been dismissed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Adams v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Ramara engaged Sentry as a general contractor to perform work at its Philadelphia parking garage. Sentry engaged a subcontractor, Fortress, to install concrete and steel components. As required by its agreement with Sentry, Fortress obtained a general liability insurance policy from Westfield naming Ramara as an additional insured. In April 2012, Axe, a Fortress employee, was injured in an accident. Axe filed a tort action against Ramara and Sentry but did not include Fortress as a defendant as it was immune from actions by its employees if they were entitled to compensation for their injuries under the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act. Ramara tendered its defense to Westfield, which declined to defend, claiming that Axe’s complaint did not include allegations imposing that obligation under its policy. The district court granted partial summary judgment to Ramara, and later entered a second order, a quantified judgment against Westfield for Ramara’s counsel fees and costs incurred to date. The Third Circuit first held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to alter its first order with respect to the aspects of that order already on appeal. The court affirmed that Westfield has a duty to defend Ramara in the underlying Axe action. View "Ramara Inc v. Westfield Ins. Co" on Justia Law