Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Brian and Nancy Langevin appealed a superior court order denying their motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to defendant, Travco Insurance Company (Travco). The trial court ruled that plaintiffs were not entitled to payment from Travco under their medical payments coverage to pay a lien asserted by the plaintiffs’ health insurer because such payment would constitute a “duplicate payment” contrary to the language of both RSA 264:16, IV (2014) and plaintiffs’ automobile insurance policy with Travco. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed and remanded. "Although our interpretation does not allow the plaintiffs to retain the benefit of payment from both a health insurer and an automobile insurer for the same medical expense, we recognize that it does leave open the possibility that the plaintiffs will receive a double benefit in a different sense — they may receive and retain the benefit of medical payments coverage, and a recovery from the third-party tortfeasor. This type of double benefit is not prohibited by RSA 264:16, IV." The Court found the plain language of RSA 264:16, IV prohibited duplicate payments for the same medical expense from only two sources: “medical payments coverage and a health insurance policy.” It does not address payments, duplicate or otherwise, from a tortfeasor or a tortfeasor’s liability insurer. Because the statute expressly prohibited “duplicate payment” only from medical payments coverage and a health insurance policy, with no reference to payments from the tortfeasor or the tortfeasor’s liability policy, the Court construed the prohibition on “duplicate payment” as applying only to medical payments from health insurers and automobile insurers. View "Langevin v. Travco Insurance Company" on Justia Law

This appeal grew out of a dispute between an insured (Summit Park Townhome Association) and its insurer (Auto-Owners Insurance Company) over the value of property damaged in a hail storm. To determine the value, the district court ordered an appraisal and established procedural requirements governing the selection of impartial appraisers. After the appraisal was completed, Auto-Owners paid the appraised amount to Summit Park. But the court found that Summit Park had failed to make required disclosures and had selected a biased appraiser. In light of this finding, the court vacated the appraisal award, dismissed Summit Park’s counterclaims with prejudice, and awarded interest to Auto-Owners on the amount earlier paid to Summit Park. Summit Park appealed, but the Tenth Circuit affirmed. “In the absence of a successful appellate challenge to the disclosure order, Summit Park was obligated to comply and did not. The court was thus justified in dismissing Summit Park’s counterclaims. In addition, Summit Park’s failure to select an impartial appraiser compelled vacatur of the appraisal award under the insurance policy. Finally, Summit Park obtained due process through the opportunity to object to the award of interest.” View "Auto-Owners v. Summit Park" on Justia Law

Baldwin Mutual Insurance Company ("Baldwin Mutual") appealed a circuit court’s class certification in a suit filed by Gloria McCain. McCain owned a house insured by Baldwin Mutual. The policy provided that any covered property losses would be settled “at actual cash value at the time of loss but not exceeding the amount necessary to repair or replace the damaged property.” McCain's house was damaged twice, she filed claims and was reimbursed by Baldwin Mutual. In each incident, an independent adjuster examined McCain's damaged property and prepared an estimate. Baldwin Mutual paid McCain's claim in accordance with the estimate prepared by the adjuster. The record contained no allegation or evidence indicating that McCain sought more money from Baldwin Mutual in connection with those claims or that she was unhappy in any way. Nevertheless, McCain’s complaint alleged Baldwin Mutual had wrongfully been reducing the amount paid on claims made on actual-cash-value policies inasmuch as its practice was to deduct some amount for depreciation not only of the damaged materials and the labor costs of initially installing those damaged materials (based on their condition prior to the covered damage and their expected life span), but also of the labor costs associated with the removal of the damaged materials. The trial court certified a class based on McCain's claims, and Baldwin Mutual appealed the certification order. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the certification order because "the class definition proposed by McCain in her brief submitted after the class-certification hearing was materially different from the class definition offered by McCain in her original complaint." Upon remand, McCain filed a second amended complaint that retained the allegations in her first amended complaint and amended the definition of the proposed class. In response to the amended complaint, Baldwin Mutual moved for motion for a summary judgment, contending that McCain's claims were barred by res judicata based on a final judgment of the trial court in "the Adair litigation," which allegedly involved the same claims and same parties. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in certifying McCain's action for class treatment because the claims of the purported class representative were subject to res judicata. View "Baldwin Mutual Insurance Company v. McCain" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington certified a question of Washington law to the Washington Supreme Court. The underlying case involved an insurance coverage dispute between two authorized foreign insurers, Ohio Security Insurance Company and AXIS Insurance Company. Ohio Security tried to serve AXIS at its office in Chicago, Illinois, rather than through the Washington State Office of the Insurance Commissioner. The United States District Court asked whether Washington law established service through the Washington State Insurance Commissioner (Insurance Commissioner) as the exclusive means of service for authorized foreign insurers in Washington. The answer to the certified question was yes: RCW 4.28.080(7)(a) provided the exclusive means of service on authorized foreign insurers. View "Ohio Sec. Ins. Co. v. AXIS Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington certified a question of Washington law to the Washington Supreme Court. The underlying case involved an insurance coverage dispute between two authorized foreign insurers, Ohio Security Insurance Company and AXIS Insurance Company. Ohio Security tried to serve AXIS at its office in Chicago, Illinois, rather than through the Washington State Office of the Insurance Commissioner. The United States District Court asked whether Washington law established service through the Washington State Insurance Commissioner (Insurance Commissioner) as the exclusive means of service for authorized foreign insurers in Washington. The answer to the certified question was yes: RCW 4.28.080(7)(a) provided the exclusive means of service on authorized foreign insurers. View "Ohio Sec. Ins. Co. v. AXIS Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Stacy Triplett filed three lawsuits against her former employer, Southern Hens, all stemming from an incident in which Triplett, while working, witnessed the gruesome death of a coworker. This incident caused Triplett mental anguish leading to an award of workers’ compensation benefits. After Triplett allegedly incurred some trouble in collecting her award of workers’ compensation benefits, she sued Southern Hens and Southern Hens’s carrier, Liberty Mutual. Triplett’s first lawsuit against Southern Hens, for failure to pay, ultimately was dismissed. Triplett then filed a second lawsuit against Southern Hens for failure to report; Triplett failed to serve Southern Hens within 120 days, as required under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h). With no official court action on her second suit, and admittedly knowing that she could not show good cause for failure to serve in the second suit, Triplett filed a third suit against Southern Hens , like the second, was for failure to report. Aware of the second suit, the circuit court dismissed Triplett’s third suit as an impermissible duplicative suit. Triplett appealed. Finding no error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Triplett v. Southern Hens, Inc." on Justia Law

