Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Darrell Jent suffered serious injuries while working on an oil rig. The rig’s owner, Precision Drilling Company, L.P., paid him a settlement, then made a claim on its insurance. The insurance company, Lexington Insurance Company, denied the claim. Precision sued, contending that Lexington should have reimbursed the money it paid Jent. Lexington issued two insurance policies covering Precision for accidents exactly like Jent's. However, Lexington argued that under Wyoming state law, the policies were a nullity, so any coverage here was more illusory than real and that Precision was solely responsible. "There can be no doubt that Wyoming law usually prohibits those engaged in the oil and gas industry from contractually shifting to others liability for their own negligence." The district court agreed with Lexington and granted its motion for summary judgment. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court misinterpreted the statute that was grounds for Lexington's motion. The case was then remanded for further proceedings. View "Lexington Insurance v. Precision Drilling" on Justia Law

Attorney Donald Gilbert represented the Utah Down Syndrome Association and several of its founders in litigation between the Association and the Utah Down Syndrome Foundation, Inc. Gilbert filed this petition for extraordinary relief challenging (1) a 2008 district court judgment ordering Gilbert to disgorge $30,000 taken from Foundation bank accounts to pay his attorney fees, (2) an injunction that originally barred Gilbert’s clients from paying him with Foundation funds, (3) an order denying Gilbert’s motion to vacate the 2008 judgment, and (4) an order denying Gilbert’s motion for relief from the 2008 judgment. The Supreme Court denied Gilbert’s petition for extraordinary relief, holding (1) Gilbert unreasonably delayed seeking extraordinary relief from the injunction, the disgorgement order, and the denial of his motion to vacate; and (2) Gilbert failed to pursue the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy of direct appeal from the denial of his motion for relief from judgment. View "Gilbert v. Third Dist. Court Judges" on Justia Law

In December 2007, a driver rear-ended Donald Etherton’s vehicle. He injured his back in the accident. Etherton filed a claim with his insurer, Owners Insurance Company (“Owners”), seeking uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage up to his policy limit. After months of back and forth, Owners offered to pay an amount significantly lower than the policy limit. Etherton sued, alleging claims for (1) breach of contract and (2) unreasonable delay or denial of a claim for benefits. A jury found in Etherton’s favor on both claims. The district court entered judgment for Etherton, awarding $2,250,000 in damages. Owners appealed, arguing the trial court erred: (1) by denying Owners' motion for a new trial based on the allegedly erroneous admission of expert testimony; (2) by denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law based on Owners' purported reasonableness; and (3) in granting Etherton's motion to amend the judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in all respects. View "Etherton v. Owners Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Carol and Eric English appealed the dismissal of the their medical negligence claims against James Taylor, D.O., and Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc., d/b/a Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center (collectively, the Respondents). Carol English sustained stroke injuries after undergoing a medical procedure performed by Respondents. The Englishes subsequently filed a complaint alleging the Respondents were negligent in performing the procedure, which they alleged caused Carol’s injuries. The district court dismissed the Englishes’ claims on timeliness grounds. Finding that the district court correctly determined that the Englishes' second amended complaint naming Respondents was barred by the applicable statute of limitations for medical malpractice suits, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "English v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a negligence suit in the Puerto Rico federal district court, naming as defendants the Municipality of Caguas, Consolidated Waste Service Corporation (ConWaste), and ConWaste’s insurance provider, stating that because he was domiciled in Texas and each of the defendants was domiciled in Puerto Rico, the district court had diversity jurisdiction over his state-law tort claims. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that Plaintiff was domiciled in Puerto Rico on the date his case was filed. The First Circuit reversed, holding that Texas was Plaintiff’s domicile at the date his lawsuit was filed. View "Aponte-Davila v. Municipality of Caguas" on Justia Law

