Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Jeremy Woods was injured in a car accident in 2017 and received medical care from Spine Specialists of Michigan PC. Woods assigned his right to payment of personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits to Spine Specialists, but MemberSelect Insurance Company refused to pay. Spine Specialists sued MemberSelect for payment. MemberSelect argued that the claims were barred by the one-year-back rule, which requires claims to be filed within one year of the medical services being rendered. The trial court granted MemberSelect's motion for summary disposition for services rendered before June 11, 2019, but denied it for services rendered between June 11, 2019, and August 12, 2020.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, reasoning that the tolling provision added to the one-year-back rule in 2019 did not apply to claims that accrued before the amendment's effective date. The court held that PIP benefits accrue when the medical services are rendered, not when payment is denied.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the tolling provision added to MCL 500.3145 in 2019 does not apply retroactively to causes of action that began to accrue before the amendment became effective on June 11, 2019. The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, concluding that the claims for services rendered between June 11, 2019, and August 12, 2020, were barred by the one-year-back rule. The court emphasized that the Legislature did not indicate an intent for the tolling provision to apply retroactively and that applying it retroactively would impose new obligations on insurers for past transactions. View "Spine Specialists Of Michigan PC v. Memberselect Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Brian Prahl filed a petition to compel arbitration of an uninsured motorist claim, alleging he was involved in a multiple vehicle accident in March 2016 while insured by Allstate Northbrook Indemnity Company. The insurance proceeds from the at-fault drivers were insufficient to cover his damages, leading him to seek arbitration for his underinsured motorist claim. Allstate agreed to arbitration in May 2018, but the arbitration was delayed and not concluded within the five-year deadline set by Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (i). Prahl argued that Judicial Council Emergency Rule 10 extended this deadline by six months due to the COVID-19 pandemic.The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied Prahl's petition, concluding that the five-year deadline had expired and that Emergency Rule 10 did not apply to extend the deadline for arbitration. Prahl also contended that the court should have granted his petition because Allstate's opposition was not filed timely. However, the court found good cause to consider the late opposition, noting that Prahl had filed a reply on the merits.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Emergency Rule 10, which extends the time to bring a civil action to trial by six months, did not apply to arbitration proceedings. The court reasoned that the term "civil action" refers to court actions and does not include arbitration, which is an alternative to a civil action. Consequently, Prahl's failure to conclude the arbitration within the statutory five-year period resulted in the loss of his right to compel arbitration. The appellate court also upheld the lower court's decision to consider Allstate's late opposition, finding no undue prejudice to Prahl. View "Prahl v. Allstate Northbrook Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

In August 2022, Rebecca Henderson and her minor son were involved in an automobile collision in Alabama. Henderson, a Kentucky resident, had an insurance policy from Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (Kentucky Farm Bureau) that provided uninsured-motorist (UM) benefits. In July 2024, Henderson filed a complaint in the Baldwin Circuit Court, asserting a negligence/wantonness claim against the other driver, Trey Allan Knapp, and a claim for damages by contract against Kentucky Farm Bureau, alleging entitlement to UM benefits as Knapp had no liability insurance.Kentucky Farm Bureau moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that the Baldwin Circuit Court lacked personal jurisdiction over it, as it only does business in Kentucky and has no contacts with Alabama. The motion was supported by an affidavit from a Kentucky Farm Bureau employee. Henderson opposed the motion, arguing that the insurance policy provided nationwide coverage, thus establishing sufficient contacts with Alabama. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss without explanation, leading Kentucky Farm Bureau to petition the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and concluded that Kentucky Farm Bureau did not have sufficient contacts with Alabama to establish personal jurisdiction. The court noted that the insurance policy was issued and delivered in Kentucky, and Kentucky Farm Bureau does not conduct business in Alabama. The court distinguished between providing liability coverage nationwide and being subject to contract claims in any state. Consequently, the court granted the petition and issued a writ of mandamus directing the Baldwin Circuit Court to dismiss Henderson's claim against Kentucky Farm Bureau for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "In re: Henderson v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Suzanne Wolf suffered multiple pelvic fractures in a car accident caused by an underinsured motorist. After receiving $100,000 from the at-fault driver’s insurance, she filed claims for underinsured motorist benefits with her personal automobile insurer and her employer’s general commercial liability insurer, Riverport Insurance Company. Wolf settled with her personal insurer for $150,000 and eventually settled with Riverport after four years of negotiations and arbitration, which awarded her $905,000. Riverport paid the award, less the amounts received from the other insurers.Wolf filed a lawsuit against Riverport in the Circuit Court of Cook County, alleging unreasonable delay in payment under section 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code. Riverport removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, invoking diversity jurisdiction. The district court granted Riverport’s motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, finding that Wolf lacked a viable legal theory to support her claim. The court also denied Wolf’s discovery request.