Stacy Triplett filed three lawsuits against her former employer, Southern Hens, all stemming from an incident in which Triplett, while working, witnessed the gruesome death of a coworker. This incident caused Triplett mental anguish leading to an award of workers’ compensation benefits. After Triplett allegedly incurred some trouble in collecting her award of workers’ compensation benefits, she sued Southern Hens and Southern Hens’s carrier, Liberty Mutual. Triplett’s first lawsuit against Southern Hens, for failure to pay, ultimately was dismissed. Triplett then filed a second lawsuit against Southern Hens for failure to report; Triplett failed to serve Southern Hens within 120 days, as required under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h). With no official court action on her second suit, and admittedly knowing that she could not show good cause for failure to serve in the second suit, Triplett filed a third suit against Southern Hens , like the second, was for failure to report. Aware of the second suit, the circuit court dismissed Triplett’s third suit as an impermissible duplicative suit. Triplett appealed. Finding no error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Triplett v. Southern Hens, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' suit based on forum non conveniens. The court held that Louisiana Revised Statute 22:868 does not evince a public policy against forum-selection clauses in insurance contracts. Therefore, the court found that the parties' insurance policy contained an enforceable forum-selection clause requiring litigation in New York state court. Furthermore, the public interest factors did not weigh in favor of keeping this case in Louisiana. View "Al Copeland Investments, LLC v. First Specialty Insurance Corp." on Justia Law

Steve Forster, Daniel Krebs, and Debra Krebs (collectively "Forster/Krebs") appealed the dismissal of their claims against B&B Hot Oil Service, Inc., and JB's Welding. Forster/Krebs argued the district court erred in construing language in a lease agreement with B&B Hot Oil as a waiver of their claims against B&B Hot Oil for damages to their building and property and to preclude a subrogation claim by their insurer, Acuity, against B&B Hot Oil. Forster/Krebs also argued the district court improperly granted summary judgment dismissing their claims against JB's Welding for concerted action and a joint venture. B&B Hot Oil leased one-half of a building owned by Forster/Krebs and used the leased property to store two hot oil trucks. An explosion in January 2010, destroyed the building and its contents and damaged surrounding property. The alleged cause of the explosion was a propane leak from one of the hot oil trucks, which has been referred to by the parties as a "knock off" truck built through "reverse engineering" by B&B Hot Oil with assistance from JB's Welding. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded a stipulation to dismiss Forster/Krebs' other remaining claims against JB's Welding without prejudice did not make the judgment final for purposes of appellate jurisdiction, the Court dismissed the appeal. View "James Vault & Precast Co. v. B&B Hot Oil Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Victaulic, a manufacturer, sued its insurers in connection with product liability claims that resulted in litigation. Following summary adjudication for Victaulic (duty to defend) and a declaratory ruling (duty to indemnify), the case proceeded to a jury trial on Victaulic’s bad faith claim. Numerous witnesses testified and over 100 exhibits were introduced. Reversing an in limine ruling, the court allowed Victaulic to interrogate Finberg, the examiner on most of the claims, who had verified the insurers’ responses to Victaulic’s requests for admissions (RFAs). The court concluded Finberg “made an admission that she perjured herself” and stopped Finberg’s testimony. When she resumed the stand the next day, represented by personal counsel, the court ruled that she could, on a blanket basis, claim the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination— in front of jury. Victaulic’s closing arguments focused on “Finberg,” “RFAs,” “lies,” and “penalty of perjury.” The jury awarded damages for breach of contract totaling $1,073,868.80, with attorney fee damages for bad faith of $8,259,712.31. The punitive damages trial resulted in an award of $46 million. The court of appeal reversed, finding prejudicial errors, beginning with the court’s allowance of the use of the RFA responses, compounded by the court’s intensive questioning of Finberg, and by several errors in handling Finberg’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment. View "Victaulic Co. v. American Home Assurance Co." on Justia Law