The American husband and German wife have lived together in Germany since 2002. They sought damages for complications that arose when a surgical stapler manufactured in Mexico by an American corporation, Ethicon, allegedly malfunctioned during a 2012 surgery that husband underwent in Germany. An Ohio district court dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens in favor of litigating in Germany. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Where a district court has considered all relevant public- and private-interest factors, and has reasonably balanced those factors, its decision deserves substantial deference. Private-interest factors include the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process and the cost of obtaining witnesses; possibility of view of premises, id appropriate; and all other practical problems. Public-interest factors include administrative difficulties from court congestion; the local interest in the controversy’; the interest in having the trial in a forum that is at home with the law that governs the action; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty. The court here correctly concluded that Ethicon met its burden of showing that if the case remained in Ohio, the vexation it would endure and trouble to the court would be disproportionate to the plaintiffs’ minimal convenience. View "Hefferan v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of D.S., a minor student with intellectual disabilities, filed suit against the school district and others, in state court, seeking damages for premises liability and negligent supervision because D.S. was raped by another student in an unsupervised area of Southwest during the school day, and because D.S. was repeatedly bullied and sexually harassed by her classmates and peers. Defendants removed to federal court, claiming that plaintiff's causes of action arose under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., and then moved to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(1) and (6). The district court denied plaintiff's motion to remand and dismissed the suit for failure to exhaust IDEA administrative remedies. The court concluded that plaintiff’s theories of liability arise out of Missouri statutory and common law, and the disposition of claims for premises liability and negligent supervision is not dependent on resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Even if the relief plaintiff requested were available under both state law and the IDEA, the well-pled complaint rule protects plaintiff's right to choose a state law cause of action. The court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that non-IDEA claims that do not seek relief available under the IDEA are not subject to the exhaustion requirement, even if they allege injuries that could conceivably have been redressed by the IDEA. Finally, the court denied plaintiff's request for attorney fees because defendants had a reasonable basis for their removal request. The court reversed and remanded to state court. View "Moore v. Kansas City Public Sch." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was walking on a sidewalk in defendant city when she was injured after tripping on a 2.5-inch vertical discontinuity between adjacent sidewalk slabs. She sued defendant, alleging inter alia that the sidewalk’s hazardous condition had existed for more than 30 days before her fall. However, in her deposition, she stated that she did not know for how long the discontinuity had existed. The only relevant evidence she submitted was three photographs of the defect taken by plaintiff’s husband about 30 days after the accident. Defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (C)(8), and (C)(10). The trial court found plaintiff’s photographs insufficient to establish the defect’s origin and duration and granted summary disposition without specifying under which rule it had granted the motion. On appeal, the Court of Appeals noted that the trial court had reviewed material outside of the pleadings and therefore concluded that the trial court could not have granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8). The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court's resolution was whether for purposes of the “highway exception” to governmental immunity from tort claims, MCL 691.1402, plaintiff’s photographs of a sidewalk defect taken about 30 days after plaintiff’s accident were sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the defect existed at least 30 days before the accident. The Court concluded that such evidence alone was not probative of a sidewalk’s past condition and was thus insufficient, without more, to avoid summary judgment. Consequently the Court reversed the Court of Appeals judgment and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s action. View "Bernardoni v. City of Saginaw" on Justia Law

In March 2012, 91-year-old Bucilla Stephenson died at the end of a two-week stay at Doctors Hospital of Augusta, LLC (“Hospital”). In May 2013, Jacqueline Alicea, Bucilla's granddaughter, acting as the administratix of her grandmother’s estate, sued defendants the Hospital and Dr. Phillip Catalano. Alicea alleged among other things that they intubated her grandmother and put her on a mechanical ventilator, which prolonged her life when she was in a terminal condition and caused her unnecessary pain and suffering, contrary to her advance directive for health care and the specific directions of Alicea, her designated health care agent. The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing among other things that OCGA 31-32-10 (a) (2) and (3), a part of the Georgia Advance Directive for Health Care Act, gave them immunity from liability. The trial court rejected the immunity argument and denied summary judgment. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the portion of the order denying immunity. The Supreme Court then granted Defendants’ petition for certiorari to review that aspect of the Court of Appeals’ decision. After review, the Court concluded the appellate court skipped over one important point: "[t]he correct analysis makes it even clearer, however, that the Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment based on their claim of immunity under OCGA 31-32-10 (a) (2) and (3), and we therefore affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment as to that issue." View "Doctors Hospital of Augusta v. Alicea" on Justia Law

Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. was a textile manufacturer, and in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it produced dryer felts at a manufacturing facility in Waycross. Some of the pipes and boilers in that facility were insulated with material containing asbestos, and Scapa used yarn containing asbestos in some of its manufacturing processes. Between 1967 and 1973, Roy Knight worked on multiple occasions at the Waycross facility as an independent contractor. Almost forty years later, Knight was diagnosed with mesothelioma. After his mesothelioma was diagnosed, Knight and his wife sued Scapa, claiming that Scapa negligently exposed him to asbestos at the Waycross facility and caused his mesothelioma. The case was tried in front of a jury, which returned a verdict against Scapa and awarded more than $4 million in damages to the Knights. The trial court entered a judgment upon that verdict, and Scapa appealed. At trial, the Knights bore the burden to establish not only that one of their experts, Dr. Abraham, was qualified and that his testimony was reliable, but also that his testimony would be helpful to the jury. His ultimate opinion as to causation, however, was not limited to any meaningful estimate of exposure to asbestos at the Waycross facility (whether qualitative or quantitative), and it instead invited the jury to find that causation was established by any exposure at all. In that respect, the Supreme Court concluded the testimony did not “fit” the pertinent causation inquiry under Georgia law, and it should have been excluded by the trial court, acting as gatekeeper, because it could only serve to confuse the jury on the issue of causation. "And given that Dr. Abraham’s opinion 'went to the heart' of the dispute about the extent of exposure and causation, 'the erroneous admission of the opinion requires that we reverse the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the trial court’s judgment.'" View "Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Knight" on Justia Law