Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In consolidated appeals, plaintiffs Robert Nelson and Kelli Tyrrell (Tyrrell), as Special Administrator of the Estate of Brent Tyrrell, pled violations of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) for injuries allegedly sustained while Nelson and Brent were employed by BNSF Railway Company in states other than Montana. BNSF moved to dismiss both plaintiffs’ claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. The motion in Nelson's case was granted; the motion in Tyrrell's case was denied. The issue on appeal was whether Montana courts had personal jurisdiction over BNSF under FELA and Montana law. After review, the Montana Supreme Court concluded that Montana courts had personal jurisdiction over BNSF under FELA and Montana Law. The order denying BNSF's motion to dismiss Tyrrell's case was affirmed, and the motion in Nelson's case was reversed. View "Tyrrell v. BNSF" on Justia Law

J.B. Hunt’s tractor-trailer traveling on I-10 in Waller County struck a disabled vehicle that had entered the tractor-trailer’s lane. The vehicle’s occupants were injured; one ultimately died. J.B. Hunt sued the occupants in Waller County to recover property-damage costs. Days later, the occupants sued J.B. Hunt in Dallas County to recover personal-injury damages. The occupants of the car claimed, and the Dallas County court agreed, that exceptions to the first-filed rule applied, so the Dallas County court had dominant jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Texas agreed with J.B. Hunt that the Waller County court has dominant jurisdiction. The occupants do not dispute whether their claims in the Dallas County suit were the subject of a pending action at the time of the Waller County petition, nor that the subject matter of the claims in the two suits otherwise satisfies the compulsory-counterclaim rule. Even if J.B. Hunt’s conduct was inequitable, the occupants failed to allege that the conduct caused their delay, if any, in filing suit. It would be odd and premature to require a potential litigant sit on his hands because his claim, viable though it may be, could be countered by an equally viable claim. View "In re J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

CVS Pharmacy, L.L.C. ("CVS"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Montgomery Circuit Court to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff Mildred Scott, as untimely filed. Scott filed a complaint asserting negligence and wantonness claims against CVS after she slipped and fell in a CVS store while shopping. Scott did not pay a filing fee when she filed the complaint; she filed an "Affidavit of Substantial Hardship," indicating that she was unable to pay the filing fee. The circuit court entered an order purporting to declare Scott indigent and to waive the filing fee. On that same day, the summons against CVS was issued, and CVS was served with the summons and complaint. A few days after the complaint was served, the circuit court entered an order reversing its earlier order, and denying Scott's affidavit of substantial hardship. Several days after this, Scott paid the filing fee. CVS moved to dismiss Scott's complaint on the ground that the applicable two-year statutory limitations period had expired without the payment of the filing fee or the approval of Scott's affidavit of substantial hardship. The circuit court denied CVS's motion to dismiss. Finding that the circuit court erred in this dismissal, the Supreme Court granted CVS' writ application. View "Ex parte CVS Pharmacy, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Wayne Farms, LLC, petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus ordering the Bullock Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Wayne Farms' motion for a change of venue and to enter an order transferring the underlying action to the Pike Circuit Court. Ben and Imogene Hicks owned and operated a chicken farm in Pike County. In April 2013, Imogene entered into an agreement in which Wayne Farms agreed to deliver flocks of broiler chicks to the Hickses' farm. Ronnie King, an employee of Wayne Farms, drove a tractor-trailer owned by Wayne Farms to the Hickses' farm to pick up a load of chickens. After the chickens were loaded, King began to drive the tractor-trailer away. Before King left the Hickses' property, the loaded trailer detached from the tractor and overturned, pinning Ben to the ground and causing him to be injured. Ben and Imogene sued Wayne Farms and King in Bullock County, alleging claims of negligence and wantonness and seeking damages for Ben's injuries. Wayne Farms moved the Bullock Circuit Court to transfer the action to the Pike Circuit Court, acknowledging that venue was proper in Bullock County but that pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens the action should have been transferred to Pike County. The Alabama Supreme Court granted the writ, concluding Wayne Farms demonstrated a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus directing the Bullock Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Wayne Farms' motion for a change of venue and to enter an order transferring the underlying action to Pike County. View "Ex parte Wayne Farms, LLC." on Justia Law