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the insurance policy did not impose a duty on Riverport to investigate and settle Wolf’s claim in good faith. The court found that the policy’s provision granting Riverport discretion to investigate and settle claims applied only to defending insureds against third-party claims, not to first-party claims by insureds against Riverport. Consequently, Wolf’s breach-of-contract theory failed, and the district court’s judgment was affirmed. The appellate court also upheld the district court’s discovery decision, as Wolf could not show actual and substantial prejudice from the denial of additional discovery. View "Wolf v. Riverport Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Alexandria Kazarian, filed a negligence lawsuit against New London County Mutual Insurance Company after a trip-and-fall accident near property owned by the defendant’s insured, Irene Swiney. Kazarian alleged that Swiney allowed a vehicle to be parked in a manner that obstructed the sidewalk, causing her to walk into the street and trip over an unsecured gas cap, resulting in injury. After Swiney passed away, New London was substituted as the defendant.In the Superior Court, a jury trial resulted in a verdict in favor of New London. Kazarian’s motion for a new trial was denied. She argued that Swiney was negligent for allowing the vehicle to obstruct the sidewalk and that a master-servant relationship existed between Swiney and the vehicle owner, making Swiney liable. The trial justice denied the motion, stating it was within the jury’s purview to evaluate the evidence and witness credibility.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. Kazarian contended that the trial justice erred in denying her motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial. She also argued that the trial justice’s use of the word “redacted” in response to a jury question was prejudicial. The Supreme Court found that reasonable minds could differ on whether the vehicle obstructed the sidewalk and whether it was a reasonable and necessary use of the sidewalk. The Court also noted that Kazarian failed to object contemporaneously to the alleged golden rule violation and the grass-growth argument during the trial, thus waiving those issues.The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment, concluding that the trial justice conducted an appropriate analysis and did not err in his decisions. The case was remanded to the Superior Court. View "Kazarian v. New London County Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Kattie Boline sustained injuries from a car accident and sued JKC Trucking and driver Jerzy Syrzyna for negligence. During her jury trial, Boline violated a stipulated order in limine by mentioning insurance, which led the district court to declare a mistrial. The court found her violation intentional and sanctioned her by ordering her to pay $62,074.95 in defense attorneys’ fees and costs. The court also ruled that no new jury trial would be held until the sanction was paid. When Boline failed to pay, the district court dismissed her case with prejudice and entered judgment against her for the sanction amount.The district court of Sweetwater County initially handled the case, where Boline filed her complaint in 2018. The case experienced several delays before being set for trial in August 2022. During the trial, Boline’s mention of insurance, despite a pretrial order prohibiting such testimony, led to the mistrial. The district court then sanctioned her and conditioned a new trial on the payment of the sanction. Boline’s inability to pay the sanction led to the dismissal of her case with prejudice.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning Boline and dismissing her case with prejudice. The court found that the district court properly considered Boline’s mental health condition, financial situation, and the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees and costs. The Supreme Court also held that the district court did not violate Boline’s right to open access to the courts under the Wyoming Constitution, as the sanction and subsequent dismissal were appropriate responses to her intentional violation of the court’s order. View "Boline v. JKC Trucking" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, New England Property Services Group, LLC, filed a claim under a homeowners’ insurance policy for wind damage to a property in Greenville, Rhode Island. The insurance company, Vermont Mutual Insurance Company, provided an estimate for the loss, which the plaintiff disputed. The plaintiff invoked the appraisal process outlined in the insurance agreement. Each party appointed an appraiser, but they could not agree on an umpire, so the Superior Court appointed one. The appraisal concluded with an award signed by the plaintiff’s appraiser and the umpire, but not the defendant’s appraiser.The plaintiff filed a petition in the Superior Court to confirm the appraisal award under Rhode Island’s Arbitration Act. The defendant filed a cross-petition to vacate the award, arguing that the plaintiff’s appraiser was ineligible due to a financial interest in the award. The Superior Court granted the defendant’s cross-petition to vacate the award and denied the plaintiff’s petition to confirm it. The plaintiff did not appeal this order but instead filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the appraisal process was not arbitration because the insurance contract did not require appraisers to be disinterested. The Superior Court denied this motion.