Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission was created, an Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board decision could be appealed to the superior court, and a party dissatisfied with the superior court’s final resolution of the case then could appeal to the Supreme Court. Construing the appellate rules, the Supreme Court decided in "Borough of Juneau v. Thibodeau," "a decision of a superior court, acting as an intermediate appellate court, which reverses . . . the decision of an administrative agency and remands for further proceedings, is a non-final order of the superior court." Joseph Huit worked for Ashwater Burns, Inc. in 2010. Early in November he was working on a remodel project, and as part of the job he removed a water-damaged vanity from a bathroom. As he was carrying the vanity he scratched his abdomen on a protruding drywall screw; he showed the scratch to some people at the job site, including his brother Steven, but did not file a report of injury. According to Huit at some point later in November the scratch appeared to heal. In early December, Huit felt ill at work, so he went to the emergency room. He would later be diagnosed with “spontaneous endocarditis” with metastatic lesions growing on his spleen, kidneys, brain and heart. By January 2011 Huit had severe aortic regurgitation, and in February he underwent aortic valve replacement surgery. Huit first thought about the possibility that the infection was work related while he was hospitalized; he explained that after the doctors told him he had an infection, he remembered the scratch and notified his employer. Ashwater Burns filed a report of injury on December 21 and later controverted benefits, relying on a cardiologist’s opinion formed after reviewing Huit’s medical records. This appeal presented the Supreme Court's first opportunity to consider whether "Thibodeau," should apply to Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission decisions. After review, the Court concluded that it should. This appeal also presented a first opportunity to consider, at least in part, the legislature’s 2005 amendments to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act’s presumption analysis. The Court reversed the Commission’s application of that analysis in this case and modified its earlier precedent. View "Huit v. Ashwater Burns, Inc." on Justia Law

The Estate of Pratikshya Gurung filed a negligence action against Norton Hospital after Gurung was born with brain damage and quadriplegia. On appeal, Norton challenged the Court of Appeals' dismissal as moot of a writ action filed by Norton over a discovery dispute with the Estate. The court concluded that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion because its decision was not based on sound legal principles where Norton's writ action is not moot because relief can still be afforded. The court stated that it is true that the documents Norton alleges are privileged have now been provided to the Estate, but options remain. Accordingly, the court remanded for consideration of Norton's asserted privilege in light of the court's decision in Tibbs v. Bunnell. View "Norton Hosp. v. Hon. Barry L. Willett" on Justia Law

The question in this case was whether an injured worker had to provide actual notice of secondary employment in connection with a workers' compensation claims process or whether the employer’s preexisting knowledge of that employment could be imputed to the insurer to satisfy the notice requirement of ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A). The Oregon Supreme Court held that the correct interpretation of ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A) required a claimant to prove that the insurer received actual notice of the claimant’s secondary employment within 30 days of the insurer’s receipt of the initial claim. View "DCBS v. Muliro" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a legal malpractice and negligent misrepresentation case where the trial court judgment granted a directed a verdict in favor of defendant Jack Platten. In an earlier lawsuit, defendant had represented plaintiffs the Harknesses against Kantor, a loan officer, and her successive employers, Sunset Mortgage (Sunset) and Directors Mortgage, Inc. (Directors), as the result of a fraudulent investment and loan scheme directed at plaintiffs by Kantor. That case did not settle to plaintiffs’ satisfaction, and plaintiffs sought to recover their remaining loss from defendant. In this case, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for a directed verdict based on the conclusion that plaintiffs’ liability theories of apparent authority and respondeat superior asserted against Sunset and Directors were not supported by sufficient evidence in the record and could not have led to a result more favorable than the settlement. Plaintiffs appealed the trial court ruling, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals interpreted the prevailing caselaw incorrectly, and that a reasonable factfinder could have inferred from the evidence presented that defendants authorized the investment scheme. The court reversed the directed verdict and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Harkness v. Platten" on Justia Law