Appellant Ihor Malanchuk, a carpenter, fell from scaffolding at a residence where he was working and suffered injury. Initially, he brought a civil action against the owner of the premises, Ilya Sivchuk. Later, Appellant initiated a separate proceeding against another worker, Appellee Alex Tsimura. Sivchuk filed a motion requesting that the two actions be consolidated pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 213(a). After the completion of discovery, Appellee and Sivchuk pursued summary judgment. The common pleas court issued a single order granting Appellee’s motion in its entirety but awarding Sivchuk only partial relief. Accordingly, as against Sivchuk, the litigation ripened toward trial. Appellant filed a notice of appeal, proceeding under the Tsimura case caption, to challenge the summary relief Appellee had obtained. In an opinion per Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925, the common pleas court expressed its belief that this appeal was premature. The question presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether an order awarding summary judgment in one of two civil cases consolidated for purposes of discovery and trial was appealable immediately as of right. The Court "realize[d] that consolidation questions have generated a great deal of controversy at both the federal and state levels, as reflected in a persistent split of authority regarding whether, or to what extent, consolidation effects a merger of claims for purposes of immediate appealability and otherwise. [. . .] complete consolidation (or merger or fusion of actions) does not occur absent a complete identity of parties and claims; separate actions lacking such overlap retain their separate identities and require distinct judgments; these principles pertain equally to appealability determinations; and they continue to operate even in the face of an order purporting to consolidate the actions 'for all purposes.'" In this case, complete consolidation did not occur, the common pleas court’s order awarding summary judgment in favor of Appellee was a final one as to the Tsimura case. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Malanchuk. v. Sivchuk" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was the validity of a workers’ compensation judge’s decision to reject opinion testimony from an independent medical witness presented by an employer and insurer, in the absence of any contrary evidence adduced by the claimant. In 2005, the appellant, Jeffrey Rhodes (“Claimant”) suffered injuries in a car accident, while in the course of his employment with the employer-appellee, IA Construction Corporation. In 2007, a workers’ compensation judge granted Rhodes' petition and awarded total disability benefits. Several years later, the employer filed a specialized notice under governing administrative regulations designed to initiate the impairment rating process. The Department of Labor and Industry’s Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (the “Bureau”), in turn, designated M. Bud Lateef, M.D., to conduct an IRE. Subsequently, based on the results of the ensuing examination, and given that the IRE had been requested outside the period associated with a rating accorded automatic effect, Employer filed a petition seeking to modify the workers’ compensation benefits payable to Claimant. The WCJ denied Employer’s modification petition, rejecting Dr. Lateef’s impairment rating opinion. In her estimation, Dr. Lateef’s assessment of cognition was an unduly limited one, since he performed only a cursory examination and otherwise relied upon only a limited range of medical records. In the circumstances, and particularly since Dr. Lateef specialized in physical medicine and pain management, not neurology, the WCJ indicated that she was unpersuaded by his opinion. On Employer’s appeal, the WCAB affirmed in a divided opinion. On further appeal, the Commonwealth Court reversed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed this appeal to address the issue, as framed by Claimant, of “[w]hether the Commonwealth Court overstepped its appellate function in making credibility judgments which is the sole function of the Workers’ Compensation Judge.” The Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth Court erred in its conclusions that the WCJ lacked authority to reject the uncontradicted testimony of the IRE physician. The case was reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the WCJ's adjudication, as affimed by the WCAB. View "IA Construction v. WCAB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Leonard Lopez appealed after a bench trial on his medical negligence claims. Lopez underwent lower back surgery at the Veterans Administration Medical Center of Denver, Colorado (VA Hospital), in order to alleviate longstanding sciatic pain. Immediately following surgery, however, Lopez began experiencing excruciating pain in his left foot. Lopez has since been diagnosed with neuropathic pain syndrome. Lopez filed suit against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act alleging, in pertinent part, that: (1) Dr. Samuel Waller was negligent in performing the surgery; and (2) that the hospital was negligent in credentialing and privileging Dr. Glenn Kindt, the supervising physician involved in the surgery. At the conclusion of the trial the district court found in favor of the government on both claims. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the United States on Lopez’s claim of medical negligence involving Waller, but reversed the district court’s judgment on the negligent credentialing and privileging claim. The case was remanded with directions to dismiss that claim for lack of jurisdiction. View "Lopez v. United States" on Justia Law