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s order. The Court held that the appraisal process was akin to arbitration, despite the absence of the word “disinterested” in the insurance contract. The Court noted that the plaintiff had initially sought to confirm the award under the Arbitration Act and only challenged the nature of the proceedings after the award was vacated. The Court concluded that the Superior Court had subject-matter jurisdiction and that the appraisal clause in the insurance policy constituted arbitration under the Arbitration Act. View "New England Property Services Group, LLC v. Vermont Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Farmers Direct Property and Casualty Insurance Company filed a declaratory judgment action against Dennis Perez, seeking a declaration that it no longer had a duty to defend or indemnify Perez under an auto insurance policy in connection with an automobile accident involving Victor Montez. Perez had been uncooperative in his defense in the underlying state court tort action filed by the Montezes, leading Farmers Direct to claim that Perez breached the policy's cooperation clause. The Montezes intervened and moved to set aside the default judgment entered against Perez, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the amount in controversy did not meet the statutory requirement.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted the Montezes' motion, vacating the default judgment on the grounds that the amount in controversy was limited to the policy's $25,000 face amount, which did not satisfy the jurisdictional threshold of over $75,000. Farmers Direct appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's order. The appellate court held that the district court erred in determining that the value of the declaratory judgment action was limited to the policy's $25,000 maximum liability. The Ninth Circuit found that there was at least an arguable basis that the amount in controversy was satisfied by considering either the potential excess liability of the underlying tort claim or Farmers Direct's anticipated future defense fees and costs, or both. The appellate court concluded that the judgment was not void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "FARMERS DIRECT PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY V. MONTEZ" on Justia Law

Kaufman Lynn Construction was hired to build a corporate campus for JM Family Enterprises in South Florida. Kaufman obtained a commercial general liability policy from Liberty Surplus Insurance to cover itself and its subcontractors. After completing several buildings, Tropical Storm Eta caused significant water damage to the completed structures. Kaufman sought indemnification from Liberty, which denied the claim based on the policy's Course of Construction Exclusion (COCE), stating that coverage did not apply until the entire project was completed. Kaufman disputed this and filed a lawsuit against its subcontractors and initiated a claims process with Liberty.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted Liberty's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the COCE excluded coverage for the water damage because the entire project was not completed. The court also dismissed Kaufman's counterclaim for declaratory relief as duplicative and ruled that Kaufman's breach of contract counterclaim was moot. Additionally, the court dismissed Kaufman's reformation counterclaim for lack of standing, reasoning that Kaufman had not demonstrated a cognizable injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and determined that Kaufman had Article III standing to seek reformation of the policy, as it suffered a cognizable injury by receiving a policy different from what was bargained for. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that the COCE precluded coverage for the water damage, as the entire project was not completed. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of Liberty's motion for attorney's fees, as Liberty's settlement proposal did not comply with the requirements of Florida's offer of judgment statute and Rule 1.442(c)(2)(B). The case was remanded for further proceedings on the reformation counterclaim. View "Liberty Surplus Insurance Corp. v. Kaufman Lynn Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

50 Exchange Terrace LLC sought to collect under a property insurance policy with Mount Vernon Specialty Insurance Company for damage to its property in Rhode Island. The insurance policy required an appraisal if the parties disagreed on the amount of loss. After frozen pipes caused water damage, Mount Vernon paid its estimated value but demanded an appraisal. 50 Exchange filed a lawsuit in California state court, alleging wrongful withholding of compensation by Mount Vernon while awaiting the appraisal outcome.The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, where Mount Vernon moved to dismiss based on forum non conveniens. The district court requested supplemental briefing on ripeness and Article III standing and subsequently dismissed the action for lack of both. 50 Exchange appealed the dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the injuries asserted by 50 Exchange were not actual or imminent because the extent of any loss could not be determined until the appraisal process was completed. The court concluded that any alleged injury before the appraisal was too speculative to create an actionable claim, thus failing to meet the requirements for ripeness and Article III standing. The court did not address the parties' arguments under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. View "50 EXCHANGE TERRACE LLC V. MOUNT VERNON SPECIALTY INSURANCE CO." on Justia Law