The issue this medical malpractice action presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on orders excluding testimony from plaintiffs' two expert witnesses and a summary judgment granted to defendants based upon the excluded testimony. Mrs. Nelson went to the Emergency Department of St. Mary's Regional Medical Center seeking medical assistance on the evening of July 21, 2006. The emergency room physician, Dr. Vaughan, ordered diagnostic tests, diagnosed an incarcerated hernia with possible bowel obstruction, and attempted to reduce the hernia. Dr. Vaughan telephoned Dr. Shepherd, Mrs. Nelson's internist and primary care provider. Dr. Shepherd instructed Dr. Vaughan to telephone Dr. Shreck, a surgeon. Dr. Shreck came to the hospital, reduced Mrs. Nelson's hernia, and she was admitted to the hospital. The medical record indicated Dr. Shreck reduced Mrs. Nelson's incarcerated hernia by manipulation. Mrs. Nelson became septic, went into septic shock during the morning of July 22nd, and she had a cardiac arrest while being prepared for surgery to address a perforated or dead bowel. She was resuscitated. After the surgery, Mrs. Nelson was given medicines to raise and control her blood pressure. Dr. Shepherd then switched Mrs. Nelson's medication to vasopressin. At approximately 11:00 p.m., Mrs. Nelson's blood pressure started to fall, her pulse became unstable and she died. A medical malpractice action was brought against Mrs. Nelson's medical providers for her last illness. Dr. Shepherd and Enid Medical Associates moved to exclude the proposed testimony of plaintiffs' two expert witnesses. They argued each witness had not provided legally proper testimony on the issue of the cause of Mrs. Nelson's demise because the testimony did not satisfy the requirements of "Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.," (509 U.S. 579 (1993)). The two defendants also sought summary judgment because the causation element of the malpractice claim action was missing from plaintiffs' claim. After review, the Supreme Court held that the opinions of the two witnesses on the issue of causation satisfied the requirements of 12 O.S. 2702, and reversed the summary judgment granted by the District Court. View "Nelson v. Enid Medical Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