A.H. and Renna Yi, both minors, were passengers on a school bus that collided with a pickup truck, causing them serious injuries. A.H. and Yi's parents, on behalf of the minors, filed suit in Missouri state court alleging, among other things, that the brakes were defective. Midwest Bus, the retail seller of the bus, originally was a party to each action, but was omitted from subsequent amended complaints. The jury found in favor of all remaining defendants and the state trial court entered judgment. The minors also each filed suit against Midwest Bus in federal court in diversity actions under Missouri law. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal on the alternative ground that their claims are barred by collateral estoppel, as oppose to res judicata, because the jury unambiguously decided that their injuries were not caused by improper installation of automatic slack adjusters (ASAs) on the bus, and that the ASAs were not the cause or a contributing cause of the crash. View "A. H. v. Midwest Bus Sales, Inc." on Justia Law

This was an interlocutory appeal involving a premises-liability case. Cynthia Adams, one of the defendants in the case, filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. Plaintiff Anthony Hughes brought a negligence claim against multiple parties: BKB, LLC d/b/a the Electric Cowboy; Jonathan Self, manager of the Electric Cowboy; and Adams, the owner of the property on which Electric Cowboy operates. Hughes alleged that he was “attacked and assaulted by a third party assailant” at the Electric Cowboy in 2011. Hughes claimed that all the defendants “had either actual or constructive knowledge of the third party’s violent nature or actual or constructive knowledge that an atmosphere of violence existed on the premises of the Electric Cowboy.” Adams was an absentee landlord, who did not physically occupy, possess, or exercise control over the Electric Cowboy and/or the leased premises prior to or at the time of the incident in question; Adams did not frequent or visit the Electric Cowboy; Adams had no control or involvement in the operations or management of the Electric Cowboy; she was never employed by the Electric Cowboy; she did not supervise the Electric Cowboy, and she did not have the right to supervise the Electric Cowboy. Adams petitioned the Supreme Court for interlocutory appeal when her motion for summary judgment was denied. A panel of the Supreme Court issued an order granting the petition and staying the trial court proceedings. Finding that Adams was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, the Court reversed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment and rendered judgment in favor of Adams. View "Adams v. Hughes" on Justia Law

In a certified appeal, the issue this case presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court's consideration was whether the doctrine of fraudulent concealment applied to actions under the Wrongful Death Act (WDA), an issue of first impression in New Mexico. Alice Brice (Decedent) died in an automobile accident in 2006, when her 2002 Toyota Camry suddenly accelerated into a highway intersection, collided with a tractor-trailer, and burst into flames. The Estate of Alice C. Brice (Plaintiff) filed a wrongful death lawsuit in 2010, asserting products liability and various other claims against the car manufacturer, the dealer, and others (Defendants). Because this wrongful death action was filed three years and eleven months from the date of Decedent’s death, Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants prevented Plaintiff from obtaining knowledge about the cause of action, that Defendants were aware of the sudden acceleration problem in its vehicles for most of the decade preceding 2010 and well before Decedent’s 2006 accident, and that Defendants fraudulently concealed these problems until February 2010 when the sudden acceleration problems drew public attention and led to congressional hearings. Plaintiff contended that it had no way to discover its wrongful death cause of action before February 2010. Plaintiff asserted therefore that after discovering its cause of action, it promptly filed its wrongful death suit on August 31, 2010. The district court granted Defendants' motion. After review, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment could apply to toll the statutory limitations period for a wrongful death claim if a defendant has fraudulently concealed a cause of action, thereby preventing that defendant from claiming the statute of limitations as a defense until the plaintiff learned or, through reasonable diligence, could have learned of the cause of action. Accordingly the Court reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Estate of Brice v. Toyota Motor Corp." on Justia Law