A special complement of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania assembled to address multiple issues raised in this appeal. The underlying civil action was a defamation case arising out of a newspaper column written by defendant-appellee Karen Heller, and published in the Philadelphia Inquirer in November 2009. The column contained negative commentary about purported actions of plaintiff-appellant John Dougherty, who was the Business Manager of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 98 and a self-described public figure and a participant in numerous civic and philanthropic activities. When confronted with information demonstrating that the commentary concerning Appellant’s conduct was false, Appellee conceded the unfoundedness and publicly apologized. The misinformation, however, appeared on Appellee’s Facebook page for an indeterminate period of time after the apology and apparently remained available through third-party sources until several years later. Appellant’s attorneys expressed concern that video footage resulting from the deposition should not be displayed for any purpose beyond the litigation. Appellee’s attorney, for her part, repeatedly indicated that she intended to use the videotape solely for purposes of the litigation, and that she would abide by all of her obligations under the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Professional Conduct. She declined, however, to make a specific commitment that was asked of her by appellant's counsel. Appellee’s attorney then suggested an arrangement whereby the videotape deposition would proceed as planned, and she would agree not to give the tape to anyone for ten days, during which time Appellant could seek a protective order or other relief from the court. Appellant’s lawyers declined this proposal. The court of common pleas entered an order granting Appellee’s motion to compel and denying Appellant’s motion for protective relief. The court directed Appellant to appear for a videotape deposition within fifteen days. Although the court believed that the potential abuse of a videotape deposition was separable from the merits, it did not accept that the issue was so important as to justify as-of-right interlocutory appellate review. A divided en banc Superior Court affirmed. The issues raised by this appeal for the Supreme Court's review centered on a threshold objection to temporary judicial assignments to the Supreme Court and a challenge to a supplanted order that previously had dismissed the appeal. In addition, a jurisdictional question was raised concerning whether a common pleas court’s denial of a motion for a protective order of the videotaped deposition constituted a collateral order subject to as-of-right interlocutory appellate review. Finally, on the merits, the appeal of the common pleas court’s refusal to issue a protective order proscribing such dissemination. The application for relief challenging temporary judicial assignments made to the Supreme Court for purposes of resolving this appeal was denied. The Superior Court's order was vacated, this appeal quashed as an unauthorized interlocutory one, and the matter was remanded to the common pleas court. View "Dougherty v. Heller" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a U.S. citizen working for Blue Offshore, allegedly sustained a knee injury while working on board a Luxembourg-flagged vessel that was located off the coast of Russia. Plaintiff filed suit against Blue Offshore and two other companies, Aker Solutions and FMC Technologies, alleging negligence. Plaintiff later amended his complaint and added more defendants, including FMC Kongsberg and FMC Eurasia. After completion of the jurisdictional discovery, the district court found that neither specific nor general personal jurisdiction existed over Aker Subsea or FMC Kongsberg. Therefore, the district court dismissed these parties from the suit. At issue in this appeal is whether the district court erred in dismissing Aker Subsea under Rule 12(b)(2). The court concluded that exercising general personal jurisdiction over Aker Subsea would be inappropriate where Aker Subsea’s limited contacts with the United States - eleven secondment agreements - are insufficient to satisfy due process concerns. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Patterson v. Aker Solutions Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Kelly Lucas applied for mandamus relief, requesting that the Alabama Supreme Court direct Shelby Circuit Court to vacate its December 7, 2015, order denying her motion for a summary judgment and to grant the motion. This application arose out of the court case surrounding two related automobile accidents in 2011: in the first, Megan Gragg failed to stop her vehicle and allowed the front bumper of her vehicle to collide with the rear bumper of Diana McKee's vehicle. Shortly thereafter, in the second accident, Lucas failed to stop her vehicle and allowed the front bumper of her vehicle to collide with the rear bumper of Gragg's vehicle, which then collided with the rear bumper of McKee's vehicle a second time. All three drivers spoke with the law enforcement officer who responded after the accidents, and the officer later completed two accident reports. McKee sued Gragg, alleging negligence and wantonness in connection with the accidents. Lucas filed an answer to the amended complaint. She denied McKee's allegations and also asserted affirmative defenses, including the expiration of the statute of limitations. After review of the trial court record, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that Lucas met her burden for mandamus relief, and that the Circuit Court erred in denying her motion for summary judgment. The Court therefore granted Lucas' application and issued the writ. The Circuit Court was directed to vacate its order and enter summary judgment in Lucas' favor. View "Ex parte Kelly Martin Lucas." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was born prematurely by emergency cesarean section at New York City Health and Hospitals Corp. (HHC) in June 2005. He was transferred to the neonatal intensive care unit and discharged in stable condition in August 2005. In January 2007, more than 90 days after the claim arose, without first obtaining leave of court as required by General Municipal Law 50-e (5), plaintiff served a notice of claim against HHC alleging negligence and malpractice arising out of failure to properly treat and manage his mother's prenatal care and failure to obtain informed consent with regard to plaintiff's care. The notice claimed that plaintiff sustained brain damage, cognitive defects, developmental, speech and psychomotor delays, fetal and respiratory distress and seizure disorder. Plaintiff filed suit in August 2008, but waited until December 2010, to seek permission to serve late notice of claim. The Appellate Division affirmed dismissal, finding unreasonable an excuse that counsel waited because he needed to receive medical records from HHC. The court held that plaintiff failed to establish "that the medical records put HHC on notice that the alleged malpractice would subsequently give rise to brain damage as a result of birth trauma and hypoxia," The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. Contrary to plaintiff's argument, the medical records must do more than "suggest" that an injury occurred as a result of malpractice in order for the medical provider to have actual knowledge of essential facts. View "Wally G. v NY City Health & Hosps. Corp." on Justia Law

Tomeka Handy filed a complaint alleging medical negligence against Madison County Nursing Home and Madison County. Handy filed her complaint for wrongful death on October 4, 2012, individually and in her capacity as the administratrix of the estate of her mother, Willie Handy, who was a resident of the nursing home from August 25, 2008, through the date of her death on April 12, 2011. The suit was filed on behalf of all the decedent’s wrongful death beneficiaries. After the county was dismissed, the nursing home filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because Handy had not designated an expert witness. Before the summary judgment hearing, Handy filed designations of two expert witnesses. The Circuit Court of Madison County granted the motion for summary judgment because Handy had failed to produce sworn expert testimony in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Handy filed a motion for reconsideration along with expert witness affidavits, but the circuit court denied the motion for reconsideration. Handy appealed, arguing that the circuit court dismissed her case as a sanction for a discovery violation, and the harsh sanction of dismissal amounted to an abuse of discretion. Because the record established that Handy failed to meet her burden of production on summary judgment, and the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Handy’s motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court. View "Handy v. Madison County Nursing Home" on Justia Law